Independent Books

"Party of One," by veteran California newspaper columnist Daniel Weintraub, details the amazing life of America's second most important chief executive, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger.

Weintraub begins with a brief overview of Schwarzenegger's early life in a small town in Austria, as a bodybuilder who, "...left his native country as a young man to pursue his vision of the American Dream. He believed with the passion of the converted that anyone who worked hard and focused on his goals could make it in America. Not just make it - but make it big. Fame. Wealth. Adulation. A beautiful family."

The author, befitting his profession as a political journalist, quickly fast forwards to 2003, the year of California's fateful recall of Gov. Gray Davis. During that election, Schwarzenegger promised to "tear up" the state's credit cards as California groaned under a huge deficit caused by a complete lack of spending restraint coupled with the tech bubble bursting that served to end a spike in capital gains tax earnings. It was this political promise that would serve as the central criticism in Weintraub's story; the greatest failing; the biggest lost opportunity. Weintraub writes, "Schwarzenegger's failure to deal with the long-term, structural problem in the budget - the fact that spending was programmed by law to grow faster than tax revenues - allowed state spending to rise from $78 billion when he took office to $102 billion as he ran for reelection three years later, an increase of more than 30 percent... By the time he was reelected in November 2006, the state was spending more per capita and more as a percentage of the economy than it ever had before... His goal of bringing the state's books back into the black - the defining issue in his first campaign for the governor's office - would continue to depend on little more than a gamble, a hope that the economy would perform better than his own experts expected. It might have been a good formula for political success. But as fiscal policy, it would never get the job done." Schwarzenegger's fiscal failings became increasingly obvious in 2008 as California's deficit came back with a vengeance at $17 billion.

Weintraub adequately retells the phases of Schwarzenegger's public career, his first foray into politics with his after school program initiative, his initial year in office, his failed "year of reform," his retooling by coming out with a proposal to massively borrow to build infrastructure, and his push to capture the environmental issue. All of this is set into the context of examining how Schwarzenegger, while nominally a Republican, governs with no discernable set of principles - a "liberaltarian," as Brink Lindsey coined.

Weintraub wraps up by breezing through Schwarzenegger's convincing reelection in 2006 and his efforts in 2007 to increase government involvement in healthcare, reform the prison system (something I had a supporting role in), and reform the political process.

All in all, Weintraub tells the story of a remarkable man trying to govern a remarkable state, doing some things well, but failing in other, more basic tests of leadership. Weintraub leaves the impression that Schwarzenegger could have done more and could be doing more, but somehow is falling short of his initial high promise.

Reviewer: Chuck DeVore is a California State Assemblyman, a retired lieutenant colonel in the Army National Guard and the author of "China Attacks."

Schwarzenegger remains the tool of big business while pretending to be the "Peoples Governor". However, when
you ask the question: Which people? The answer is those who contribute to his campaign, aka, big business.
He has decimated benefits for workers injured in California and his staff illegally implemented the permanent
disability rating schedule, like the V.A. did with Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans. However, a California Work-
ers' Compensation Judge has refused to use the schedule and filed a case reporting how the Schwarzenegger administration is cheating injured workers by lying to the legislature. Most importantly, like G.W. Bush, he refuses to correct the problem and has twice vetoed bills passed by the legislature to fix the deceit. We are awaiting a decision on the Boughner case to correct the problem. Please don't be fooled by his act that he is not a typical Republican. He is, and always will be, a big business Republican.

Considering the subject matter, Dan Weintraub was able to capture my attention long enough to get through the book. I liked Arnold more as a paid actor saving the world than a paid politician using the State of California to perfect the art of "bait and switch". Where or where are public servants who serve the public or has public servant become an oxymoron. Kudos to Weintraub for his research and coherent presentation of a plate of "green eggs and ham" dressed up as a thought out road map to move California forward.

This is a terrific book. It takes a very complicated and important subject -- how California is governed -- and explains it in a way that is clear, accurate and fun to read. The book is particularly valuable for explaining a much misunderstood and timely subject: Schwarzenegger's health care plan, which passed the Assembly but failed to get out a committee in the state Senate. Although this book is important and should show up on a few college syllabi, it doesn't feel like homework. Some of the writing is more than clear -- it's beautiful.

Recently, Daniel Weintraub argued that correctional officers should not receive raises. He also suggested that officers should make LESS, since there are so many applicants for the job. His logic is not only twisted, but also a reflection of the "scrooge mentality" afflicting many bosses.

In Weintraub's world, men and women would be paid the least amount possible, and unions would be banned. This means that the teacher's union would not be allowed to ask for better wages, and that the Hollywood writers (without their union) should be paid as little as possible. Because, after all, there are thousands waiting in the wings to be teachers and writers, which, by Weintraub's logic, means writers and teachers are paid too much! This flies in the face of the obvious: labor creates value (John Locke).

Also, in America, if a job is dangerous, requires skills, or involves education or training, we pay more for that career-- which is why NFL players, despite "only having a high school education", are paid more than Bee writers! Why don't we don't hear Weintraub and his cronies attacking the 49ers? After all, football players make way more money than correctional officers.

The fact is, officers are required to attend hundreds of hours of training (they attend an arduous academy) both on and off the job. They are educated (many have BA's and MA's) and their job is dangerous (if you don't believe this, ask the family of Manny Gonzalez, an officer recently murdered by an inmate). Officers work long hours, and yes, get paid overtime for those long hours-- would Weintraub expect them to work for free? And officers do a thankless job that neither Daniel nor his cohorts would be willing to do, for any amount of money.

As for the officers' union: membership in a union is a legal right, guaranteed by U.S. law. An officer can choose to not join the union (membership is voluntary), but he still receives union protection. Officers organized a union, because prior to the union, in 1970, a "prison guard" only earned $600/ month. At that time, guards had no training, no education, no protective equipment, no baton, and no alarm (just a whistle)-- They had just their wits to protect them. Before the union, a guard's retirement (if he lived that long) was $240/ month. So, that is where officers came from, and they don't want to go back.

