Military Law Books

I found this book very informative. I am not a profesional, but rather a TACSIM buff. This book is great for people who play tactical style airsoft or paitball.

This is a great book which details the struggle that non-profit groups, individuals and countries undertook in order to ban landmines.

While it tells the story of the International Campaign To Ban Landmines who won a Nobel prize for their work, this book also chronicles the stories of other such as the landmines survivors whose needs were almost ignored by those trying to help them.

The other thing about this book that's interesting is that you can see the techniques these people used to pass a humanitarian law on the international level.

All in all a good read.

This book was very favorably commented by the Canadian News Magazine "The National" in its pieced aired on July 7, 2008. This book (when it was released) played a large part in Canada's abolition of the capital punishment, but Steven Truscott's conviction was upheld. (The death sentence was, however, commuted to life in prison). Three years after the book was published, he was released on parole/license.

ON July 7, 2008,the Ontario Government gave Mr. Truscott $6.5 finding he was in fact innocent. This book has again gained relevance.

While it lacks passion of Dr. Brzezinski's works, this book is a cold-blooded review (detailed and timely) of U.S. intervention policy. Not written for a mass reader, it keeps CNN-style "human rights" hoopla to a minimum. Chapter on "New Techniques of Coercion" will be especially revealing for non-US readers.

Calhoun packs a ton of useful insights into this work, a book low on detail but full of fresh, succinct ideas. The objective of the book is to analyze the various military ventures forwarded by Wilson and to discern the pattern, if any, in these forays. Mexico, Germany and Russia are the major countries that Calhoun focuses on, examining Wilson's intervention in their problems. Calhoun breaks down the "uses of force" into five distinct categories, attempting to define each intervention according to its features as a specific type of force. These uses of force range from "The use of force for protection" to "The use of force for association." In the interests of not giving away the entire thesis of the book, allow me to say that Calhoun's thesis, though sometimes thick and slippery, works effectively. Having been assigned this book for a class in grad school, I can attest to the fact that Calhoun's work taught me much about Wilson and his intriguing foreign policy.

Dean Ely has done a good job with this book. It contains, for the most part, a realistic analysis of who has power in foreign affairs, and why. Unfortunately, he overemphasizes the importance of text and cases in what is really a political process. For example, he claims on p. 5 that the president cannot start a war. Well, with a blinkered, textual analysis he's absolutely right. The problem is that presidents have started wars (the Mexican-American War being the first of a not-so-illustrious line of them). So Dean Ely's analysis is smacked in the face by real life.

Other specific problems in Dean Ely's book include: (1) on p. 9 he states "from childhood we Americans are programmed to fall in when the bugle sounds." What? What country is he living in? The country has not been militaristic since 1945, if then. The man has no idea what true militarism is. His comment obviously flows from an anti-military world view. (2) The U.S. was not in a "naval war" with Iran in 1987-1998, as Dean Ely claims on p. 49. Shelling an oil platform and shooting up a couple of speedboats hardly qualifies as a "war." Once again, the reader is left with the sense that Dean Ely's analysis is subject to a preconceived world view. (3) enlisted personnel do not have the "skepticism aboout superiors' orders" drilled out of them during basic training, as Dean Ely claims on p. 57. Having been an officer in the military myself, I can assure the potential reader that's not the case.

The problems noted above all stem from Dean Ely's own prejudices. I would give 5:1 odds that Dean Ely is a liberal democrat, who attended an East-Coast school sometime in the 1960s. His analysis fits that mold perfectly. So read this book, but remember that the author has not risen above his own particular biases.

This collection of essays is fantastic. It brings together a number of issues in war crimes law, including the early origins of humanitarian intervention and community interest in human rights through the disucssion of the works of Grotius and Gentili. IT is a valuable addition to any collection of international law texts.

This book is a very well written account of the trial which decimated David Irving and helped to fight against the growing threat of Holocaust denial. Overall, the book keeps you "in the middle of it all," as if you are really there, which makes for a very good read. He gives an excellent amount of background into all the important characters so you feel like you know them while you read. He uses metaphors often to help the reader understand what the trial seemed like from the spectator's point of view. My only reservation is that there are definitely a few ways in which the book could have been improved.

