Asia Books
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The truth versus slanders about "Assassins"Review Date: 2006-05-17
Awesomely written, providing great insights !!Review Date: 2001-08-06
Essential Reading on the Ismailis and "Assassins"Review Date: 2005-10-24
If Daftary's tone appears to be defensive, he's got several centuries of reasons behind him: since Marco Polo swept through Persia and returned to Italy with fantastic and horrific tales of how "no person, however powerful...could escape assassination" at the hands of the "Old Man of the Mountain" and his band of hashish-eating followers, Ismailis have had their work cut out for them. (Bartol's work certainly doesn't help, largely relying as it does on those myths and fabrications.) Taken together with Lewis' work on the subject, Daftary's study offers a compelling argument against Marco Polo and the bread crumbs of myths that followed him back to Italy.
The expert's perspectiveReview Date: 2005-04-12
Good history, slow readingReview Date: 2001-11-19


Great ExperienceReview Date: 2006-10-30
A True KingReview Date: 2000-09-06
MasterpieceReview Date: 2002-10-27
His memoirs are a detailed, entertaining, and highly personal view of a changing world. In leading his followers into northern India, he laid the groundwork for the Mughal Empire, one of the great Islamic powers of the early modern period - and it is this achievement that history primarily remembers him for. Yet the _Baburnama_ shows that there is considerably more to the story than its conclusion.
With unstinting and engaging honesty, Babur talks of his early struggles, his constant setbacks, and his lifelong desire to hold Samarkand, glorious seat of his ancestor Timur (Tamerlane). For Babur, India is only the consolation prize after his failure to reconquer the lands of his birthright; India is rich, yes, astoundingly so, but it is far removed from his fond reminiscences of home. Along the way, reports of skirmishes with his enemies, and the constant betrayals of his allies, share the page with descriptions of local flora and fauna, and fascinating observations on everyday life in the cities and towns that he spends time at - and it is here that the work's true enjoyment lies.
Bear with the initially confusing internecine squabbles of the Central Asian nomads, and you'll be richly rewarded. A comprehensive and compelling insight into both Central Asia at the turn of the sixteenth century, and the day-to-day pressures inherent in the leadership of an empire based on conquest.
Great BookReview Date: 2006-01-22
I had problems with Salman Rushdie's preface, however. It is not a bad introduction, but some of his comments seem to be flawed. The writer explains the contradictory aspect of Babur's psychology (both ruthless/aggressive and soft/cultured) as the outcome of two conflicting "aspects" within Islam. Mr Rushdie does not explain how he arrives at this conclusion, however, and he fails to mention the possibility that Babur's aggression might have naturally stemmed from his Mongol background & warrior instincts. In addition, in the 2nd last paragraph, Rushdie seems to contradict himself when he compares Babur to Machiavelli: "In both men, a cold appreciation of the necessities of power, of what today would be called realpolitik, is combined with deeply cultured and literary nature, not to mention the love, of excess, of wine and women."
A World ClassicReview Date: 2002-11-28

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Review of Vietnam, Preview of IraqReview Date: 2008-04-15
I'll list just one example: the myth that technology is a panacea, and a substitute for troops on the ground. Donald Rumsfeld appeared to believe that he had discovered a revolutionary breakthrough that would allow for an easy victory in Iraq, one no one had ever thought of before. In fact, he'd just fallen for the same exact myth as the planners of the Vietnam War, for the same reasons.
Numerous other comparisons can be made reading this book. It's not a moral critique of the war, but rather a chronicle of bureaucratic disaster, and a blueprint for what was to come.