Also, folks join unions for protection-- to receive decent pay and decent benefits-- which is why McClatchy and all the other newspapers destroyed the newspaper unions, over 30 years ago. Newspapers hate unions, because unions give the workers rights-- the right to speak out against abuse, the right to pick one's job assignment, the right to expose corrupt bosses, and the right to sue for better work conditions. The union, in spite of Weintraub's complaints, is less influential than the rich business lobbies, and certainly less powerful than the writer's union (assuming Daniel is a member; certainly not possible).

Contrary to Daniel Weintraub, Officer's salaries are not a major cost to the state: 41% of California's budget goes to schools and 25.3% to Health and Human Services (welfare). Corrections is only 7.3% of the budget; officers salaries actually account for less than 3% of the total state budget. With gas rising to $4/gallon, and inflation at over 5%, no pay raise means pay cut-- for a job which is dangerous, dirty and difficult.

There is a certain irony about Daniel, a wealthy man, lecturing working stiffs about making too much money. Perhaps Weintraub could take a pay cut from his cushy six-figure editorial job? Because, as Weintraub argues, a job which has more applicants than openings is paying too much. And many new journalism grads want Daniel's job! But then, ignoring or manipulating the facts is common for reporters and editorial writers at the Bee. When you have an agenda, then fair and balanced reporting goes out the window.


In ending this letter, I realize I have wasted my time: the Sacramento Bee (Daniel's boss) will never print this letter, or give equal time to dissenting viewpoints. Or, if I am "lucky", the editors will pretend to be "fair" by allowing me a hundred words or so to respond, thus crippling my comments, and making my letter impotent. After all, as all working folks know, only rich men who own newspapers have freedom of speech. The rest of us go online and read blogs.


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I have the first ed. of this book and just got the 2nd ed. It's much better, very up to date, clearly written wtih LOTS of helpful application code. This cD with this new edition is great, since it has the code on it.

This book starts out with 120 pages of fluff C - mediocre at best and NOT why I bought the book. Then it discusses briefly what microcontrollers are - seemed more like a bunch of scattered notes on the topic thrown together - again NOT why I bought the book. Then it dives into Motorola chips and spends many pages talking about them - NOT why I bought this book. Then the author uses really useless examples like sort routines (like that happens in microcontrollers a lot - better examples would have helped here) to illustrate whatever it was he was trying to illustrate. Over all the book had the feel that the author tossed a bunch of lecture notes together, some poor cut and paste C examples in the beginning and then just simply got lost in his mission to show us how to program microcontrollers in C. The reason I bought this book was to learn what I could and could not do with C. I wanted to find out where C ended and assembly code "had" to take over. I wanted good in-line programming techniques, addressing schemes, code techniques, the best ways to implement monitors, slick ways to manipulate registers.. This book was about Motorola chips and some strange examples of how to program them. The book should NOT be called Programming Microcontrollers in C - maybe something like, Some Touchy Feely Intro To C and Motorola Chips With Sort Functions.

This book is written by a retired Motorola guy and it shows. Van Sickle all but ignores other processors and all of his examples are based on Motorola controllers and C compilers. He's also a bit out of date in many areas.

Much of the book is centered around older (non-flash) Motorola parts. He mentions some of the newer ones here and there, but it's obvious the bulk of the author's experience and the first edition of the book pre-date the newer parts.

The book doesn't really go into a lot of detail in any one area, but instead tries to cover a lot of ground using assorted examples and code snipets. Many of the examples may or may not be useful depending on what you're trying to do.

The book isn't geared towards total novices, as it doesn't really start from ground zero. The author assumes you know the hardware side of things, how to run a development project and the basics of working in C. There are two chapters that sort of gloss over the C language, but they're not complete enough for a novice. Unfortunately, he doesn't go into many specifics in those chapters on how C applies to a embedded project so they're kind of a waste of ink.

All in all, I don't think this book is worth anywhere near its ...list price. If you're interested in the Motorola M68HC05, HC08, HC11, HC12 or HC16, however, it might be worthwhile for some readers.

I have the first ed. of this book and just got the 2nd ed. It's much better, very up to date, clearly written wtih LOTS of helpful application code. This cD with this new edition is great, since it has the code on it.

Programming Microcontrollers In C is a "user friendly" compendium of solid information on the use of C to fully exploit the power of today's microcontrollers. Beginning with an excellent tutorial on C basics, the reader is introduced to microcontrollers with descriptions of their programming environment and tips on coding for microcontrollers. Expert Ted Van Sickle then goes on to describe techniques for obtaining maximum performance from code; the differences between 8-bit and larger microcontrollers (giving application examples and providing details on using different compilers); advanced information for programming embedded systems and RISC microcontrollers (using Motorola's MCORE as the example). Programming Microcontrollers In C offers a great many useful C routines and the accompanying CD-ROM. contains all of the software referenced in the text, as well as C compilers, a full set of Motorola's microcontroller documentation in hyperlinked PDF format, and a fully searchable Deluxe eBook version of the text. The latest title in LLH Technology Publishing's "Embedded Technology" series, Programming Microcontrollers In C is a very highly recommended and invaluable addition to the dedicated programmer's reference shelf.

I enjoy reading about film, and had previously read (and enjoyed) "Shooting to Kill" by Christine Vachon and David Edelstein and "Down and Dirty Pictures" by Peter Biskind, so I thought I this would be a great book for me.

I haven't seen many of the "classic" indies detailed in the book (i.e. Slacker, She's Gotta Have It, Go Fish, etc.), so I had trouble understanding (and sometimes paying attention to) parts of Pierson's book. I did learn a lot (and I'm happy about that), but I was also confused much of the time. It would have certainly helped if I would have seen the movies he was detailing. He didn't write the book for people like me. He probably wrote it for people with already strong backgrounds in independent film.

I predict it's a really good read if . . . you have seen loads (i mean loads!) of indie films since the "Stranger Than Paradise" (1984) and you already know about the directors and distributors of the post-1984 indie scene.