D. D. Guttenplan did an excellent job of recounting the story in a journalistic style, using as little personal opinion as possible and making it clear when he does include his own beliefs. The only problem with this is that he accomplished the task almost too well, which makes the story a little boring at times. Sometimes it is only the desire to know more that keeps you turning the pages. Guttenplan also did not do a very good job of explaining the historical background. For someone who is reading the book without any previous knowledge of the Holocaust, especially about the people involved, it can be easy to be confused by the sheer number of characters and historical figures that play a role in the trial and the period in history with which it was concerned. Finally, when dealing with the trial proceedings themselves, Guttenplan uses ellipses a lot, almost too much. It's hard to read the conversations shared between Irving, the expert witnesses, and Richard Rampton, the defense attorney and see so many ellipses and not feel like you're missing something (However, I wouldn't recommend looking for the transcript from the trial, the book says it's several hundred pages long).

Despite these weaknesses, I would definitely recommend this book to anyone who is interested in Holocaust history or the Holocaust denial movement (I myself picked up the book while doing research for a paper on the dangers of Holocaust denial). Guttenplan is obviously concerned about the "revisionist history" movement that David Irving represents. Throughout the book he makes blatantly obvious the methods used by David Irving to bend the truth to suit his needs. And, to wrap up the book, he spends the last chapter by reinforcing the point that David Irving is only the tip of the iceberg. He makes it clear that the trial was not the end of the Holocaust debate, but merely one incident in a struggle against ignorance that does not apply only to Jews and Holocaust, but to anyone who takes pride in their history. For this reason, this eye-opening book is well worth the read, even if you're not a history buff.

For those who like gripping court dramas that touch on historiography, epistemology, WWII history, and politics, D.D. Guttenplan has written your kind of book. "Holocaust on Trial," is a 'gavel to gavel' account of the David Irving v. Deborah Lipstadt and Penguin Book Co. trial.

Irving, a non-PhD'd historian, writes books purporting to show that there were no gas chambers at Auschwitz, that far fewer Jews died there than is thought, and that Hitler had no knowledge of the 'final solution to the Jewish question.' Lipstadt is an Emory University professor of Jewish Studies who wrote a book, called "Denying the Holocaust," in which she brands Irving as a 'dangerous' holocuast denier. Upon the release of Lipstadt's book Irving sued Lipstadt for libel in his home country of England where the libel laws are such that (contra US law) it is the defendent that must prove that libel did NOT occur and that everything she said was accurate. Thus, to show that she didn't libel Irving, Lipstadt must show that everything she writes about him is accurate. In order to do that, she has to, in a court of law, prove that the holocaust happened the way most historians believe - gas chambers and all. And, she must prove that Irving knowingly distorted evidence to arrive at a contrary conclusion.

Guttenplan's book does a good job recounting the trial with journalistic detail. We get a good feel for who David Irving (who argued his case himself) and who the defendants are (though as Lipstadt doesn't speak at all in the trial, she is certainly the most absent of the characters). We get a good feel for the grave stakes each side is playing for. Should the defense lose, shock waves will flow through the entire historical community, who are watching with baited breath. Should the prosecution lose, Irving will prove himself to be a historical quack. This book does well at painting the picture of a tense, yet spectacular, trial.

While Guttenplan tries to be journalistically objective, never dismissing Irving as may be tempting, he certainly doesn't get a good impression of Irving. (Of course, Guttenplan is also quick to point out that just as Irving is not a PhD'd historian, neither is Lipstadt, who's PhD is in Jewish Studies.) Even readers who don't know how the real trial ended are likely to get the continual feeling that Irving is to be outmatched. In this sense, the book is anti-climactic; but just like watching "Titanic," the fun is not in finding out how it ends, but in finding out how it gets there. Basically, Lipstadt wins and exposes Irving as a fraudulent historian with questionable motives and you, the reader, get to see how she pulled it off!

Other readers have noted that this book is long on journalism, and short on philosophical rumination. What is proper historiography? How much of history is evidence and how much is inference? How do we know what 'historical truth' is anyhow? None of these questions are discussed at any length. If that is what you want, Deborah Lipstadt and Richard Evans (a historian the defense used to debunk Irving's historical claims) both have books out that touch on these questions. This book is the journalism; not the philosophy.

