Asian-American Books
Related Subjects: Hmong American Vietnamese American Taiwanese American Indonesian American Thai American Burmese American Malaysian American Cambodian American Organizations Arts and Culture
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Collectible price: $69.75

A new light on an old battleReview Date: 2007-06-11
To Young To Live It - Old Enough To Appreciate It!Review Date: 2007-05-13
Richard Charles Dewees
Douglassville, Pennsylvania
President, The Dewees Group, Inc.
Former member of the "Fighting First"
Dagger Brigade, 1st ID - Big Red One
Details Bring Back MemoriesReview Date: 2007-04-20
Bud Stevenson Fairfield, CA
I was there. It's true!Review Date: 2007-04-11
I was there. That's the way it happened.
It is a very little known part of the Vietnam War. Everyone's eyes have been focused on the Marine Corps Combat Base at Khe Sanh and the months that it was under constant artillery and mortar bombardment. Without taking away from the bravery of those who had to withstand it, there is only brief mention at most in the history of Khe Sanh that the District headquarters compound, consisting of a mix of 175, mostly Vietnamese paramilitary and Montagnard tribemen troops under the direction of US Army and Marine Corps Advisors, and the Vietnamese military District Chief, repulsed an attack by a North Vietnamese regiment-sized force of about 2,000 fresh troops with brand new equipment that had just crossed from North Vietnam along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The attack lasted for a period of about 36 hours before the defenders were ordered to abandon the District Headquarters. We were able to survive because the author of this book, a West Point graduate, called artillery "air-burst" rounds directly over our position at the height of the attack. The book describes the bravery of the Army medic, the Air Force spotter who directed jets to bomb the enemy positions, the failed attempt to bring in reinforcements who were ambushed by NVA lying in wait, and the "Puff the Magic Dragon" plane circling during the night firing its Gattling guns to protect the defenders. The defenders were eventually evacuated by helicopter on the second day or had to traverse enemy territory by foot to make it to the Marine Corps Base.
Having been ordered to abandon the District HQ, the NVA (North Vietnamese Army) took control of the area between the Marine Corps Combat Base and the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp, which the NVA later attacked and overran with amphibious tanks, thereby totally isolating the Marine Corps Base Camp.
If you want to know the full picture of the Battle of Vietnam, especially the complete story of the Battle at Khe Sanh, you need to know how the NVA planned and executed an objective that was intended to be the American version of the defeat of the French at Diem Bien Phu. The NVA, ultimately, lost the Battle of Khe Sanh militarily but "won the war" through its continued insurgency and the resultant media attention and reporting back home.
Are there lessons to be learned for our present military operations? I'll leave that for the reader to decide.

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an interesting read for both Koreaphiles and politicosReview Date: 2003-08-24
The author was in the unique position to know fully about both positions during key moments in Korea's modern history. The result is a read that is sometimes funny, often insightful, and always interesting.
Perhaps what is best about this book is that while it helps to have a basic understanding of Korea's recent history in advance, it is by no means required. Young's straightforward style makes otherwise complicated issues seem as simple as night and day. It also provides a wealth of information in under 200 pages without overwhelming the reader.
Readable Modern HistoryReview Date: 2003-08-07
I have spent the better part of my adult life in Korea or working with Koreans. I was surprised and delighted by the things I learned by Eye on Korea. It filled many gaps in my understanding of how things went down in the late 70's and 80's. It was full of names, places and events that I recognized, but had never before had a coherent picture of how they all related. Eye on Korea provides that coherence.
If I am forced to complain about anything, it would be the brevity. I would have enjoyed a couple hundred more pages. It's evident from what Col. Young tells us--and from what he doesn't tell us--that he knows enough to fill volume upon volume.
This is a MUST BUY for anyone interested in Modern Korea or Korean-US relations.
A Fresh Look at Contemporary Korean-American RelationsReview Date: 2003-07-03
After four years of training in Korean language and culture, Young was a first hand witness and participant as American diplomats convinced South Korean President Park Chung-hee not to develop his own nuclear weapons. The lessons from this experience might well be of use today in dealing with North Korea's nuclear ambitions.
From the perspective of a military attache,Young provides new insights into the intrigue and behind-the-scenes efforts to derail President Jimmy Carter's troop withdrawal policies. His on-the-scene account of the military coup of 1979, and subsequent events, is extraordinarily authoritative and comprehensive, and provides new information for historians. He provides personal observations on the imposition of martial law and the Kwangju incident that followed, when Korean military forces ran amok during protests in the city and killed and wounded hundreds of civilians. For the first time, he details how the United States was caught flat-footed, and how policy makers at the time failed to respond, thus sowing the seeds of anti-Americanism in the years to come.
Additionally, Young's insider account of dealing with the senior leadership in North Korea in both diplomatic negotiations and business settings makes a major contribution to understanding the internal dynamics within this secretive state.
"Eye on Korea" is a great mixture of contemporary military and diplomatic history. It offers stories that are entertaining, provocative, and often humorous. Those interested in the region, the issues, and modern Korea will value this book.
The Keen Eye of ExperienceReview Date: 2003-08-07
This book offers the reader a fresh insight to events and analysis not seen elsewhere. It is written for a non-technical audience but is valuable for the cognoscenti as well. I recommend 'Eye on Korea' most enthusiastically to every concerned person who wonders what the future holds for America in the vital but tumultuous environment of the Korean Peninsula.


