Japanese American Books
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The Most Thoroughly Researched History I've Ever Read!Review Date: 2008-07-06
Thorough review of the actual battle of MidwayReview Date: 2008-06-20
Reflects, in my opinion, the real "fog of war" that both navies had to fight with those days.
It is mainly focused in the Japanese side, giving credible answers to questions that had been ignored over the years by all history books that I have read.
Shattered SwordReview Date: 2008-06-19
In the wake of this book, I don't think there will be any further need for continued discussion over the relative action of the US and IJN fleets and what really happened near Midway on that fateful day.
The explanation of Japanese tactical and strategical thought which lead to their demise is clearly spelled out and it finally lets the reader understand the how and why of the action Adm. Nagumo took at the time.
Altogether, I could not have asked for a better book on the subject.
Overall, A Great BookReview Date: 2008-06-18
When the subject is as complex as this battle, and the research so comprehensive, any author has a responsibility to write as concisely as possible. Doing so respects the reader's time and improves the chances of the less dedicated making it through the text. Not only is this book unnecessarily wordy, the authors sometimes use three or four paragraphs to explain a point only to spend another paragraph or two summarizing and/or providing 'in other words' alternative explanations. Frankly, the average reader may be hard-pressed to finish this work. I half expected the last page to be a submission form for three hours of credit.
With that said, the afterglow is a pleasant one for those of us with a deep interest in this battle and the patience to read through to the end. The authors do a fine job of explaining why they're explaining. For example, with great effect they use Japanese carrier procedures and doctrine as evidence indicating what was actually happening in specific timeframes. Another example is showing the real role the decimated American torpedo squadrons played, which was critical but not for the reasons most people believe. The research appears impeccable and the conclusions reached on points where absolute evidence does not exist make sense.
The authors are perhaps a bit snarky when addressing some other sources on the battle, but I believe that to be a product of their own passion for accuracy, the battle, and the Imperial Japanese Navy as opposed to any intended animosity.
Bottom line: highly recommended, but be prepared to invest some time.
A History Book That Delivers What The Movie Couldn'tReview Date: 2008-07-04
Since Japanese historiography has shaped the Midway story for over six decades, Parshall and Tully decided to address their gripping minute-by-minute account of the battle through the eyes of Japanese experience and intentions in order to restore a sense of perspective. In truth, much of Mitsuo's narrative and interpretation is not as much defective as it is deficient. Midway was the product of complicated forces; its individual tactical events at many turns had lives of their own. Thus, only by breaking the battle into dozens of microcosmic signatures could Parshall arrive at something resembling a true chronology of the encounter, though war is such a hellish psychological event that exactitude is its first victim.
The attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, was for the US the beginning of the beginning. For Japan it was the beginning of the end. It may not have been clear to Americans in 1941, but Japan's eastward expansion to Hawaii was something of a Pickett's Charge moment save that Japanese efforts had, for a time, a more favorable psychological outcome. Parshall's map [20-21] makes the Japanese problem crystal clear: advancing across the Pacific meant investment north and south as well as east. Japan at this point had been at war since at least 1937, first with China and then throughout Southeast Asia.
In these circumstances the Midway situation takes on a whole new look. The Empire's interest in seizing the Island had little to do with westward expansion, and much to do with protecting its holdings. Possession of Midway would allow the Japanese to cut US supply lines to Australia. Achievement of the goal was certainly within capability, given the limitations of the US Pacific Fleet, had not the ambitious Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku overreacted to recent US sorties with a complicated plan of his own for Midway. Yamamoto violated a basic tenet of war--massed force--to execute simultaneous action toward Dutch Harbor in the Aleutians. Parshall is careful to note that this Aleutian action was not a feint, as is popularly believed, though Dutch Harbor had questionable value in any strategic equation.
With two carriers off to the cold north, Yamamoto proceeded to Midway with four carriers instead of six, and just a one carrier advantage over Halsey's three. [Bill Halsey, of course, would be hospitalized with shingles and replaced by Ray Spruance for the Midway expedition.] The result is basic history, with the US destroying all four Japanese carriers with the loss of only the Yorktown. Parshall certainly does not diminish the accomplishment, nor do he and his colleague entirely deny the element of luck. More often, he takes the dramatic edge off of events, reminding his readers that in war the best schedules go awry, runways get congested, radios break, intelligence gets manhandled, and weather conditions change.
Parshall believes that that US Pacific fleet was not quite the crippled eagle it is often portrayed to be. Between the Pearl Harbor and Midway encounters the Lexington and the Yorktown had embarrassed Yamamoto on several occasions in his back yard. The US Navy had learned quite a bit about aerial warfare despite the fact that at Midway its planes were somewhat inferior. Vice Admiral Nagumo, commander of the strike force, found himself repeatedly surprised by the Americans' tactics and capabilities, though admittedly some of these tactics--with tragic and needless loss of life--were as much a surprise and shock to the Americans' own commanders.
