Freedom Books
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A Book of HopeReview Date: 2008-06-20
AmazingReview Date: 2008-06-15
I would highly recommend this book to everyone regardless of whether one thinks they have addiction issues or not. Everyone will benefit from reading this book.
a book for everyoneReview Date: 2008-05-15
Addiction - A Gift?!?Review Date: 2008-05-16
This book is a must read for all of us who find ourselves (or love another who is) "in bondage to something that initially promised to make everything better, until it made everything worse."
The best book ever written on addiction!!!Review Date: 2008-05-10
I read the book in a matter of days. I was unable to put it down! I am a graduate level counseling student, lead an addictions group, and I have been through my own recovery from numerous addicitons. Needless to say, my bookshelves are FULL of addiction books. This is BY FAR the best book I have ever read on the topic. It reaches the heart in a different way and puts a whole different slant on the struggle.
THIS BOOK IS HIGHLY RECOMMENDED FOR ANYONE INTERESTED IN ADDICTION PROCESSES, HELPING SOMEONE THROUGH AN ADDICTION, TREATING ADDICTIONS, COMING FROM A FAMILY WHO STRUGGLES WITH ADDICTION, EFFECTED BY ADDICTIONS IN ANY WAY.... Pretty much anyone!!!
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illuminates Chomsky's dissident analysisReview Date: 2000-10-27
"In the study of any system, it is often useful to look at something radically different, to highlight crucial features. Let's begin, then, by looking at a society that is close to the opposite pole from ours: Brezhnev's USSR.
Consider policy formation. In Brezhnev's USSR, economic policy was determined in secret, by centralized power; popular involvement was nil, except marginally, through the Communist Party. Political policy was in the same hands. The political system was meaningless, with virtually no flow from bottom to top.
Consider next the information system, inevitably constrained by the distribution of economic-political power. In Brezhnev's USSR there was a spectrum, bounded by disagreements within centralized power. True, the media were never obedient enough for the commissars. Thus they were bitterly condemned for undermining public morale during the war in Afghanistan, playing into the hands of the imperial aggressors and their local agents from whom the USSR was courageously defending the people of Afghanistan. For the totalitarian mind, no degree of servility is ever enough.
There were dissidents and alternative media: underground samizdat and foreign radio. According to a 1979 US government-funded study, 77% of blue-collar workers and 96% of the middle elite listened to foreign broadcasts, while the alternative press reached 45% of high-level professionals, 41% of political leaders, 27% of managers, and 14% of blue-collar workers. The study also found most people satisfied with living conditions, favoring state-provided medical care, and largely supportive of state control of heavy industry; emigration was more for personal than political reasons.
Dissidents were bitterly condemned as "anti-Soviet" and "supporters of capitalist imperialism," as demonstrated by the fact that they condemned the evils of the Soviet system instead of marching in parades denouncing the crimes of official enemies. They were also punished, not in the style of US dependencies such as El Salvador, but harshly enough.
The concept "anti-Soviet" is particularly striking. We find similar concepts in Nazi Germany, Brazil under the generals, and totalitarian cultures generally. In a relatively free society, the concept would simply evoke ridicule. Imagine, say, that Italian critics of state power were condemned for "anti-Italianism." Such concepts as "anti-Soviet" are the very hallmark of a totalitarian culture; only the most dedicated and humorless commissar could use such terms.
Well-behaved party hacks were guilty of no such crimes as anti-Sovietism. Their task was to applaud the state and its leaders; or even better, criticize them for deviating from their grand principles, thus instilling the propaganda line by presupposition rather than assertion, always the most effective technique.
With these observations as background, let us turn to our own free society.
Begin again with policy formation. Economic policy is determined in secret; in law and in principle, popular involvement is nil. The Fortune 500 are more diverse than the Politburo, and market mechanisms provide far more diversity than in a command economy. But a corporation, factory, or business is the economic equivalent of fascism: decisions and control are strictly top-down. People are not compelled to purchase the products or rent themselves to survive, but those are the sole choices.
The political system is closely linked to economic power, both through personnel and broader constraints on policy. Efforts of the public to enter the political arena must be barred: liberal elites see such efforts as a dangerous "crisis of democracy," and they are intolerable to statist reactionaries ("conservatives"). The political system has virtually no flow from bottom to top, apart from the local level; the general public appears to regard it as largely meaningless.