Very informative Review Date: 2008-06-01
a rave from the author of the bookReview Date: 2007-05-18
I wrote 'Fiasco' and was pleasantly surprised by how well it was done as an audiobook. I actually listened to it on my commute and enjoyed it. I recommend it highly.
Illuminates some of the mistakesReview Date: 2007-02-10
The biggest and least excusable problem was that the lack of anything clear enough to be called a military strategy. It almost sounds like Bush thought the sound bites used to market the invasion to voters amounted to an adequate description of military goals. This left various parts of the U.S. forces pursuing conflicting strategies that ranged from attempts to aid Iraqis in building a democracy to attempts to conquer Iraq for its Al-Qaeda connections, leaving U.S. forces to a confused pursuit of conflicting strategies that guaranteed increased Iraqi hostility toward the U.S. without accomplishing much else.
This book suffers somewhat from a narrow scope and an over-reliance on opinions from within the U.S. military. Ricks and his sources seem to be too optimistic that they've learned a strategy that has some chance of working if U.S. voters are patient enough, but they show no familiarity with the analysis in Robert Pape's book Dying to Win which suggests that the strategy advocated in Fiasco will perpetuate the conditions under which suicide bombings increase.
The book implies that a sufficiently wise set of leaders could have produced a strategy with a reasonable chance of success, but I'm left doubting that any U.S. overthrow of Saddam Hussein could have produced a good result.
The book is mostly cautious about historical events that the author can't verify, such as Bush's motives, and the extent to which U.S. policy was manipulated by Iran.
I'm curious why Fiasco doesn't devote much attention to the current Iraqi government. Possibly it is sufficiently tainted by its association with the U.S. that it is irrelevant, but if so I would have expected an argument to that effect.
Excellent CD; Well Read; Fascinating but grim story. Review Date: 2007-08-07
I highly recomend it..........now I need to buy something else.....or wait for Tom Ricks to write a follow-up.


Makes history very readable...Review Date: 1998-07-01
It looks like a time capsule with details.Review Date: 1998-05-28
It's the most comprehensive book on Filipino AmericansReview Date: 1998-05-26
A delightful book. Good, thorough coverage.Review Date: 1998-08-08

Starred Review, Publisher's WeeklyReview Date: 2004-02-02
A wonderful story.Review Date: 2004-07-01
We follow Jin-Han's memories from the time he lost his hat to when he lost his mother. These two points of reference are tied together for Jin-Han, connected forever in his heart. But there are some wonderful stories that lie between them. We can enjoy hearing about class photograph day when Jin-Han was in kindergarten, his first kiss, what it was like to become a big brother, and the many other times he shared with his family and friends.
Author John Son has created a collection of stories that will make you smile. It will also make you stop and think about the life of immigrants and the many hardships they have to face. There are so many things that need to be learned and understood. Jin-Han and his family undoubtedly must have felt isolated at times, like a small island in the vast sea of American life. We also see how the second generation can become separated from the first. Jin-Han wants to be as American as his friends are, while his parents still hold on to the Korean ways. As we watch Jin-Han grow up, we can see the divide between the parents and the boy widen; it is both interesting and sad to watch.
John Son involves us in the life of his Korean family and proves he can tell a wonderful story.
--- Reviewed by Marya Jansen-Gruber (mjansengruber@mindspring.com)
The Korean Experience.Review Date: 2005-02-06
I would recommend this book for other kids/adults that were adopted from Korea. Because it gives you insight on the way we might have grown up if we were living with our natural parents. And it fills in some of those missing blanks that all of us have.
Moving first novelReview Date: 2003-10-21

