China Books

This is really one of the few books that everyone seriously interested in himalayan art should not afford to miss. All the different aspects of the himalayan branch of the buddhistic religion / philosophy which have visual representation - from tangkas to statues, to any kind of ritual objects - are illustrated with exceptionally detailed, wonderful pictures, each supplemented by exhaustive descriptions. Entire chapters of the book introduce, and then guide, the reader to and through the meanders of a truly fascinating journey, which develops from peak to peak, from monastery to monastery in that magic world - suspended between land and sky - known as The Himalayas. This is one of those rare books with top class quality built in. Outstanding !

I was unfortunate to miss the exhibition for which this book is a catalogue and a venue for presenting the previously obscure art of the Chakrasamvara tantras of Nepal to a wider audience.

In the absence of being at the exhibit, this catalogue reproduces all 157 objects to a high degree, enough for you to ascertain for yourself the ideas of the authors, and to appreciate the quality, beauty and devotion held by the artists and reflected within these works of art.

The authors had access to Nepalese tantric priests for help in explaining the meaning of some of the esoteric representations, allowing for an accurate description of much of the iconography contained within the artworks. At the same time, the authors don't transgress the secret nature of the practices as contained in the ritual ceremonies of Chakrasamvara or the oral lineage from Guru to disciple.

Excellent work to have conceived and organised an exhibition of this nature and to have exectuted to this extent.

Samuel's erudite and comprehensive review is fast becoming an indispenable tool to any serious student of Tibetan religious life (of whatever hue). Encompassing a breathtaking range of literature and information, the author's forte lies in his ability to convey the sheer vastness of extant scholarly material on Tibet, without at the same time getting bogged down in an excessively scholastic vocabulary and style. Readers should take note that this is certainly NOT a book for uncommitted beginners, or for those that want a feel-good dip into Buddhism (although the determined reader could reasonably treat it as introductory), but rather represents a comprehensive and in-depth guide for those who seek to become truly well-informed about one of the world's deepest and most facinating religious civilizations.

Samuel may have set a standard with this book for Buddhist studies. It is not an easy book, for example because of its thoroughness and the difficult issues it tackles, but it is well-presented and seems convincing. I, at any rate, would not want to debate Samuel on its positions.

When looking at Buddhist books, it seems many provide only a superficial context for the deep concepts they present. Introductory works on Buddhism or teachings by a modern teacher may assume or disregard your knowledge of key cultures and a vast history of development. It may be that the writer or teacher is him/herself unaware of that background. Of course, that "background" may be so big as to make it impossible to focus on any present teaching.

What is key to Samuel's study is his correction to the mistaken assumption that Tibetan religion consists almost entirely of the Dalai Lama and the clerical orders. That's not to deny their importance but Samuels puts them into perspective. That Tibetan religion can be as complex as it is is staggering: one wonders how any Tibetan can make use of it. Perhaps having grown up in that culture, it seems natural. Samuels, at any rate, for the non-Tibetan reader, shows how far Buddhism in Tibet has moved from Theravada Buddhism and clerical Tibetan Buddhism into shamanism, Tantra, Bon and Dzogchen ...

After reading this study, I'd expect any individual seeking to practice Buddhist will still be left wondering how to make use of such a rich spiritual tradition (or whether that richness hadn't become excessive). But "Civilized Shamans" suggests a great deal of creative religious activity, at least some of which may fascinate you.

This book is not for every one, but it has plenty to offer those who think they might be interested in the history of urban reform in a Chinese provincial capital. Chengdu lies in western Sichuan province, a remote but populous part of China. Nestled at the feet of mountains that rise in the west to the Tibetan plateau, Chengdu is a beautiful and fascinating city with a long and rich history. This book was written for and should prove to be of primary interest to scholars, but it should also appeal to serious travelers who plan to visit Chengdu (or have already visited) this rewarding spot off of the usual tourist itinerary. Civilizing Chengdu focuses on efforts to administer and reform the city in the half century prior to the founding of the People's Republic of China. It is scrupulously researched but written in an accessible style. Scholars interested in modern Chinese history have recently begun to focus on developments in urban areas, and there have been a number of excellent works published over the last few years that have dealt with different urban historical topics. Most of these books have concentrated on the major cities of eastern China, such as Shanghai, Guangzhou and Beijing. This book begins to address the need for work on the many smaller cities scattered across the country.