If you don't feel like your an industry expert just yet, trying reading "Shooting to Kill" or "Down and Dirty Pictures." They assume much less about the reader. Then watch the "classics" mentioned in these books. Then read this book. You'll appreciate it much more.

Spike, Mike, Slackers & Dykes was revised and published in January 2004 under the title: Spike Mike Reloaded. It contains a new foreward by Kevin Smith, new chapter by John Pierson, and a new dialogue between the two of them.

Although I'm a big fan of indie films, I found this book a bit dull. Not that I'm looking for a typical Hollywood put on the glitz and glamour type of book, but the book basically deals with how the author put together financing and got distribution for some indie films. It definitely could have been told in a more exciting way. The best thing about it is the interviews with Kevin Smith that are interspersed through the first half or so of the book. Then, they drop off, and I did as well. The author is definitely a huge fan of Kevin Smith, which is great, as there are a lot of Kevin's journal entries included about when Clerks was at Sundance. If you like Kevin Smith, this is a good read, if only for the interviews and the chapter about Clerks. If not, then well...you might like it, but it's a little dull. If you haven't seen Slacker, Go Fish, Roger and Me, Clerks, She's Gotta Have It, Amongst Friends, Reservoir Dogs, etc., then you might have a hard time as well.

The "A Guided Tour Across a Decade ..." portion of the title is a little misleading to some.

While he talks to and about Kevin Smith, Quentin Tarantino, Michael Moore, Jim Jaramusch, Spike Lee and others, and while it's a first account of the American independent film movement circa 1990s - this is NOT a book about their films (either as analysis or critique) or them (as directors and their techniques or merely celeb gossip).

This is a book about the trials and tribulations of being a producer's rep.

There are two types of people who should read this book and would find it useful.

If you plan on directing or producing a movie - consider this book a MUST READ - film distribution 101 reading.

He talks in relevant detail about representing some of the most important American independent films of the 1990s including SHE'S GOTTA HAVE IT, CLERKS, ROGER & ME and others. While he gives an almost day-by-day blow of some of these films as they travel from film festival circuit to deal making to publicity tours - the real value is are the details about the process that one can expect as an independent film maker.

Now, a decade later, many things have changed (especially the financing numbers and studio/distribution situation today versus the 1990s) - what hasn't changed is the overall process of what you might encounter and expect. Here's a great opportunity to read what they encountered and what lessons you might learn from them.

The detailed summary on a deal-memo and points that they negotiated regarding the distribution contract and revenues from distribution and home video - are worth the price of a USC Film School class (not the whole education - the books not that great - just a excellent class :-)

If you are a film fanatic and want to learn a portion of the nuts and bolts of the process of film festivals and independent distribution - you should find this book of interest.

Why only three stars? Deduct one star for ... this book would've been more interesting if we got more of a first hand account from the directors and their feelings during the process along with John Pierson's.

Deduct another star because the industry and the financial numbers and the players have changed so the details of the situations are not very useful.

But the foundation of Sundance and other buzz-worthy festivals reached the public eye during this period so if you're going (or thinking of going) to Sundance, Toronto, et al - get up to speed on all that's transpired so far.

Again, this is a MUST READ for aspiring directors and producers. For others, it all depends on how interested you are in the history of the business process of indepedent film-making ...

What could've been a good guide to modern indie film is bogged down by Pierson's relentless and self-serving tooting of his own horn. Who cares?!? What we really want is the inside story of all these independent films and filmmakers. Pierson seemed to lose track of who the stars of his book should be. I also found the author's writing and his overall knowledge of movies to be lacking. A much better book on the same broad topic is "Celluloid Mavericks" by Greg Merritt, which covers the entire history of American independent film from a much more literate and balanced perspective.

What came under this title was actually J.M. Barries book Better Off Dead. Ihave tried To talk t customer service by phone and email. No service at all. I cant review Fairy Tales until I can actually read it.

This is a good book. It has has all the anderson fairy tales I've ever heard of. The drawings aren't the greatest. I'd say the book would be for a child under 8.

I think that most of us have been exposed to at least some of Hans Christian Andersen's fairy tales. If we haven't read them, we, of previous generations, have probably seen the movie of his life starring Danny Kaye, and any child who watches television has probably seen a Disney version of "The Ugly Duckling."

While these, and similar productions are entertaining, they "prettify" his stories. what I mean by this is that many of his tales have very sad endings and/or have dark gloomy atmospheres. Not all, but many.

For example, "The Little Match Girl" tells the tale of a poverty stricken child whose father sends her out on a freezing New Year's Eve to sell matchsticks. She is afraid to come home without having made any money, as her father will punish her. As the night grows colder, she lights the matchsticks one by one for a drop of warmth. In the flare of each match, she sees visions of her grandmother in heaven, and with the last match her grandmother descends from heaven and takes the little girl in her arms. In the morning, her frozen body is found.

In "The Red Shoes," a little girl is given a pair of red shoes which she feels are the most wonderful things in the world, she values them above everyone and everything, and even at her own communion can think of nothing other than how beautiful she looks in her red shoes. These shoes prove to be her death, as they cause her to dance for days on end until she finally had to have the executioner chop off her feet so she could stop dancing. Then, and only then, with stumps for feet, did she repent for her conceit. As in many of Andersen's fairy tales there is an obvious moral here.

Some other old favorites such as "The Ugly Duckling" and the Emperor's New Clothes" are included.

I think that this is a very good English translation of the included tales, but what makes this book stand out are Arthur Szck's illustrations. There is no copyright date in my copy, but I'm sure it is over 50 years old, and even so, Szck's color illustrations are each and every one worthy of framing. In bright, bold colors, and frequently with an oriental feeling, they are just plain wonderful. I fell in love with them, and I'd bet that most readers would too.