The media present a spectrum of opinion, largely reflecting tactical divisions within the state-corporate nexus. True, they are never obedient enough for the commissars. The media were bitterly condemned for undermining public morale during the war in Vietnam, playing into the hands of the imperial aggressors and their local agents from whom the US was courageously defending the people of Vietnam; a Freedom House study provides a dramatic example. For the totalitarian mind, again, no degree of servility is enough.
There are dissidents and other information sources. Foreign radio broadcasts reach virtually no one, but alternative media exist, though without a tiny fraction of the outreach of samizdat. Dissidents are bitterly condemned as "anti-American" and "supporters of Communism" as demonstrated by the fact that they condemn the evils of the American system instead of marching in parades denouncing the crimes of official enemies. But they are not severely punished, at least if they are privileged and of the right color. Again, the concept "anti-American" is particularly striking, the very hallmark of a totalitarian mentality."
Just one example of Chomsky's brilliant analysis contained in this seminal study of how the major US media works together with the US government and its corporate interests to undermine democracy. A must read for any student of journalism.
Cliff Notes for Manufacturing ConsentReview Date: 2005-08-11
As for the content of the work, I recommend that readers consult the excellent reviews by Chris Green (always, always read his reviews), Egalitarian, and "Reader" (10.10.99) on this page. I couldn't possibly improve on them.
One last observation: Chomsky resides in Lexington, but I can't help but wonder if the title selection plays on the historical significance Lexington has as the location for the beginning of the American Revolution. Perhaps I am poeticizing the title. Nevertheless, I am quite certain that this work will make the canon of literary political dissent as so many of Chomsky's works have already done.
New edition of old Chomsky observations on foreign affairs. Review Date: 2004-12-25
The implications suggesting that the U.S. is a terrorist state in that it was telling the Nicaraguan people that Contra terror and the embargo would continue unless they voted out the Sandinistas in Feb. 1990, was not noticed in the U.S. media. Indeed Time magazine celebrated the attacks on Nicaraguan civilian infrastructure i.e. U.S./contra war crimes as causing the Sandinistas to be voted out. The killing of the poor by the U.S. backed security forces in El Salvador and Guatemala, which ran elections under extreme terror, received little sustained attention.
Chomsky observes that Laurence Pezullo, while the last U.S. ambassador to Somoza, had advised the National Guard to continue its final mass murder operations which were killing tens of thousands. After Carter couldn't prevent the Sandinistas from taking power, the National Guard, the future Contras, were flown out in U.S. military planes with Red Cross markings (a war crime). The media had nothing to say about the U.S. successfully pressuring the new UNO government in Nicaragua after 1990 to drop its demand that the U.S. comply with the World Court ruling of 1986 that the U.S. stop terrorizing Nicaragua and pay 17 billion dollars in reparations. After the U.S. withheld desperately needed aid, the Chamarro government dropped its demand for U.S. compliance
The media suppressed that evidence of Libyan involvement in the murder of one American that led to the "retaliation" against Libya in 1986 which killed many dozens of civilians, was non-existent according to the West Germans. . Chomsky writes that likewise evidence for Libyan involvement in the Lockerbie bombing is negligible (and years later this is still the truth, see--William .Blum's new book "Freeing the World to Death). In any case, Lockerbie may have been "retaliation" for the U.S. shooting down an Iranian civilian airliner in 1988, killing 290. The commander of a nearby vessel, David Carlson later wrote that the Iranian plane was clearly civilian.and not acting otherwise.. The shoot down, by the U.S.S. Vincennes, Carlson suggested,was designed to test the ship's Aegis missile system. This atrocity was the culmination of U.S. support for Saddam in the Iran-Iraq war; for a few days later Iran capitulated to a cease fire on Iraq's terms. When the commander of the Vincenes came home, he was awarded medals by George Bush Sr. In another case of the U.S. and blowing up planes, Chomsky writes that George Schultz later admitted "in a backhand way" that the terrorists who blew up the Air India Flight over Ireland in 1985 killing 329, originated in a mercenary training camp for Central America in Alabama. It was a sting operation that went haywire.
