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An essential resourceReview Date: 2001-07-07
This guide was our companion when roaming Dartmoor last JuneReview Date: 1999-10-29
an excellent referenceReview Date: 2007-03-09
Fine Scholarship, Fine WritingReview Date: 2003-02-12
a great work made betterReview Date: 2004-11-28
The beautiful book is loaded with hundreds of photos, explores the ancestry, methods of construction and why they were abandoned after thousands of years of use.
Marvelous work made even better by bringing the information up to date.

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Thanks Barack Obama!Review Date: 2008-03-25
I was really impressed by the analytic capacity of the author and as I am usually not reading books about economic affairs and also not about politics I am even more astounded to find it fascinating and suspense driven. Honestly, if it was not for Barack Obama to get me interested in politics I probably had never read a book like this.
Sarkozy facing the truthReview Date: 2008-03-24
Old fashioned Review Date: 2008-03-23
Fascism, Stalinism, Euro-ManiacismReview Date: 2008-03-23
It is really worthwhile not only to know the political and military history of the 20th century but also it's financial history. Especially the latter provides for explanations of the inexplicable, the World Wars, the rise of Fascism, Stalinism and now Euro-Maniacsim. Ralph T. Niemeyer must be a genius to be able to combine mathematical, statistical and political facts and make the read of normally dry matters exciting! Congratulations on a superb and unbeatable analysis. I wished our political leaders knew about it.
Survival of the Fittest is the Opposite of Freedom and Equality Review Date: 2008-03-10

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Still the best survey of Rome availableReview Date: 2007-08-09
The Best History BookReview Date: 2000-08-20
Cary's incisiveness fills niche between Mommsen and GibbonReview Date: 2002-12-18
The Standard on the SubjectReview Date: 2001-09-29
What makes this book so extraordinary is the depth and breath of the subject matter covered. Military history, politics, technology, art, science, social development, trade, are all given ample coverage. While it can be quite dry, the reader is free to skip around reading only the subjects of interest. For the scholar or the curious, this is a must own text that will serve as a crucial guide and reference.
A bit better than the Grant, but longerReview Date: 2008-04-30
-Fails to take stock of the moral implications of gladiatorial contests for the Romans.
-Contains a crushing weight of detail regarding municipal organisation for the reader to skip.
-Contains very little on the end of the Empire and what followed it.
-Cary and Scullard are Empire apologists, claiming the Romans stumbled into possession of an empire they never wanted, while still being good enough to say they consistently laid down provocatively -- indeed unacceptably -- harsh pre-conflict terms of peace.
-Virtually ignores the beginnings of Christianity entirely (which may or may not be of passing interest even to a secular spiritualist, depending on whether or not you know).


LoadedReview Date: 2002-07-03
Great bookReview Date: 2002-07-07
As the previous reviewer said, Wistrich does do a wonderful job of documenting his sources and I too got a lot of further reading and research ideas from this book.
Illuminating and Useful Discussion Of The Holocaust!Review Date: 2002-10-02
As the author points out (and as others such as Lucy Dawidowicz so famously in "The War Against The Jews'), this scapegoating effort was no only an expediency arising from the discontent and chaos of the Weimar years after World War One, but also a deep-seated cultural tradition extending back hundreds if not thousands of years. Indeed, questions regarding Jewish claims to citizenship had been hotly debated both officially and unofficially every place from the many legislative forums to the floors of the local pubs as long as anyone could recall. There was nothing new or novel about German prejudice against and antipathy for the Jews. And as he adds so succinctly, this was (and indeed is) a problem extending far beyond German borders. After all, we do well to remember that most European countries turned their backs on the problems of the Jewish émigrés attempting by the thousands to flee the coming horror in Nazi Germany. Indeed, many such as the Swiss and the French cooperated in handing over indigenous Jews to the German authorities during the war.