Parshall observes that American forces did enjoy an overall edge in technology, planes notwithstanding. Photographs of the late Soryu, Kaga, Hiryu and Akagi carriers throughout the book reveal tinker-toy vessels of another generation, which in some cases were actually Gerry rigged when designers changed schemes. US carriers enjoyed greater simplicity and a much more efficient deck technology, particularly in the design of elevators which allowed for rapid turnover of planes for duty. Most notably, American carriers enjoyed much safer and more efficient fire control systems, which gave the Yorktown an added essential day. From a humanitarian standpoint, Parshall brings home the terrible suffering of Japanese sailors primarily from fires resulting from poor ship design. As a rule the rank and file of the Japanese Navy manifested an amazing courage and devotion to duty; Parshall's account puts the responsibility for their plight in the appropriate places.
Parshall's decision to write from the Japanese perspective was quite daring and very successful. As befits a military work, nearly one-third of this book is composed of maps, photos, and an exhaustive bibliography. It is hard to imagine how the author could have been more helpful with his illustrations of ship movements and time lines. And yet this is a work with a gripping story line. The revised truth about Midway is still a captivating tale, about commanders coping with strain and sailors loyal to their comrades. For all its technical information, Parshall's work can best be described as eminently human.

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A wonderful book and an unforgettable taleReview Date: 2008-07-06
Evidence Not Seen is a must read for any ChristianReview Date: 2008-06-13
Evidence Not SeenReview Date: 2008-06-09
woman had. I could only hope to be that brave and strong.
Inspiring!Review Date: 2008-05-03
True EvidenceReview Date: 2008-04-05

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Finally, Truth Instead of MythReview Date: 2008-05-06
Attitudes like these have unfortunately become common in the United States over the years, and as Frank points out, are based on ignorance and self-righteousness. President Truman's aide, Admiral Leahy claimed after the war that the use of the bomb was "unnecessary" (Frank points out that there is no record of his opposition at the time the decision was made). This is, of course, true. The Japanese would have eventually surrendered even without the use of the bomb. The question, though, remains "at what cost"? There are two possible scenarios, (1) American and Allied forces invade the Japanes Home Islands in order to force a decision, or (2) no invasion is mounted, but a tight blockade and heavy air bombing keep up the pressure.
Frank shows that although a two-phase invasion was planned, Operation Olympic in Kyushu, followed by Operation Coronet on Honshu near Tokyo, as time passed, American interception and decryption of Japanese messages showed that powerful forces were being brought up to the planned invasion zones along with thousands of aircraft designed for Kamikaze attacks. The civilian population was also being trained to carry out suicide attacks (the government's slogan was "100 Million Die Together"). As a result, American enthusiasm for the invasion scheme waned and, instead, a plan to destroy Japan's railroad system to prevent the distribution of food was developed, which, along with the naval blockade, would bring starvation to the population, forcing the Japanese government to eventually capitulate. The question remained "how long would it take to reach this situation"? Frank points out that over 100,000 Chinese were dying every month during the war, in addition to large numbers of Allied prisoners and forced Asian laborers in southeast Asia. If the war dragged on longer, hundreds of thousands of these people would have died. Had the blockade "succeeded" in bring famine in addition to plague and civil disorder to Japan, hundreds of thousands, if not millions of Japanese would have died.
Frank also points out that something like 350,000 Japanese died in the Soviet campaign to conquer Manchuria, many of them civilians. In addition there were still large Japanese forces in China , the Dutch East Indies (today's Indonesia) and southeast Asia. Without the shock of a surrender brought about by the use of the Atomic bombs it is conceivable that these forces would have continued to fight on (the Japanese Army in China had a history of subordination). There was also a Soviet plan to invade the Japanese home island of Hokkaido. One can only specularte on how many deaths would this have caused, in addition to the possibility that the USSR would have set up a "Japanese Peoples' Republic" in their zone, just like they did in Korea, for which the world is still paying to this day. It is odd that those who show "compassion" for the Japanese people in saying that the bomb shouldn't have been used, seem to lack the same compassion for the oppressed thousands who were dying every day in the Japanese-occupied territories.
Frank also shows that the popular "deus-ex-machina" scenario that supposedly the Japanese government had really made a decision to surrender and were in contact with the USSR government is false. It is true that there were contacts with the Soviets, but they were on a low diplomatic level, and no decision to surrender had been made before the first use of the bomb. In addition, no contacts were made during the three days that passed before the use of the second bomb. It turns out that some Japanese leaders thought the bomb was merely a one-shot affair which the Americans couldn't repeat. Frank shows clearly that America's leaders had no choice but to make the decision they did and that this decision saved untold number of lives, both Allied and Japanese. Anybody who saw the horrific casualties at places like Iwo Jima and Okinawa in addition to the mass suicides of Japanese civilians at Saipana and Okinawa would reach the same conclusion.
Richard Frank is performing an invaluable service in destroying the "politically correct" myths demagogues like Wright are propagating and showing that a clear, open mind leads one to the truth.