Anyhow, this is a very solid book about a tial all of Britian was watching (oddly, it got little publicity in the states). For those concerned with history and the mechanisms by which historians tell the good from the bogus, this is a book worth reading and thinking about.

Gutteplan's account of the Irving trial is very informative, and he is quite thorough in covering the various nuances of the trial, particularly the testimoney of different witnesses. However, he appears overly concerned at points with maintaining a netural tone. For every critique of Irving, Guttenplans tries to throw in a minor, meaningless criticism of Deborah Libstadt. By the end of the book, Guttenplan's stance on Irving is clear; rather than vascillating, he should have taken a more comittal, firm tone. Also, at times, Guttenplan places himself into the larger narrative, which comes across as awkward and unncessary. He also displays an odd concern for irrelevant detail, which he often explores in footnotes. Lastly, Guttenplan's thesis is ambiguous and not clearly presented throughout the text; most of the book reads like journalistc reporting, but the last chapter is personal commentary, which is seems out of place. I will once again commend him, however, for his thoroughness.

Deborah Libstadt recently delivered a guest lecture to my Judaic Studies course at college, and I look forward to reading her account of the trial. I expect her book to contain less speculation and to be more insightful than Guttenplan's.

When he is reporting on the trial, Guttenplan's book is gripping and invaluable. Invaluable because he not only reports on the trial but takes the time to make cultural and legal "translations" for American and British readers alike. So as a report on the momentous David Irving versus Penguin Books Ltd. And Deborah Lipstadt this book is amongst the best I have read.

Where it fails (and fails considerably) is when Guttenplan stops reporting and starts injecting his politics into the book; when he starts lecturing the reader. Guttenplan is very much of the left and is very careful to show it. And he is thus very careful to show (at every considerable chance) that he does not like Deborah Lipstadt's politics or the ADL or the Board of Jewish Deputies. He says these organizations "police public discussions". (He does not bother to actually come up with evidence for this assertion--something that stands out in a well-documented book such as this.) Or, again he assures us that Jews "use" the Holocaust to say "You abandoned us to Hitler, and now you owe us"; "You didn't do enough to save our brethren from the Nazis. Now you must be blindly loyal (for example) to the current government of Israel.." Again he does not bother to substantiate any of this.

In a sense, these are throw-away remarks; something "everyone knows". (And perhaps in the UK where he lives everyone does "know" this). Unfortunately, they are not true. And Guttenplan does not bother to check if they are; he just "knows" they are. Even more annoying is that whenever Guttenplan gives us these bits of "common knowledge" he does so as-a-Jew and as-a-relative-of-Holocaust-survivors. He seems to think that his ethnicity, religion and relatives give him some sort of extra moral standing. They don't.

So if you want a gravel-to-gravel well-written account of this historic trial, I recommend this book. But I warn you against the "everyone knows it" and "holier than though" passages. They are (not too put too fine a word on it) simply false.

D.D. Guttenplan's book on the David Irving's lawsuit against Penguin Books and Deborah Lipstadt proves to be a well written account of this trial where Irving lost his reputation as a respected military historian and gained a new one as an racist, anti-Semitic and a neo-Nazi. This is one major trade-off for any one individual. Mr. Guttenplan's book of the trial provides a clear and easy to followed account of the trial through its many issues and personalities.

However, where Mr. Guttenplan goes wrong in this book was when he insert his own personal opinions on books and issues that were discussed and argued over during the trial. To be real, we readers are not interested in Mr. Guttenplan's opinions on these matter although he inserted it anyway. This colored the writing of the trial. This proves to be an contradiction to the general theme of the book where the author does his best to sound "neutral" when reaccounting the trial.

It would also help if Mr. Guttenplan included some photos of the main characters of this trial as well as some diagrams of some of the areas of dispute. (Like Irving's claims that gas chambers were actually "air raid shelters"....!!??!)

Overall, not a bad book but it could have been better.

Japan has committed some of the world's worst atrocities in history (nanking massacre, unit 731, batton death march, comfort women, pearl harbor, ect..) and they still refuse to apologize, compensate, or make an accurate history in there textbooks. Why is Japan so cowardly and instead try to make their amends to their victims of the horrible crimes against humanity. No wonder people call Japan a "devil" race.