'The Snow Queen' is possibly the greatest short story I've ever read. Although its message is essentially Christian, its means of getting there is staggering, Surrealist and far from dogmatic. There is an Alice quality to the heroine's narrative as she seeks her abducted playmate, full of singing flowers, helpful crows and robber barons - the songs of the flowers are full of sexually loaded and enigmatic imagery. But the word-pictures as a whole are haunting, the blazing sheen of the snow, with the suggestive reds dotting it throughout. The final puzzle is worthy of Borges. Wow.

My daughter (for whom this book was purchased) was very disappointed that this book had no illustrations. Is this not a children's book??????????!? What were these publishers thinking? The first thing she said when we excitedly unboxed and opened up this book was, "Why aren't there any pictures?!?". Had I known this book were not child-friendly, I would not have wasted my money. I would have chosen another version. Just an FYI, since Amazon seems to be mixing reviews on here among various versions of books... this review is for ISBN# 0-517-20573-4. I bought this and other books based on reviews that were not relevent to the particular version of the book I purchased. I really would love to know which version the other reviewer who saw beautiful illustrations has!!! It was not this one.

If one were to pick the "ideal author" to narrate a history of the CIA or KGB, the choices usually end with a decision between a former operative in one of the agencies, a historian, or a journalist. In Battleground Berlin, Murphy, Kondrashev, and Bailey have managed to find the merging of two of the three. The first two are former operatives - one in the CIA and one in the KGB. The latter, is a reporter. It is an important distinction to make from the beginning, because the tone and language used in their book is often that of the first-person, and it is always narrated with a vested interest, first-hand accounts, and material that may seem overzealous.

Luckily for the three, the Cold War remains a fertile topic of examination for historians. In terms of uniqueness, Battleground Berlin represents one of the first times in the post-Cold War era that former CIA and KGB officers have come together to write about the history of American and Soviet intelligence operations. The work is not simply the memoirs of David Murphy, former chief of the CIA's Berlin Operations Base, and Sergei Kondrashev, former head of the KGB's German department and active measures department, but relies to a considerable extent on a vast array of sources from both Soviet and American archives. To be sure, much of the story is based on the recollections of the co-authors, but these are tempered by supporting evidence.

In this work, the reader is treated to a sober and balanced account of major Cold War events in Germany as interpreted by the American and Soviet intelligence services. The authors' smooth narrative touches on the primary events that will be familiar to most historians of post-war Europe: the Berlin Blockade, the Korean War (and its effect on Germany), the June 1953 uprising in East Germany, the Otto John case, the Berlin Tunnel, and the Berlin crisis of 1958-1961 which culminated in the building of the Berlin Wall.

The authors portray in an interesting manner the intelligence organizations in Germany in the initial postwar years. The view put forth is not necessarily a unique one, but it is put forth in a dynamic manor: The fledgling CIA was naive and unprepared compared to the seasoned opponent in the KGB. The authors point out, for example, that the CIA did not receive its first Russian speaker until 1947 (p. 23). In contrast, the Soviets in Germany were preparing for intelligence operations in the West "as the fronts advanced into Germany (p. 33)." The authors attribute this contrast in preparation to the deep-seated paranoia which characterized Soviet Russia (p. 26), as personified in Joseph Stalin.

Battleground Berlin sets out to describe in detail the major Cold War events in Germany, and specifically Berlin, as they related to intelligence. The account of the Berlin Blockade makes clear that the Soviets had reliable information on the position of the Western governments, but that this information was not translated into useful knowledge because the Soviet leaders rejected intelligence that did not conform to their preconceptions. As a result, Soviet intelligence officers often "appropriately" adjusted negative intelligence before distributing it to higher levels of the Communist Party, or simply did not distribute discouraging intelligence. On the other hand, the authors argue, the West opted to continue the Airlift in part because of reassurance by CIA reports that the Soviets did not intend to take military action against the West for continuing the Airlift (p. 62). This analysis of the effect of CIA intelligence on American policy during the Berlin Airlift is provocative, but the evidence to support it is disappointing. The authors cite an interview with Gordon Stewart, the head of the German mission in Heidelberg, as their primary evidence that "senior policymakers in Germany and Washington" were making extensive use of CIA reporting (p. 62). This may be insufficient evidence to support the authors' claim that, "Information obtained by CIA's Berlin Operations Base had a significant and immediate effect on US decisions about West Berlin and West Germany (p. 78)." Furthermore, the reader might have expected mention of the Western counter-blockade, and other events, as contributing to the Soviet decision to lift the Berlin Blockade.

What the authors are truly doing, in their work, is attempting to provide the greatest detail presently available on American and Soviet intelligence organizations during a number of significant Cold War events. Their book successfully untangles the numerous Soviet bureaucratic agencies and departments involved in foreign espionage from one another. Its main strength, however, lies in its portrayal of the inner workings of the Soviet system which effectively hindered reliable intelligence from becoming a useful product in policy-making. Stalin's Soviet Union by its very nature broke the intelligence cycle.

The weaknesses of this work, however, detract from its overall contribution to its academic use. Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of this work is that it falls short of its claim in the introduction: "The great story of this book is how information becomes knowledge and how this knowledge gets transmuted into political policy (p. xxv)." While events and motives are discussed, little is illustrated to show the effects that such actions had on policy. There is no demonstration of how policy was created, changed, or affected. The authors provide suggestions of such an effects in the discussion of the Berlin Blockade and of the Berlin Wall, but certainly not sufficient evidence to support the claim in the introduction.

Lastly, the authors appear overly pleased with their own "uniqueness," repeating phrases like "never before revealed," (pg. 38) and, "previously unknown" (pg. 51). While much of the evidence and accounts are compelling and interesting, they are hardly unique in and of themselves. What they do not rely on is perhaps their strongest claim. Their knowledge and information is not solely unique, but their portrayal, their comparison side-by-side, and especially their collaboration between two "sides," are what make the work useful, distinctive, and informative.

This is the first time a thorough review of post war Berlin intelligence activities has been published. For the professional this is a good compilation of operations (collection, defection, analysis, etc.). For the novice the book is a difficult read - chock full of details but not written in captivating language. Students of history need to add this to their collection of books to keep and use as reference.

