Military Law Books

Alfonsi was perhaps in a unique position to be researching the first Gulf War prior to and then during the planning of the second. In the 1992-2000 interim, the principals were accessible and open. Little did they know they would again be in a position to again affect policy in this region.

Alfonsi succeeds in his Woodward style reconstruction of Gulf I and its immediate aftermath. He informs, or reminds, of the time lines, April Glaspie's reports, the role of Joe Wilson, the build up, the acceptable range of Iraqi aggression, the support of the neighboring states, the diplomacy surrounding the Saudi bases, and the disastrous impact of Pres Bush 41's exhortation to the Iraqis to rise up against Hussein. The Gulf War I part of the book is 5 star and above for its documentation of history.

Also given good coverage is the impact of this war and the situation in Bosnia and how the two converged in the 1992 presidential campaign from the point of view of the Iraq War principals.

Alfonsi's segue into the 2003 Iraq invasion is disappointing. This last arc of the circle takes less than 50 pages. He says "it was in the DNA" of the Bush 43 administration. This does not explain why we went back.

While in the part of the first Gulf War Alfonsi clearly defines the role of oil, the discussion of oil is totally absent from the second. Neither does he explain how the then Secretary of Defense and cheerleader for leaving SH in place at the end of Gulf I, totally changes to hawk as Vice Pres. These are only a few of the missing pieces that subsequent researchers will undoubtedly explore.

Circle in the Sand is reader-friendly research that brings some light on how the same folks that held Saddam Hussein in power after Desert Storm ended up involved in a civil war and a nation building effort a decade later.

The need to contain "estable" the Persian gulf, the distraction of the U.S. foreing policy on the Balkans crisis, the Republican defeat in 1992, the change of guard on the GOP leadership, the asscent of neoconservatives to power, the events of 9/11 and the perverse skill of an iraqi dictator to take advantage of the U.S. internal political conflicts are all combined to explain the constrast between the outcome of both wars.

Although comprehensive and convincing, Alfonsi's work omits an important force driving American troops back to Iraq. The quest for reliable and profitable source of energy as well as the defense industry interest on the conflict are not remotely mentioned as a reason on Why we went back to Iraq. Despite the omision, the book is worth reading not once but twice.

From Christian Alfonsi's lucid account of how Bush Jr. reprised and expanded Bush Sr.'s Iraq war, at least one horrifying lesson emerges: the dynastic obsessions of a family in power can throw the state into turmoil as easily today as in the days of the Caesars, Borgias and Hapsburgs. Conceived by a cabal of the father's consiglieri, whose self-serving and often self-deluding representations Alfonsi carefully recounts, this descent into the disaster belied all the safeguards of representative government as well as the inertial conservation of modern society's lumbering institutions. Historians in the 19th century wrote narratives of great men--heroes and villains alike. Although that type of history has gone out of fashion, it is still the right story in certain circumstances and this is one. Everyone should recall this book's story whenever families and their retainers seek power, regardless of their party affiliations.

With deliberation, Christian Alfonsi traces events preceding and following the first Bush's 1991 war to force Iraq out of Kuwait and proceeds to analyze how his administration's policy weaknesses and "victory fatigue" led to the subsequent 2003 invasion of Iraq on George W. Bush's watch.

Alfonsi cites mainly public sources in his Notes, supplemented by some material from interviews he conducted, and with these he does a creditable job supporting his depiction of crucial developments. For example, he documents how the U.S. ended up keeping troops stationed in Saudia Arabia after cessation of Gulf War combat even though the kingdom had been promised all American military would depart. And, the author emphasizes that pressures on the Bush administration to do something about ethnic cleansing in the Balkans distracted American officials to a point that Saddam could take advantage. However, despite a fluent treatment of what actually happened, Alfonsi tends to stay on the surface. Apparently, he doesn't have evidence for a deeper dig into the reasons people such as Defense Secretary (later Vice President) Dick Cheney did opinion 180s: Cheney stated in April 1991 that "It makes no sense at all" to embroil American troops in "a civil war inside Iraq." He said it would "literally be a quagmire." Yet, Alfonsi relates that in 2000 just after Bush and Cheney were declared the official winners of the election, Cheney said at a celebration dinner that now something could finally be done about removing Saddam Hussein. Huh? True, Saddam had been a thorn in the side of American power since the Gulf War, but the rising conviction of neoconservatives and those they could persuade that Iraq must have a new leader seems disproportional to his provocations. Perhaps the neoconservatives presumed that U.S. military power was so overwhelmingly superior that any target could be permanently vanquished without much American bloodshed or lengthy engagements. But -- again, probably because evidence is not readily available -- Alfonsi documents the jumps in key officials' (such as Cheney's) thoughts without thoroughly dissecting how they evolved.

CIRCLE IN THE SAND is, therefore, not a complete study of "why we went back to Iraq." But it does shine a steady light on some vital causes. And Alfonsi does not shrink from pointing out that al-Qaeda was born at least partially due to American activity in Saudi Arabia during the Bush I years, and that after 9/11 the Bush II administration allowed the chance to corner Bin Laden and other top-level al-Qaeda members to slip through their fingers largely because they considered Saddam Hussein and an invasion of Iraq a higher priority even though Iraq could not be convincingly connected to the 9/11 attacks.

Recommended.

This is a superb account about how George H. W. Bush and his team won the 1991 Gulf War, and how (and why) Saddam Hussein prevailed in the subsequent decade. Alfonsi's intent was to write a book on the 1991 Gulf War; not only did he have access to recently unclassified material, but he received cooperation from most of the architects of the Bush I Adminstration's foreign policy. Because he did the bulk of his research well before George W Bush became president and at a time when the architects of the 1991 Gulf War thought their public service was over, those he interviewed were undoubtedly more candid and less concerned with a "CYA mentality" than they would be if interviewed today. His sources consist primarily of the recently unclassified memoranda and interviews. The heroes of his recounting are George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft.