In "Civilizing Chengdu", Kristin Stapleton discusses the reforms that took place between 1895-1937 in the capital city of Sichuan province. During this time Sichuan aided in the downfall of a two thousand year old dynastic system and witnessed the rise of warlordism.

Throughout much of Chinese history the management of cities took a backseat to the much more populated rural areas. However, by the late 1800's the increase in urban inhabitants, the influence of European ideas, and the numerous colonial cities scattered throughout East and Southeast Asia at this time gave rise to a new appreciation for urban management.

The book examines two urban reform programs: The first was based on the 'New Policies' of the late Qing period and the second was the city administration movement of the 1920's and early 1930's.

Before discussing these two reform eras, Stapleton gives a description of Chengdu's physical layout, social organization, status as a provincial capital, and methods of administrative rule in the late Qing period.

The book then moves on to discuss the reforms, especially police reform. Traditionally in China soldiers carried out police functions such as the guarding of important buildings and other structures and maintaining the peace at the local level. But since it was felt that these duties obstructed the modernization of the army, many believed that a modern police system was needed.

At the forefront of this movement was Zhou Shanpei. In 1899, Zhou had visited Tokyo for the first time and had become an admirer of its orderly and productive nature. Between 1902 and 1912 Zhou served six Sichuan governor-generals in Chengdu. During 1902 he had helped to establish a police administration. Zhou became head of the police bureau in 1906. Besides keeping order in the city, the police, under Zhou set out to transform social habits and customs. Theaters and brothels were brought under tighter control and workhouses for unemployed vagrants, beggars and lawbreakers were founded (p.99). Also vocational training for orphans were established. (For these and other social programs carried out under Zhou Shanpei's tenure as head of the police bureau see pp. 125-38). In 1907 Zhou Shanpei was appointed the superintendent of economic development in Sichuan province. Through this role he continued to have influence on urban reforms until 1911.

Sichuan, in 1911, saw the escalation of tensions over the central government's decision to nationalize the building of railroads. Originally, each province had control over railroad construction and it was considered a matter of local autonomy. However, local corruption and unwise investments (realized during the Shanghai stock market crisis of 1910)caused the central authorities to usurp local control. This was the catalyst that set in motion the downfall of the Qing dynasty and with it came the end of the first set of urban reform in Chengdu.

The immediate post- revolutionary period brought a different political atmosphere to Chengdu. No effective government replaced the fallen Qing bureaucracy. In this vacuum of authority, secret societies, such as the Gelaohui (Society of Elders and Brothers)came to the fore along with a group of prominent reform minded scholars called the 'Five Elders and Seven Sages' (Wu lao qi xian) and activists associated with the foreign community. Secret societies had been marginalized and suppressed during imperial rule, but during the early 1900's they witnessed substantial growth in membership and popularity (also see Stapleton, "Urban Politics in an Age of 'Secret Societies': The Cases of Shanghai and Chengdu", in Republican China, vol. 22, no. 1 (Nov.), pp. 23-63). The police force continued to exist but their control over community affairs was greatly negated by these new social forces.

It was in this strained and fragmented political atmosphere that warlordism was able to develop. "Between 1917 and 1935 Sichuan's regional armies engaged in hundreds of small and large scale wars, breaking the province up into occupation zones that grew and shrank and changed hands frequently"(p. 184). Stapleton shows how in this environment the second wave of urban reform in Chengdu attempted to take place.

These reforms began with General Yang Sen's arrival in Chengdu in 1924. Yang controlled Chengdu for only sixteen months before being chased out of the city by his rivals in the summer of 1925. Stapleton describes how Yang Sen's policies during this time did not take into consideration "local politics" (p. 219). Yang and his colleaques knew about the reform that had transformed coastal cities like Shanghai, and were eager to bring these techniques to Sichuan. However, through his attempt to remake Chengdu, Yang's authoritarian style isolated a large segment of the city's population (see chapter 7).