Moreover, the climate of blind indifference extended to the pulpits of the clergy, as well, and persistent rumors claim that the Pope himself was cognizant of the plight of the German and other European Jews and did little if anything to intercede. In fat, this book provides a yeoman's service by articulating and discussing a number of salient and competing interpretations, ranging from Daniel Goldhagen's controversial thesis enunciated in "Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust" to Christopher Browning's thesis as expounded in several recent books (see my reviews of both authors' works). Wistrich also recapitulates the differences between the so-called "intentionalist' and "functionalist' theories of the Holocaust, and as I have written elsewhere, I believe that while the evidence indicates a functional approach, I also believe that the same evidence is consistent with the idea that Hitler and the Nazis always intended to exterminate the Jews (along with all of the indigenous populations of the conquered territories to the east). All the functional argument really proves, as far as I can see, is that existential circumstances played into the execution of a standing policy which was a virtual cornerstone of Nazi social policy.
As someone professionally educated as a sociologist, I was fascinated by the author's discussion of the meaning of the Holocaust in terms of history, and the question as to whether or not it represented the "antithesis of Western Civilization" or its realization. This treads very close to a searing indictment made by sociologist Max Weber of the eventual drift of rationalism as practiced in western societies toward a kind of non-thinking and non-substantive form of the rational impulse, a shadow which contented itself with the forms and practices of rationalism but none of its intent and rigor. To the extent he was correct that such a society would become an "iron cage" imprisoning man and endangering everything good that he stood for, perhaps Mr. Wistrich is onto something here. Enjoy!
Not as good as it could beReview Date: 2005-01-04
And I think, contrary to the author, that the entire extermination of the slavic population was practical for the Nazi's and it did serve a major ideological agenda. From reading Hitler's "table talk," it seemed to me like that was the future plan.
Also, the author says that "When Himmler instructed Rudolf Hoss to establish the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp, the reason given was expressly ideological; the need to extirpate the biological roots of Jewry." In something as serious as this, I think it's important that every fact is presented where there can be no confusion- otherwise, if they learn otherwise, it can cause problems. This would lead me to believe that Auschwitz was erected at the time of this talk with Himmler, when actually, the talk with Himmler happened in 1941, and Hoss had been camp commandant since 1940- and that Auschwitz was first established as a labor camp and turned INTO a death camp for the purpose of extirpating the biological roots of Jewry." that might be nitpicking on my part and it could be said that the Birkenau addition implies the time, but since the Nazi's crime is so terrible, every word is important, every sentence is a voice from the Holocaust crying out, so you have to make sure everything is clearly said. That's what I think, anyway.
This is a good book, but something like "Never Again" by Martin Gilbert might be a better introduction than this,
A scholarly analysis of the Jewish Holocaust .Review Date: 2003-11-01
In this book, Hitler's main aim was to rid Eurpe of all its Jews. His goal continued despite setbacks on the fighting fronts. Hungarian Jews were murdered up to the closing months of the war, even though Germany was in the process of being defeated. Germany's loss was also blamed on the Jews.
Wistrich gives us a scholarly analysis of why the Jews were selected, how the lack of solidarity in the Jewish population helped the Nazis kill their victims, and why the Western Allies did little to stop the killing. As Wistich states, other genocides in later years just shows how little has changed in the history of genocide. A minority group is selected for the blame of something, and revenge is exacted.
This is a great scholarly read for why the Holocaust happened. It places Hitler front and center in one of the greatest crimes of all time.

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Excellent Presentation, Worthy of Criticism & DiscussionReview Date: 2008-01-05
There is little new information (if any) here, but the author's description of the functioning of the General Staff, the OKH and OKW from pages 17 to 101 is particularly easy to understand, and I say this as someone who first read Goerlitz's "History of The German General Staff" at the age of fifteen in 1954. It is this part that makes the book worth the price of admission.