The most interesting aspect of the book may be the insight it gives on the interworkings of the Soviet State. While some passages go into detail much beyond what the general reader will want to know, it is worth trudging through the slow passages.

While there were some stories and information of interest, the book is very often dry to the point that it's unreadable. I skipped some sections.

There's also a tendency to self-aggrandize. Several time, the authors take a few moments to criticize other works, and then say "here for the first time" is the real story. While undoubtedly they do have some never before seen information, I think they spend a little too much time beating their chests.

Somewhat interesting, but certainly not spellbinding. Reads like a textbook.

Gorbachev's 'glasnost' and 'perestroika' made much more harm to Western Intelligence than any ideological campaigns of his predecessors. Only once before, namely during the WWII, did Stalin manage to trick the West into believing in 'comrades in arms' and 'Allied powers' slogans of Soviet politics. It resulted in thousands of people, who hated Bolshevism, to be forcefully returned to the Soviet Union after the war, where they were either shot or sent to Gulags. Simultaneously, Western intelligence services were paralised by many moles successfully operating on all shores of the Atlantic and Pacific. As a result, Stalin was awarded "A Man of the Year" title by the Life magazine twice (1939 and 1942), and Gorbachev became a Noble Prize (for Peace?!) winner in 1990.

What did Mikhail Sergeevich do for this award? Deceiving the West with his 'glasnost' concept, he managed to convince many leaders that the Soviet Union started to move in the direction of the open, democratic society. At the same time, the CIA suffered the heaviest blow of all times duting the 1985 Year of Spy with most of its officers ambushed and expelled, and secret agents arrested and shot. Surprisingly, the number of Soviet moles within the CIA and the US government did not decrease after Senator McCarthy's fierce anti-Communist campaign. Names are well known, but I would like to stress that the most recent case dates back to 2002!

So since the Soviet Union under Gorbachev-Yeltsin-Putin started its ideological attack, the number of officers at the Soviet/Russian desk of many Western intelligence services had been dramatically reduced. The budgets allocated for balancing KGB-SVR operations in Europe and Americas were either cut or withdrawn. RFE/RL was moved to Prague, and its staff now consists of only a fistful of journalists. It is virtually unoperative and is being justfully criticised by both American and Russian politicians.

In 1983 Burton Gerber, then head of the CIA's SE division, started secret cooperation with the KGB, authorised by his bosses. In the 1990s first writers and journalists 8late John Costello, as an example), and then the CIA officers started to queue to be nominated Soviet KGB collaborators in "bashful projects of unseen openness". David Murphy, former head of the CIA's SR division, notoriously known for his multiple faux pas (take Nalivaiko and later Nosenko cases, for example) co-authored this book, which gives no credit at all to American intelligence, but fully acts in the interests of Soviet propaganda. I was very much surprised to see such respectable analysts and archivists as Hayden Peake and Oleg Gordievsky praising the book in their earlier reviews. Maybe, it was fashionable in 1997, but then followed Bearden's production in 2003 (Milton Bearden is another former CIA's Soviet/East European chief), so the suit became dangerous. I guess the only way to stop it will be to publish Rem Krasilnikov's book, recently appeared in Moscow. Former Soviet KGB General claims: 'the Cold War will never be over!'

I would not recommend this book for kids preparing for the middle level ISEE exam. The practice exercises for all levels of this exam are intermingled, so it is not clear to the student which exercises are likely to appear on their particular test. It would be overwhelming for a younger student to use this book without a great deal of parent direction.

A Family Apart is one of my favorite books. The main conflict is that a mother can't support her children and makes a decision to give them away. The five children are the antagonists and don't want to leave their mother. The mother is the protagonist and believes it is for the best that they are to be given away. The setting first starts off in New York but most of the story takes place on their journey to the west. I thought this book gave a realistic look at what life is like for orphans. I didn't like that all of the children were separated from each other. I would definitely recommend this book to eighth grade students. It is very suspenseful and exciting. I would also recommend this book to teachers. It takes place at a very interesting time in history and is very descriptive.

I used this book to get ready for the SSAT. It helped alot and when I took the test, I knew exactly what to expect.

If you are about to take the SSAT exam STOP! Buy this book immediately! It was the best thing that I did, when I went into the exam I felt as though I had already seen the paper! This was my only preparation for the exam, unlike many other of my friends who went to expensive tutors....... I was the only one who got ranked in the 97th percentile and now I am going to Phillips Academy/Andover! Thank you Princeton Review!

This book helped me prepare for the middle level ISEE, but for anybody that really wants to study and cram, I would reccomend for you to buy as many books as possible, though this should be your first.

I was painfully underwhelmed when I sat down at the bookstore for about an hour with a coffee and this book. Basically, it's a semi-unrelated series of whitepapers very pointedly aimed at management types. If you're looking for persuasive essays about how directories can increase your ROI, by jingo, this is your book. You may also be introduced to some new buzzwords while you're at it. Unfortunately, if you want either the big picture of how an LDAP directory works or the nuts-and-bolts of LDAP administration, this isn't your book.

Perhaps I just bought the wrong book for what I wanted to do, or maybe I just don't get it, but in either case, this book left me very underwhelmed.

I work at an ISP where we use LDAP for a number of purposes, from authenticating customers connecting to our network, to e-mail filtering, to htaccess authentication on our internal-use web servers. While I am comfortable using an LDAP browser to manage our users in LDAP, I really wanted more of an idea about how to set up and run an LDAP directory, so I bought this book to help me understand LDAP schemas.

While this book does describe a lot of the background to LDAP directories, it really didn't do much to fill in what I am missing. How do you design an LDAP schema? How do you know when to use ou=, o=, etc.?

On the plus side, I really *DID* appreciate the overview of various LDAP products currently available, and was pleased to see that all of the LDAP products I have used at work (OpenLDAP, iPlanet Directory Server and, or course, Active Directory) were described, along with their relative strengths and weaknesses. However, I really expected a little more meat--and maybe not quite as much background--about implementing an LDAP directory than I found in this book.