The post-Yang Sen city administration attempted a more conciliatory policy, bringing the city's more conservative elites back into the fold. This period (late 1920's- early 1930's) saw "the revival of many of the administrative institutions and techniques established by Zhou Shanpei during the New Policies era" (pp. 246- 47).

The second attempt at urban reform reached its apex in 1934. During this time General Liu Xiang reorganized Chengdu's police force, also taking many ideas for its administration from Zhou Shanpei's reform efforts. Stapleton, like Frederic Wakeman in "Policing Shanghai, 1927- 1937"(1995) and Stephen MacKinnon in "Police Reform in Late Ch'ing Chihli" (Ch'ing-shih Wen-t'i, vol.3, no. 4 1975) believes that the police reforms during the 'New Policies' era was "one of the most significant political events in twentieth- century Chinese history" (p. 247).

It is refreshing to see such a thorough study of a city in China's hinterland during the late Qing and early Republican era (add to this Wang Di's, "Street Culture in Chengdu", 2003) after so many studies have been done on coastal cities of this period. Because of the dearth of secondary sources in English, research on inland provinces and cities make for an exciting new path in the study of late Qing and early Republican history.

I inherited my grandmother's Noritake china set when she died, and wanted to know the year of production and what it was worth. The pictures of the maker's marks and patterns were very useful. I discovered our pattern was made in 1931, and was worth about $2,500! Not that I would ever part with such a sentimental gift...It's just nice to know the history of something. Thanks to the author for her research!

I found this book to be very useful. It's very well organized and well written. An only suggestion for the next edition is to have glossier/brighter/clearer photographs.

I found this book to be logical and informative. The foundation of this book is based upon the chronilogical use of each mark. The patterns are then listed alphabetically within the time period that "mark" was used. Because of this book - all my freinds and colleages think of me as a "Early Noritake Expert" - I dont have the heart to tell them that I am not! I highly recommend this book to any and all collectors and/or dealers of Noritake!

I purchased this book to clear up my conception of some of the Metlox patterns but it opened my eyes to some very collectible pieces that I had been over looking. Nice pictures with several styles in each catagory that eliminates the guess work. As a beginner collector of Metlox I am truly please with this book.

This book is the definitive work on Metlox Pottery. It's a "must have" for the collector and enjoyable reading for the person wishing to learn more about California pottery. Full of hundreds of pictures and values, this book is an invaluable guide and resource.

This 1998, 232 page book features more than 500 full color, large photos of a great variety of collectible souvenir china. 1998 values are shown. There is a nice introduction to the topic and plenty of descriptive text throughout. It's well indexed for easy item location. Major topics include, Collecting Souvenir China in the U.S., Golden Era of Souvenir China, The Pioneers, Identifying Producers, Shapes, Forms and Styles, and related items. A nice bibliography is provided. Collectors will love looking at the great photos provided. A useful reference.

This handy paperback volume is a true gem on collecting late 19th/early 20th century souvenir china. The numerous color photos and informative text make this an excellent addition to any collector's bookshelf. Highlights include wholesaler marks and information on manufacturers.

This edition promises to be the corner stone for the souvenir china collector!

I read an earlier edition of this book and was very impressed. Part of my MA thesis is on Lao She. My only complaint about this anthology is that it does not contain his novella, "Crescent Moon." This anthology is about 750 pages and includes most all of 20th century China, including Taiwan and a few non-Han Chinese authors. The selections are excellent and the stories are self-contained, i.e. they are short stories, poems, essays, or novellas, not extracted chapters. The spellings are pinyin, not Wade-Giles. I would highly recommend it to someone wanting a large pool of 20th century Chinese authors.

This anthology presents a superb cross section of Chinese literature, from the time of Lu Xun to the present. The editors have included works from the mainland, as well as Taiwan, and the scope of authors and genres is tremendous for a single volume. A good starting point for anyone interested in Chinese literature, as well as those already familiar with it.