Chapters 10, 11 and 12, offer nothing new except for one-sided cherry-picked references tending to support the author's far-reaching conclusions. Nonetheless, such support is weak at best. From time to time the author seems to understand this, but then he goes ahead and states his questionable conclusions anyway. For example, even though the author is quick to point out (& accurately) that memoirs are often self-aggrandizing, he uses a sole, questionable source (Lossberg) to describe Jodl's attitudes at the end of 1941 and his agreement that Manstein, at the time a newly-baked army commander, and someone who had never been responsible for more than one panzer division in his earlier corps and now 11th Army, was the leading general to assume overall command of the eastern front. Very doubtful, and something that cannot be verified!
The author correctly points out that many higher-ranking officers like Beck believed that Germany's only hope lay in winning a short, decisive military conflict rather than an economic or diplomatic course of action. Yep! Like a bridge player who carefully studies his cards and sees that there is only one course of action that might win the contract, he takes the sole option open to him. When it doesn't succeed, one should not criticism the player for not having used another strategy UNLESS IT CAN BE SHOWN THAT THE STRATEGY COULD (not would) HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL. Unfortunately, this is exactly what the author does without showing any realistic basis for alternatives. The player can be criticized for making the contract in the first place, but that was never the function of either the OKW or the OKH. I was also amused to see that the author took a similar position to the German defeat in World War I -- the high command again attempted to apply an operational solution to a strategic problem. Once more for the West Coast, what would the author have recommended they do? That he doesn't state.
Yes, intelligence concerning the Soviets was almost nil, but military intelligence world-wide has been notorious for being poor except in combat conditions. The US was and is no exception to this rule, and Ultra (not mentioned by the author) was indispensable to the Allies (most notably in North Africa.) In a limited time frame like that for Barbarossa, one does the best one can. As far as logistics are concerned, the German economy was not put on a total war footing until Speer did it in 1944 with the resulting improvements in production. Of course, by then it was too late, and at any rate, that was not within the purview of either the OKW or OKH. And the US also used the term "supply" just like the Germans. With regards to personnel, the Germans only had one chance against the Soviet Union and that was denied them by Hitler's racial policies. The Germans needed to fight a "War of Liberation" against the Communists, setting up puppet governments in the non-Russian states and utilizing their manpower. In spite of everything, the number of Hiwis was enormous and Russian units like Cossacks and the Vaslov Army still opted to fight alongside the Germans. But again, this was not an option open to the OKW or OKH. So given the situation, what was the high command to do? The author is silent on this point, but condemns the General Staff anyway. One feels compelled to point out that Beck paid the ultimate price, Fritsch sought death before Warsaw, and Halder narrowly escaped execution before the war's end.
Yes, there was a culture in the General Staff that viewed the Versailles Diktat (it was not a negotiated treaty) as unbearable and to be torn up as soon as possible. Yes, they wanted to regain lost territories. That is hardly new or difficult to understand in the light of history. To the extent that Hitler's aims coincided with theirs, the German senior commanders supported him. To their regret, they found themselves riding on the back of the tiger. Even at the end, von Bock's last words were to Manstein, "Manstein, save Germany!"
For a much fuller treatment on the German officer mindset that the author only alludes to, see Robert Citino, "The German Way of War."
Military personnel are normally conservative (as the author points out), and the General Staff operated much like they did in 1870. Insofar as their opponents were incompetent like the Polish, French, and British, they won easily through aggressiveness and vastly superior training. The US Army adopted much if not all of the German leadership doctrine and training methods after World War II, recognizing that US performance in Europe was spotty at best. War gamers traditionally equate three American soldiers to two Germans, and Marshall's contention that over 40% of American infantrymen refused to fire their rifles in combat brings "the greatest generation" into question. Live-fire training has never been possible to any degree in the American Army, mostly due to objections by civilians for the casualties it causes. Of course, another reason the Germans fought so well is that they executed over 30,000 of their own military personnel in the course of the war for a wide range of offenses.