In short, if you want a general overview of LDAP directories, this might be what you want, but if you are looking for a "how to" guide, you probably should keep looking.

I was looking for a book that would tie together the bits and pieces of LDAP knowledge that I had gathered from the internet for a thorough overview of LDAP. But after reading this book, I still don't have a clear understanding of basic concepts such as namespaces. One section led me to believe that a DNS-based namespace was the same as an LDAP hierarchical namespace, but then I had my doubts after reading another section. Are cn, ou, dc, and uid all object classes? I have heard that LDAP does not respond to a client with a pass/fail response, but there is a discussion of result codes in response to such operations. What are theses codes? When and how are they issued? Walk the reader through from beginning to end with an example of connecting to an LDAP server with a query or an authentication request and show the messages that are passed back to the client (if any). In a discussion of public key encryption, the author states: "the public key is published for anyone to know, whereas the private key is kept secret from everyone but the user....it doesn't matter who knows your public key, because the public key can't be used to impersonate you." Please explain this apparent paradox; if I need the public key to decrypt your message, and anyone can have the public key, then how is the data secure? Couldn't anyone tapping into our communication decrypt it if they have the public key too? Including some actual PERL, or JSP, or VB.NET with ASP.NET scripts for connecting to and querying an LDAP server would have been a plus.

It is difficult to write a technical book that doesn't merely present a collection of technical facts (which I will take on faith as being accurate). It is important to be able to state the facts plainly and connect them to form a coherent idea. For example: "A workgroup is just a group of workstations that share a browse list." I had read volumes about workgroups, workstations and browse lists in other books before finding this concise line (and many more like it) in a book by Mark Minasi. There is nothing for the reader to ponder or second-guess with such a line - it is short and to the point. As is, I didn't find a similar style in this book, nor did I find much information that isn't already freely available on the internet.

Suppose you were an administrator who is asked to run an LDAP-Server, but the only thing you know about LDAP is, that it is a fashionable IT-buzzword. Then this book is for you! If your task is to create a directory infrastructure for a whole company or organization, "LDAP Directories Explained" could be a perfect first read, but after it you will want to turn to a more comprehensive book. This book also does not claim to contain installation guides for any specific LDAP server implementation (though it has some links on this topic in one of its appendixes).

"LDAP Directories Explained" is well organized, specialized terms are being defined before they are used, there are no obvious typos and no useless digressions. Brian Arkills does a perfect job to make you understand the basic concepts of LDAP. He also makes you feel, that the LDIF-syntax which looks so deterring and obscure at the first look is in fact quite simple and he teaches you how to query an LDAP server. This is exactly the knowledge that is sufficent for 90% of the IT staff concerned with LDAP. Brain Arkill conveys it on only 200 pages. In the second half of the book he assesses three major LDAP-implementations: OpenLDAP, Microsoft Active Directory and Netscape Directory Server. We use neither of these, but the book was invaluable to me though.

I remember from my last job that the basic concepts of LDAP never were adequately explained in the Microsoft curricula, so I can also heartily recommend this book to Windows sysadmins.

This is the book for people like me who
had heard about directories, but couldn't
get past the (&(cn=foo*)(ou=*Bar*)) notation
to figure out what was going on. The
book does an excellent job explaining how
LDAP directories can and should work
within an enterprise. Brian Arkills has
written a wonderful book.

Anyone who wants to learn some of the 'Why?'
about MS Active Directory would do well to
start here. The first half of the book lays
out the basics of directories, with numerous
references to standards documents (RFC's).
The rest iterates through popular LDAP
directory implementations, what they have to
offer, how they are 'special' and why you
might want to use them.

As other reviewers have pointed out, the book prominently displays Che on the cover but precious little information about his life. Che's influence and despotism could easily fill a large volume. This book was a disappointment in that it barely touches on such an important historical figure. I'm hoping a better treatment is in the works somewhere. The "Progressive" world needs to know that one of its major heroes was, in fact, a murderous maritinet - and a dismal failure as a human being.

As a Latin-American, I very much enjoyed the book. Some of the ideas expressed were interesting and I agree with, some don't. But the main intention in buying the book was to learn more about "Che", and my surprise was that "Che" was not there. He was present in less than a third of the book, in a excessive "compressed" way, and it even wasn't the most interesting part of the book. It looked more as a "bait" to get more people into buying the book. As I said, is a good book, but if you are looking for "Che", he will not be there.

First off, this is a very short book (79 pages). The first chapter deals with the life of Che Guevara. Che since his death has become a legend. The reality of his life are blood stained hands. Che executed a lot of people. This happened both during the Cuban Revolution and its aftermath. Che was not someone you would want your daughter or sister dating. He was a killer, but somehow his persona has assumed the legend of underdog and hero.

The following two chapters talks on how Latin America has been mismanaged economically and politically since independence. Both the left and right have instituted statist economies in their countries. The rule of the strongman has corrupted the political system. Corruption and the lack of followed laws has also undermined the capitalistic system in Latin countries. Few countries (except for a brief time Argentina) have followed the course of capitalism. The result are very poor countries with a small elite controlling the resources. These chapters relate how following a capitalistic economy these countries would not be poor and mismanaged.

The writing on these final two chapters are pretty heavy. This is not for everyone. The one chapter on Che was an enticement to read the following two chapters. That is why this book is not for everyone.

It shouldn't be too hard to find a book that is critical of a loser like Ernesto Guevara, but it is. This book finally counters much of the romantic clap-trap that exists about the murderous, anti-freedom, hate-filled hypocrite, but it's certainly not ideal. I'd like more info abot his life and his work and his "teachings" overall, but most of the more exhaustive biographies are stricly the aforementioned sentimental clap-trap. This book is a little too short and branches out into areas I'm not really interested in, but it gets 4 stars simply for being a good attempt and the FIRST attempt at honesty regarding this horrible man.