Exceptionally well researchedReview Date: 2007-10-02
Frank has done an excellent job of dispassionately presenting the facts about the endgame of the Pacific War. I appreciate that Frank laid out the evidence and left it to the reader to judge where it pointed.
What is clear from the evidence is that neither the Japanese nor American leadership had adequate information to judge the other's intentions during 1945. In fact, there is some evidence that the Japaneese High Command was being mislead by underlings regarding the state of American morale. Thus the War Council believed that they were just one decisive battle away from being able to negotiate with the Americans for softer terms than Unconditional Surrender. On the other hand, American intelligence community were not adept enough to draw out from the vast array of intercepted cable traffic a clear picture. Thus they did not provide Truman information that was 'actionable'.
As for the bomb, the preponderance of evidence amassed by Frank points to the conclusion that once the decision to build the atomic bomb was made, the Manhattan project took on its own momentum and thus made the bombs use inevitable.
All-in-all a terrific book. Since I finished it on September 30th, it makes it onto my Summer Reading Favorites of 2007 :-)
Excellent in-depth defense of why the atomic bomb was neededReview Date: 2007-07-02
First, Japan was NOT ready to accept unconditional surrender, even with the caveat of the preservation of the Japanese throne, until after both bombs were dropped. Frank uses extensive declassified transcripts of Ultra (military) and Magic (diplomatic) U.S. codebreaking to get members of the Japanese war cabinet's own words, or lack thereof, on this issue. Within that is the fact that Japan's attempt to use Russia as an intermediary-ally in negotiations was totally out of tune with reality, so much out of tune that Tokyo actually expected Moscow to honor the full one year's "down time" after abrogating the two countries' neutrality agreement.
Second, the Japanese Army was ramping UP the plans for Keisu-Go, the all-out defense of the Japanese homeland, after the spring firebombings of Tokyo and elsewhere. Top Army brass considered that the U.S. might well try blockade, and thought it had enough kamikazes, midget submarines, etc., to make the U.S pay enough a price for even the blockade that it would settle for a negotiated peace. Again, Frank looks in-depth at Magic and Ultra transcripts to show how much support there was for this.
Third, Frank demonstrates that U.S. casualty fears of an invasion of Kyushu were well-warranted and may even have been understated in some cases.
The determination of the Japanese Empire to resist was well-known by American troops in the Pacific who had seen the Japanese, on average, take 97 percent casualties in many of their defensive actions. A militaristic government was ready to exploit this to the death.
The atomic bomb was therefore used for reasons of the highest seriousness. It was NOT dropped on Hiroshima as a demonstration for Stalin. And, speaking of demonstrations, the fact that it took two atomic bombs on Japan to get it to surrender puts the lie to the idea that a "demonstration" bomb would have been enough to get the Japanese to a non-negotiated surrender with them attempting to hold on to territory.
Yet more praiseReview Date: 2007-04-10
I was as unaware as anybody of the details of the end of the Pacific war until I met a fellow (Bill Lear, son of "the" Bill Lear) who was on a troop ship to Olympic. He said the officers told them that they all were going to die. After that the book was a natural, and I couldn`t have chosen better.
In my present line, I am in Japan a lot. If there is any one thing that makes Frank`s book fascinating, it is the detailed look at the inner workings of that eastern mind in the government and military leaders, and the resulting confusion for their hapless diplomats. In some cases it is not so radical - we Americans still get huffy about Pearl Harbor, when the Japanese were following a pretty basic tenet of war. Frank didn`t really go to a lot of trouble to remind us that the "unfathonable" Asian way of seeing things is normal to them. Perhaps it isn`t necessary. Any Japanese soldier who sees dying for his emperor/country as his highest honor will tend to see anyone who surrenders or is beaten before he can sacrifice himself, as the lowest sort of worm, not worthy of bayonet practice let alone a bowl of rice. Just an example, but with a point. Frank managed to state facts, back them up with numbers and intel documents and let it go at that. The case builds easily in the reader`s mind that this was a terrible war and that the allies/Americans were in a real conundrum about how to end it. Which brings up the sadly fascinating fact that the very thing that the allies demanded, as a way of keeping "these fascist and militarist governments from starting a world war every few years", was unconditional surrender, the very thing the Japanese couldn`t accept.
One thing which makes a really great book is that it opens discussion on the topic rather than, say, on the writer`s vocabulary. By that measure, this is one of the best. Please indulge me...
I have been to the peace museum in Hiroshima. It is very moving and also very evenhanded. It shows the little uniforms of the school kids killed - they were in town that day to help build firebreaks. It also has the army order on the wall which commanded that when the invasion came, all subjects were to show up on the beaches with pitchforks, sticks or any other weapon that came to hand. Hiroshima, by the way (to answer a previous comment) was the headquarters of the 5th Japanese Army, in charge of Japan and Korea (where they'd been since 1920, only getting to Manchuria in 1931, re another comment)It was also a recruit center, and a navy shipyard, in other words not exactly non-military.