Plus ca change . . . .Americans just don't get itReview Date: 2008-01-16
Loren Baritz describes the complete ignorance of foreign cultures, the complete inability to predict consequences, of the presidents, politicians, and military commanders who dragged us into a no-win war with "north" Vietnam. In his preface Baritz says:
"The war presidents beieved in what they were doing. I have no doubt they were sincere. Victims of Cold War jitters, they meant to curtail the spread of communism. With deep-seated American idealism, they intended to engineer a more sanitary and more democratic Vietnam. LBJ desperately wanted to "win their hearts and minds," and Nixon described the war as a "noble cause." They wanted to save the Vietnamese, sometimes from themselves, always from their ideologically crazed brothers. Our sense of moral superiority to the rest of the world, our missionary compulsion, is a story as old as the settlement of America. . . Our commanders lusted for a massive conventional battle . . . [but] There was never a front line -- never any line at all -- and no territory to be won and held. The Vietcong looked exactly like our allies in South Vietnam, never appearing in uniform and easily blending into the village life of the countryside. . . . For the GI grunts in the field, it was a grisly nightmare. Think of the soldier "lucky" enough to have his laundry done by a sweet old woman who, after dark, changed into a Vietcong guerrilla, laying mines on the path to the mess hall."
Nothing has changed. We are still putting our GI's at unnecessary risk due to presidential delusions. We are still labeling our real enemies (Iraqi's, Saudi's, Pakistani's) as friends -- just to keep that oil flowing. And soon we will be importing thousands of so-called Green Zone Iraqi "friends" into the US when we cut and run.
It's fifty years after the Vietnam debacle, and Repubs and Dems are just as clueless as they ever were about the dangers implicit in anti-Western, anti-rule-of-law, cultures and value systems. Now our democracy-sloganeering president has put our soldiers into Iraq, as Nixon said about Vietnam, to "win their hearts and minds." But for the GI grunts, it's a nightmare even more surreal than Vietnam was: This time our clueless military commanders are not only inviting the enemy Shia into the Green Zone to do the GI's laundry and translation, this time they are forcing the naive, young GI's go on patrol with Shia gunmen, who could easily shoot them -- the infidels -- in the back at any moment and in good Islamic conscience. This time the oil-blinded leadership is TRAINING the enemy.
Too bad it didn't get read by our leadersReview Date: 2004-11-09
BackfireReview Date: 2006-01-21
Book review #3
Baritz, Loren. Back Fire: A History of How American Culture Led Us into Vietnam and Made Us Fight the Way We Did. Baltimore: The John's Hopkins University Press, 1985.
Loren Baritz takes a look at the Vietnam War in a way that lets us understand why we decided to fight and why we fought the way we did. Unlike most surveys of the war that focus on the logistical elements and command decisions which explain what the war was Baritz explains why it was. "To understand our present role in the world" Baritz explains, "we must understand the Vietnam debacle." (p.9) Indeed, if we are to learn anything from our mistakes, and virtually everyone now agrees that Vietnam was a mistake, it is essential to know why something happened and not just what happened. To explain why Vietnam happened the way it did Baritz proposes that there is "an inherent connection between war and culture [that is] present in all nations." In our case, Vietnam was fought the way it was because our culture left us no other way to fight it.
Baritz divides the book up into three parts. The first part, Tinder, explains why America decided to fight in Vietnam and the myths that forced us to make war half way around the globe with a people that we did not understand. The second part, Fire, explains how we fell into an ever deeper war in Vietnam and how our means of fighting determined how we fought and why we were unable to effectively combat a vastly inferior military force. The third part, Backfire, is the most telling part of the book for it presents an explanation of how our culture forced us to fight the way we did, why we ultimately lost, and why we are still making the same mistakes today.
In Tinder, Baritz convinces us that Americans firmly believe that we are the best. We are a "chosen people" inhabiting a "city on a hill" doing "Gods work" bringing a "Great Society to Asia." Such blatant solipsism is part of our entrenched American dogma. So ingrained is this self righteousness that we truly can not comprehend someone who does not wish to be like us. One GI put it simply "The Vietnamese are so stupid that they can't understand a great people were trying to help a weak people." So it was, as Baritz explains, that Gods Country went to Vietnam to save them.