The U.S. funded Noriega's candidate in 1984 elections in Panama that Noriega stole with great violence, a period when he was knee-deep in the drug trade.. George Schultz went down to the inauguration of the candidate, Barletta. The U.S. later soured on Noriega of course, for reasons having nothing to with his bad qualities. As the U.S. invaded Panama to install more reliable drug tycoons in the name of freedom, the Bush senior administration was resuming high tech sales to China and lifted a ban on loans to Saddam's Iraq. After the U.S. suppressed peaceful settlements of the first Gulf war and killed tens of thousands of Iraqis, Thomas Friedman and Alan Cowell explained that after the first Gulf War the U.S. undermined the anti-Saddam rebellion.. They hoped Saddam would remain in place until a more pliable clone of the dictator could overthrow him and restore Iraq to the "iron-fisted" rule that the U.S. had so admired before August 1990.. Ahmad Chalabi complained in the British press about the U.S. supporting Saddam's butchery of the rebels. Chomsky notes that the late Senator Moynihan was heard a great deal during this period about his devotion to the UN charter/international law. Of course, Moynihan had bragged in his 1978 memoir about blocking UN efforts to stop Indonesia's aggression against East Timor in 1975 while U.S. ambassador to the UN. He admitted that the invasion, supported by the U.S. until 1999, had killed 60,000 people by early 1976... The media did not juxtapose proclamations of U.S. opposition to aggressive dictators with U.S. support for aggression in East Timor, Morocco in Western Sahara(also helped along by Moynihan at the UN), Turkey in Cyprus, Turkey's ethnic cleansing of its Kurds, South Africa in Namibia and Angola, etc.
Chomsky analyzes a review by Caleb Carr about a book about America's mid 19th century Indian wars and notes its similarity to a hypothetical apologetic for Nazi expansionism. He exposes some embarrassing contradictions and fallacies in the venerable A. Schlesinger's claim that JFK intended to withdraw from Vietnam without victory.
Chomsky at his Best and most accessibleReview Date: 1999-04-02
One thumb up, way up.Review Date: 1999-08-11

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MILITARY FAMILIES MUST READReview Date: 2005-12-18
I recommend this book!Review Date: 2005-10-18
Must ReadReview Date: 2005-02-03
This book took me back to my own memories of the first time my son was deployed to Iraq. Facing my son's second deployment, I once again picked up Letters Home and read it again and again.
I hope that everyone in America has the opportunity to read this book to understand what it is like to have a loved one in the military.
Once you buy this book you will not be able to put it down!
I anxiously wait for more books by this very talented author.
A Must ReadReview Date: 2005-01-28
This book is a "must read".Review Date: 2004-12-07

Used price: $3.39

The REAL story of the Texas Rangers - the good, the bad and the uglyReview Date: 2007-06-26
A VALUABLE ADDITION TO TEXAS HISTORYReview Date: 2007-03-17
Much to the pleasure of Texans and history buffs acclaimed historian Robert Utley returns with his sequel to Lone Star Justice (2002) thus bringing the saga of the Texas Rangers to the present day. Many have been introduced to the Rangers via television with such programs as Walker or Texas Ranger, yet it is left to Utley to deliver the most telling and intriguing story of all.
We read, "One Riot, One Ranger. A single Ranger could quell an incipient riot. Rangers and Texans alike reveled in the image of the stalwart, fearless lawman facing down an angry mob. On occasion it came close enough to happening to provide at least an inspiration for the slogan."
Yes, the Rangers were and are, for many, men of mythic stature. Utley debunks some myths while perpetuating others. History is at its most fascinating as the Rangers enter the twentieth century leaving their beloved horses behind and chasing criminals in motorized vehicles. They're no longer after rustlers but set their sights on modern criminals and the utilization of contemporary methods, such as forensic science.
With Lone Star Lawmen readers view the Mexican Revolution (a dark point in Ranger history) and visit towns made rich and lawless by oil. The dramatic capture of Bonnie and Clyde is retold, as well as the Branch Davidian tragedy near Waco.
Prodigiously researched Lone Star Lawmen is one more valuable addition to Texas history.