That the Officer Corps was not prepared to conduct a modern war with the necessary personnel, logistics, intelligence, and economic basis is correct. But neither were the French, Polish, British, Japanese or Russians. The Axis were defeated through a combination of British and American code-breaking, Russian manpower, and American logistics and economic power. The US struggled to put 90 divisions on the ground in Europe, but changed the Red Army into a mechanized force while the Wehrmacht became increasingly dependent on horses. Yes, the German machines were good, but German engineers tinkered their way to oblivion and prevented mass production.
The author sums up with the following statement: "The myth persists of a supremely talented, if politically naive and ambitious, German officer corps being led unwillingly into war and defeat by a ruthless dictator, a megalomaniac with no understanding of the military art." If one removes the word "unwillingly" and tones down "supremely", that "myth" would seem to be true. Nor do I know any serious scholar that believes in the myth as stated. Maybe some portion of the readership does, but only if they are not well-read on the subject. The author then states an untruth: "They (the officer corps) made strategic decisions, independently and in support of Hitler's, that started a war...." I know of no strategic decisions made independently by the German officer corps or high command that started World War II. Maybe the author can enlighten me. They didn't even make strategic decisions in support of Hitler that started the war unless you count their support of Hitler himself during the crises of 1933 and 1934. For that focus on Hammerstein-Equord, Blomberg, and those that refused to back Fritsch.
The author also castigates the Officer Corps for continuing the war after its futility should have been obvious. Gee, that was why Halder resigned. One is also tempted to castigate Robert E. Lee and Confederate commanders for continuing the Civil War after the fall of Atlanta. But like German officers, (& the German opposition had already been told in no uncertain terms that the Allies would not help them), they could not rise in rebellion -- they could only play their cards as they were dealt and hope for the best. Maybe a miracle would take place -- it has before. Only in hindsight is everything so clear.
Like I said -- this book is an excellent starting point for discussion. But I deplore the current trend by the author, Wolfram Wette, and others -- they represent the pendulum swinging too far in the opposite direction from the memoir literature of the 50s and earlier studies.
And lastly, I must register my objection to the author's dissertation advisor writing the Foreword and even being referenced on the title page. It should have been enough for the author to acknowledge Murray in his Preface. Moreover, Murray clearly shills for the author, using adjectives like "outstanding" and "extraordinary." Obviously the standards of objectivity and propriety in the academic world (or Ohio State at least) have changed, and not for the better.
A new interpretation of an old dispute.Review Date: 2006-11-10
Extensively researched and thoroughly documented, as well as clearly and engagingly written, this book is a significant addition to the scholarly literature on the German armed forces in WWII, as well as a refreshing antidote to the tiresome rehashing of the Führer's blunders and the self-exculpatory memoirs of numerous German officers that appeared in the wake of Germany's defeat. Strongly recommended for those interested in the subject, and another fine work of military history from the University Press of Kansas.
5 STAR MILITARY HISTORYReview Date: 2006-10-15
High Command? What high command?Review Date: 2002-06-04
The problem was only partially Hitler's. The Germans never really created a staff to manage a global conflict. Hadler resented Hitler's inferference, but because it was usually stupid, not because Hitler should have been managing the war, not the battles. The Germans were superb at what they considered the "operational" level of command--the control of armies on a single battlefield. But they never looked at the "big picture."
The book also proves that the German army high command, such as it was, had serious failings. They simply did not understand the logistics of a campaign as vast as the Eastern Front. Nor did they have the intelligence gathering capacity to estimate what they were getting into when they attacked the Soviet Union. Worse, they did not even realize their problems.
This book can teach a lot about why people frequently fail to understand and act upon hard facts. Learning this can help avoid future disasters of any sort.
Shatters some old mythsReview Date: 2002-04-30
Megargee argues convincingly that the German Generals had a political agenda similar to the Nazis. That is they supported the abrogation of the Treaty of Versailles, they wanted an end to democracy and they wanted Germany to rearm and to become a great power again. A large number of Generals such as Rommel, Guderian, Zeitzler and Reichenau were if not committed Nazis, enthusiastic barrackers yelling support from the sidelines.