I do not know why this account of the relationship between the 1991 Gulf War and the current War in Iraq has not received more publicity and a wider audience, but his conclusion is well supported by his sources: "All wars are inherently political acts. But the Bush Administration decision to invade Iraq in 2005 was more political than most, a war of choice waged by a generation of officials who had been indelibly scarred by their experiences in an earlier Bush Administration. . . . . The war against the Taliban and al-Queda in Afghanistan was a just, necessary war and proportionate response to 9/11. The war in Iraq was none of these things."

In this brilliant collection of essays on US foreign policy, Blum presents the case against America's wars, overthrowing democratically elected governments, imperialism, ad nauseum. MLK, Jr. summed it all up very eloquently: "The greatest purveyor of violence on earth is my own government."

The truth is that there is something terribly wrong with this country and its government. And the misery inflicted on the people all over the earth by the successive US regimes, as documented so precisely by this excellent book, is awakening a sleeping giant. Don't ask HOW the US will be made to suffer and to pay for this 60+ year outrage to all decency. Life finds a way, and we will pay. This book answers the question, WHY?

This was a fantastic read on how BUSH SUCKS!!

Osama Bin Laden even reccommends the book for reading:

http://apnews.myway.com/article/20060119/D8F81VJG2.html

This is a brilliant collection of essays, extraordinarily acute, containing some fascinating information. Blum is the author of two of the very best books on US foreign policy - Rogue state: a guide to the world's only superpower (Common Courage, 3rd edition, October 2005) and Killing hope: US military and civil interventions since World War II (Zed Press, 2003).

This book includes a selection from his Anti-Empire Reports, available at www.killinghope.org; studies of some US interventions; an overview of the Cold War, showing how Cold Warriors have consistently used Goebbels' biggest and most-repeated lie about communist aggression and violence; and studies of the unemployment and poverty inflicted on American workers, exposing the myth, peddled by Gordon Brown among others, of the USA's booming economy.

Blum exposes the US state's current political violence against Cuba, Venezuela, Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan. Charles Clarke should perhaps readdress to George Bush and wormtongue Blair his remarks about how political violence is so unnecessary nowadays.

Contrary to Blair, the war on Iraq has not made us safer. Blum cites the US State Department as witness: "Tensions remaining from the recent events in Iraq may increase the potential threat to US citizens and interests abroad, including by terrorist groups." (Voice of America News, 21 April 2003.)

Blum quotes a leading member of Al Qa'ida who threatened that they will bomb people in Britain "until the people of the country themselves recognise that this is going to go on until they get the leadership changed." Oh, no, sorry, that was Britain's Admiral Sir Michael Boyce threatening to keep bombing people in Afghanistan.

Strangely enough, people the world over tend to react hostilely to aggression and violence. Colin Powell wrote of the 1983 US assault on Lebanon, "The U.S.S. New Jersey started hurling 16-inch shells into the mountains above Beirut, in World War II style, as if we were softening up the beaches on some Pacific atoll prior to an invasion. What we tend to overlook in such situations is that other people will react much as we would." Was he glorifying terrorism?

This collection of essays authoritatively challenges American foreign policy. In a very bad and long-standing case of personal projection, America charges other nations with 'terrorism' while ignoring it's own actions.

Our double standard transcends presidents and parties, but Blum believes national conduct is most transparent under George W. Bush. Foreign policy is either done our way or else we invade and bomb the living daylights out of everything we can get a hold of.

It's not at all surprising this approach fails to convince countries that America is `good' and is actually shrinking our global status.

Blum's written other (more comprehensive) books providing a badly-needed perspective on American foreign policy. However, collections are useful 'intro' gifts.

For the last 40 years, American soldiers have been trading potshots with locals from Vietnam to Lebanon to Somalia to Iraq and wondering why. Since our troops have, of course, been sent to liberate these folks from one tyranny or another, shouldn't we be greeted with flowers and kisses like those old films from WWII. So why don't these locals at least recognize our good intentions, and stop shooting at us.

Blum's small volume won't furnish a definitive answer, but it will point the reader in the right direction. A collection of scatter-shot essays from one of empire's chief critics, the chapters are simply too brief and casual to have scholarly impact. I'm sure that critics, lacking better arguments, will dismiss the book as anti-American. Although the 26 chapters may be wide-ranging and impossible to organize, they add up to a damning glimpse at several of Washington's most cherished pieties-- 1) Our government respects democracy, 2) We're fighting terrorism everywhere, and 3) Our interventions are humanitarian. Washington expects us to swallow these truisms since everyone in authority keeps repeating them. Besides, "unAmerican" ideas like the author's aren't taught in school, read in newspapers, and are never, never seen on tv. No wonder, as Blum points out, 27% of adult Americans believe the sun revolves around the earth! For a culture that appears to equate critical thinking with a lack of patriotism, Blum's caustic aspersions on our popular mind-set seem a reasonable response.

Despite the book's mediocre quality, the author remains one of the most clear-eyed observers of America's far-flung and aggressive empire-- the 800 lb. gorilla no one wants to admit is in the room. Readers made curious by this loose collection should pick up Blum's master-work, Killing Hope, for a definitive look at how the empire operates. My one real complaint-- Why does the book conclude with a self indulgent cheap-shot at reality-challenged Angelenos? Mr. Blum should know that I, for one, live in Los Angeles and can assure him that I do not consult my astrological chart or any other psychic source for daily advice. No sir-ee, my wife does it for me.

After being witness to many of the incidents that happened in Panama, I am shocked to read that the items printed are written as being true. I think that this book can help alot of women who might actually have been sexually harassed but can not be a guide to the military's judicial process. False information can only be regarded as lies and should not give other military women cause to fear the system.

I am a retired US Army LTC--Military Police Corps and personal know Major Fischer. As a Lt., she worked for me at West Point. She was a bright, energetic and competent young officer with a future in the Army. Since my retirement, we have been in contact through cards and phone calls. Not until this year, did she ever mention to me that she had been sexual assualted by her supervisor. However, I can now related to several of her phone calls which requested information about individuals. After my retirement from the Army, I was Chief of Police at the University of Kentucky for 10 years. I am very familar with the area of sexual assualts and all the new titles we have attached to these situation. I believe Major Fischer's account of the incident. It took great courage on her part to report the incident and write this book. It appears that after all the Army's problems with this area, it final has taken some appropriate measures to address this area. My hope is that this book will help others and give hope to those who have had to deal with sexual assualts.