- Gail Cooke
The Best History of the Texas Rangers, Period.Review Date: 2007-02-17
Truth Trumps Mythology--Not a Moment Too SoonReview Date: 2007-02-17
A True Master Rescues History from the Pit of MythReview Date: 2007-02-17

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Finance for the CSOReview Date: 2008-08-16
Excellent referenceReview Date: 2005-12-19
An excellent book with only one major flawReview Date: 2007-08-09
My favorite aspect of MCR is its explanation of economics and finance terms to the security audience. I felt like applauding when I read on p 47 "[M]any managers... are merely calling the IRR an ROI or ROSI (return on security investment). Given that the concepts of "return on investment" and "internal rate of return" are well established in the accounting, finance, and economics literature, as well as among nearly all senior financial managers (e.g., CFOs), security managers should be careful how they use these terms. Indeed, misusing these terms can only lead to problems for the security manager." (See p 45 for a comparison of ROI, IRR, and NPV.)
In a similar fashion, MCR explains what a "return" is for security on p 21: "The benefits associated with cybersecurity activities are derived from the cost savings (often called cost avoidance) that result from preventing cybersecurity breaches. These benefits are difficult, and often impossible, to predict with any degree of accuracy. Moreover, since the actual benefits are conceptually the cost savings associated with potential security breaches that did not occur, it is not possible to measure these benefits precisely after the security investments are made."
What of "investment"? Pp 28-30 say: "[O]rganizations tend to treat the bulk of their cybersecurity expenditures as operating costs and charge them to the period in which they are incurred," unlike capital investments, which "represent assets of an organization that should appear on the organization's balance sheet." The authors recommend us to "view all costs related to cybersecurity activities... as capital investments with varying time horizons."
So what is a cost? P 5 says "The cost of information security is essentially a negative network externality associated with the Internet... [It] arises when malevolent individuals and organizations [which the authors properly label "threats" on p 12] join the network, thereby imposing costs on all well-intentioned users. These costs take the form of losses caused by actual security breaches plus the cost of actions... designed to prevent such breaches."
P 30 wisely states "[N]o amount of security can guarantee that breaches will not occur... The goal of the organization should be to implement security procedures up to the point where the benefits minus the costs are at a maximum." The footnote on p 31 continues with "An alternative way to view this discussion is to think of the goal as one of trying to minimize the sum of the costs associated with cybersecurity activities and the costs associated with breaches... the optimal level of cybersecurity for an organization would be the same under the cost minimization goal as it would be if the organization were to maximize the net benefits." I think most managers prefer to think in terms of cost minimization, which is a prevalent throughout IT.
Costs are dissected on pp 56-58: "The direct costs of cybersecurity breaches are those costs that can be clearly linked to specific breaches... the indirect costs of cybersecurity breaches cannot be linked... Explicit costs of cybersecurity breaches are those costs of breaches that can be measured in an unambiguous manner... implicit costs are opportunity costs (i.e., costs associated with lost opportunities), which cannot be measured without ambiguity... the benefits derived from spending funds on cybersecurity activities come largely from the cost savings derived by avoiding the implicit costs of breaches."
Page 63 explains why companies have "Chief Privacy Officers" and the like, even though preserving privacy is the confidentiality aspect of the CIA triad and could be a CISO responsibility: "The findings from our study show that, on average, information breaches that compromise confidentiality do have a significant negative impact on the stock market value of corporations experiencing breaches. Indeed, the average decline in the firm's stock market value... was approximately 5 percent."
So far so good, right? The major flaw with MCR arrives in ch 4, on p 68: "The variables affecting potential cost savings include (1) the potential losses associated with information security breaches, (2) the probability that a particular breach will occur, and (3) the productivity associated with specific investments, which translates into a reduction in the probability of potential losses." This is true -- but this is the key problem: devising even rough estimates of 1, 2, and 3 is nearly impossible in practice. The authors' examples (see figure 4-2 for one) assume these factors can be determined (like $10 mil total potential loss without countermeasures, 75% probability of loss with no countermeasures / 50% with $650,000 of countermeasures, and so on). When I saw these contrived examples I wondered "what is the origin of these figures?" The fact of the matter is that they are all guesswork, which means the calculator can say anything the analyst wishes to produce.
In some sense we are back to square one, although much better educated in economics. (Note that Andy Jaquith's book Security Metrics also observes how calculating these figures is nearly impossible in real life.)
Because MCR is so right in all of its other discussions, the book deserves 4 stars. A proper acceptance of the difficulty or impossibility of determining 1, 2, and 3 might have resulted in 5 stars. Perhaps a second edition will address these concerns?