One interesting point is Megaree?s estimation of the ability of the German Generals. After the war a large number wrote memoirs in which they modestly estimated themselves as pretty good. Megaree concedes that from an operational point of view the German army did well. However it was vulnerable in a number of respects. The key mistake made by Germany in the war was the attack on the Soviet Union. It would seem clear that the planning for operation Barbarossa was deeply flawed. For instance the Germans knew nothing of the actual strength of the forces against them. (The Soviets had 5 million men, 20,000 tanks and 20,000 aircraft to the German?s 3million 3,200 and 3000 respectively) In addition the Germans had no clear plan of defeating the Soviets. Barbarossa was based on the hope that the bulk of Soviet forces could be destroyed near the Polish border. It was then hoped that the Soviets might give in or the government would collapse. However if this did not eventuate the Germans had massive supply problems. They had limited fuel, and they could not use the Soviet railway system until they changed the gauge. In fact when the Soviets failed to collapse the Germans suffered massive supply problems, not being able to supply their troops with winter clothing and struggling to maintain ammunition levels and fuel and spares for their vehicles and planes.
Thus throughout the war the German Army acted as if intelligence was not really worth worrying about and that supply was a problem which could be overcome by an act of will. This deficiency was not a problem in initial war in the west, as the distances were so small and the French and British acted incompetently when faced by the German advance. However against the Soviets it was fatal.
Megargee summarises the weakness of the German generals as one of a strategic weakness. It was one that they shared with Hitler and in fact it is clear that they had little insight into the reason for their defeat even after the finish of the war.
Another issue dealt with by the book is the question of the role of Hitler?s leadership in bringing about the loss of the war for Germany. Megargee clearly shows that it was only in the later part of the war (1944) that tensions arose between Hitler and the Generals. By this time the war was lost. Over the big decisions there was not a lot of disagreement.
This book although expensive is short and easy to read. It is interesting not just for those interested in the war, but it illustrates how history can be distorted by over reliance on self serving material.
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Kenmare UnveiledReview Date: 2008-05-09
Helpful guideReview Date: 2008-02-22
All you need to get around IrelandReview Date: 2008-02-23
Even the maps in the book are excellent. We ended up using the Rough Guide maps combined with a tourist map we got at the aiport for a large-scale view of the country. The Michelin driving map we brought ended up being too complicated to use.
After several great experiences with them, Rough Guides are now my guide book of choice. You won't be disappointed with this one!
Almost BlueReview Date: 2007-05-29
Always a great guideReview Date: 2007-06-07
If you like to really EXPLORE a country, rather than find the next good shopping area or find the most economical place to sleep, this book and ALL of the "Rough Guides" are for you!

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Situation at Leyte.Review Date: 2007-04-16
1) Killed in action by air combat.
2) Killed by ground fire or by gunfire from enemy ship.
3) Killed in flying accidents due to the conditions of the airstrip on Leyte Island or because of enemy action.
4) Orignial group who start off at the Leyte airstrip in October through December 1944 and how many were left?
5) How many replacements did the 49th Fighter Group recieved and how many died in action or in flying accidents due to enemy action or some other mishap during the same time period?
If they tried to emphasize these battles like a meat grinder, then please give a complete casuality list; otherwise, the only time I hear of a meat grinder battle is those fought by the Germans since we have no hestitation about printing the German dead, wound, and POWs.
They should have made books like this years ago. Then we would know the horrors of World War II instead of glorying it through our culture for the last 62 years.
In the book Kenney Reports, Colonel Merian Cooper, who was General Kenney Chief of Staff, had worried that we were sticking our necks out if we invade Leyte. After reading Jungle Ace and some other books about how the Army had failed to secure a quick capture of the island, Col. Cooper was right. The battle of Leyte Island went on for nearly three months which was just as long as the battle for Normandy. After their defeat at the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the Japanese had other chances to destroy our shipping and airfields in order to bring the American invasion of the Philippines to the point of defeat if they had use their air power more efficiently.
