Taxation Law Books
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InaccurateReview Date: 2001-12-05
Very Interesting; Maybe Too Ambitious; More Off Base ReviewsReview Date: 2001-12-22
A separate issue is that, as some of the prior reviews demonstrate, this book is apparently not well suited for economists. They seem to look for particular things in legal histories (note that at least one of the reviewers mistakenly characterized this book as an "economic history") and, when they don't find them, they claim that the history is a failure. Two reviewers ("Disappointing Read" and "Inaccurate") have now argued that there is something wrong with Peritz's book because he fails to observe empirical data and theoretical research allegedly showing that the monopolists of the late 19th c.--the time when the U.S. adopted its first federal antitrust law--in fact promoted healthy markets because they "caused prices to fall and output to rise." The implicit argument that flows from this is a little mysterious--the reviewers seem to argue either that Peritz is wrong because antitrust is wrong (i.e., that the monopolists were good and therefore Congress should not have adopted antitrust), or that in fact the Congress of 1890 did not have the monopolists in mind when they enacted the Sherman Act because they recognized, as some conservative economists now argue, that the monopolists were socially beneficial.
Neither argument follows at all; the criticism is off base at least for the following three reasons:
1. To the extent that the criticism faults Peritz for his failure to show that antitrust is in fact good policy--that is, for his failure to offer a substantive response to the alleged empirical proof of the social beneficence of the monopolists--it misunderstands Peritz's project. Again, he sets a very big-picture task for himself, but no part of it is a substantive defense of either the antitrust laws nor any particular vision of competition policy. He merely wants to examine the "history, rhetoric [and] law" that surrounds the idea of "competition" in U.S. history (note that both of the prior negative reviews assume that this book is about "antitrust history," but neither in the title nor in Pertiz's statement of his purpose does he say that this is a book about "antitrust history"--rather, it is a history of "competition policy"). He *never* sets for himself the task of arguing that the monopolists were bad as a matter of economic substance nor that antitrust is good as a matter of substantive policy.
2. To the extent that the previous reviews quibble with Peritz's view of the historical origin of U.S. antitrust law, they are wrong. As was shown beyond serious doubt in a classic legislative history of antitrust (John D. Clark, "The Federal Trust Policy" (1936)), the Congress that passed the Sherman Act and the later Congress that passed the significant 1914 amendments to that Act utterly and apparently intentionally ignored the prevailing academic economists of their day. Therefore, though some academics at that time argued that markets are sufficiently self-regulating that even the Rockefellers and J.P. Morgans and so on should just be left alone, Congress didn't care. (And, moreover, that was _not_ a universally held economic view, nor is it today, by any stretch of the imagination.) So how is any purported empirical proof of the efficiency of the mega-monopolies relevant at all to a legislative history of antitrust? Congress didn't care about it.
3. But most importantly, the final reason that I think the previous reviews are off base is that they simply reflect a political bias that nowadays is very common amongst economists and conservative lawyers, and accordingly they reflect (though only implicitly) the basic ugliness of conservative microeconomics. Both reviews imply a basic tenet of all right-wing economics: that where markets are "self-regulating," according to the pinched and narrow definition that conservatives give that term--namely, when particular companies cause "prices to fall and output to rise"--they must be left alone. Believing in such a view depends on