This book does a good job of describing typical small business activity in a city that the author lived in for a couple of years.
I have long been puzzled by the reports that China has a booming economy in spite of widespread corruption and hardly any rule of law, when those problems seem to ensure poverty elsewhere.
This book does a good deal to resolve this mystery. It suggests that Fukuyama's claim that "there is a relatively low degree of trust in Chinese society the moment one steps outside the family circle" is misleading because the Chinese notions of family ties aren't as rigid as in the west. Family-style trust is more like a commodity that can be readily acquired by most people who have decent reputations, via friend of a friend type connections between people. And the networks of reputation do well at ensuring the reasonableness of corrupt or arbitrary actors.
It would be nice if we could copy the good parts of these aspects of Chinese culture, but I suspect that's as hard as copying the social capital that Fukuyama describes in his book Trust.

Economic activities are embedded in social relation. In his criticism of economics, Mark Ganovetter (1985) pointed out the "atomised and undersocialised view of human action" held by neoclassical economics tended to undermine the role of institutions on economic activities. This view of embeddedness has long been noted by economic sociologists (Ganovetter, 1985; Dacin, Ventresca, Beal, 1999) which theorised organisational embeddedness.

Prof. Wank's interesting book "Commodifying Communism" provides an excellent context for readers to understand the concept of economic embeddedness. Drawing from years of ethnographic research in Xiamen, the author vividly illustrated how institutions both formal and informal collectively influence the cognition and behaviour of agents during the process of transformation. Observation in the field led to what the author believed institutional commodification of Communism which as a process refutes simplistic views on market transition.

Methodologically, the multidisciplinary approach adopted by the author not only successfully integrates sociology into institutional analysis but also skilfully incorporates different theories into an eclectic paradigm. Practically, the book also sheds lights into the business process and culture in southern China and helps readers to understand the context Chinese business.

As a reader from Xiamen, I felt familiar with various characters described in the book and wondered whether they had managed to survive the latest anti-corruption campaign centre-staged there. The ethnographic approach adopted by the author possesses much power of story telling, and as a result, the research had not drained analysis of life compared with the formalist's account on China. Methodologically, the deconstruction of language truthfully illustrated how norms, values and belief were construed and constructed by various actors. Indeed, one strength of this book that I found particular enlightening is its power to reveal what most Chinese would think as "common sense" but turns out to be incomprehensible to most foreigners.

Theoretically, these penetrating insights have helped distinguish the "institutional commodification account" from the normativism of political economy. I consider these aspects thoughtful and revealing, trully capable of providing an distinctive informal approach to conventional analysis. This approach not only acknowledges the importance of social institution beyond market but also highlight the degree of complexity in transitional economies.

Structurally, the book consists of three parts. Part one familiarises readers with contenting arguments, outlines the research design and introduces its central argument: `institutional commodification'. Part two explores the process of commodification in the context of agents' behaviour response to formal and informal institutions. Finally in Part three some interesting comparison were made between China and Eastern Europe while the major argument was further pursued in the context of politics, economics and sociology. The time scale of research was set in one of most dramatic period in modern China demarcated by the event in 1989.

The institutional commodification account is certainly an innovation in the sense that it captures the reality and dynamics of growth and most importantly presenting the complexity in its wider social context of network. Indeed, I really admire the angle where the author choosed to present the context of arguement. From there, the reader may appreciate how ingrained value, belief and relations have collectively shaped the process of transformation.

When I first went to China in the mid-1970's, I was confused as to how Hong Kong, with no resources, could be so rich, and China, with massive resources, could be so poor. Nowhere was the contrast so stark as crossing the bridge at Lo Wu, where we had to disembark the Hong Kong train and stroll across the border to re-embark on a Chinese train to Canton. The Hong Kong border police were sharp, disciplined, lively, friendly and their cousins across the bridge, literally cousins, were sloppy, unhappy, sullen and dull. That difference ran through everything on both sides. How could this be? How could the China that gave the world Shang bronze, silk, paper, tea, amazing ceramics, stunning architecture, gunpowder, the stirrup, not to mention literature and ten thousand other useful things, could end up so poor, so uninventive?