Our almost total ignorance of the Vietnamese culture is now legendary but at the time it did not seem important. Our sense of righteousness and invincibility was so complete that we never even considered the possibility that we were the real enemy to the South Vietnamese. One of the greatest blunders of the Vietnam War was the refusal to see the indigenous forces of the South as the main target. Instead, we assumed that the North was behind our failures to win the hearts and minds of the "backwards" South Vietnamese. Baritz is careful to explain that all nations have myths about their own greatness, but it is when these myths of inherent superiority are combined with power that terrible things happen. As was the case for us in Vietnam. Indeed, Baritz's book is now routinely quoted to expose the similarities between Vietnam and Iraq in an attempt to put the brakes on what is turning out to be a similar debacle.
Our moral superiority has often been derived by our technical superiority according to Baritz. Our obsession with the power of technology is absolute. It has been, and is today, the firm belief of most Americans that technology is the answer for most problems. This dependency on technological solutions, according to Baritz, blinded us to the proper response in Vietnam which was counterinsurgency. To truly win the hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese, intelligence and human interaction, practiced on a national scale might have handed the US a victory. But such a strategy offered no stage to display our superior technology. Even when our use of technology was obviously not working the Army responded in a typically American way. "When something failed to work we did more of it."(p.233) While such insanity is self-evident today, at the time it was perversely logical to the American generals who were so caught up in their own myths that to do otherwise would be tantamount to admitting the entire American way of life was wrong. After reading Backfire the belief in American military strategy as an extension of what is essential about America is not such a slippery slope. Baritz is very convincing connecting American culture to the way we fight. We are a technological nation and, more than anyone, dream of winning wars by the push of a button. "Shock and Awe," "smart bombs," and "stealth" are all extensions of our desire to separate us from harm and have the wonders of American ingenuity save the day. In Vietnam, as well as in the war on terror, where there is no front line intelligence gained from good foot soldiers and not bigger and better missiles are the deciding factors in achieving victory.
If all of this is so clear now why do we continue to make the same mistakes? In the third part, Backfire, Baritz explains that we have no choice. We fight the way we do because our culture defines who we are and how we fight. As long as our culture remains the same we will continue to be more efficient in our fighting but no more effective. This is because we are prisoners of our faith in technology. In order to maintain a high tech society the functioning of government, business, and the military must reside in a bureaucracy. As Baritz explains "when the technological mind is turned to the problem of organizing human activity, the result is bureaucracy." (p.48)
Baritz demonetization of the effects of bureaucracy on the military is total. With clarity and logic he explains how the fighting of such a technological war necessitated the bureaucisation of the military and its tragic consequences. The most damning of the outcomes is the development of careerism within the officer corps. The shift of officers from "leaders to managers" created such hazards as a drop in morale, insubordination, lack of responsibility, lack of experience, and unimaginative tactics. When officers are working to "get ahead" the job takes precedence over the mission and the mission suffers as it did in Vietnam.
The combination of bureaucracy and technology in Vietnam led to the eventual, extreme conclusion in strategy, that of having no strategy; the body count. When killing becomes and end unto itself the morality of war breaks down quickly. War becomes cold and passionless. Baritz correctly finds fault with such thinking claiming that "passion is an appropriate response to war." Without passion and debate the bureaucratic ship will be on autopilot. Incidences such as My Lai are the tragic results.
Did we learn from Vietnam? Baritz claims that "one antidote for folly is experience" and the experiences of Vietnam should have cast our invincibility myth into the ashcan as well as our reliance on technology as a panacea. Yet, it seems that the lessons of history are nothing in comparison to the American Myth that we are a city on a hill. Ronald Reagan against the Soviets, Clinton against the third world and the Bush Doctrine of preventive strikes and the forced spread of democracy all have repeated some of the mistakes that we made in Vietnam.
Baritz concludes that "our power, complacency, rigidity, and ignorance have kept us from incorporating our Vietnam experience into the way we think about ourselves and the world." (p.349) To fight a different, more humane, more effective war, will require more than a change in the military structure but a change in American cultural thinking. Looking at the current global policy of the United States, this does seem likely to happen any time soon and so we will continue to fight the way we do: with a national myth that shows us that we are good, with technology that makes us strong, and a bureaucracy that gives us standard operating procedures. Unfortunately, it has proven not to be a winning combination.