My Dad flew in B-29s. He was a tough old farm boy, but once he met an army buddy who had also `been there` That`s the only time I saw him cry. I don`t think it`s wrong to lament the terrible things humans are capable of doing to each other and to make them stop; a basic about war, by the way. The fact that millions of innocents had died and were likely to keep dying in this war would make any way of stopping it look pretty good, ie, "moral". I personally would say, you can`t argue with success. The Japanese had been fighting since at least 1920. Days after the bomb, it was over. I`m in the camp of "the Russians had nothing to do with it." I want to thank Mr. Frank for explaning readably and in detail, how that came about.
Finally a note from my Mom... The war council was correct in believing that Americans were sick of the war (Incorrect in their eastern way in seeing Potsdam as weakness). They were beaten but wouldn`t quit. If you had a family member in the service, you put a red star in your window, and if they were killed, you changed it to a gold star. There were plenty of houses with two gold stars in the window. People in 1945 wanted the war to end and wanted the boys home. Imagine you are Truman, and a wife/mother says to you, "You mean to tell me you had the means to end this war the day before my boy was killed, and you didn`t do it?"
Read this book.
This book should be required reading for all Americans and JapaneseReview Date: 2007-03-25
It is easy today, with so much information out there about the horrors of atomic warfare, and so little remembrance of the actual history of the final stages of WWII, to be critical of the U.S. decision to drop two atomic bombs on Japan.
Sadly, as a result, most Japanese are taught today that they were merely the victims of overwhelming American might, rather than the aggressors and instigators of war, and even more sadly, we are confronted with the shameful specter of anti-nuke, anti-war, anti-history Americans pathetically apologizing to the Japanese, misquoting history, and blindly ignoring the real facts behind the decision to drop the atomic bombs on Japan.
In this book, Richard Franks sets about methodically re-creating the historical context of the end stages of WWII. He addresses virtually every controversial claim, every possible scenario, in the decision process that led to the atomic bombing. Other reviewers have mentioned several points already, and so I present only a summary of the major controversies dealt with in this book:
1. Why was it necessary to drop two atomic bombs or to use them on civilians? - The U.S. was afraid that Japan would think that its supply of atomic bombs was limited (and in fact, production was limited, but was steadily growing), and wanted to demonstrate to Japan that it had the ability and willpower to completely annihilate Japan with a series of atomic bombs. As it turns out, the U.S. calculations were correct. After Hiroshima was bombed, Franks points out that there was a faction in the Japanese military that had enough knowledge of the difficulty of uranium separation to deny the possibility that the U.S. could have developed such a bomb or claimed that the U.S. would not be able to keep up the atomic bombing, and used these arguments to continue to hold out against surrender. Other Japanese military leaders hoped that world opinion would bar the U.S. from further use of the atomic bombs on civilians. That the Japanese military doubted the willpower of the U.S. to use atomic bombs against civilians is proof that a mere demonstration on some unpopulated target would have been useless. Dropping two atomic bombs thus served to vaporize all of the final delusions of these fanatic military leaders.
2. Wasn't Japan close to surrender already because of the massive firebombing of its cities? The U.S. had destroyed over 60 Japanese cities already, killing over 100,000 in one raid on Tokyo alone. However, while this caused enormous suffering for Japanese civilians, the military elite ruling Japan couldn't care less, and continued to hold out for a final land battle, intending to inflict enormous casualties on any U.S. invasion. Their calculation was that the U.S., a democracy with freedom of the press and freedom of speech that even then was extremely sensitive to casualties, could be forced to offer a negotiated surrender with better terms (see no. 5 below for more on this) instead of unconditional surrender. One thing that Franks does not emphasize enough is that subsequent firebombings after Tokyo killed far fewer people per raid, as the Japanese learned how to deal with the firebombing better. A significant factor in the success of the firebombing was the nature of the highly flammable wooden cities of Japan. However, neither firebombing nor the inaccurate conventional bombing of that era would have had much impact on the dispersed and hidden armed forces of the Ketsu-Go operation (the Japanese plan for a massive suicidal countering of an American invasion on the island of Kyushu). Ketsu-Go versus the atomic bomb would have been a completely different story. The general in charge of Ketsu-Go happened to have his headquarters in Hiroshima, and after surviving the atomic bombing and seeing its effects, he bluntly told Hirohito that he could not be sure anymore that his forces would be able to fend off an invasion. IMHO, it was this realization by the military that Ketsu-Go would fail in the face of the atomic bomb that was the key in forcing the military to accept defeat without an invasion. And it was this realization by Hirohito that the military would accept his "command" to accept unconditional surrender that encouraged this timid personality to finally step in and "command" surrender (Franks gives some more convoluted reasons that I think are less convincing. He does not emphasize enough that Hirohito had no legal authority at the time to force the military to do anything - Hirohito's power was entirely based on tradition, respect, and superstitious symbolism - and in fact the military fanatics had a history of assassinating advisors to Hirohito whenever it seemed that he was favoring a course of action that they did not like).