Linda Fisher's testimony brings hope, strength and inspiration. I will soon commission to be an officer in the US Army. Her testimony has given me a broader perspective of the reality of being a young, ambitious and a beautiful female in the military. It may be true that it is a male dominant force, but women have gained a greater respect in the military over time and throughout history.
Fisher exposes the reality of what can happen within the ranks of the military between males and females, superiors and subordinates. This type of incident is not new. Throughout history the same, if not similar situations have occurred. We have to understand and realize that this happens in the general society. In businesses and schools, to men and women of all ages in all types of professions. This book, can help anyone understand the adversity faced when put in this situation. It disturbs and affects both parties the harassed and the harasser. I have both witnessed and experienced sexual harassment incidents outside of the military and within the military, I understand the pain and the fear.
I am grateful to have read such a testimony that has given me the awareness of what goes on and how to deal with it. (...)

I have read ULTIMATE POWER:ENEMY WITHIN THE RANKS and urge anyone, who is shocked by the abuse that women receive, to read this terrific personal account by an army officer who lived this horrible situation. First of all, take the time to read the personal life of Linda Fischer and her climb to the rank of Major in a so called "mans world". Linda has shown how successful a young girl can become by setting a goal and then reaching that pinnacle of success. When you realize what a an enormously loving person she is and then read her account of this harassment, you wonder how these things can go on. The story is so intense and told in the first person, you can actually feel Lindas pain as she explains her own personal feelings and frustrations as the powers to be turn a deaf ear to her 'crys for Justice."..This may be Linda Fischers first attempt at writing, but you won't put this book down, as she allows you to come right with her in the days and events leading up to this atrosity and her frustrations in the months and years that follow. You don't have to be in the military or ever be harrassed, to feel her pain. All you need to understand what Linda went....and is going through, is be a human being .You will love her writing style and be shocked by her account of this true happening. What a fabulous person she must be.....first to live this experience and then to put it in terms that ALL of us can understand. Is this a 5 star book? Its a 10 Star......READ IT and you'll see why!!!!!

Ultimate Power, Enemy Within the Ranks is a must read for those of us who have suffered through the pain, humiliation and stigma associated with reporting sexual harassment within the U.S. Army. Although I am a civilian employee of the U.S. Army, who was the victim of sexual harassment by a supervisor, coincidentally, at the same Army post where Fischer now serves, it is utimately the Commanding Officer's within the command who make decisions about how the case is handled when harassment charges are brought against an accused harasser. The unspoken of policy of sweeping these cases under the carpet is the Army's way of dealing with harassment and just like the Fischer case, my harasser was allowed to quietly retire with full benefits. Fischer has brought to light the further victimization women must face when asserting their rights in sexual harassment cases. Reading this book brought back painful memories, but it also sparked a shimmer of hope that a meaninful life does exist after being sexually harassed within the U.S. Army. I now know I am not alone. I recommed it for all employees of the Armed Forces, military as well as civilian. Thank God we have women like Linda Fischer to step forward for what is right........

Very informative book. Great to touch up on knowledge and skills for yourself. Also taught some of the techniques to the rifle team I was on.

This is the updated version of the Ultimate sniper ! Great reading and lots of good tips on the art of sniper craft. A lot of ammo and scope calibration data that is valuable.

interestting reading however felt the comments on the Eastern bloc weapon to be a bit bias!

DaveC

I bought the original version of this book at an Army PX in 1995. It was great then, the updated version is even better. When my original became so worn from use it was falling apart I ordered the new version from Maj. Plater's website. He even made it out to me and signed the front and back covers. Whether you are a police of military sniper or you just want to learn some techniques (or find out what gear you need) to improve your rifle shooting this is THE book. Unlike a lot of books written by guys who have been there and done that (Maj Plaster was a US Army Special Forces SOG recon Sgt for 3 yrs in Vietnam) there is no hint of arrogance or showmanship in this book.

This book is phenomenal in its scope and detail, and the author has the vast amount of experience in both years and combat to back it up in gold. I was truly pleased that this book was everything I had hoped and heard it to be when I bought it. The author writes as though he is speaking to you both as an instructor and as a fellow shooter...because of this everything he discusses is very clear and also interesting. The topics are too many to list, with plentiful photos, drawings, and tables to help convey the information. This is a thick reference you will want to come back to again and again, and each time you do you will take more away from it.

Everything, and I mean every single aspect of snipers, markmanship, ballistics, weapons, tactics, military and civilian organization, is covered. Things you want to know, things you didn't know you wanted to know, everything is here.

This is the Sniper and Marksman Bible.

The book arrived in the estimated time and in the condition advertised by this seller.

This book is an outstanding history of the four year process necessary to introduce meaningful reforms of the command structure into the U.S. Defense Establishment. The process involved courageous champions from the military services, equally courageous and bipartisan senators and congressman, and dedicated and knowledgeable legislative staffers. It is a story of persistence and dedication to the cause of reform in the U.S. Military.

In the wake of WWII the U.S. Congress passed the 1947 National Security Act. This act was meant to unify the U.S. Defense Establishment and enhance inter-service cooperation. Unfortunately, the military services, especially the U.S. Navy, pushed back hard and in the end were able to maintain their services autonomies within the newly created Defense Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). In the same way the so-called unified commands were unified in name only. And most seriously the command and control (C2) system under the Act was so convoluted that it contributed to the repeated breakdown of military C2 systems and tragically led to a lot of preventable U.S. military casualties.

Locher provides what appears to be an accurate and authentic history of the execution of a complex process to reform the command structure of the U.S. Military. He also notes that two military officers, General David Jones and Admiral William Crowe were willing to rise of above service parochialism to strongly support this process. But it is the late Senator Berry Goldwater and Senator Sam Nunn of the SASC who Locher singles out for specific praise. Both men put national security well ahead of partisan politics and joined with Representative Bill Nicholls to build a comprehensive reform bill. Yet it was the SASC staff that actually made the reform process move forward. In the end the reformers prevailed and the Goldwater-Nichols act became law. The changes it introduced were important and clearly needed. Both the positions of Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the JCS were considerably strengthened and the military C2 system immensely improved.