Hard book to put downReview Date: 2004-01-27
It is difficult to find fault with the author's contentions that we fought the wrong war. Our enemy fought a political and psychological war, a war against American culture; whereas we fought a conventional war and were trapped by our own cultural assumptions of American invincibility. It is the author premise that American foreign policy was, and is, driven by our cultural myth of America as the City on a Hill. Baritz observes that as Americans we see ourselves as the new Israel, God's chosen people. The author contends that because of this myth the American people see themselves as a moral example to the world, Baritz wrote: It means that we are a Chosen People, each of whom, because of Gods favor and presence, can smite one hundred of our heathen enemies hip and thigh. . . . We believe that the people of the world really want to be like us, regardless of what they or their political leaders say. So Baritz takes the Ugly American approach to our foreign policy.
In a sense, he is right. Our belief in our own invincibility, and that the Vietnamese people wanted to be like us and welcome us drove the war. It was inconceivable to us that they would not share our values, applaud our intentions or embrace our presence. It led us to trust in our guns and to our failure to state our national objectives for this war.
Here are a few of the remarkable insights the author gives us:
There was a tendency for American war planners and policy makers to think the job was done when their plans and policies were approved, leaving no one to monitor whether or not what they decided was effective. He points out that we supported a regime that had little popular support and our conventional military tactics made the problem worse because bombing, artillery, napalm and Agent Orange would wound and kill the very people whose support we needed. After Tet, the Viet Cong insurgency was defeated and the Phoenix program of the assassination of Viet Cong leaders had decimated the leadership of the Viet Cong. By 1970 General Giap had concluded the only way the North could win the war was through regular war, the very kind of big-unit engagement American Generals had hoped for. But by this time, the political war at home was lost. Yes, the press was partially to blame for our defeat. The constant stream of defeatism by the Press, especially during and after the Tet offensive cannot be underestimated in turning American opinion against the war.
Baritz takes issue with the claim that the war could have been won if the military had been allowed to fight it differently. Not because we could not win, but because the American culture at the time precluded such a victory. Vietnam was not perceived as a threat to American, there was no anger in the American public to support such a war. In the end, the North Vietnamese understood American culture, they believed they could win if they did not lose. All they had to do was to outlast American patience. The Americans war leaders believed that they would lose if they did not win. The failure to achieve quick and decisive victory doomed the American war effort.
Has the America changed? Are we now willing to do what we were incapable of doing in the 1960's? that is to wage an effective war? Or has the American public, like that of ancient Rome as the barbarians gathered on their frontiers, grown tired of defending its freedom? Only time will tell.

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An entertaining, illuminating, alternative view of Bangkok!Review Date: 2005-06-05
Bangkok really Inside Out!Review Date: 2006-05-24
Finally, someone wrote something different about Thailand that pays tribute to its complexities and nuttiness. "Bangkok Inside Out" by Daniel Ziv and Guy Sharett is an engaging, easy-to-read book that covers the less-covered aspects of Thailand that make the country and the people so lovable. From transvestites to beauty contests for chubby women to more serious aspects like amulets and the street dog problem, the book is perfect for the well-seasoned traveler or arm-chair one. I am half-Thai, half-American, which doesn't necessarily make me an expert on Thailand or the culture; however, anyone attempting to learn more about it must read "Bangkok Inside Out".
Beware Amazon Pricing SCAM.Review Date: 2006-01-03
I actually wrote to their Customer Service and they said it doesn't matter because their final price is cheaper.
Anyhow, just don't pay attention to that false 34% discount price.
every angle on the City of AngelsReview Date: 2005-05-18
Essential info for the travelerReview Date: 2005-11-09
If you are visiting this marvelous city, this book is a must. I hope the authors plan on doing the same for other Asian cities.

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Compassionate Tales of a Foreign CultureReview Date: 2007-10-31
Although it is an exquisite little package, Cayenne Wall leaves a bit to be desired in its proofreading. The typo count is far too high to honestly earn five stars in a review. If the book had contained four-hundred pages, the comma omissions, etc., would have been acceptable, but anyone should be able to present a clean product of one-fourth that size.