3. Weren't the estimated potential U.S. casualties in an invasion grossly inflated? Perhaps they were, but first of all, if you are an American and think that ANY number of dead American soldiers in an invasion of Japan would have been worth trading in return for not using the atomic bomb, then you need to have your citizenship revoked. And if you are Japanese, and believe that a U.S. invasion would have been preferable to atomic bombing, then you really don't understand the fanaticism of the military elite that was in control at the end of the war. At Saipan and Okinawa, the local Japanese citizenry had been recruited into the battles and had suffered enormous casualties. Even worse was being planned for an invasion of the Japanese homeland, with the entire civilian population given bamboo sticks and suicide bombs which they were expected to use against U.S. soldiers. Franks calculates that the civilian casualties in an invasion of Japan would have far exceeded what was suffered at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In addition, U.S. intelligence eventually revealed that preparations for Ketsu-Go were so extensive that chances for a successful invasion were becoming increasingly uncertain. American casualties would have almost certainly been enormous. While General MacArthur blithely swept all of that intelligence under the rug, and continued to insist on the original invasion plans, Admiral Nimitz was on the verge of going on the record opposing the invasion when the atomic bombs were dropped. This book makes clear that a U.S. invasion of Kyushu, led by the over-confident MacArthur, could have well been a complete disaster.
4. Wouldn't a blockade and continued bombing of Japan have forced a surrender? - Yes, but it would have taken a much longer period of time, at a minimum of several more months, and resulted in enormously greater loss of life to others besides U.S. soldiers. Franks points out that by attacking Japan's railway systems and vital coastal shipping, the U.S. could have easily shut down all food distribution in the country. However, again, because the Japanese warlords did not care about the suffering of the civilian population, it is likely in such a scenario that they would have held out for so long that Japanese deaths from starvation would have easily exceeded the deaths from Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Plus there were also the vastly greater numbers of deaths that would have occurred in the countries that had been invaded by Japan, people who would have continued to die under a brutal occupation. There would also have been much greater numbers of deaths amongst Allied POWs. The numbers calculated by Franks are truly staggering, and make clear that atomic bombing to force a surrender was by far the least of all evils in terms of total numbers of dead people. Franks also recounts the massive atrocities committed by the Japanese in WWII. Yep, after you read these sections (the atrocities mentioned included dissecting and drilling holes into the brains of captured, living American airmen, among other niceties), you might also look more favorably upon atomic bombing Japan. Let's face it, this was a war without mercy, and the Japanese, who were merciless in their treatment of their enemies, had no right to expect any. Nevertheless, after the surrender, Japan did receive mercy, in the form of massive shipments of food from America to their starving civilians.
5. Wouldn't a negotiated surrender, as demanded by the military warlords, have been preferable to atomic bombing? No, first and foremost, up until the atomic bombings, the Japanese militarist faction simply refused to consider surrender under any conditions. They wanted an invasion and a chance at redemption of national honor with their Ketsu-Go operation. The peace faction's best efforts consisted of delusional hopes that Russia could somehow broker a negotiated settlement. Even AFTER both atomic bombs had been dropped, and Russia had declared war on Japan, the militarist faction continued to hold out briefly for a negotiated surrender with three additional terms besides maintenance of the emperor (which the peace faction also wanted): a short occupation by a minimal force, demobilization of Japanese troops by Japanese officers, and trying of war criminals by Japanese courts (Franks does not mention these details in his book - they are contained in another book "The Day Man Lost Hiroshima"). Acceptance of such conditions would have resulted in only a temporary cease-fire, much like the treaty of Versailles had been for WWI. It would not have removed the basic root causes that led Japan to attack East Asia and America - the institutions and ideology of an intensely nationalistic and fanatic military elite that put national honor and pride above everything else, including common sense. This bitter lesson from WWI, that the military elites and institutions of Germany and Japan needed to be completely eradicated in order to ensure lasting peace with those nations, was what caused Roosevelt to demand unconditional surrender. Roosevelt did not want the sacrifice of the lives of so many soldiers to be in vain, as it had been for WWI.
In summary, people critical of the atomic bombing of Japan simply fail to grasp just how difficult it was at that time for the U.S. and the peace faction in Japan to force an increasingly delusional military elite that was fanatically committed to national honor and pride to give up all of their institutions of power without first completely immolating their country. Read this book, read it carefully, and you WILL understand.

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Mandalay's ChildReview Date: 2001-03-22
I am sure that the story in this book is very touchingReview Date: 2001-08-05
Simple and movingReview Date: 2004-06-14
Modern Day Freedom FighterReview Date: 2000-06-05
A Story of Suffering and Hope...Review Date: 2001-02-22
In November of 2000, I had to pleasure of meeting Dr. Prem Sharma when he was in my area and visited my class at school. He talked to us about having respect for all people and their personal/religous beliefs and how important it was to realize that fighting does not help situations. Dr. Sharma, who lived in Burma during World War II, was forced to leave with his family because of the Japanense threat to the Burmese people. He moved with his family to India, but here found himself amongst the battle between the Hindus and the Muslims for Pakistan and India.