Excellent ReadReview Date: 2008-02-20
Great book!Review Date: 2003-01-24
Good for hard-core WWII air combat nuts (like me!) as well as the average reader. Anyone with any interest in combat aircraft, WWII, or great reading material in general will love this book!
-Scott Rudi
You almost meet the manReview Date: 2003-07-11
This is exceedingly hard to do, but Bruning has done it: he somehow got long-ago memories jumpstarted, got people talking. While I accept that some of the quoted conversations probably did not take place word for word as presented, I feel the approach helps the book make the man more real. Charles Martin, in his bio of Tom McGuire, did the same thing, and it worked for both authors.
Thanks, Mr. Bruning for bringing a too-little known hero to light. You can be sure that my children will read about Gerry Johnson. When will you write another aviation biography? How about Charles H. MacDonald of the 475th FG?
Jungle Ace is a must for pilots, especially fighter pilots!Review Date: 2005-09-26

Fun and InspiringReview Date: 2008-06-15
French Life in the Slow LaneReview Date: 2007-12-05
You don't have to know anything about barging or boats to love this book. All you need is a desire to learn about Burgundy France from a unique perspective. Michelle Caffrey tells her true-life story of buying and refitting a lovely barge and lets you drift with her along the tree-lined canals of one of France's most beautiful regions. Textured with fascinating characters and the rich detail of food, wine, and countryside, this book lets you "just imagine" an intriguing and peaceful life style--with a good measure of surprise and humour mixed in.
Informative read on a great escapeReview Date: 2007-05-12
As something of a technical geek, the descriptions of the boats they looked at and the buying process they went through to find Imagine was of most interest to me. I now have a better idea of not only what kind of boat to buy but how to go about finding one. I did enjoy reading about the places and people they met but I'm also an explorer at heart, looking forward to my own discoveries. Their sense of entrepreneurship in starting Barge and Breakfast was also of interest as my wife and I both are involved in teaching entrepreneurship at Colorado Mountain College. My exposure to Roma people in Eastern Europe taught me that if you are going to be a gipsie, you also better be an entrepreneur. Sharing my boat with strangers in close quarters is not my idea of fun but it works for them. Proving that there are many ways to fund your dreams if you are creative. Seems like that is what "Just Imagine: New Life on an Old Boat" is all about anyway.
If there are any criticisms of the book it would be that the closer I got to the end of the story, the more grammatical mistakes I found. Not serious stuff but an indication that maybe barging is really more fun than writing about it.
Sail on friends. Some day we will gather by a campfire on the same riverbank to share a bottle of fine wine and a story or two.
Not the Same Old StoryReview Date: 2007-03-08
John Hardman
I could taste the wine and cheeseReview Date: 2006-04-27

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What Melville Left OutReview Date: 2007-10-23
Newby was 18 when he went to sea in 1938 on a barque owned by a Scandinavian shipping firm. Before World War II, it was still economical to deploy a commercial fleet of these behemoths around the world to scoop up grain crops from Australia for the European market. When his job at an advertising agency (hilarious) was threatened by lay-offs, he indulged the youthful romance of life at sea stoked by a girlfriend's naval father and signed up with the Erikson firm's ship, Moshulu. He kitted up grandly, found a Louis Vuitton steamer trunk. Immediately aboard ship, he learned that a lot of the work centered about scaling those tall masts, cleaning the "restrooms" and repelling off the side to scrape rust. He was the only Englishman among Scandinavians and Germans who were decidedly not of the Louis Vuitton school. Newby's character sketches are priceless and he captures the hybrid vernacular so well that by the end of the book, the reader knows as much as he learned. The book is loaded with technical information about the boat and its mission, but also with accounts of dramatic storms, bedbug plagues or occasional leisurely pursuits like capturing an albatross just to measure its wingspan. I purchased a used original UK Reader's Union edition (think Book of the Month Club) that usefully had a detailed illustration inside the back cover and a world map inside the front, with the journey dated and marked off.