The U.S. Navy was strongly opposed to the reform movement and argued that it would destroy the competency of all four services. It would be easy to pillory the Navy as an obstructionist and parochial institution, but Locher does not do this. He is even handed and fair throughout this book. In truth hard fought though the battle over reform was there were no villains of the same magnitude as the two heroes of the story Goldwater and Nunn. The only person in this tale that comes off somewhat dubious is John Lehman then Secretary of the Navy who is portrayed as both devious and disloyal.


This book is an important contribution to the history of the U.S. Military Establishment and Locher did an excellent job. But the book is more than that. It is a blueprint showing how reform can be implemented against large and bureaucratically entrenched organizations. The U.S. Intelligence Community comes immediately to mind.

Fantastic case study of Congress in action. Without tooting his own horn too much, Locher presents a great first person account of how the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) became law and made the US stronger. This amazing achievement occurred despite a bitter Navy, a stone-walling Secretary of Defense (Weinberger), and a non-committal President (Reagan). Due to a strong bi-partisan relationship between Senators Nunn and Goldwater (among many others in Congress), this needed piece of legislation became law. Locher tells the story from his perspective as a staffer for the Senate Armed Services Committee. So perhaps the House side is a little less than thorough. Locher also points out the negative aspects of all those who opposed GNA. Still, Locher is fairer than most people when they are fully committed to a seriously important change in law. Most interesting to me was reading how ineffective Weinberger was as SecDef. He was so unwilling to negotiate that he became largely irrelevant and he missed out on any number of opportunities to have a serious impact on GNA. Locher would probably be the first to say that GNA did not fix all of the problems with the military regarding cooperation in taking on serious missions, but GNA has certainly helped.
Along with Showdown at Gucci Gulch and The System, this is one of three great policy process case studies. Most importantly, it shows how Congress can have a strong influence on the military, foreign policy, and America's national security - even in areas that are normally considered to be the president's prerogative.

My rating is in the middle because the book should be required reading for anyone who wants to know how Goldwater-Nichols came about, however, at the same time, it is extremely biased in its delivery, analysis and conclusions. The author was appointed by Senators Nunn (D) and Goldwater (R) to be the senior reorganization staffer who, "led the team that helped congress 'get smart' on this complex but critically important subject." Because of Locher's involvement from the Act's beginning through to its approval, which gives him unique insight, he has a vested interest in presenting his justifications for the Act in a positive light. This is best seen in his portrayals of the principals involved; those who supported reform are heroes who were not afraid to stand up to the establishment and the institutionalized bureaucracy. Those who opposed Goldwater-Nichols were more interested in their own power and often presented emotional rather than factual or issues based arguments.

Unfortunately, the book was published in 2002, which means the work was done before the US invasion of Iraq in 2003; it would be interesting to see his analysis of the relationship between the SECDEF and the JCS now.

Bottom line: if you're interested in how Goldwater-Nichols evolved, buy the book; I did, and I have no regrets. But read it with a (big) grain of salt.

I bought this book at the Army War College after hearing its author speak to the Army Strategy Conference on "Rebalancing the Instruments of National Power." I have posted 29 pages of notes at Earth Intelligence Network, with a page or two from Jim Locher's brilliant luncheon presentation.

Having spent the evening with this book, and with an understanding of what the Project on National Security Reform will be providing to the next President of the United States, I found the book totally inspiring, and most important for what it represents as proof that "Phase II" of national security reform is not just possible, but likely in 2009.

A few highlights:

1) The service chiefs fought this bitterly, to include lies and deceptions and fabricated studies.

2) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Jones, and later Crowe, get high praise for having the gumption to call for reform in the first case, and agree with reform in the second, but they were virtual outcasts for doing so.

3) Senator Sam Nunn will be back. As I look at the make-up of the Project, which also benefits from Newt Gingrich's brilliance and his mastery of history and House protocol, I have a very strong feeling that the follow-on to Goldwater-Nichols, a National Security Act of 2009, is not just viable, but undefeatable.

4) I've known Jim Locher as a thoughtful and courteous person for over a decade, and this book confirms my personal view that he is one of the most loyal, dedicated, intelligent, and responsible individuals we have, totally committed to public service in the purest sense of the word. The reviewer who demeans the author has no basis, in my view, for his negative judgement.

I have just one worry: everyone is beginning to realize that neither John McCain nor Barack Obama have a strong bench, and at the same time everyone I talk to seems to believe they will repeat the long-standing mistake of seeking to implement a single-party executive. This they must not be allowed to do. Please visit Reuniting America to understand the concept of Transpartisanship, in which ALL parties (including Libertarians, Reforms, Greens, and others) share leadership positions so that we might harness the COMPLETE distributed intelligence of the entire Nation.

The Project will provide a preliminary report on Phase II of national security reform in early July 2008, and a longer report in September 2008. Once a President is elected, a complete set of Presidential directives, draft legislation, and recommended amendments to Congressional jurisdictions and protocols, will be provided so that the President might be ready to implement national security reform within 100 days of taking office. We cannot wait for the Quadrennial Defense Review in the second year of the Presidency; those focusing their time on influencing that document would be well-advised to contribute shorter versions of their work sooner to the Project. By 1 May 2008.

In his comments today at the Army War College, the author told us that everyone said this would be impossible; that it was lunatic, and so on. This book is a deep historical account of how good intentions across party lines can achieve the impossible and serve the public. While I disrespect both party machines for failing to control a reckless and arrogant presidency hijacked by the vice president, I do believe that we can create a narrative on the need for reform that the public will accept and then demand of its Congress.

I will miss Barry Goldwater, the last true conservative I remember, but I am, in putting this book down, confident that John McCain and Sam Nunn and others can find common ground. This book proves the impossible can be achieved, and I believe this book is essential substantiation that the next step: civilian professionalization, inter-agency operations and authorities, multinational information sharing, a robust "white hat" capability, and a national open source agency that can influence how $2 trillion a year in other people's money is spent eradicating the ten high level threats to humanity, are all achievable in the near term.