This book is truly a magnificent piece of work and something that all people, whether interested in Burma or not, should read. It gives insight into the lives of the Burmese people, the struggle for their freedom through war, and things that Dr. Sharma has witnessed in his life since the piece is partially biographical. The story is composed in a way so that the reader truly becomes attached to the family in the story. The power that this novel has over the reader is amazing -- you will shed some tears at least twice!
Dr. Sharma was a wonderful man to meet in person. He appeared very open to comments and questions about his novel and his homeland of Burma. As I correspond with him in Wisconsin through letters, I find that he is one of the most amazing people I have met in my life because of his talent and what he has been through.
As I anxiously await the publication of Dr. Sharma's other parts to the trilogy I urge everyone to pick up this novel and read it for a true experience of Burma and wonderful writing!

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A Hero's Experience in World War IIReview Date: 2008-07-01
Pages flew byReview Date: 2008-04-06
true storyReview Date: 2007-11-24
Tenney does justice to an event all too often forgetten....Review Date: 2007-08-09
While this is not exactly a full account of the Death March and the surrounding events filled with statistics and data, it is Tenney's first hand account that makes this horrendous event so palpable that the reader feels as though they are enduring the very same hardships.
Do not expect this to be a simple or comfortable read. While the book has some wonderful and very happy moments, namely Tenney's own postive attitude and inner strength, these moments are doubled by nearly unbearable situations that will make you cringe, as any story about one of the most horrifying events of the war should. Tenney describes in extreme detail the atrocities of the Japanese military. While this story is anything but rosy, it is indescribably important, as it tells a story which seems to be forgetten in our society. What these men suffered through was every bit as terrifying as those on the battlefield, and those who suffered during the Holocaust. Tenney does their story justice, and shows us that these harrowing men deserve every bit of respect and admiration as any other serving in an American uniform.
Unbelievable and InfuriatingReview Date: 2006-09-13
The book itself is a great read. It was obviously written by a survivor, so consequently it has that 1st person feel that I like.

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Midori by MoonlightReview Date: 2008-07-15
Lively and Luscious!Review Date: 2008-06-14
Love this Book!Review Date: 2008-03-06
This took the cakeReview Date: 2008-03-02
Treat Yourself to Hours of FunReview Date: 2008-02-24
Here she is in San Francisco, all the way from Japan, to marry the man of her dreams, when he ditches her for his sleazy ex-girlfriend. Although she's stranded in a strange country, she faces the situation with courage, creativity, and a lot of spunk!
I also enjoyed learning more about the Japanese culture, which was woven seamlessly into the story.
A subplot involving the Japanese mafia adds even more intrigue.
I highly recommend this book for hours of fun reading.

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Thoroughly engrossing!Review Date: 2002-03-03
Fresh and Different.Review Date: 2003-10-22
First of all, the term "Asian American" should be eradicated. I am not an Asian American. I am a Chinese-Vietnamese American, as specific as that. With that in mind, this anthology is mainly composed of Chinese and Japanese-American perspectives. Where are representational voices of Vietnamese, Cambodian, Laotian, and South Asian people (India, Parkistan, Burma).
Secondly, I agree with Mr. Chin that Tan's and Kingston's portrayal of Chinese culture is primitive and backward. Tan's Joy Luck Club contains lot of images that promote cultural sensationalism and exoticism. For example, An Mei's mother cuts her flesh from her arm and dumps them into her grandmother's soup. The non-asian readers will subsequently thrive on this stereotype and apply it for all "Asians." This is like another form of canibalism. Another example of cultural sensationalism is the uncle eating live, jumping shrimps with his chopsticks (or Did I miss something?). As for Kingston, the Woman Warrior clearly was written with an intention as a feminist piece. Because there is no greatly equal novel to dispute its exaggerated feminism, mainstream readers take this as a true portrayal of Chinese/Asian men -- brutal rapists.
Furthermore and on a positive note, what makes this anthology fresh is the fact that it includes other fresh(not new)but neglected voices such as Louis Chu, John Okana, Monica Sone, Gish Jen, and so on, writers that are not given a fair chance in mainstream publishing.
Finally, I think this is a great anthology. Unfortunately, it does not truly represent me and my Vietnamese American community. What I got from reading this anthology is a sense of freshness as far as perspective is concerned; however, emotionally, I am more identified with Flannery O'connor, Toni Morrison, and Duong Thu Huong.
For those dire fans of Mr. Chin and harsh critics of interracial relationship: He married a caucasian woman, so are some of his colleagues.
Beware of whom you worship!