I mention in my book that China has been under foreign control for some 500 of the last 1,000 years. I developed a hypothesis that under foreign domination, China does not thrive. Further, given Chinese history, there is nothing in Chinese culture that would bar China from assuming a position in the first rank among the nations today. Later, when I took a sabbatical from work to finish a bachelors degree in Asian studies, I came across a professor who made the same point, except about the Chinese under the Yuan Dynasty when poetry and art flourished. He proposed since all industry would benefit the Mongols, the Chinese elite retreated into the reflective arts, and the industrial arts re-emerged when the Ming tossed the Mongol invaders out.

But here is the problem with my hypothesis, China was poor, and is poor, but clearly Mao Tse Tung and all his associates were Chinese, so China clearly spent the last century under Chinese control.

Or not.

I just finished two books by Laszlo Ladany, a Hungarian lawyer, fluent in Chinese, who spent the 1940's in Shanghai and North China and moved to Hong Kong in 1949 eager to see how the new China would develop. He started China News Analysis, a weekly summary of Chinese media and party documents. His reports were required reading in all of the intelligence services around the world, if nothing else to double check what the home services were learning. He died in Hong Kong in 1990. The first book "Law and Legality in China" is a summary of Chinese law in history, and then covers specifically law under the Peoples Republic of China. In essence Ladany demonstrates China had all power in the hands of the party, with party members exempt from the law, and chaos otherwise. So, under Chinese communist rule, things can be very bad indeed. Think power with no responsibility.

The next book was more to the point: The Communist Party of China and Marxism, 1921-1985: A Self Portrait. It is a strange title. But his success as a China watcher stems from his discipline of working strictly with documents from the Chinese Communist Party, and reading their official publications. Hence the "self-portrait," that is, Chinese Communism as the Chinese Communists tell it. Ladany also met with escapees, refugees, defectors and anyone else heading in or out of China (recall China was closed to the world for at least 10 years, and had only one ambassador, to Egypt, during the cultural revolution). Ladany even consented to meet with me a couple of times, but back then there were only a couple of hundred Americans let in China twice a year, and I was one of them.

As the Communist party tells it, Chiang Kai Shek and Mao were revolutionaries... both looking for something to fill the vacuum of the crumbling Qing dynasty. Chiang choosing nationalism, and the founders of the Chinese Communist Party in the 20's, Mao among many others, turned to the recently victorious communists in Russia for a plan of action. The degree to which the Chinese "communists" did not understand what communism was, and the degree to which they slavishly followed Moscow is astonishing to read. All this by page six! As the book progresses, communism in China was a Russian operation, which begs the question, how could so few people, under foreign direction, manage to take over a country? Ladany lays this out, translating from the Chinese documents.

According to the communists, the nationalists were winning the war on the communists at every step, forcing a grand retreat, or the Long March to Yan'an. Lucky for the communists, the Japanese invaded, tying up the nationalists, and Moscow directed the Chinese communists to ally with the nationalists in the fight against the Japanese. At the same time, the communists were to avoid any heavy lifting in the struggle while doing everything they could to undermine the nationalists, especially in public opinion. One result was after the US victory over Japan, US generals, short of the manpower necessary to garrison North China, had to rely on surrendered Japanese troops to maintain order. So in spite of the victory, the Chinese citizens were still facing Japanese bayonets and soldiers. The communists offered an alternative. The communists were given equal rank in international negotiations, as the Soviets insisted. Although a history, the book proceeds almost like a novel, so read it for the details. But as I proceeded, I felt confident that my hypothesis was in fact a worthy theory. Chinese communism was merely a Eastern European import, not Chinese.

I recall reading Mao's little red book in China, and being astonished at how banal it was. (This is not unique, everything I've ever read by any politician has since proven to be as bad). Through constant struggles, anyone with any education or wisdom was purged in China, so the farther along the communist progressed, the cruder and more ignorant the leaders left standing. Forgive me for repeating myself, but this is what the communists say about themselves, after Deng Xiaoping gained power. Recall the rehabilitation of many past leaders, such as Liu Shaoqi, and criticism of even Chairman Mao.