I have to tell you that I am Korean and as people know we hate Japanese! Japan still state that the Japanese have not killed any Korean and Chinese and 99.99% of the population does not know anything about the horrible torture they did on Korea and China! Also, the Japanese states that Dokdo is their land when it has been owned by Korea for more than 6 centuries! So stop pretending to be apologizing Japan! You guys did that 5 times already! We won't get fooled agaiN!

This is one of several books detailing the atrocities Japan committed in China during WWII, atrocities the Japanese and their government have yet to face up to in a mature and honest manner. I suppose, for Japan, it's a matter of losing face, and if that's so, Japan has a lot face to lose. Those who deny the Nanjing butchery are so blinded by their hate of communism that any truth exposed by anyone who even minutely appears to support China's view is instantly shrugged off as a lie(s). The bottom line is, the Nanjing Massacre and other Japanese atrocities are about as untrue as the existence of the Comfort Women (Chinese and Korean women kidnapped by Japanese soldiers so as to whore themelves among the Japanese military), and the Bataan Death March where so many American and British military and civilians were murdered along the long walk to Japanese POW camps, none of which Japan has yet to come to terms with either. In fact, the Japanese government even refuses to discuss the Comfort Women.
Those who deny Japan's responsibilty are the same kind we in the west refer to as revisionists when they say the Holocaust never happened. They're not revisionsists; they're liars. A few of the reviews of this book are so full of philosophical and political claptrap that it reminds one of a cheap hamburger loaded with filler. Unfortunatley, the burger is so full of God-knows-what that instead of pleasing the customer with its juicy full rounded appearance, one distasteful bite and you instantly realize you're about to throw up.

In Japan Honda Katsuichi has been revered as among his country's finest journalists in print media. But sadly, his excellent journalism pertaining to the horrific acts committed by Imperial Japanese military forces against helpless Chinese prisoners of war and civilians during the three month-long campaign in late 1937 and early 1938 that led to the fall of Nanking (Nanjing) - then the Republic of China's capital - has been ignored or harshly criticized (or both) by his fellow Japanese, who still cling stubbornly to the historical fiction that they too, were victims, because of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (I have a question for those Japanese - including several previous Amazon.com reviewers who've demonstrated that they are delusional - who still deny the great, wanton crimes against humanity inflicted upon Asians, Americans and Europeans by the Empire of Japan in its ruthless attempt to create a "Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" in the 1930s and 1940s. Why do you think the United States felt compelled to use the atom bomb against Japan? Could one of the reasons be the savage, genocidal war which Japan's military forces waged against the Chinese from 1937 to 1945? In stark contrast, Germany, Austria, and Italy have atoned for their crimes against humanity. When will Japan's elected government make the same admission?).

Honda Katsuichi's "The Nanjing Massacre" isn't an easy book to read, since it is replete with many eyewitness accounts, by Chinese survivors whom Honda interviewed personally in the 1970s and 1980s, that provide clear, compelling evidence of countless acts of genocide by Japanese military forces against the Chinese, and especially, brutal treatment of civilians, including, most infamously, raping adult women and girls, and sexual molestation such as stabbing them in their vaginas with bayonets and swords. It is a better, far more accurate, book than Iris Chang's justly celebrated "The Rape of Nanking", since it shows that Japanese acts of genocidal brutality did not begin with the fall of Nanking in mid December, 1937, but instead, started as soon as Japanese troops waded ashore at Hangzhou Bay, more than a month before. This American edition also includes excerpts from previous and more recent books written by Honda on Japanese military atrocities during the campaign to take Nanking, as well as revealing excerpts from the diaries of Japanese soldiers who were guilty of committing these crimes. If nothing else, Honda's books ought to be required reading in Japanese classrooms, and the English translation of this book may one day compel the Japanese government to atone for the genocidal actions of its military forces - most notably the Imperial Japanese Army - in the 1930s and 1940s.

In response to the reviewer below, I must say that it isn't true that 99.9% of the Japanese do not know about the "rape of Nanjing," or that Japan has not apologized at all. We do know it and it's in our history textbooks as well, granted that we are not taught that part of history as much in detail as those in China or Korea. The Japanese government has also apologized on numerous occasions, the question of their sincerity aside. Partly abetted by the nationalist trend that is currently on the rise in Japan, a handful of historians are attempting to rewrite the history; however, it is absolutely wrong that the whole nation is completely ignorant of the matter. Any attempt to appeal to sensationalism or fervent patriotism just adds fuel to the fire.
As for the book in question, this is a pretty good traversal of the matter, though some call into question the impartiality of the evidence employed.