A Must Read!Review Date: 2002-03-01
I'm FilipinoReview Date: 2002-02-09
It's a matter of history.Review Date: 2002-04-26
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Death MarchReview Date: 2005-09-13
Gripping AND Complete!Review Date: 2007-08-25
A First-Hand Account of the Atrocities of WarReview Date: 2003-06-05
After two to three years of living in this nightmare, the American forces returned to liberate the Philippines. Fearing that the prisoners would be liberated by the returning Americans, the Japanese loaded the surviving POWs into "Hell Ships"; massively overcrowded freighters to be transferred to the Japanese home islands. Some of the men went mad, while others drowned when their ships were sunk by American submarines. Once in Japan, the men were forced to work long hours in Japanese factories and mines while still receiving little in the way of food or medical care. The conditions in the Japanese labor camps were as unimaginable as they were in the Philippines; little food and water and constant beatings by the Japanese guards.
I've read several oral history books about World War II, and this book is one of the best. Knox lets the survivors' stories create this book. I was in awe of the horrible conditions that these men were forced to survive under. It is a true testament to the human spirit that these men were able to overcome the merciless beatings and the extermely meager food and water rations they received to survive and return home. Anyone who questions why the Americans used the atomic bomb should read about the Bataan prisoners and what they were forced to endure. I highly recommend this fine piece of oral history. Read it and understand what some of the true heroes of World War II did for their country.
GRIPPING ... COULDN'T PUT THE BOOK DOWN!!!!Review Date: 2003-03-15
I'm not accustomed to reading books in the first hand account style, but I found it more interesting to read the text as opposed to the typical factual style that a history book would have.
This a great read for you military history buffs out there! It's almost as good as sitting down with the vets and hearing them telling you their experiences.
Such a great book.Review Date: 2004-12-14

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Pure LeadershipReview Date: 2007-10-04
Timothy Kendrick Author-PTSD: Pathways Through the Secret Door
Quality in the writing, Quality out of the informationReview Date: 2005-08-15
One of the top achievements in the XX Century!Review Date: 2004-12-05
There is a powerful statement of the Samurai code : Do not make anything useless.
And this is the way you get close mre and more to the essential doctrine and quality philosophy .
Deming was a pioneer in this sense, because he knew to establish patterns of behavior and systematic direction for an issue that mostly of the real artists own in his inner world .
His reading is absolutely recommended for any kind of reader .
And his presence must be a perpetuum mobile for the management no matter your discipline field is!
READ, READ, READ!!!! - easy redability and useful...Review Date: 2001-09-24
This book captures the essence of the way at looking at quality, no matter what field you may be in. The examples are dated, but the simple premise of what the book discusses is as important as ever today. The companies I have worked for since graduation from college (1992) still haven't come close to thinking of quality as described, and it was a hot topic in my production management classes during that time. The readability of the book is excellent; real-world (not classroom) analysis that keeps you interested in the subject without confusion.
The one dis-heartening (sp.) thing in this book is that for low- and mid-level managers, it's difficult to be an agent of change when nobody else believes or is comitted to this practice. Everywhere I've been so far still put too much emphasis on things that Deming calls crazy. I'll leave that for a management effectiveness book to discuss, but it's a read that anybody would find useful.
Useful BookReview Date: 2006-05-26
The book written in plain language that focus on the essential quality and productivity message without statistical abstractions, which make it easily understandable to a wide readership. Those readers that have not read Deming's "Out of the Crisis" or Mary Walton's "Deming Management Method" will benefit the most from reading this book.


epitaph for a peachReview Date: 2007-10-02
Not so much an epitaph, but a love letter to the landReview Date: 2007-08-08
A third generation Japanese American peach and grape farmer, David Masumoto inherited the family orchard from his father. He also had the heritage of his childhood memories of how that particular peach variety, Sun Crest, tasted and ran with juice unlike the pretty red baseballs that have passed for today's supermarket peach varieties. Mr. M wanted to show the world how delightful an old-fashioned peach could be.
When he took over his father's farm, he resolved to not only continue growing his Sun Crests, but to do it organically. This would prove challenging in our day and age of cheap, quick fixes; moreover, it would test his strongly felt ideals. The land needed to heal and replenish itself after years of chemical fertilizers and toxic pest control methods. Masumoto had to take his example from research on other organic farming practices, planting wildflowers to encourage beneficial insect life and sowing "green manure" crops to act as natural mulch and compost. All this took time, patience, and faith that his hard work would eventually pay off.
Epitaph for a Peach is rich in sensory descriptions, philosophy, and nostalgic flashbacks. It is a picture of the way a farmer's life is connected to the seasons, capricious weather patterns, and changing market conditions. Not incidentally, Masumoto also teaches about the obscure history of Japanese farmers in the Valley - something that even I, native to Fresno, had little idea of. Reading this book was a slow, thoughtful experience much in the same manner that one slows down to savor a rich fruit. Recommended to anybody interested in history, growing food, or the vanishing California landscape.