Aside from the typos, Beyond the Cayenne Wall is an outstanding first book from a new author. The stories are carefully composed and memorable in style. The individual predicaments these characters find themselves in will stay with you long after you have finished reading this short book. These women were each backed into a corner by an unrelenting culture in a land of familiarity to the author. Shaila Abdullah has definitely done her homework in the accurate cultural translation of reality into fiction.
not for the faint of heartReview Date: 2006-06-07
While its cover image may intimate things exotic, soft & gentle, all the stories are raw & unbridled in how they get to the core of these women's emotions & how their cultures' traditions chafe on their hearts & souls.
The descriptions of the land these women love are luminous & yet we quickly become privy to the terrible culture clashes & the despair & sheer brutality of their everyday lives.
The highly personal and deeply intimate collection of author Shaila Abdullah's conceptual short-storiesReview Date: 2006-03-09
"Stoop to conquer"Review Date: 2006-01-20
I truly enjoyed this collection of short stories, and devoured them in one setting. Reading about the determination of Tannu, the fierce protectiveness of Dhool, the revelation of Minnah, the stoicism of Shiwali, the persistence and horrible discovery of Minal, the grief of Mansi, and the redemption of Nyassa brought all of this into sharp relief. In today's climate, we often see the eastern world against the backdrop of war and conflict. We never see the more mundane aspects of everyday life that fuel so much of the other. What I appreciated most was the view into everyday life that tends to be overshadowed and outright forgotten in today's political climate.
Although the women are not always successful, they are always triumphant. Even when circumstance conspires against them, and fortune turns its back, each of these women demands and receives small victories. Be it the mockery of a quickly hidden glance, the silence of hidden passion, the damning knowledge of a bully's frailty, each story illustrates that sometimes the best part of victory is-modesty. It has not been since college that I remembered reading about feminism around the world. Sometimes, it is very easy to believe that our kind of feminism is the only kind. Feminism isn't only about working outside the home and sitting in front of the classroom. Sometimes, its as much about what is still going on inside the home, and what kind of classroom. Sometimes it is about bouncing back as opposed to striking first. I think these stories make an excellent addition to any woman's library, and I heartily recommend them.
Reviewed By: Angela Hailey, Black Butterfly Review
Thought provokingReview Date: 2005-12-11
Abdullah writes well as she articulates each character and draws the reader into the realm of the woman's life.

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Beyone the Great Mountians a simply wonderful childrens book.Review Date: 2008-05-10
stunningReview Date: 2008-04-08
A piece of artReview Date: 2006-01-18
to read the entire poem from the title page. Enchanting. Children and adults are fascinated by the
composition of pictures that form a single word (or character). When they exclaimed, "Wow! These
words are so different from English." I couldn't help but add to the beautiful words of the Author
and said, "Be open to difference, Difference helps us see beauty."
An intro of art and a new language to childrenReview Date: 2006-01-18
poetic visions for childrenReview Date: 2005-10-23
Unique & very different fare for parents & children.

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Bhutan Book CommentReview Date: 2008-07-17
beautiful. They definitely loved posing and being photographed. I hold
off reading BHUTAN until the end of the day when I need and want a
mental boost and not once has 'Hiddens Lands of Happiness' failed."
- Woodfin Camp
A true adventureReview Date: 2008-04-17
Given the quantity an importance of the text I would have preferred block set with serif fonts - always better for reading stories because this is a full fledged travel and cultural narrative in the style of Paul Theroux and not merely a coffee table "picture book". Literary quotes need to appear "loose" and work well left-justified. The lack of page numbering for the introduction, which is long and full of narrative, appears somewhat confusing since the layout is the same as in all the chapters.
But truly, this is a beautiful book. I enjoyed the stories and the insights into Bhutan's culture as well as the brilliant photographs - many of them have stayed in my mind ever since I first saw them.
Congratulations to John Wehrheim and Serindia for a great and original work of art.