I wish the first chapter was expanded into a full-length critique of Che.

I thought the authors did a good job at analyzing the whole situation in North Korea, and their solution would work except for one fatal flaw: Kim Jong Il cannot be negotiated with. Period. He is a pathological liar. He deceived us in 1994, and he will deceive us again. He lies not only to the world but to his own people. Mark my words, peace will only come when Kim Jong Il is out of power and Korea is reunited under a democratic regime. Only then will the threat be gone.

In the book, Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How to Deal with a Nuclear Armed Korea, authors Michael O'Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki offer a grand strategy for securing American interests in Northeast Asia and for integrating North Korea into the international arena. It is a thoughtful plan and O'Hanlon and Mochizuki cannot be faulted for their lack of strategic vision. However, it is a plan that hinges on some problematic assumptions, and that is therefore riskier than the authors suggest.

O'Hanlon and Mochizuki argue for a strategy that they say is a middle ground between the accommodating diplomacy of the Clinton Administration and the more confrontational Bush Administration. In their view, Bush's approach to North Korea risks backing Pyongyang into a confrontation on a peninsula where any conflict would bring on devastation far beyond what South Korea and the United States would be prepared to accept. By contrast, while they see the Clinton Administration's 1994 Framework agreement as somewhat successful in temporarily capping North Korea's nuclear program, they readily admit that it established a precedent for encouraging Pyongyang to pursue nuclear blackmail and that it was not effective in blocking the North from cheating.

Consequently, the authors push for what they call a Grand Bargain, in which the United States, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea would offer North Korea extensive economic aid and security guarantees, including a peace treaty and non-aggression pact, in return for significant reductions in both conventional and WMD under a rigorous verification regimen. O'Hanlon and Mochizuki argue, convincingly, that North Korea could not win a military conflict, and that given the qualitative disparities between Pyongyang and the allies, significant reductions could be undertaken without endangering South Korean or American security. In the long run, the authors argue that Pyongyang may gradually be drawn into peaceful reunification.

There is no doubt that this strategy has much merit, and that its analysis of the current military balance of power on the peninsula is as described. However, the success of the author's approach depends on two untested assumptions: 1) That North Korea truly wants to modernize its economy and would be willing to trade away its military forces for a settlement, and 2) that the West would be able to respond quickly to any North Korean failure to abide by a deal.

As regards the first point, the authors provide some evidence that North Korea would like to modernize its economy, but the evidence is not conclusive. Kim Jong Il has indeed demonstrated some willingness to reform the catastrophic North Korean economy, but for the most part this has been to insure the military might of the regime, not to modernize it. Indeed, the benefits of such reforms as their have been thus far have gone almost entirely to the military. What is more, in the way the authors structure their arms reduction proposal, further benefits would accrue to a North Korean military that would have shed itself of useless and obsolescent equipment, thereby making it more dangerous.

In and of itself this would not be an unacceptable risk, but it does not take into account the domestic political implications for Western, specifically South Korean but also potentially American, interests in such a Korean settlement. If North Korea were to cheat on a settlement, its public would have little to say in the matter. However, the same is not true for South Korea, where public opinion would limit the ability of the Seoul government to respond to North Korean treaty violations.

The situation is roughly analogous to what the United States faced in trying to hold the Soviet Union accountable for violations of the ABM treaty during the Cold War. Washington's accusations of Soviet cheating at the Krasnoyarsk phased array radar installation were proven to be correct, although they were dismissed by Moscow, but American public opinion was so wedded to the ABM Treaty that it left Washington unable to meaningfully respond. In the context of the Korean peninsula, such a situation could have potentially fatal consequences since the margin for error on the DMZ is even smaller than it was in the world of superpower brinksmanship. Yet South Koreans are far more wedded to their "sunshine policy" toward the North than America ever was to détente. This makes any agreement with the North a far more politically complicated proposition for the allies than would at first appear to be the case.

Beyond this, the book envisions a continued American presence in Northeast Asia, notwithstanding that any settlement on the peninsula would immediately undermine the South Korean public's support for that presence. Indeed, even under the current circumstances, South Korean public opinion has grown increasingly restive about America's military posture.

Furthermore, there is little to suggest that a settlement that allows North Korea to prosper would not work against U.S. strategic interests. From an American perspective, any deal that does not envision an American withdrawal from the peninsula at some point in time- from a place that Washington initially became involved with in part by accident - cannot be deemed useful over the long run. What the United States most requires from any Korean settlement is an arrangement whereby it can redeploy its military forces off the Asian mainland and back to positions consistent with a maritime strategy. Such a re-deployment would restore strategic flexibility to the United States, allowing it to escape from the static defense it must now maintain on the peninsula.

None of which is to suggest that what O'Hanlon and Mochizuki have proposed is without merit. To the contrary, this is a singularly insightful and useful book. However, where it falls short is in its optimistic assumption that Kim Jong Il is as reasonable and as dedicated to a balanced settlement as are the authors. That assumption is unproven, and it will not be without risk to test it.

While this argument offers an insightful proposal on dealing with N. Korea (backed up by a great deal of stats) it should have been an article not a book. The book begins to get very repetitive fast, and offers information for the purpose of backing the argument (Grand bargain offered to N. Korea). This is not a book to tell one about life in N. Korea, its past history, or details about its Leader and his "pleasure squad" and Japanese kidnappings. This is a policy proposal, a very well formulated one, to deal with N. Korea right now. The argument is stretched out to fit into book form, and gets redundant after some reading. An interesting perspective, but leaves one wanting for another book.

There are few places in the world more dangerous than the Korean peninsula; yet after a decade of engagement with North Korea, the world is no closer to resolving this potentially disastrous stalemate. After the 1994 framework de facto broke down in 2002, all bets about how to deal with North Korea were off. The world had to start over.

America was not only focused on Iraq (thus putting on hold dealing with North Korea), but it also lacked any comprehensive plan for diffusing the crisis. The purpose of the "Crisis in the Korean Peninsula," by Michael O'Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki, is to fill this gap and offer a broad strategy about what to do with North Korea.