PS: I would be remiss to not quote the authors' exceptional insights into the problems with security auditing. P 132 says "[T]he checklist approach tends to shift attention away from the cost-benefit aspects of such security. That is, the checklist approach usually assumes that conducting a particular procedure is inherently worth doing." P 137 hits the nail on the head: "[F]or some firms, it is quite possible that the costs of cybersecurity auditing will exceed the benefits. If this were to occur, then cybersecurity auditing would in effect decrease the firm's value." Amen.
An excellent economic analysis of cybersecurity investmentsReview Date: 2006-02-06
What I like about the book is its appeal to practitioners and academics alike. There is a nice section on developing a business case for cybersecurity investments. Empirical evidence to support their arguments are provided throughout the book. Complex ideas like real options and cybersecurity investments are nicely explained with simple and insightful examples.
Overall, whether you are a manager making or evaluating the case for cybersecurity investments, or teaching in this area, this book is a must-read.
Managing Cybersecurity Resources: A Cost-Benefit Analysis Review Date: 2005-11-22

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lots of interesting informationReview Date: 2004-10-01
Sets the standard on the subject.Review Date: 1997-12-22
The book features excellent color illustrations of the medals, ribbons, and insignia, with information on the historical context, mandate (mission), participant countries and strengths, fatalities incurred, and number of medals issued. There is also a chronology, a world map of operations, a splendid section on Korean War medals and variants, background essays, bibliography, index, and more, providing comprehensive coverage of this relatively neglected area. Borts' admirable work will likely be the standard on the subject for many years to come, and will be of particular interest to students of contemporary military affairs as well as collectors.
(The "score" rating is an ineradicable feature of the page. This reviewer does not "score" books.)
Sets the standard on the subject.Review Date: 1997-12-22
The book features excellent color illustrations of the medals, ribbons, and insignia, with information on the historical context, mandate (mission), participant countries and strengths, fatalities incurred, and number of medals issued. There is also a chronology, a world map of operations, a splendid section on Korean War medals and variants, background essays, bibliography, index, and more, providing comprehensive coverage of this relatively neglected area. Borts' admirable work will likely be the standard on the subject for many years to come, and will be of particular interest to students of contemporary military affairs as well as collectors.
(The "score" rating is an ineradicable feature of the page. This reviewer does not "score" books.)
Comprehensive Guide to United Nations MedalsReview Date: 1998-11-20
Sets the standard on the subject.Review Date: 1997-12-22
The book features excellent color illustrations of the medals, ribbons, and insignia, with information on the historical context, mandate (mission), participant countries and strengths, fatalities incurred, and number of medals issued. There is also a chronology, a world map of operations, a splendid section on Korean War medals and variants, background essays, bibliography, index, and more, providing comprehensive coverage of this relatively neglected area. Borts' admirable work will likely be the standard on the subject for many years to come, and will be of particular interest to students of contemporary military affairs as well as collectors.
(The "score" rating is an ineradicable feature of the page. This reviewer does not "score" books.)
Used price: $79.95

just short of the summitReview Date: 2000-10-17
scholarly expertise revealedReview Date: 2000-02-02
A fine piece of academic workReview Date: 1999-07-09
Paradoxically enlighteningReview Date: 1999-04-07
Still the bestReview Date: 2003-08-18
A triumph from the master interpreter of continental thought.
And slow, cold, cheap food.

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The Science of Military OutcomesReview Date: 2004-11-25
Brilliant study of modern warfareReview Date: 2005-02-21
Stephen Biddle, a Professor at the US Army War College, has produced an important book on modern warfare. He shows how material forces, numbers and technology, only count if used in the modern system. Force deployment shapes the role of material forces. He analyses full data-sets of modern battles, proving that bigger is not always better.
The increasing lethality of firepower means that since 1914 exposed mass movement is suicidal. Only the modern system of using combined arms, cover and concealment enables the attackers' forces to survive the defence's response.
Biddle looks at three significant battles, firstly, the successful German attack of March 1918. For preponderance theorists, the Allies should have stopped this attack dead. The German/British force-to-force ratio was 1.5/1, among the least favourable of any major attack of the war. The British had a few more tanks, but the main weapons were still the infantry and guns of 1915-18, a defence-dominant technology. The British official history blamed the fog, as if there had been no fog until then.