I took particular delight in Mao's campaign for More Faster Better Cheaper, an effort to bring material benefits to the Chinese peasant through communism. Now, correct me if I am wrong, but more faster better cheaper comes through free markets, or given human nature, relatively free markets.

To review the argument in How Small Business Trades Worldwide, innovators introduce new and better products, and eventually conservators "steal" the product and lower the cost and widen the access to the item, service or agricultural produce, through economies of scale. At the same time access (distribution) widens, the quality improves and options emerge, giving more better cheaper faster.

Think telecommunications, travel, energy, distribution, and even beer. In the last 3 decades we saw all `deregulated' to some extent, and in that measure in these fields we got more better cheaper faster.

This free market is not what democrats or republicans call free markets... when they say free market they mean policies that reward their friends and punish their enemies (each has a different set of friends and enemies, while there is a super class that benefits either way, not unlike the super bowl, where one loses and one wins, but the owners clean up regardless, making money off of taxpayer funded stadiums).

The free market is not `capitalism.' Capitalism is a term coined by the enemy of free markets, slick because it describes one function in the free market, and that is capital formation. Capitalism is to a free market as a carburetor is to a car: important, but not the thing. Free markets precede governments, let alone any "ism." Free markets are merely exchanges between neighbors, and cultures evolve in part to protect (the root of the word "legal") free trade from either coercion or fraud, or both. Like natural law, indeed as part of the natural order, free markets already are, and how, given the terrain, climate, resources and human genius the Chinese cultures grow around what is natural in man, so it is different from what, say the Saxon cultures grow around what is natural in man.

When Chinese revolutionaries grasp something temporary and possibly the worst experiment in human history and manage to impose it on China, the results were starvation, murder, theft and every other conceivable disaster. (And to read Ladany, about the riskiest career choice a human could make in the last century was to become a communist. No one slaughtered more communists than communists.) Not only did China fail to get more better cheaper faster, they ran out of toothbrushes. Forget about vitamin E. The Chinese clinched it...in every attempt, socialism bring less, slower, more expensive and worse. You can say the Chinese had astragalus and other wonderful home remedies from traditional Chinese medicine, but they did not have those either since production and distribution of everything collapsed.

The book entertains the question as to whether China was ever communist at all, or simply in a constant conflict of a Trotskyite sort. In any event, constant purges wiped out the educated class, leaving the army in control of the country, with Mao on top. Well, of course, if communism had just one more chance, like Cambodia, it would work, but it never does. (Of course pure communism works, but only in monasteries where a closed economy of people who have died to the world and prove their dedication to Christ by submitting to a Prior. Not everyone is called to that life.)

I watched the change from the Maoists being in control to Deng Xiaoping gaining control, and I was under the impression that the chaos stopped with Deng. Not so, according again, to the communists. And obviously, in 1989, the Tien An Men square debacle showed the conflicts continue. No one can riot like the Chinese, and films come out of China regularly proving this art is gaining popularity. They do have the advantage that in a riot, the more the merrier, and in all things Chinese, a large crowd is assumed.

Back to my hypothesis: on page 453 of the latter book, there it is... Ye Qing, who studied in Paris with Zhou Enlai, and with the Communists in Moscow in the 1920's left the communists in 1927 calling them "just more warlords who split the unity of the country." He said "communism was a European product, an imported foreign commodity" His argument was the divided China presented a temptation the Japanese could not pass up. Because of the communists the Japanese invaded, and 50 years of misery ensued. Ye's argument from the 1920's was recalled in the 1980's because precisely that question was being asked in China... how did communism ever help China? To ask the question is to know the answer.

But one thing is clear. Can you name the leader of China? I had to look it up. No more all-powerful Chairman. Rational law is being instituted. Freedom is growing and economic opportunity with it. Anyone who travels to China can see it is changing, growing fast. China now lends the United States money, to help us out!