Mr. Schlesinger's book is good in some regards. But I have to agree with an earlier reviewer about the rambling on at the end of the book.

The best aspect of the book is the history of American presidents and the process of engaging in war. An example being Truman setting the precedent of "the president possessing the inherent power to go to war."

The author effectively explains the differences between preventive and pre-emptive war.

The history of close presidential elections was used as a segue to the electoral college topic.
His chapter on the electoral college was very good! He detailed the history of and changes made to the electoral college. The "national bonus plan" is intriguing and a possible solution to the anomoly of a candidate winning the popular vote while losing the presidency due to different results from the electoral college.

This book was good on some level,but had some boring areas that left me disappointed overall.

If he had not been the author of The Imperial Presidency, you wouldn't be reading so many reviews of Arthur Schlesinger's latest work. The technique of identifying recurrent historical patterns in the nature of Presidential power and comparing them to the current office-holder worked extremely well in Schlesinger's classic discussion of how White House resources triumphed over hostile Congresses under Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon. It is neither well-executed nor particularly effective in Schlesinger's analysis of George W. Bush's manipulation of a basically compliant Congress to pursue a unilateralist foreign policy. As other reviewers note, there is little that is particularly innovative in the Bush administration's actions in Iraq other than the scale of the intervention (compared to Johnson in the Dominican Republic, Reagan's abortive effort in Lebanon and more successful invasion of Grenada, etc.). What is different is the extent of the miscalculation, both of the enemy and of world reaction. In his three chapters on foreign policy, Schlesinger hardly touches upon these issues, but instead launches into a passionate defense of the success of multilateralism in addressing previous conflicts and problems. In fact, the author never really explains why US multilateralist belief in the efficacy of alliances ever became transformed into unilateralism. At the same time, former congressman Lee Hamilton performed superior historical analysis in his recent work, A Creative Tension, in addressing the systemic issues that influence the balance between congressional and White House influence in times of conflict.

Schlesinger's criticism of Attorney General John Ashbrook's attacks on civil liberties in the name of national security and his diatribe against the electoral college, which occupy about a third of the work, are neither original nor timely. In fact, a good argument can be made that the electoral college in 2000 did exactly what it was supposed to do...prevented the election from reflecting the interests of urban and ethnic coastal minorities at the expense of the suburban, small town, and rural majorities. The fact that so many Americans voted against their personal interests for a President who could be characterized as shallow in thought and elitist in sympathy is unfortunate and even tragic,..but that's democracy.

Succinct, sensible, scholarly not sneering...if only George II had chosen the likes of Mr. Schlesigner for his advisors instead of the neocon nincompoops who've set in motion the waning of our military & economic power, influence, and prestige. The accident of history that gave us a president with no sense of history along with a messianic mission has done more damage to our country than the communists of past or the terrorists of present.

This book cries out to be read by every thoughtful, reflective, informed American. So much for any sales in Crawford, even though it's only 7 chapters and 150 pages...perhaps if W. could read a chapter a week he'd finish while still on vacation!

"In 1998, Donald Rumsfeld, [Paul] Wolfowitz, [Richard] Perle were among the eighteen signers of an open letter to President Clinton arguing that regime change in Iraq 'needs to become the aim of American foreign policy'." This quote from world-respected author and one-man political think tank, Arthur Schesinger shows that these individuals were looking for an excuse that 9/11 gave them, to invade Iraq. They began beating the tocsins of war shortly after to create their vision of a middle eastern democracy under a pax americana.

Arthur Schlesinger points out in detail how the Bush administration pressured the CIA for raw intelligence from which they would make an interpretation, how the reasons for invading Iraq kept changing, and how the White House kept contradicting previous statements. The reader can only come to the conclusion that the Bush Doctrine is an utter failure, the invasion of Iraq was not to fight terrorism but to satisfy a right-wing vision, that we were lied to about an association between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin-Laden, that we lied to about WMD. Even after this collaboration and weapons failed to materialize, Schlesinger states "the Bush administration is left with liberation, which it had once deemed an insufficient justification for putting American lives at risk."