See also my reviews of the following books that complement this one:
On the Psychology of Military Incompetence
Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC
The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command
Bureaucratic Politics And Foreign Policy
The Pathology of Power
The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (The American Empire Project)
The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People
Wilson's Ghost: Reducing the Risk of Conflict, Killing, and Catastrophe in the 21st Century
Breach of Trust: How Washington Turns Outsiders Into Insiders
Vice: Dick Cheney and the Hijacking of the American Presidency

Everyone who felt inpired by John F. Kennedy's book, "Profiles in Courage", or John McCain's "Character is Destiny" will find "Dissent: Voices of Conscience" to be a most worthy sequel. Although all those persons presented are Iraq War dissidents, the real issue is not the Iraq War, or even war in general. Rather it is the recognition of humanity's noblest pursuit - the personal courage to stand by one's conscience, come what may.

Character matters. Honor matters. Integrity matters. The reader who agrees with these sentences will find this book inspiring and reinforcing of one's own pursuit of inner greatness in the midst of overwhelming criticism and negative consequences.

Whether the reader is for the Iraq War or against it, this book will allow the reader to conjure up in the mind others who have shown great courage and self-sacrifice for a noble cause.

As the author of two books, "Christian Chess" and "Early Maxims and Aphorisms", I am very impressed with the authors' consistently high quality of writing style, documentation, and breath of topic. I eagerly await future sequels to this book.

Those against the Iraq War should seriously consider introducing this book to elected officials, whether state legislators or Members of Congress. Those in favor of the war should bring it to the attention of pastors and friends.

Good people can differ on perceptions of the rightness or wrongness of a war or any policy. Most, however, will agree in the rock-solid principles of being men and women of conscience.

Ann Wright and Susan Dixon have turned up the volume on the voices of dissent, according them the credibility and urgency denied them by mainstream media.

This is an essential work. The citizens who put their careers and reputations on the line to inform a nation, a world, of the facts surrounding the most important decisions of our lifetimes, not only need to be honored, but listened to. And any citizen worthy of the claim needs to read and reflect on the selflessness that prompted these men and women to act completely outside their zones of comforts and personal interest.

The book is imminently readable, accessible, supportable. It is a primer on good citizenship as well as an eye-opening revelation of the inner workings of self-interest in government.

Wilson (Woody) Powell

This is a great book and every American needs to read it now. We have had enough lies and deceit for the past seven years. Kudos to those who stand up and do the right thing.

Ann Wright presents stories of many who have taken courageous actions in disagreeing with their countries' actions in invading Iraq. Not the least of these is her own action in resigning from the US diplomatic corps after nearly 40 years of service to her country. This new way of service to the United States of America and all fellow/sister human beings is at least as powerful as all she has accomplished in a long and distinguished career as an Army officer and a diplomat.

"To announce that there must be no criticism of the President or that we are to stand by the President right or wrong is not only unpatriotic and servile, but is morally treasonable to the American public."

Theodore Roosevelt, May 7, 1918.

"Dissent: Voices of Conscience" is about people who have witnessed first hand the deceit and deception on the part of the Bush administration and how they carefully crafted intelligence to fit their plan to invade Iraq. For those who don't know, they were planning to do so from before Inauguration Day 2001. September 11th gave them all the excuse they needed to hatch the plan.

The voices were people in our government who were privy to illegal and immoral acts that were being committed in violation of our Constitutional rights, and in the name of security. They were FBI agents, justice department attorneys, diplomats, and active duty military who witnessed the tortures, the propaganda, and the eavesdropping on American citizens for political purposes rather than for national security. There is also an extensive list of generals and admirals who have spoken out against our policies, and have written Congress and the President.

What really surprised me was what I didn't know because the "mainstream-drive-by-left-leaning" press did not report it here, or else they gave it very little play. It was the outright collusion of British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, and Australian Prime Minister, John Howard who was censured by the Australian Senate in October 2003, for misleading the public in justifying sending troops off to war with one senator even accusing Howard of unprecedented deceit. Numerous diplomats in Her Majesty's government spoke out, leaked information, resigned, or were arrested for following their consciences. These revelations almost brought down the Blair government, and Howard was defeated in the next election. Even the Danish prime minister, who was one of the first to volunteer his forces, denied intelligence information to his Parliament which would not have supported their participation.

One of the more disgusting revelations of this book was our silence over the barbarism that is occurring in Uzbekistan against its citizens by their brutal leader, Karimov. The U.S. while all for bringing democracy to Iraq turned a blind eye to the tortures that were occurring in that country so long as we had an air base for our operations. It didn't matter even when two people were actually boiled to death. We only spoke out about the human rights abuses AFTER that government honored a new agreement with Russia's Vladimir Putin who insisted that the US base and our operations be closed.

We also learn what kind of people these people really were. They weren't radicals, malcontents, or non-conformists. These were people who really believed in the system and its ideals. When the system was perverted by their superiors, they faced a moral dilemma. Most them were forced to resign or retire, or were demoted or transferred, in spite of statutory protections for whistle blowers that were ignored. Katherine Gunn, a translator for the British government leaked to the press that our government was eavesdropping on members of the U.N. Security Council to attempt to pressure them to go along with a U.S. sponsored resolution against Iraq. She readily admitted what she did. She was fired and arrested. The U.S. wanted her tried. The day of the trial, her Majesty's government dropped all charges. Her barrister made it clear that he would spill the beans on everything. The stories of Colleen Rowley (FBI agent, Minneapolis office), and Sible Edmonds (FBI translator) were particularly powerful and poignant.

Much of the book is a brief story about these voices of conscience, which was usually followed by their letters of resignation or whistle-blowing. While some of the letters were quite interesting, I began to pass by many of them. I was and still am in a moral quandary when I read about officers and enlisted who deserted or refused to deploy or fight because of policy. (Neither group gets to decide that). Nevertheless, the book is surprising in the new information I learned, and what people of conscience sacrificed to right wrongs and injustice, and bring the truth to light.


May 7, 2008--ninety years later.


It is 257 days and a wake-up until the Bush tyranny is over.