one's willingness to believe that the only social values that matter are endogenous to the simplistic model of perfect competition. But that requires several large empirical leaps of faith, because it requires one to believe that the simplistic model of competitive equilibrium that is the heart of neoclassical economics is in fact sufficiently similar to the real world that it is the answer to all policy questions. In fact, as was observed in a previous review ("Best In Its Field), the simplistic model, however useful it may be in the classroom and in textbooks, ignores profound matters of policy and conscience that are not endogenous--that is, values that are not internalized by market participants and therefore can only be served by policy makers.
Failure to understand this problem explains how men like Ricardo, for example, could look across the human wasteland of poverty, disease and suffering that was the British Industrial Revolution and say that, hey, it's okay, because markets are efficient and since the markets have produced this human tragedy, then it must be the best we can do.
Best in Its Field; Previous Review Off BaseReview Date: 2001-08-10
One word of warning is that the book is ideologically tilted. Peritz is associated to some degree with a left-leaning movement in legal scholarship called "critical legal studies," and a primary purpose of this book is to combat what Peritz considers the revisionist history or historical ignorance underlying the conservative economic revolution in antitrust since the 1970s. That said, however, his readable and informed book is a work of genuine and serious scholarship and not at all a simple political broadside. It is a welcome dose of perspective in a debate that recently has grown narrow and unduly obsessed with theoretical abstraction.
A brief word about the prior, very negative review (entitled "Disappointing Read"): it is beyond me why the assertedly "large (and still growing) body of research" which purportedly "show[s] that [the 19th c. monopolies] in fact promoted competitive markets" has anything to do with the "mythical notion" that "antitrust legislation was enacted in response to increasing monopolization of the U.S. economy." In fact, whatever economists may have come up with during the late 20th c.--the "large (and still growing)" body of research--is itself irrelevant to the motivations of the policymakers who first created the antitrust laws.
Moreover, though it is true that certain writers in recent decades have begun to argue that the megacompanies of the late 19th c. in fact were good for the economy, and that the so-called "muckrakers" and other populist critics of the early monopolists had gotten it all wrong, that is not to say that that research is right and Peritz is wrong. In fact, this allegedly "large (and still growing)" body of research is itself controversial and, so some would argue, politically biased. It is at a minimum at odds with nearly a century of widely held belief and therefore to be received with caution. Moreover, it seems contrary to mountains of anecdotal evidence of intentional and serious wrongdoing, like brutality towards labor and willful disregard of basic quality and safety, that when committed by a monopolist represent a genuine threat to our polity and a legitimate concern of our government. Whether or not the vaunted synergistic efficiencies that purportedly flow from industry consolidation outweigh the evils of monopoly is not at all a settled matter (which evils, contrary to the glib implication in the prior review, cannot necessarily be measured by endogenous market phenomena, but may very well produce externalities like massive distributional inequalities, distortion in capital markets, undue political influence in private hands, environmental harms, etc.).
Anyway, it may or may not be a "mythical notion" that monopolies are bad, but whether it is "mythical" or not, the evidence suggesting it was not available to the 1890 Congress that enacted the Sherman Act and it is therefore irrelevant to a history of their motivations.
A disappointing readReview Date: 1999-02-13