Infrequently, news of the outside world drifted to the ship via a radio signal from a distant land. It is not good news, but at sea they can mostly ignore it. Like the Pequod in MOBY DICK, the Moshulu was its own complete world. That's the beauty of this book: it captures a fully evolved culture that would suddenly disappear a year later. When Moshulu unexpectedly returned first among the fleet, Newby packed it in. He had lived a lifetime and grown up in under a year. The next time the boat went out, it returned to the waiting Germans. Afterwards, it turned up in a future where commercial sailing ships were no longer competitive. Sic transit gloria mundi.
A Well Told Tale of Real Life at Sea Under Sail - Circa 1939Review Date: 2007-05-21
Newby went on to become a rather prosperous clothier in London but was better known for his travel writing till his death last year (2006) at the age of 86. I had read his "Travels in the Hindu Kush" years ago and put him down as a kind of smart alek and I had also read the paperback of this book published by Penguin in 1971 but had not appreciated it till I got it down from my shelf of sea stories last week and read it again. He's a dmaned fine writer here and I take back what I said about him being a smart alek. His description of life at sea and the sea iself is as good as anything I've ever read; and you will enjoy it. For those who like sailing ships there's a lot of technical detail about rigging, watch-standing etc. and you can skip this and read about a storm at sea if you want but if you wade through the technical stuff you will be amazed at what you learn. I strongly recommend the whole thing to you.
A great read, & a great listenReview Date: 2001-09-18
Though I've been reading his books for 20 years, for some reason I'd never run across "The Last Grain Race", and for well over 1000 miles I listened to the reading of this book, and when I got to Portland on my return leg, my first stop was at Powell Books to grab a hard copy of the book.
This is one of the finest books I've ever read. I was going to say "seafaring books", but that is too restrictive.
Eric Newby's commentary and sense of humor are first-rate, like always. While listening, and while reading, I was transported by this book. The conditions seem indescribable, but Newby succeeds in describing them, and paints cold, wet portraits of the days and nights in the rigging and the foc'sle of the barque "Moshulu". I subsequently found a book of the photographs of this voyage, Newby's "Learning The Ropes", which gives us faces to the cast of "Great Grain Race".
Old friends of my youth came to visit while I was engrossed in this book, Sterling Hayden's "Voyage", the film "Windjammer", and the loss of the sailing ship "Pamir" in the late 1950's. The "Moshulu" survives today, as a restaurant ship in Philadelphia, but she was interned on Lake Union in my hometown of Seattle during WWI, and her consort, the "Monongahela" was the last tall ship to pass under the George Washington (Aurora) Bridge before it was closed to tall-masted ships.
An interesting sidelight: While recently rewatching "Godfather II", I noticed that in the scene where young Vito Andolini (Corleone) arrives in New York, the ship he's on is the "Moshulu".
Eric Newby is one of a kind. Now that he is gone we'll never see his like again.
If You Read Only One Book This Year: Get Them BothReview Date: 2001-09-24
After a brief stint as an office clerk, Newby at eighteen signed on as an apprentice seaman for an around the world cargo voyage, with no nautical experience or skills other than a careful eye and superb memory for detail. "The Last Great Grain Race" is the story of one of the last four-masted barques, which in 1938 sailed from Ireland to Australia to pick up a cargo of grain and return to Ireland, a voyage which would take nine months. Ultimately it was to become the last voyage in such a vessel, as the impending war would change the world forever. We are fortunate that Newby was along to document the voyage. We are equally appreciative of his thoughtfulness in bringing his camera, as "Learning the Ropes" is the superb photo essay of this journey.
Newby apparently was a very skilled photographer. Oddly, he only briefly mentions his possession of a camera in "The Last Great Grain Race." He never lets on that his is so actively chronicling events and shipmates throughout the voyage. Though Newby does an excellent job describing what is like to climb aloft in all kinds of weather, the black and white photographs take the reader aloft as well and provide the narrative even with more impact and grace.