Additional References:

Cook, Robin, "The Point of Departure: Why One of Britain's Leading Politicians Resigned over Tony Blair's Decision to Go to War in Iraq."

Willmshurst, Elizabeth, "Rules of Engagement. Newspaper article in "The Guardian.

Short, Clare, "An Honorable Deception?: New Labour, Iraq and the Misuse of Power."

Carne, Ross, "Independent Diplomat: Dispatches from an Unaccountable Elite."

"The Butler Inquiry."

Murray, Craig, "Murder in Samarkand." 2006 in the United Kingdom

"Axis of Deceit: The Story of the Intelligence Officer Who Risked All to Tell the Truth About WMD and Iraq."

Alford, C. Fred, "Whistleblowers: Broken Lives and Organizational Power."

Radack, Jesselyn, "The Canary in the Coalmine: Blowing the Whistle in the Case of `American Taliban' John Walker Lindh." Self-published, 2006

Edmonds, Sibel, www.JustACitizen.org. This lady was a translator for the FBI. She was fired in 2002 after she blew the whistle on the lack of proper supervision of supervisors and shoddy translation. She has been featured on "60 Minutes."

Zinni, Anthony, General (Ret.), "Battle Ready."

I've read and enjoyed all of Charles W. Henderson's books. Jungle Rules is another top notch effort.

This novel relates true court martial cases from the Viet Nam War, author Henderson weaves the very intriguing true cases using fictitious characters as lawyers and accused. THE JAG office is headed up by a real uptight Col. with a need for his troops to dance to his piping, he is thwarted at every turn by two fresh from the states lawyers who find that justice is far more important than the Colonels vicarious needs. The story is not unlike a legal MASH.
I highly recommend this book, very entertaining.
Jack Caffrey, Fmr, Marine Cpl. (Korea)

I think this is Charles Henderson's most entertaining book since Marine Sniper. There was more to Vietnam than just the battles. This book shows another dimension of the country by describing the DaNang underworld and what happens when some Marines get involved in it. The hook to this story reminds me a little of the TV series Law and Order, which is pitched as fiction based on real life events. This is similar, but set in the Vietnam War and based on a lot of things that did happen in the DaNang area.

This book has plenty of salty language. I also agree that profanity can be badly over-used. That's one of the things that really turned me off to the TV series "Deadwood." Use too much profanity and the words loose their impact, or just become distracting or feel like shtick. I think there's a good balance in Jungle Rules.

Although this book is a very entertaining read, I can't believe Berkeley/Caliber gave it such a lame looking cover. It looks like a history class text book! It totally misses the theme of the story. This novel deserved an exciting looking cover that properly fit the material. I thought about knocking a star off my review over this issue, but I'm not going to penalize the text over a screw up by the publisher's marketing department.

For individual who states that it doesn't use enough "Muvver-Fletchers" I applaud the restraint. I've read many books over the years, and some authors seem to make them "more authentic" by over-use of foul language. Sell books? I hope not! Clark Gable should have been horse-whipped for using "Frankly my dear, I don't give a da++! This simple departure has flooded the screen with filth. Heck, I spent thirty years in a Marine Corps Uniform, and I'm well aware of some of the rather colorful language that punctuated our speech. I have also read many John W. Thomason novels that I thoroughly enjoyed and no foul language was used - the story was the thing!

I would also like to point out that this is a NOVEL, NOT a true story although it is based on some true events. The characters are fictional (deliberately so I might add). Henderson's writings are excellent; I thoroughly enjoyed his book "Marshalling the Faithful" as that one was a true story and covered a number of personal friends (one of whom had been my room-mate in the Basic Officer's School, and another was a Lieutenant I inherited in the 2nd Recon Battalion after his service in Vietnam). Not only does Henderson tell a great story, it's the way he puts the story together that brings me back to his writings!

Excellent and entertaining reading. He makes it clear that the book is fiction, and his personal experience as a Marine in combat gives it an "aire" of authenticity not normally garnered in current military writing.

Highly recommended - it'll certainly hold your interest if you read it for what it is! If you want everyday "barracks language" give me a call and I'll oblige! Heh, heh, heh...

Dick Culver

I too, was in Vietnam during the time this book was written. I was a machine gunner in the Grunts and this is exactly how "Real Marines" talk and act. Many people "Served" in Vietnam, but "Few" were in the "Mud with the Blood" - This is an OUTSTANDING book written by a former Recon Marine and it doesn't get more "REAL" than that! Charles Henderson is a "Marine's Marine!!!"
Give this book a read and ignore the negative report in this review. Charles Henderson has an outstanding reputation among "Real Combat Marines" and he writes it as it really happened. It took me back to Nam after the first few pages and that's what it is all about.
Charles if you are reading this, your Six will always be covered by me!
PitBull Out
Semper Fi,Pro Patria
Charles Patrick "PitBull" Dugan USMC Ret.
0331 machine Gunner - Infantry Vietnam 1966-1967

A thoroughly detailed portrait of the Third Reich and its internal politics and power struggles between the various players.
The only criticism is that the author tends to lean toward an attitude of "acquital due to technicality". He believes that the system was unfair & that the leaders deserve a pass, of sorts, due to the elementary stage of internat'l law & the impromtu procedures. Opinion is fine, but I was expecting an unbiased read.

One of the most important trials in history of Mankind.The lies,the pain ,anguish,the pupets in a strange chess game.One of the boos to understand modern history.

This book was released in 1966 seeing its fourth printing as late as 1969. I was still in college in those days and obtained my Macmillian & Company hardcover print through The History Book Club.

I had read William Shirer's "The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich" (who hadn't) while yet in the military, and about the time of returning to civilian life, Professor Davidson's book appeared. His book was the only one I can recall of those times, being the forerunner of others to follow. Today I also have Persico's study on my shelf, however, I value Davidson's book equally.

The book is a large volume in excess of 600 pages that will more than acquaint any reader on the Palace of Justice and the ensuing tribunal proceedings. And between pages 304-305, are some of the better photographs of the 22 Nazi criminals appearing before the court.