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Too much Economics 101 speculationReview Date: 1999-01-30
The book is founded on the theory of bus and jitney operators having rights to own the curb for bus stops. This brings about too much free market optimism, but very little assurance that public transit would actually be improved.
It's no surprise that free market public transit is advocated, one of the authors is from the Libertarian Party think tank, the Reason Foundation.
The authors also mention that in places where transit was deregulated, there was no survey on how riders actually felt about service before and after deregulation. So there is no guarantee about improvement.
a way to better transitReview Date: 2007-01-03
This would allow the predictably high-volume routes to be served by the high-volume, large bus & cost overhead municipal operation while allowing the service increases possible through the addition of smaller and possibly innovative operators.
Makes sense to me. While clearly advocating their position, the authors recognize and address the ligitimancy of the municipalities' concerns over service preservation. With sensible implentation, I'm sure it would work to improve urban transit which (it seems to me) currently consists of balancing the interest of car-driving taxpayers to limit transit subsidies and the interests of Municipal Transit Agency employee unions to maximize employee wages and benefits, with the transit customer well down on the list of concerns.
Demonstrably WrongReview Date: 2002-04-29
This book promotes the notion that "free enterprise" must be inserted into public transit so as to maximize the benefits to passengers and society at large.
However, this notion is demonstrably wrong.
For example, local bus operations in British cities outside of London were completely de-regulated in the 1980's by the national Tory government, e.g., public funding was almost entirely cut off and private bus companies were allowed to compete freely against one another (as opposed to "privatization" in the U.S. which has mainly meant a public agency putting service out to competitive bid). Regional pass schemes allowing passengers to freely transfer from one route or operator to another were abolished.
The results are conclusive. Bus patronage in British cities dropped more than 30% by the early 1990's. In London, bus patronage over the same period actually increased somewhat, despite major cuts in subsidy funding. The difference was that London retained regional governmental control of fare and service decisions, despite putting much of the service out to bid.
The disaster of British local bus de-regulation has also been repeated in spades by the ill-considered "privatization" of British Rail. Rail privatization has been a big enough disaster to become one of the hottest public issues in Great Britain.
The successes obtained by "centralized" regional planning and decision-making authority in elected government hands is quite conclusive in other countries. In Zurich, per capita transit usage is among the highest in the developed world, exceeding a number of Japanese cities. Zurich's success--in one of the most affluent, high auto-owning urban areas on the planet--is based on centralized planning at the canton level, plus generous government funding. Zurich has managed to retain very high transit market share despite rapid motorization since the 1960's. The reasons that Toronto, Canada's past success with generating high transit usage levels, are essentially the same as Zurich, though the current pseudo-free market provincial government in Ontario is too boorish to understand this.
"Free
market" economists like Klein often cite the "success" of private transit in Southeast Asia; however, those "capitalist" bastions
of Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia have relied on centralized planning and sufficient funding to allow new transit systems
to function through selective privatization, but not anywhere near the model that Klein espouses. In effect, government transportation
policies in Hong Kong and Singapore guarantee the transit market (e.g., car use is restricted, heavily taxed). The Zurich
and Toronto models have proven to be less authoritarian.
Klein proves how blinkered economists--particularly those
who espouse "libertarian" views ("new right" in British and Australian terms)--are very shortsighted about public transit
and other similar public policy issues.
For one of the few books that I've seen that "gets it right," I recommend "A Very Public Solution" by Paul Mees, a professor of Planning and Public Policy at Melbourne University, Melboune, Australia (yes, Amazon carries it).
Mee's point about urban transit is best summed up by this from one of my unpublished papers:
Flexibility would be the greatest benefit of improved transit to "transit dependents" and would-be "choice" users. This is clearly explained by the book "A Very Public Solution" (Page 289; Dr. Paul Mees, Melbourne University Press, 2000. Melbourne, Australia):
(Mees' excerpt):
With public transport itself, the critical issue is flexibility. And the key to flexibility for passengers is simplicity and predictability, not a bewildering array of constantly changing options. The latter produces confusion, not convenience. Paradoxically, to be flexible, public transport must also be rigidly predictable: perhaps the best analogy is with the road system, rather than with cars themselves...
This means that frequent service on an easy-to-understand, predictable, and reliable network of regional and local transit services delivers vastly superior flexibility to the customer. Such transit systems typically service a far higher percentage of "choice" patronage. Compared to an infrequent, specialized, hard to understand jumble of routes, such transit networks compete successfully with automobiles.
A Very Public Solution's prime case study is Toronto, Canada. Toronto has significantly higher per transit usage per capita than many European cities, an order of magnitude higher than most U.S. urban areas. Toronto's exceptionally high transit use occurs despite millions of residents living in dispersed suburbs essentially indistinguishable from the American norm. Canadian fuel prices are only slightly higher than the United States. There are more similarities than differences between Canadian and U.S. culture. Toronto's transit usage remain high, despite service cuts caused by an early 1990's recession.
Great Book!Review Date: 1999-07-25

