Europe Books

I personally think that Gorky belongs at the top of elite Russian writers.

In the aftermath of 9-11 and the concerted efforts by both the policy and intelligence leadership in both America and the United Kingdom to both deny that 9-11 was a failure on their parts, and to "sex up" the dossiers leading to an unjust war in Iraq, I really like and recommend this book to anyone remotely connected to national security decision-making.

There are four major points in this book that neither the publicity prose nor the earlier reviewers emphasize, and I focus on these because they are the heart of the book and the core of its value:

1) Peacetime breeds officers, systems, and doctrine that are unlikely to stand the empirical test of war. As the author notes, every incompetent in war has previously been promoted to his or her high rank in peacetime. Systems are adopted without serious battle testing or interoperability (and intelligence) supportability being assured, and doctrine takes a back seat to protocol and keeping up appearances.

2) Technologists are especially pernicious and dangerous to future warfighting capability when they are allowed to promulgate new technology under ideal peacetime conditions, and not forced to stand the test of battle-like degradation and the friction of real-world conditions.

3) Doctrine based on the lessons of history rather than the pomp of peacetime is the ultimate insurance policy.

4) Robust--even intrusive and pervasive--communications (signaling) in peacetime is almost certain to denigrate healthy doctrinal development, has multiple pernicious effects on the initiative and development of individual commanders, and can have catastrophic consequences when it is severely degraded in wartime and the necessary doctrinal foundation and command initiative are lacking.

This is a very long book at 708 pages, and I would hasten to note that the book is worth purchasing even if only to read Chapter 25, pages 562-601, in which the author brilliantly sets forth 28 distinct "propositions". The balance of the book is extraordinary in its detail and a pleasure to scan over, but its primary role is to absolutely guarantee the credibility and industry of the author.

Each of the 28 propositions, one sentence in length with varying explanatory summaries, is compelling, relevant, and most critical to how we train both flag officers and field grade officers of all the services. Were the author so inclined, I would encourage him to develop the final chapter as a stand-alone primer for military leaders seeking to learn from history and avoid the dangerous juxtaposition of too much technology and too little thought. While the author draws his propositions from an excruciatingly detailed study of the Battle of Jutland and the British naval cultures in conflict before and after Jutland, this book is not, at root, about a specific battle, but rather about the constantly forgotten "first principles" of training, equipping, and organizing forces for combat. Hard to do in peacetime with the best of leaders, a tragedy in waiting with the more common peacetime pogues in charge. "Ratcatchers", the author's phrase for those who do well in war, are crushed by the peacetime protocols, and this is perhaps the greatest lesson of all: we must nurture our ratcatchers, even place them on independent duty to travel distant lands, but somehow, someway, keep them in play against the day when we need them.

I was glad that this work was not completely one-sided. Andrew Gordon stated how commanders like Sir John Jellicoe and Sir Hugh Evan-Thomas were in many aspects not up to leading a wartime battle command because of their reliance on central control and inflexibility to the fluidity of battle. It also showed how much of Lord Nelson's command style appeared in Sir David Beatty, but he does not hide the fact that Beatty made many big mistakes that led to the loss of two capital ships a few thousand sailors. Beatty at times is shown as reckless (the Battlecruiser Force lacked the targting accuracy when needed most and two battlecruisers were lost) and not a good communicator (he did meet with Evan-Thomas to explain what he expected of them and caused the 5th Battle Force to take much unnecessary damage). But, he was a courageous commander and did his part by leading (as ordered) the German High Seas Fleet to Jellicoe's Grand Fleet of over 35 capital ships. It also shows that despite his shortcomings, Evan-Thomas was a brave man and did his part during the fight with the Germans.

After getting into this book, I was hoping to read more on the German aspect of the battle, especially since Admiral Scheer almost led his High Seas Fleet to annihilation by the Grand Fleet not once, but several times during the battle. But, the fact that Andrew Gordon was a former British Naval officer and that his work concentrated on his organization, I can understand why he explained the British aspect of the battle. Plus, his main focus was not the battle, but how command style wholly influenced the outcome of this engagement.

Gordon focuses on the tension between doctrine's role as a useful tool for helping a widely flung set of commanders act in concert when distance, smoke, and angst prevent their communication and how a careless search for practical doctrine might invite a stifling dogma in its stead. As Gordon so fluidly writes of the malaise gripping the "fleet that had dozed unchallenged in the long calm lee of Trafalgar", the trust Nelson placed in subordinates had not long survived his death in that battle and its heir was an officious busyness centered on sparkle and conformity.

Particularly delightful in this work and an aspect not to be missed is the benefit to be realized by using two bookmarks when reading it, with the second preserving your spot in the end notes. Its 100+ pages of notes manifest a stringent and complete attribution of his borrowings, but a great many of the notes are not simply citations of others work but illuminating tidbits well worth savoring as you plow along the main text.

A new reader will also find that color has not been sacrificed in the rush to meet the obligations of covering so large a battle. My favorite anecdote was one of an untroubled officer on HMS Lion who, unaware that the Germans had truly been sighted, calmly finished preparing his sandwich as action stations were rung. The mental picture formed of his arriving on the bridge with mouth full and hoagie in hand is not unlike someone doing "the wave" in the audience at Ford's Theatre as Lincoln takes his seat.

I mean the 5 stars. I have given 5 copies of this book to people I know, simply to ensure that they might understand the mania for naval history it has fanned in my heart. If there is any justice in this world, this book will enjoy a massive new print run.

This is, in fact, considered a masterwork of history, an eminently readable and elegantly stylish work by Manchester, a master of the trade. Manchester, a retired history professor at Wesleyan University in Connecticut, is widely regarded as one of this country's preeminent biographers and historian. The Krupp dynasty was extinguished in 1967, when the last surviving family member passed away. With his death the legacy of a four hundred year span of contribution to the European armaments industry came to an end, and so brought to a conclusion a tradition spanning wars and quite profoundly influencing outcomes of European history for centuries. The Krupp Arms conglomerate was technologically innovative, devising new weapons such as a superior cannon to an anti-air vehicle weapon designed to counter the reconnaissance capabilities of aerial observation balloons to exotic and much more capable submarines, which they then built for over four decades.

In so doing, they became fabulously rich, and rose to become extremely influential and exceedingly conservative voices within the realm of German political circles. No German leader could hope to marshal the resources or the weapons of war necessary to mount a military campaign without first gaining the trust, confidence and support of the Krupp family, which then cleverly and cynically manipulated this influence to vastly enrich themselves. During World War One, their cannons helped to flatten the French city of Verdun, and at one point succeeded in lobbing projectiles into Paris from as distant a location as some eighty miles away, an unheard-of innovation at the time. Aiding the Third Reich in its secret rearmament effort after the end of the First Word War, they provided a much advanced tank design that eventuated in the Panzer tank, used subsequently so successfully in Hitler's blitzkrieg through France in the summer of 1940.

They were quite influential within the German society as well, having armed the forces of Kaiser Wilhelm for battle before World War One, and then surreptitiously backed Hitler financially in the so-called terror-campaign" of 1933. Incredibly, the Krupps participated in the war crimes of the Third Reich, even controlling and operating more than 130 concentration camps during the war. Afterwards, they help to rebuild Europe in the eventual development of the European Common Market. This is a truly fascinating book written with all of the usual style and substance one come s to expect of William Manchester, and it is certainly a book I can highly recommend to anyone with an interest in European history. Enjoy!