The plan is both comprehensive and ambitious. In fact, ambition is its chief attraction; Mr. O'Hanlon and Mr. Mochizuki do not want to diffuse the crisis, they want to resolve it. That means offering North Korea an alternative future with more security and more prosperity. This "grand bargain" entails abandoning nuclear weapons, reducing conventional forces, obtaining security guarantees from America, reforming economically (modeled after China or Viet Nam), launching a dialogue on human rights, and returning Japanese kidnapped victims.

The big question, of course, is whether such a plan is realistic. The authors do their best to show that it is. America, China, Russia, South Korea and Japan can all benefit from stability and prosperity in the peninsula. What about North Korea? This is an enigma, but the authors' argument that Pyongyang might go for it is both persuasive and interesting.

When everything else has failed, there is little harm in changing course. But Mr. O'Hanlon and Mr. Mochizuki have produced a great vision from this dead end; this book is an incisive look into the history of the conflict with North Korea and a road map to solving it. At least, if this plan fails, the authors argue, the world will know for sure that there is no reform for North Korea--no carrots, just sticks. But their plan surely deserves a chance to work first.

Michael O'Hanlon is one of the most brilliant and perceptive writers on strategic issues around today, as many of his many readers in the Los Angeles Times know well. Now pairing up with the other Mike at the Brookings, he does not disappoint his many fans with this superbly written new book. With North Korea there is no doubt about whether or not this rogue state possesses many weapons of lethal danger, nuclear being among them. But that means that to negotiate with a regime as dangerous as the North Korean takes endless tact and wisdom - failure could result in the deaths of millions of people. It is precisely such wisdom that the two Mikes of the Brookings provide us - so start praying now that their wisdom prevails, that the threat is dealt with peacefully and that war will not come to Asia, as many understandably fear. Christopher Catherwood, author of CHRISTIANS, MUSLIMS AND ISLAMIC RAGE (Zondervan, 2003) and THE BALKANS IN WORLD WAR 2 (Palgrave, 2003)

As a young independent voter, I am frequently mocked as too liberal for my Republican friends and as an "apologist for coporate America" by my Democrat friends. This book speaks to me in the assurance that I am not alone. It reads like "Profiles In Courage" for the political arena. Extremists are denounced and not given the chance to color the progressive landscape of the Centrists. The book feels well-paced and should inspire one to action. It personally gave me hope for 2008, when hopefully reasonable voices will be raised again.

John Avlon's book Independent Nation, distinguishes itself from the pack of jeremiads against our polarized political culture via his ability to use small points to prove larger ones. He weaves a rich tapestry from the fabric of American history that allows the reader an insight not only into political giants such as Moynihan and Giuliani's policies, but there persons as well. By including sections about lesser known figures Avlon shows that while we do live in a unique time, this is not the first generation whose politics were personal or polarized.

One of the most fascinating parts of the book is the section on Edward Brooke, who is an often forgotten figure in the struggle for civil rights. How did a black Republican get elected to the US Senate in white Democratic Massachusetts? Avlon argues that by pursuing the "vital center" he was elected first in 1966 and then re-elected in 1972 even as Nixon was losing the state. The arguments he uses to buttress this point are impressive and well-thought out.

Is there a vital center anymore? The fringes of both parties take out their vengeance via the primaries on any person who puts forth what Dick Morris called the "triangulation strategy" and but yet we sometimes let great leaders slip by like Guliani, Moynihan and even Clinton.

I once read that we get the politics we deserve rather than those that we desire. Avlon illustrates this with countless examples of people who were excoriated by their own parties and often only appreciated in historical retrospect. Where have you gone Daniel Moynihan....

Finds too much fault with the left but does little to criticize the rightwing fascists. To Avalon, himself a worker under Rudy Guliani who goes fundraising all the time for his Repug cronies even in South Dakota and Mississippi, being a moderate means giving in to the rightwing fascists as much as possible without looking as rightwing-ish. In other words, just be rightwing-light and you'll automatically be billed a moderate. Worthless book.

I was disappointed with the book. The first part of the book had a description of 'Centrism' that is relatively well-reasoned. The majority of the book has to do with describing individual politicians (or political races) involving Centrists. This is where the book fails. Of the presidents since FDR, the author classifies them all as Centrists, with the exception of LBJ, Ford, and GHW Bush. The real kicker came when he describes GW Bush and his 2000 campaign as centrist, and using "Centrist" as a description for the Reagan Conservative Revolution is more than just a stretch.

I was looking for some glimmer of light for those of us who are dismayed by the strong partisanship in the US today. Instead, the author seems to embrace the partisans (mostly on the right) as centrists, while he ignores real centrists such as John McCain or Christine Todd Whitman.

Avlon makes some good points, and his book is worth reading, particularly for its insights on what went wrong in the Carter administration.

On the other hand, Avlon sometimes stretches the evidence to make a point, so that he even winds up contradicting himself.

Writing about Nixon as a typical moderate, Avlon says that Nixon rejected the Republican appeal to racist southern votes, and that Nixon strove to reassure voters he "was no Wallace." Nixon was "ultimately successful" in desegregating southern schools, and is finally quoted as writing that "Republicans must not go prospecting for the fool's gold of racist votes."

But when later writing about African-American Senator Edward Brooke's role as a moderate, Avlon claims that Brooke was constantly fighting the Nixon administration's "southern strategy," now claiming that Nixon himself was appropriating "George Wallace's blue-collar southern segregationist support." To signal his support of the South, Nixon here is said to have nominated to the Supreme Court Haynsworth, who had questionable commitment to civil rights, and then nominated Carswell, who was "spectacularly unqualified," though Southern, and believed in segregation. The Nixon administration had an "intentionally slow timetable for desegregation." Here, BROOKE, not Nixon, is quoted as calling the search for southern racist votes "fool's gold."

The book is worth reading, but beware the stretched facts.

The binding in the book I bought was cheaply made.