Bhutan - hidden lands of happinessReview Date: 2008-04-16
Searching for Life's Missing IngredientReview Date: 2008-04-29
We see their rustic dwellings and simple clothes and think of them as backward, yet their peaceful countenances speak of values different from our own. While they're satisfied with taking care of their basic needs, we clamor incessantly for more.
I was so initially taken by John Wehrheim's photographs of the Bhutanese that I couldn't wait to discover what he had written about the culture. His telling character sketches whetted my appetite for a deeper understanding of the Buddhist way of life.
With a book so beautifully packaged, the danger is to judge it as mere travelogue, memoir, or coffee table bric-a-brac. Rather, it is an opening on a true Shangri-La culture that points in its simplicity to missing aspects of our western way of life.
It's wonderful!Review Date: 2008-03-26
His stories are filled with great humor and portray the Bhutanese people - of all ages and stations in life, from a child to a Senior Abbot and the soon-to-be King - as playful, respectful and devoted to their culture. I've followed his work for more than thirty years, and this book - together with his new film "BHUTAN -- Taking The Middle Path To Happiness" - make a bright and welcome package into a world "where happiness is the guiding principle of government. Imagine a people who see all life as sacred and the source of their happiness, a place with an abundance of clean and renewable energy, a nation committed to preserving its culture. Imagine a Kingdom where the King lives in a simple wooden cottage and judges his progress by the country's `Gross National Happiness.'"
John Wehrheim's book "Bhutan: Hidden Lands of Happiness" is marvelous!

Best account of the Cultural RevolutionReview Date: 2006-10-14
An Interesting MemoirReview Date: 2005-11-27
I was a bit surprised by other reviewers who saw this book as evidence of the stereotypical "easily-brainwashed Chinese." Such generalizations feed an overly simplistic view of history - if you read this (and other books on the Cultural Revolution) without attempting to project preconceived notions onto the characters, I think you'll find that Gao and his friends had their own reasons for their actions, and the story will seem much more rich for it.
Descent into HellReview Date: 2003-10-28
Unlike Germany, neither China nor Russia have been particularly singled out by the culturally elite, despite the recognition that both nations behaved abhorantly toward the academic and intellectual community. This was nowhere more true than in the "People's Republic". How is it possible for such an ancient culture to descend into madness on such a grand scale? But in a hermetically enclosed place and with an ideology that promoted irrationality people, and particularly youth, can be manipulated into performing awful deeds.
Yuan Gao was away at school and was swept up in a fervor that gripped a nation far worse than any religious trauma. China was turned into a nation in which every citizen was suspect unless they participated fully in the madness itself. It was something so horrible and so unbelievable that even today the subject is rarely broached. The human cost of communism is a subject that should receive more attention (but hasn't) and this story, as terrible and heart-breaking as it is, should help this lack of focus.
In the end, he did escape the madness but the horrors of those times will remain with him - and CHina - forever. It is only slowly that Mao has been transformed from a god into something approaching his true, unstable self.
Tales of the Easily LedReview Date: 2002-03-05
Gao Yuan was swept up in this insanity, and in the beginning of his narrative he enjoyed proving his revolutionary zeal by "outing" the teachers at his school who supposedly were not righteous or revolutionary enough, and participated in destroying many of their careers. But Gao stopped having so much fun when the lives of his friends, his family, and finally himself were destroyed. Instead of the unified force of revolutionary youth that Mao envisioned, the logical outcome was the disintegration of the youth movement into smaller and smaller factions, who merely used Mao's instructions as an excuse to bully each other and consolidate power. Gao is not afraid to admit to his own evil acts, such as when he participated in the beating of a teenage girl, pulled a meat cleaver on his own father, or when he helped destroy a hospital, all because he was lead to believe that his politics were more righteous than everyone else's. He then watches helplessly as the countryside descends into factionalism and anarchy. Some parts of this book are quite alarming, as the youths digress into torture and warfare, and many of Gao's friends are severely injured or killed in the factional fighting.