The crew is as varied and colorful as one might expect the conditions are harsh and oftentimes dangerous; the work is unrelenting, demanding and dangerous in its own right. Newby works alongside seasoned veterans and never shirks.
Grain Race however does have its limitations. There is a tremendous amount of technical detail that can often leave the reader literally at sea. For example "There were still the sheets of the topmast staysails to be shifted over the stays and sheeted home, the main and mizzen courses to be reset, and the yards trimmed to the Mate's satisfaction with the brace whips." Newby does provide a graphic of the sail plan and running rigging (79 reference points), but these are only of marginal assistance.
Another shortcoming is the language barrier Newby faces. This is a Finnish crew and commands are rarely given in English. Newby and the reader often have to work out the language; if the reader misses the first context or explanation then subsequent uses of the terminology will be lost, a glossary might have helped here. Newby does faithfully record dialects especially when he is being spoken to in occasionally recognizable English and these dialogues are often amusingly recounted.
Eric Newby should seriously consider issuing both in a single volume and one has to wonder why this wasn't done when Grain Race was first issued or at least when "Learning the Ropes" was released a couple of years ago. It is interesting to speculate on the length of time between the original release of Grain Race and the very vivid and informative photographs. Regardless it was worth the wait.
Grain Race the narrative and Grain Race the photographs make for an enjoyable double read.
Exciting sailing adventureReview Date: 2002-03-18
Newby is undeservedly less well known than other writers who have imitated him. His books, "A Small Place in Italy, "On the Shores of the Mediterranean" and "The Big Red Train Ride" have been imitated by other authors. His writing style is spare and matter-of-fact; he doesn't try to impress the reader with overblown prose instead letting the facts speak for themselves without florid editorial comment.
There's a funny account a trick played by the Belfast stevedores on the sailors of Moshulu. Among the tons of rocks loaded into the hold were two dead dogs. The decomposing dog carcasses fill the ship's hold with an overpowering odor that plagues the men as they dump out the ballast and load the grain months later off the shore of Adelaide.
The Last Grain Race goes into great detail describing the operation of a sailing ship, complete with obscure jargon names for the sails and rigging. Newby seems to have been working too hard on the trip to completely enjoy and appreciate it. The books gives a glimpse at a lost world of merchant sailing ships and the quiet life of sailors at sea, now exchanged for sparsely manned giant container ships crossing vast oceans in a matter of days.
Moshulu returns to Queenstown, Ireland on June 10, 1939 after a pace-setting 91-day passage by war of Cape Horn. It had taken 8 months for a round-trip in which Moshulu brought 4,875 tons of grain from Australia to Ireland. Newby leaves the ship a full-fledged Ordinary Seaman. World War II will start in a few months and obliterate the peaceful world of merchant sailing ships.

Used price: $13.65

A Movie?Review Date: 2008-04-09
Dr. Bob Alottsa
The Last Voyage of the SS Henry BaconReview Date: 2002-02-07
Son of a SurvivorReview Date: 2002-02-01
"The Last Voyage of the SS Henry Bacon"is an excellent addition to any collection of Maritime or World War II history. After spending many years gathering first hand accounts and recently de-classified US Government documents, the author has transformed long ago events into a fast paced and riveting story of struggle and survival on the North Atlantic's deadly "Murmansk run".
This story again reminds us of the sacrifices made by the seamen of our Merchant fleet during WWII. Without their courage and dedication to duty, this world would have been very different from the one in which we have been raised.
I give thanks to my Dad, Dick Burbine and the crew of the SS Henry Bacon, as well as to the men of the HMS Zambesi.
Dr. Alotta -- Great Job -Well Done!
A deadly and harrowing true storyReview Date: 2002-03-17
Relative of Messman lost on the Henry BaconReview Date: 2002-02-22
Related Subjects: Greece Turkey Finland Netherlands
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