If one is to read on this trial, Eugene B. Davidson's book of 40 years past should still be considered. No matter the passage of years, his book still matters. And it is good to see it yet extant through this recent publishing event.

Still recommended.

Semper Fi.

Author Eugene Davidson has provided the reader with a 600 page account detailing the responsibilities of the 22 defendants who were tried in Nuremberg, Germany, for war crimes in World War II. The book is not a question and answer session of each one. Rather, it provides us with an account of what each man was responsible for in regard to Adolf Hitler's Third Reich. Most of the defendants were merely anti-semetic flunkies who parroted the beliefs of Hitler. Hjalmar Schacht had the highest I.Q. with 141 and Herman Goering was second with 139. I found the defendants to be a curious lot with each one openly disliking, jealous of, or not trusting the other. Had they pursued other endeavors rather than follow Hitler, some of them may very well have gone on to successful careers. These once powerful men appear to be a rather grandfatherly collection while sitting in the courtroom at Nuremberg. I did find the book to be kind of long, but if you are interested in learning about this cast of characters this would be a good book for you to read.

If you are looking for a day-by-day account of the proceedings of the Nuremberg tribunal, then you will be somewhat disappointed by this book. (If that is what you're after, try Gilbert's "Nuremberg Diary.") An introductory chapter certainly outlines how the tribunal came into being, and Davidson deals with the jurisprudence of Nuremberg (i.e. Was it really a trial? Or was it revenge?) in his concluding chapter, but the bulk of this book is not given over to a daily account of the proceedings at Nuremberg.

Instead, this book is literally an "Account of the twenty-two defendants at Nuremberg." Taking each defendant in turn, Davidson gives us a neatly potted account of their history, their involvement in the Nazi regime, their relationships with other high-ranking Nazis and ultimately, decides the extent of their guilt. In short, the reader is provided with 22 "mini-biographies." The conduct of many defendants at the trial is occasionally discussed, but that usually takes second place to the historical data.

This books does contain some fascinating insights on the working relationships between the various Nazi officials. In almost every case, one is struck by the realisation that any given minister was in conflict with almost everyone else. For instance, Speer got along admirably with Hitler (until 1944, at least), but he distrusted almost everyone else in the Nazi hierarchy. Likewise, Kaltenbrunner appeared to regard almost everyone except the Fuehrer as his enemy. It seems that all of these defendants were trying to zealously protect their own sphere of interest and fend off all those who attempted to enroach upon them.

In general then, this book makes for stimulating reading. As for Nuremberg itself, Davidson concludes: "In a world of mixed human affairs where rough justice is done...Nuremberg may be defended as a political event if not as a court." and "In a certain sense, the trial succeeded in doing what judicial proceedings are supposed to do: it convinced even the guilty that the verdict against them was just."

This book was a great piece of writing for anyone that is interested in learning about how the U.S. helps rebuild nations. It was very useful for research that I was conducting.

great background history to today's strategic events in Middle East

This book present an excellent policy analysis of USA-led enforced democratization. Based on historic-comparative study of seven such cases (Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosova and Afghanistan), striking policy recommendations are derived on military and police presence over time, humanitarian help, economic reconstruction, building of civil society, holding of elections and more, as as to maximize success in democratization. In all these respects the book is outstanding, in terms of method and substance alike, as is to be expected from a RAND Corporation study. However, the book also demonstrates a widespread cultural blinder of USA policy thinking, namely underrating of cultural factors and over-optimism in respect to making the world democratic. Paradigmatic is the following statement, put forth without any reservations (on page 204) "democracy is transferable to non-Western...societies", followed by a definite statement that "there is no reason why Iraq cannot be democratized and establish democratic institutions and a pluralist polity". Little wonder that this frame of thinking, as applied in the book to Iraq, failed to foresee, at least as a contingency, what is now happening there, the idea of persistent and increasingly effective armed resistance against USA and other Western "democratizisers" after "victory" not being taken serious enough. If what is probably the best strategic Think Tank in the USA suffers from such misunderstanding of realities that do not fit into Western perceptions of "the other", there is much that USA policy makers and policy planners have to learn so as to enable the leading country of the West to fulfill is increasingly crucial role as the leading guardian of Western civilization and security.

This is one of the portfolio of books exploring what it takes to create successful democratic nation-building--From German to Iraq (as the subtitle notes). It is also one of the better volumes among such works.

The RAND report goes into considerable detail, providing an operational definition of democratic nation building by looking at the commonalities in seven such interventions (Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan). The report seeks to establish those factors associated with success or failure. Among those linked to success were the use of force "to underpin a process of democratization" (Page 1), occupation, peace enforcement, stabilization, and reconstruction. Success is (Page 2) ". . .the ability to promote an enduring transfer of democratic institutions."

The RAND report suggests a number of prerequisites, including military presence over time by the occupying country, international police presence over time, reducing postconflict combat-related deaths, timing of elections, dealing with refugees and internally displaced persons, initial external assistance, external per capita assistance, external assistance as a meaningful percentage of GDP, and changes in per capita GDP. This obviously entails a commitment to provide substantial resources to the redevelopment effort, to be willing to invest considerable time to nation building, to make sure that appropriate security arrangements are made. In short, the process cannot successfully be done quickly or "on the cheap."

Unhappily, the conclusions of this book--if accurate--surely raise questions about the ultimate success of the American involvement in Iraq.

This is one kind of pre-war analysis for post-war Iraq that the Bush administration is accused of ignoring. (Iraq-specific background is the other.) Indeed, the back cover attributes to CPA head Paul Bremer, "...a marvelous how-to manual...I have kept a copy handy...since my arrival in Baghdad."

The book uses seven case studies in search of lessons for post-conflict reconstruction: Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. Each case study examines the challenges (security, humanitarian, civil admin, democratization, and reconstruction), the U.S. and international roles, what happened, and lessons learned.

Overall conclusions include: of the many variables, the level of effort in time, manpower and money is perhaps most important; security must precede reform; political reform needs to be "legitimized" by economic growth; there are tradeoffs between multilateral and unilateral efforts; and having good neighbors helps.

These conclusions are not earth-shattering, but the comparative effort is useful in itself and the lessons ought to have been helpful in Iraq. Compare this book with Orr's Winning the Peace (CSIS, 2004).