The Germans won an unprecedented breakthrough, advancing 40 miles across a 50-mile front. The Germans implemented the modern system tactically and to some extent operationally; the British didn't. This broke the great stalemate, not new technology, US intervention or exhaustion.
Biddle's second example, Operation Goodwood in July 1944, was the failed Allied effort to break out of the Normandy beachhead. The British had more troops and weapons: 1,277 tanks, 4,500 aircraft and 118,000 troops against 319 tanks, several hundred aircraft and 29,000 troops. If preponderance theorists were right, the British would have won, but they tried an exposed mass tank charge, unsupported by infantry or suppressive artillery.
Biddle's third example is Operation Desert Storm of 1991, which US forces won with an unprecedentedly low loss rate. US forces used the modern system, the Iraqis did not. The superior US air technology did not eliminate the Iraqi resistance: 2,000 tanks still fought back after the air assault. US troops with or without advanced ground technology, and those fighting local engagements at better or worse odds, won equally convincingly.
An interesting thesisReview Date: 2004-07-26
Thought provokingReview Date: 2006-10-04
Unfortunately, the case studies and battles are not really described, and if you were not already familiar with the battles before (as I was not in 2 of 3), the analyses will not help to gain any real understanding.
Second, the model presented is an excellent tool for "post mortem" analyses. However, since according to the model, the major factor that will decide the outcome of the battle is force emplacement, and since it cannot be known in advance what will the force emplacement be (neither for friendly nor for enemy forces), the model cannot really be used to predict outcomes of future battles. I see this as a major problem with the model.
Provocative, Brillant and ControversialReview Date: 2005-11-13
The author presents a balanced, provocative and well presented case for how victory or defeat occurs in battle. This book is designed for both the tecnical numbers kind of person and also the less technical. The chapters can be read as a stand alone or you can also go through the entire book. Either way it has immense value.
The thesis of this book is that force employment, or the doctrine and tactics by which forces are used in combat is centrally important. This book is great reading, is controversial in its presentation but clearly provides both empirical and quantitative analysis to support his position. THIS BOOK IS A MUST READ.

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TKE-- THE UNTOLD STORIESReview Date: 1999-04-02
Perfect!Review Date: 1999-01-08
A book whose magnitude is monumental.Review Date: 1999-04-01
A supremely relevant work of scholarshipReview Date: 1999-03-23
Great ResourceReview Date: 1999-04-10

Used price: $0.45

The Money MentorReview Date: 2001-08-08
The Money MentorReview Date: 2001-08-08
A novel way to learn about managing your moneyReview Date: 2001-04-24
I liked the book, though I would sock any dentist who tried to talk about compound interest while he was drilling. This could be an excellent gift to give anyone going off to college, or starting a small business, especially an arts business. Anyone heavily in debt might find the heroine a wee bit hard to live up to.
An Entertaining Way to Learn About MoneyReview Date: 2001-04-20
This wonderful book is essential for anyone who has had consternation or outright difficulty managing their money. Even for those who are frugal and well organized, it gives extraordinary insights into societal and historical attitudes regarding money and debt. It puts money management into human terms. I alternately cringed (when recognizing my own patterns) and cheered, as the heroine began to pull herself out of the demoralizing trap of debt.
While the book is a fountain of information, there is also a real drama here. By humanizing the problem through the story of a young woman, Iris, plagued by debt and her aid at the hands of a wise and generous mentor, Saidah, it keeps us turning the pages. Instead of a dry lecture filled with advice, this story unfolds as a journey with all the pathos and uncertainty we can recognize in our own battles to balance the cares of earning a living with the real goal of contentment. It's a remarkable work with much more than sound guidance about money management. Filled with history, literature fables and a touch of Zen it is is fascinating and reassuring. We aren't the first generations to be torn apart by money mismanagement.
By the end all I could say is where can I find that mentor? And I want Saidah's telephone number. But I suspect that the author would reply that the mentor can be within us. She is always there in the gift of this book.
Manhattan Librarian's recommendationReview Date: 2001-04-29
Related Subjects: Coast Guard Kings Point Norwich Plymouth State Springfield Western Connecticut
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