One interesting side effect of this book is Gao's descriptions of the personality cult Chairman Mao built around himself, and how he bullied the people into worshipping him as a supreme deity. This man succeeded in making a billion people think he was a god. That's an interesting study in politics and sociology.
"Lord of the Flies" and "1984" at a national scale.Review Date: 2004-01-23
The book does a fine job of painting Mao as a cult leader that succeeded in making himself a virual infallible god in the eyes of the citizenry, pushing one socialistic national program after another that were universally irrational and doomed from the get-go. The book showcases a unique traditional asian culture that promotes/permits this lemming-like following of "the leader", migrating blindly into disaster.
To me, one of the most fascinating aspects of "Born Red" is the apparently honest and heartfelt attempts by the citizenry to, at one level, mentally embrace and pursue the communist paradise promised by Mao while, at a much more personal and everyday level, actions that are more practical, rational, pragmatic, selfish, carnal, and capitalistic prevailed. In "Born Red" one sees students memorizing entire books written by Mao, formally criticizing others/themselves endlessly, and violently persecuting those that are PERCEIVED to be even one iota less than 100% loyal to the official party line (as they see it) -- all the while these same students guiltlessly steal, cheat the system, seek and peddle influence, lie, rape, even murder. The contrast is striking and impossible to reconcile.
The other horrific lesson one takes away from "Born Red" is how easily these chinese students (representative of the entire nation) could so easily be compelled to completely and quickly alter, even reverse, their allegiances and internal mindsets -- those who were enemies could, overnight, become allies; that which was wrong one day would (upon authorized dictate) be considered right the next day; a political system (Capitalism) that was seen as the greatest evil in the world would, within a decade, be officially lauded as the road to national success -- all of these flipflops seemingly being accepted by everyone without the batting of an eye or otherwise questioning the irrationality of it all. This aspect of the tale is strikingly reminiscent of Orwell's "1984".
My biggest single criticism of "Born Red" is the level of detail in which the author recounts his lifestory. Countless conversations are recalled word for word; minute details, complex sequences of events, names & places are described in apparently flawless detail in spite of the decades that have passed. I don't begrudge dramatic reconstructions "based upon factual events" but I do think they should be identified as such.
"Born Red" is a quick and easy read -- it should be manditory reading for all High School govenment or social studies classes.

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Independent WomenReview Date: 2006-09-28
My only problem with the book is that many of the chapters were published in magazines in the late 1980s and the book was first printed in 1992. I would like to know how things changed or have not changed since than. What has happened after the boom economy has popped? I guess I have to find a book from the late 90s or early 21st Century for that.
Excellent book, entertaining readReview Date: 2005-06-20
A Simple look into Japan's NightlifeReview Date: 2002-03-14
A Unique Perspective on Japanese Night LifeReview Date: 2001-01-10
I also really like the layout of the book. She starts out with her story and what compelled her to make the book. But without assuming she is all-knowing on the subject matter. She recruited numerous others to tell their stories as well.
I got the book because of my interest in Geisha but learned so much more than I ever expected to. I had no idea of so many of these things! It was quite a page turner as you?re eager to learn even more.
A look before and behind the curtain.Review Date: 2002-11-29
As she states '... supply the material for a man's dreams and desires. Being able to keep a man believing that he has a chance, a possibility of making love, and yet always tactfully turning him down in such a way that he enjoys his time, is a hostess's true talent'. (p.50)
It is a lively and very interesting inside look into this more or less hidden part of the Japanese society.
This book covers all the strata of the Japanese sex/entertainment business: from 'top of the bill' geishas to heroin hookers. As Lisa Louis states 'the mizu shobai stage reflects a bizarre mixture of humanity, including top company executives, power-wielding gangsters, ranking politicians, Buddhist monks, preservers of ancient tradition, curious Westerners, third-world economic refugees, desperate women, and lonely men.' (p.206)
But it also gives indirectly a good picture of the Japanese society in general: lonely men, lonely wives, women who work at night for their parent's old days, the subordination of women.
Not to be missed by those interested in the Japanese society.