-Andrea, aka Merribelle
An excellent view into the life of a small-scale family farmReview Date: 2008-02-06
Epitaph for a PeachReview Date: 2002-07-31
The Struggle ContinuesReview Date: 2004-01-24
Related Subjects: JACL Chapters
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First these authors clearly did their homework, and to say that they explore the battle in the utmost would be an understatement. Setting the stage for the battle with germane explanations of the geopolitical, then strategic, and then operational backdrops that led up to 4-5 June 1942 the authors then delve into the battle wielding an awesome array of salient information ranging from the psychological makeup of the senior Japanese commanders on the scene, to Japanese naval doctrine of the time, to the naval architecture of the four Japanese flat tops, to how many bomb carts each carrier had (and are thus able to derive such details as the quickest possible practical TIME, down to the minute, it could have taken to re-arm waiting dive bombers and torpedo planes in the hangar bay) to even the names of individual Japanese pilots in the CAP and when they were launched. What emerges is a picture of the battle in toto, grounded in a thorough understanding of the pacific campaign and the entire war itself, aided by a completely fresh and unbiased look (which subsequently shatters many myths about the battle) and delivers not just the most accurate picture of what happened and why during the fighting, but also what it meant in the larger scheme of how the rest of the war was fought and ultimately won (or lost by the Japanese). This is truly the stuff history is supposed to be about.
What is better yet is that the book, in a surprising cut against the grain for pieces written by more than one author, reads both like an erudite intellectual analysis and Tom Clancy-esque action thriller. Throughout the book you are taken from the strategic and coolly logical minds of senior commanders, to white knuckle seventy degree dives in the cockpits of cascading American SBD's flying through walls of flak and marauding Japanese zeros. Later you are privy to the acts of desperate survival of Japanese engineers sweating in the asphyxiating air of the engine rooms in their carriers as the ceilings above them start literally glowing red from the heat of uncontrollable fires ravaging above and blocking their only route of possible escape.
After setting the stage of the history of the Japanese naval war in the Pacific up until the time of the battle and explaining the strategies, doctrines, and technical features (i.e. carrier air wing make up, command organizations, etc.) of both the American and Japanese navies the authors place you onboard the ships of the Kido Butai for a minute by minute account. This in depth and detailed account takes you from the moment they sortie from Hashirajima bay to their ignominous retreat mere weeks later. The writing is crisp, fast paced, and clear, conveying information, tension, emotion, and action all at the same time without compromising any of those features. Told primarily from the Japanese side it is taut and disciplined, delivering information to the readers as it came in real time to Nagumo and the staff of the Kido Butai on the cramped bridge of the Akagi and under fire, instead of giving the reader a truly "God's Eye View" of the battle. There is just enough delving into the worlds and actions of Nimitz in Pearl Harbor, Flether onboard the Yorktown, Spruance onboard the Enterprise, and several other American forces to give appropriate context and understanding, but the reader is basically experiencing what the Japanese commanders were going through. This allows the reader to truly appreciate the Clausewitzian "friction" that plagues any battle, and to understand the decisions the commanders made at the time. After the fact everything is tied together by the authors to deliver a true picture of exactly what happened each minute of the battle. The scope of the battle and the author's telling of it is enormous, covering not just the more familiar strike on Midway istelf and ensuring carrier duel, but the ordeal of survivors from each carrier as they attempted, futilely, to save their ships then abandoned them, to the harried Japanese retreat and the less familiar American attacks on the Mogami and Mikuma which ultimately led to the latter's destruction.
The book sets the record straight on many things, of which I cannot mention all. When the American dauntlesses rained down upon the Japanese carriers at 1020 however it is clear that their decks were NOT full of a strike package just moments from launching to crush TF 17, this was a myth that was propagated by Mitsuo Fuchida after the war's end for self serving purposes as well as dramatic flair. VT-8's heroic and fatally doomed torpedo attack did not draw down the Japanese CAP, instead it was just one of a series of hurried and poorly organized American attacks that virtuously threw the Japanese into confusion and left them reacting to conditions rather than shaping them. The Americans were not so outmatched as is commonly believed, but still won a glorious victory ableit against a deeply flawed plan developed by the actually bullying and overbearing Yamamoto (who was restricted from leaving Kure Naval Harbor while in Japan to visit Naval General HQ in Tokyo on fear that other resentful officers there would literally kill him.)
The lessons the authors draw from this battle are applicable even today. The Japanese primarily lost the battle, and the entire war for that matter (although for the entire war the relative industrial might of the US played a far more important role than it obviously could have in this single, early on confrontation), due to an operational rigidity born of national culture and character. This rigidity left it unable to correctly learn lessons from its past operations, anticipate future operations as well as enemy capabilities and reactions to such, and, most critically, to adapt to real world circumstances when their overly elaborate plans inevitably began to unravel against determined and unpredicted enemy actions. (The Japanese expected to face a cowed, fearful, and largely reactionary and passive US Navy at Midway, and not the aggressive and ably commanded force that Nimitz actually sortied to meet them and that guided itself on the flexible principle of calculated risk rather than dogmatic devotion to operational planning.)
I simply can not say enough good about this book. It is useful to anyone with an interest in history as an example of the heights that that discipline can reach and the edifying fruits it can bear when practiced properly, to those in the military who seek a better understanding of how war actually is fought and can be fought best, to someone who wants to read about a real world battle written with the excitement and drama of a great fiction author.
HIGHLY RECOMMENDED!!