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Confusing, not enough detailReview Date: 1999-10-22
Furthermore, an updated edition would be welcome inasmuch as there have been several changes to S Corporation regulations, the most notable being in 1996 when the limit on number of stockholders was changed from 35 to 75, a substantial increase indeed.
Very DisappointedReview Date: 1999-11-25
Very informative. Well written. Humorous writing style.Review Date: 1999-04-16
Excellent information and advice.Review Date: 2003-12-30

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The "Flat Tax" is a Shell GameReview Date: 2007-08-08
This country was not founded on the principle of "pay up or you're going to jail".
But that is what taxes are.
If you think they are inevitable and that it's impossible to have society without them, you have a LOT of reading to do.
You could start with "Your Money or Your Life", by Sheldon Richman. From there, amazon should direct you to other titles of interest with their helpful book suggestions.
You could also check out Amazon Top-100 reviewer John "Scott" Ryan. He has some reading lists that can point you in a very good direction.
Biased against governmentReview Date: 2003-11-06
Better Late Than NeverReview Date: 2001-02-03
How a true American tax system should work!Review Date: 2001-08-04
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It stinks, but it is thoroughReview Date: 2005-03-31
there has to be something betterReview Date: 2005-10-17
Good ResourceReview Date: 2004-06-19
Still, I'm working in the securities area this summer and I don't know what I'd do without it. Hornbooks are great and I highly recommend them. But sometimes they don't really delve into the fine points of the law. This book is all about the fine points. I'll admit it's dense, but securities law isn't the simplest of topics. The other textbooks I've seen don't have as many cases and they seem to gloss over important topics like materiality which isn't that terrible until you need to know whether a particular activity is material.
Does the book cover a lot of ground? Yes. Is it a challenging read? Yes. Is there a better Sec. Reg. text out there? I haven't seen one.
very unclearReview Date: 2004-02-16

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Good basic guideReview Date: 2007-02-01
Taxes in brief for beginnersReview Date: 2000-03-31
OBSOLETEReview Date: 2001-11-02
WSJ must introduce a new and updated edition.
Good basic guide - helps understand the vocabulary of taxesReview Date: 2003-02-07
It gives you a basic introduction to the kinds of taxes we pay at the federal and local levels, the IRS, "paying as you earn", the annual (federal) return (with a nice general overview of the general applicable forms), audits (shiver!), and a little overview of tax planning. But, again, this guide's purpose is to provide a general overview and to provide you with basic concepts and vocabulary. Think of this as a good introduction to the topic rather than a practical preparation guide and you will understand what this book is trying to do.
It has lots of color and every page also uses helpful illustrations of the forms and processes involved in the tax process. Great for young people trying to learn what they are facing as the goverment(s) remove large chunks of their income to keep us in whatever it is we think we have from the government(s).

ObscureReview Date: 2006-10-17
Good StuffReview Date: 2002-12-31
Basement
Then to spy
in an unused cellar spot
Under a bulb fixture
long since jury-rigged
in
deal cast-off
And between oil tank
and salt-scalloped stone wall
--Between a ruck
and a carapace--
A tiny skeleton--mouse.
My
instinct:
to trip-tipsy the dark
--As even the Dean
and Cuchulain might--
fantastic.
[My opinion is that Muldoon peaked in 1990 with his tour de force, MADOC--A Mystery, the book-length poem and astounding work of the imagination. MADOC was large, confounding, mysterious, lyrical, and sui generis (really). Yet many readers/reviewers did not appreciate it. Since that work, Muldoon seemingly has tried to obtain such appreciation by offering more manageable fare--featuring topical themes, easy wit, sentiment, form, and rhyme (not to mention all those pretty names of Irish places). He has served up plates of warm apercus. If that is your thing--fine. He is terribly accomplished--his more recent poems, including those of Moy Sand and Gravel, sparkle with polish and panache. But I will take the polar edge of the creative MADOC thankyouverymuch.]
Solid collection best read after his previous three volumesReview Date: 2005-04-11
The reason this collection loses a star is the last poem, as usual in his work a longer one: "At the Sign of the Black Horse." The Irish navvy-Jewish mogul undercurrent never convinces, but seems layered over the parental concerns. Where Muldoon often swerves to avoid obstacles, here he seems to plow ahead, but ends up floundering a bit when taking more time to expand and concentrate his direction would've made for a better poetic quest into a very deserving subject of culture clash.
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This is a ScamReview Date: 2008-02-29
Happy UserReview Date: 2007-01-20
Crim Pro and Evidence books. In my work as a JAG attorney, I have found that they are perfect memory joggers to help with my part-time prosecution duties.
useful the night before your finalReview Date: 2000-06-08

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Ho humReview Date: 1998-09-09
Easy to read and understandReview Date: 1999-12-18

Excellent in terms and study materialReview Date: 2006-12-06
The worst...Review Date: 2006-11-22
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In this book, the author seems totally unaware of this fact. I found this book to be frustratingly bad, poorly argued and too often based upon myths about American economic history.