For a more general vieuw of the erotic aspect of the Japanese society I recommend 'Pink Samurai' by Nicholas Bornoff and the books of Ian Buruma.

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An excellent book and resourceReview Date: 2008-07-28
glantz shows genius as usualReview Date: 2008-04-24
Dry and long - but hey, isn't that why we buy it?Review Date: 2007-06-18
OK, nothing's perfect (5 stars means it's as perfect as it could be in our imperfect world), I can tell you one complaint. At one point he claims that command turbulance wasn't that bad even during Barbarossa. He cites statistics. But what I would've needed is some comparison. It's fine to know that less than X% of certain types of commanders were relieved of command, but it would've been nice to read some comparison: how was it with other armies... Without those, the data just hang in the air... (There were a few similar points - it's not much in a book well over 600 pages. So I still give it the 5 stars.)
Red Army at a GlantzReview Date: 2006-06-26
Nearly PerfectReview Date: 2007-06-23
Glantz' book is divided into three parts to tell this story. The first is a chronological discussion of the first 30 months of war, subdivided into the initial period, which covers the war up to the Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad and then the second period, which covers the remaining 12 months. This first part of the book not only discusses the conventional view of the war but also clearly exposes the many Soviet operations that have lay hidden in virtual obscurity since war's end. Glantz also does a fine job showing how the Soviet-German war affected the course of WWII in general. Perhaps out of necessity this part of the book is rather concise. In any case it is still eye opening to have the vast number of counterstrokes, counteroffensives and strategic offensives laid out as they are here. As he himself points out, prior histories of the war have led to an almost constant and simplistic portrayal of operations as smooth periods of Wehrmacht offensives in the summer and Soviet offensives in the winter. He also clearly dispels the myth that the Red Army was simply along for the ride after the surprise attack and shows how Stalin and the Stavka repeatedly during the initial period of war attempted to organize counterstrokes as well as full counteroffensives.
Part two of the book is a very thorough look into the force structure of the Soviet army. This section is as comprehensive as one could possible ask for and retain a modicum of readability. Even as such, it is certainly the most difficult section to work through as it is basically a detailed look into how every aspect of the Soviet forces were reorganized from Front down to battalions in some instances. As such is feels at times to be comprised of endless tables of organization. This should not be overstated however, as this type of attention to detail is what most readers of Glantz have come to expect. Furthermore, it is this level of detail that sets him apart from most other widely published WWII historians. He does not simply explain to the reader that a particular type of unit was employed in a particular defensive or offensive action. He thoroughly explains how that type of unit came to be and gives the prior organization of similar units and why they failed to work.
Part three is a thorough analysis of the leaders of the Red Army and those that they led. The first subsection is broken up primarily into mini biographies of every major general, commanding every Front, Army, and Corps and all of their variants. It does so and gives a very interesting breakdown and percentages by year of the surviving and thriving general staff as well as command failures and traitors. Glantz then gives a very enlightening look into the soviet soldiers; who they were (ethnicity and gender are investigated here) how they survived, why they fought and what methods were used to keep them toeing the line, particularly after the hideous and demoralizing losses of the first six months. This section is probably the most readable of the three and is a very well written look into the human aspects of the war.
Finally, Glantz has once again written a history of the Soviet-German war that is groundbreaking, to say the least. Using sources that only he seems to be able to gain access to, he has delved more comprehensively into the factors that allowed the Red Army to first survive and eventually defeat Hitler's Wehrmacht, than anyone else before him. Yes, this volume reads quite dryly at times and the tables of organization can seem daunting but it must clearly be understood from the beginning that this is not a book for the casual history reader by any stretch. This book is meant for the dedicated historian of the Soviet-German war-those who need more than a basic overview of the military operations and geopolitical ramifications of the war. With all that said the only weakness that this book has are some instances of sloppy writing and subsequent poor editing. At times-particularly in Part I-this poor editing is truly frustrating and frequent. For the most part though, this is never more than a minor irritation. As a whole Glantz can, once again, be said to be the undisputed master of Soviet-German war history.
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