It is not so much that China has instituted reforms that are helping Chinese, but that the communists have so little control that the Chinese people are very free indeed. What we are seeing, are Chinese, relatively free of foreign influence, are exhibiting the creativity any nation would show, and succeeding quite well. As Chinese.

The communists tried to wipe out China's past, as the Soviets tried in Russia, as Pol Pot tried in Cambodia. It didn't work. There is a group in China, in charge, called the communist party. They are about as communist as I am. There is no Soviet Union calling the shots (so to speak.) The Chinese are rebuilding China after a disastrous century, a century in which China's fate was largely decided by foreigners. This next century I think we'll see China reassume it's natural place in the world and begin to offer mankind the fruit of its genius. In the natural course of events, a China that is 1/4 of the world's economy would be a very good thing, no more a threat than New York is to California. Each getting rich benefits the other. Competition means to "strive with," competition is not combat.

India is reassuming its rightful place as well.

Magnetism belongs to nobody, and the Chinese are making great strides in magnetic levitation transportation, a cheap clean and fast way of moving things. Coupled with computer technology, they very well may leapfrog America in advanced transportation and distribution. Just as Jobs at Apple took GUI from Xerox and built a fortune on it while Xerox could not catch a profit, so China will take what naturally belongs to everybody, in their relative freedom and their natural genius as humans, (merely Chinese in this instance), and profit.

USA cannot do mag lev for the simple reason too much of our economy is based on subsidies to the auto and airline industry. In 30 years, taking a flight in USA will be as quaint (and as embarrassing) as riding a rickshaw in Hong Kong is today, when Red Wind Transport can deliver you door-to-door 300 miles away in one hour flat, providing any personal services you desire on the way.

This book is very helpful for those who want to know more about the earlier years of the Chinese Communist party. More than half the book covers the period before the 1960s. The author has synthesized a lot of information from the the available documents and interviews with old Communist leaders. He does a good job of pointing out the inconsistencies of currently available knowledge (for personal testimony is often self-serving, not least in a Communist country), while also supplying solid educated guesses at what really happened. The writing is clear, though because of the nature of the material, one might get lost at times with the many, many names if close attention isn't paid. This is probably a better book for a person already acquainted with recent Chinese history than an absolute beginner.

this book is amazing. it's so sweeping in scope and vast in its concerns. chronicling the decline and eventual fall of the diplomatic ties between albania and china, the novel centers on several characters whose lives are directly and indirectly implicated by the sinister game-play of doublespeak and ambivalent symbolic gestures which are hallmarks of chinese politics. this novel is relentless in its critical view of a very complicated relationship, but it does not fall into the trap of blaming or accusation on either. instead, Kadare carefully delineates the various nuances emitted by the Chinese government which are then carefully, if not always successfully, interpreted by the Albanian government so as to chart the next political move. Mao Zedong is given a certain prominence here, and the novel's marvellous rendition of this strange man and his predilection with death and the theatre would give any psychoanalyst a field day. in my view, the most compelling section of the novel is the interchapter of the tragedy of macbeth, which can be read as a cleverly intertext of the history of the power-struggle between Zedong and his marshall, Lin Biao, and/or as the superior-subordinate dialectic between China and Albania. truly, Kadare is one of the 20th (and the 21st) century's most important writer, and this novel is enough to vouch for his excellence.

This novel is often considered as the second in the "winter series" of Ismail Kadare. The first one is "The Great Winter" dealing with the worsening relations between Albania and the Soviet Empire. "The Concert" appeared in Albania in 1988, and dealt in turn with the relations between communist China and Albania. Kadare profited from the communist world's internal cleavages, and pretending to denounce and critizice the Albanian state's enemy (that is, the Chinese regime), he actually denounced Communism itself. The novel has lengthy descriptions of the Chinese dictator at that time, Mao Tse Dung, and deals with the Chinese culture in general, although it is by no means trying to faithfully make it approachable to readers. The main character is an Albanian writer, who is sent to China in a particularly difficult period in the relations of the two countries. Ismail Kadare masterfully describes the intrinsic communist politics. The novel is wonderfully written, has a terrific plot, and is an amazing witness on the power-play.