I found the first three chapters captivating, but I gave this four stars because of a need to keep a dictionary by my side. The author's vocabulary far exceeds mine, and those of fewer words may find this annoying or challenging. I was also annoyed by the author's use of French without translation: "Nous Sommes Tous Americains." (We are all Americans.) In some places, I had to stop and absorb his insight--a more worthwhile pursuit.

But, if you are looking for a powerful and persuasive argument against our government and its actions, Arthur Schlesinger gives it to you. Read it, and soak it up. Finally, remember the words of George Bush:

"There was no viable exit strategy....Going in and occupying Iraq, thus unilaterally exceeding the United Nations mandate, would have destroyed the precedent of international response to aggression that we hoped to establish."

That was from George Herbert Walker Bush (41)!

Arthur Schlesinger is a writer and historian who has authored many books and served some time in government. He is a Pulitzer Prize winning author and a person who has earned respect over the years for his insight into government, history, and the important issues of the day.

In this book, Schlesinger spends most of his time talking about the decision to go to war against Iraq and its long term effects on the American people and the democratic way of life. Some of the book's analysis deals with war in general terms but the author spends the bulk of his time talking about the Iraqi conflict and the Bush administration's approach to war. Everyone already knows about the phony "weapons of mass destruction" charge and how it was used to justify the invasion. Schlesinger is a critic of this decision but he actually gives credit to Bush in one respect: He doesn't necessarily think that Bush made up the story. Rather, he thinks the decision was based on faulty information that should have been recognized as faulty but was accepted in its entirety. Bush and his administration were anxious to go after Saddam so they were willing to quickly accept anything that would justify moving the U.S. closer to war. Lost in all of this, of course, was the pursuit of the real enemy: Osama Bin Laden. Bush and his cabinet dismissed the hunt for Osama as soon as they found a reason to go after Iraq.

Even though this book is primarily written about the decision to go to war and how the approach to war has changed over the years, there is also a good deal of talk about democracy in general and how the Bush administration's policies will affect democracy in the future. Schlesinger accurately states that democracy, capitalism, property rights, and personal freedom all go hand in hand and that many of these components of freedom are being diminished gradually by the Bush administration. He also states that the trends in recent history show that the twentieth century ended with more democratic societies than at any other time in the past. But rather than serve as a cause for celebration, this increase in Democratic societies will continue to be tested. Democracy still faces many challenges from different factions who want their idealism forced on the rest of the world. Among these, Schlesinger seems most worried about the problems with religious fundamentalism and extremism. These are, indeed, great threats to democracy not just in Islamic lands but also here in the USA as fundamentalists of various Christian stripes try to blend their interpretation of religion into the law of the land.

Another area of concern that is covered in this book is that of the Electoral College and the election of 2000. Schlesinger, like many other Americans, doesn't want to see the same situation occur where the people's choice- the candidate with the greatest popular vote- didn't win the election. This has now happened four times in America's relatively short history and some type of reform needs to take place to ensure it doesn't happen again. Rather than simply advocate the elimination of the Electoral College and a direct election by popular vote, Schlesinger offers some different alternatives to the problem, some of which I had never heard before.

The Electoral College reform offers some good, original thought but other than this, most of what is contained in "War and the American Presidency" is old news and it's the type of analysis that I have read dozens of times by dozens of different authors. Schlesinger writes well and he expresses himself in a humble yet intelligent way, showing respect to everyone- even those with whom he disagrees. But there is little material in this book that hasn't already been covered by other authors.

This book offers some good reading, even if it does rank low on the originality scale. It is a quick read and because it is so brief (only 141 pages not counting the index- short enough that I read it in one day), it reads like a university lecture. The dialogue in this book seems like it came directly from a lecture series and while this isn't necessarily a bad thing, it means that the book offers too little depth to be taken as seriously as it should be.

"War and the American Presidency" isn't really long enough to be completely effective. But it does offer some good reading material and some persuasive conclusions. For these reasons, I'm going to give this book a marginal recommendation and a rating of three stars. It could have been much better with more attention to detail and about twice as many pages. But it is still ok and it does offer some good, respectful criticism of the Bush administration and its misguided approach to foreign policy.