"Claim of Privilege" is a fascinating work of nonfiction that reads like a novel. Not only does it recount the details of a little-known military plane crash, but also our government's abuse of power. Once you read Siegel's book, you'll want to share it with others.

The unilateral invocation of the 'state secrets' doctrine by the government is frought with problems. This book sets forth the history of the leading Supreme Court case on the subject. But it approaches the task more as an exercise in telling the story of the 'sleuthing' by the heirs of the three of the civilians killed in the Air Force accidednt giving rise to the intial litigation than as an analysis of the issues. Half a century after the events, the issues are fascinating, the human story is simply not all that interesting, however painful for the participants.

On page 300, the author rattles off a half dozen current cases where the Bush administration successfully blocked private litigations by invocation of the doctrine, providing a half sentence summary of each. The details of those sister suits are much more important than the details of where the widows and orphans met for lunch. But, in nthis work, 'human interest' substitutes for policy analysis.

The truly core question tends to get lost in all the story telling. Much less shocking than the Supreme Court's sanctioning the government's refusal to allow the heirs to examine the official report of the air accident is the fact that the Court did not require the government to submit the allegedly 'secret' report to the presiding judge for in camera inspection. The Supreme Court submitted to the unilateral truncation of the judiciary's customary function.

Finally, and a complaint which probably only a lawyer would be likely to make, while I am appalled by the government's conduct in this case, I have a strong suspicion that a much better defense/explanation for its performance could be written than Mr. Siegel has provided. The issue is too important for polemic

No one questions that governments need to keep some things secret. There is no reason that I should be able to get detailed blueprints on the newest of submarines, for instance, nor need I decode the latest messages going to the generals in Afghanistan. In matters of national security, keeping secrets even from citizens is only sensible. There is a problem, though, that it is the national government that makes decisions about what is a matter of national security. There are other reasons to keep secrets, like covering up blunders or limiting financial redress against the government, and bureaucrats may be eager to claim that these must be kept secret and ask for your faith that they need the secrecy in the interest of national security. There is an important Supreme Court decision that first put the "states secrets privilege" into the law, _United States vs. Reynolds_ of 1953, and it is a basis for subsequent states secret decisions, of which , of course, there have been many. It is a shock to find out that the decision was based on lies presented by the prosecution, and that the government fallaciously insisted that the details that would have shown them to be lies were too secret for the courts to consider. In _Claim of Privilege: A Mysterious Plane Crash, a Landmark Supreme Court Case, and the Rise of State Secrets_ (Harper), journalist Barry Siegel has told the amazing, often distressing story of this case. In a riveting narrative, he tells us about the personalities behind the decision, the families that were affected by it, the historical context of the times in which it was made, and the governmental aftereffects. It has much of the David-versus-Goliath appeal of a legal thriller, while it also throws light on current governmental insistence on the privilege of keeping secrets.

The decision arose out of a 1948 crash of a B-29 Superfortress bomber which was testing secret electronics, and which crashed, killing nine of thirteen men aboard. Among the dead were three civilian RCA engineers, and their widows claimed the crash was a result of government negligence. There are always accident reports after such crashes, but after the suit was brought by the widows, the Justice department claimed the accident report was a national security secret, even though it had nothing to do with the secret electronics on board. Lower courts rejected such a declaration, but the Supreme Court decided that courts should accept any executive branch claim of secrecy and not look any deeper; part of the court's deference to the government was that the political atmosphere was thick with communist plots and international threats. The lower courts decided rightly; the Supreme Court was presented with a fraud, and wrongly decided on the basis of that fraud. The latter part of this book is a satisfying human story of how children of the dead engineers and the one remaining widow got together starting in 2000 to pursue their claim, and how the original law firm that has pursued the case was eager to take up the battle again.

It turned out to be, at best, a muted victory; national security concerns were high at the time of the new claim, just as they had been at the time of the original one. The new claim, however, made it clear that the original one had been based on a fraudulent claim of national security. The claimants weren't interested in repealing the original decision, or attempting to tear down established national security law. What they accomplished was that judges, when confronted with lawyers for the Justice Department claiming secrecy due to _Reynolds_, had to remember the faulty background behind the original judgement, and ought more closely to consider whether something is a secret just because the government says so. It is good to remember this at a time when the state secrets privilege is a favorite tool to drop whistle-blowers, restrain investigation into detentions, and promote surveillance programs. Siegel is too good a journalist to let his book turn into a manifesto against the secret-hugging current administration, and though he mentions some current cases, his criticism is mostly implicit. Nonetheless, this is a powerful legal story which convincingly shows that citizens ought to have a measure of distrust when the government waves the "state secret" flag.

If you really want to know how Cheney, Bush & Co (along with Nixon and every other administration from 1948 on)can legally stonewall the country on critically important matters of war and peace, READ THIS BOOK. It's a rigorously reported, mindblowing narrative about the first "state secrets" case, brought six decades ago against the U.S. government by the widows of three civilian engineers killed during a test flight for the Air Force. The widows wanted to know why their husbands died; the government refused to tell them, claiming that "military secrets" would be compromised. In fact, the U.S. wasn't about to make public the real cause of their husbands' deaths: The plane's known but uncorrected mechanical flaws and the pilot's incompetence. And the Supreme Court ruled (why is this no surprise?)in favor of the U.S. What do three widows and their newly fatherless children matter compared to protecting "state secrets"--even if they're bogus? There's much, much more to Siegel's harrowing, multigenerational story, but I won't spoil it for you. Just buy the book.

This book is the chronicle of a grievous travesty of justice at the highest level of our American political system. One branch of government lied to another branch of government, and 50 years thereafter the lie was discovered and its content was made public. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States of America it became evident that our judicial system is incapable of effecting the balance of powers that was assumed in our founding documents.

A litany of successive abuses of executive privilege has proceeded from that event, protected by legal assumptions that were couched in the mechanics of the original lie. Barry Siegel gives us a detailed and meticulously documented look into this part of our American heritage, and he does it with a strong personal sense for the human beings who have been - and will be affected.