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An American StrangerReview Date: 1999-09-02
Artists live by different rulesReview Date: 1999-08-15
A story of maturing people seeing love for the first time.Review Date: 1999-01-15
Outstanding book about a teen coming of age.Review Date: 1998-12-08

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Great work.Must possess book.Review Date: 2007-02-04
The leaves have been produced so lively that they truly represent the rich heritage of Indian Painting in the remote area of Khandesh in the later decades of 18th Century. Not only the scholars and art lovers but also the people of Khandesh were unaware about this painting tradition of their own area. The fine blending of different Rajasthani and Malwa styles can be found in these paintings. This fusion is entirely a new discovery for the world of Indian Art.
A mystic pictorial manifestation of Geet GovindaReview Date: 2006-09-08
Geet Govinda: A journey of loveReview Date: 2006-09-08
Marvelous description of a new style of miniature paintingReview Date: 2006-08-28

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Ultimate betrayalReview Date: 2004-06-07
The author reveals arduous research and the ability to place these anecdotes onto paper without losing emotion and perhaps color. As a previous reviewer has stated...better late than never. My congradulations and thanks to the author.
I would give this book more stars if possible.
I am the author of ...Eye of the Tiger and Thoughts Etched in Jade.
Enlightening.Review Date: 2003-01-06
The message is troublesome but not surprising: the military personnel were rounded into re-education camps and suffered untold tragedies from humiliation, torture, mental degradation to physical impoverishment within a communist prison system. The majority of the officers were jailed from ten to fifteen years; one officer was detained for a total of 22 years.
While 70,000 former political inmates and their families were allowed to immigrate to the U.S. through the ODP (Orderly Departure Program), many more are still living on the fringes of the Vietnamese communist society. A former major drives a pedicab for a living. In this McKelvey's book, we heard the voices of a doctor, a tailor, a politician, an engineer, a spy, a pilot, and a teacher. They all endured "grueling and unforgiving ordeals that only the strongest would have survived." Family members were ostracized for being related to the political prisoners; their wives suffered uncounted financial, emotional, physical hardships, their children barred from a decent education.
The book is one of the few that deal with the long-term psychological effects of the incarceration on the inmates and the sufferings of their relatives.
The author concludes that: 1) War does not end when peace treaties are signed because the negative rippling effects of war and destruction affect many generations to come. 2) The U.S. should be very careful about intervening militarily in any part of the World. 3) The U.S., if it does go to war, cannot simply abandon friends and allies to the mercies of common enemies.
The best book about postwar Vietnam's reeducationReview Date: 2006-01-17
The author probes deeply into the postwar lives of these former public servants and officers of South Vietnam. From the initial reporting date in June 1975 until their release, the interviewees recall the brutal details of the camps, their captors and the communist indoctrination--basically hard labor and starvation. "Reeducation" is a misnomer.
Nixon and Kissinger's "Peace with Honor" never materialized. Ford took care of the refugees in the U.S. but didn't/couldn't intervene. Carter, well...he was busy with pardoning draft dodgers and Iran. The U.N. and Amnesty International finally took notice in 1979 when it was too late for the majority of those who had perished.
I give this book four stars only because it reeks of academia, its format of Q&A rather than an arcing narrative. It should be included in every Vietnam class, especially those professors and students who care to learn about America's defeated and abandoned allies.
Rather late than neverReview Date: 2002-10-14
In fact, my family background was 'clean' in the eyes of our government because my parents were not involved in any military service for the former government. But I have friends whose family situations were exactly the same as those portrayed in the book. I must say those are incredible human sufferings, and not only for one generation. I am glad some of those stories are now heard, perhaps a bit late but still, better than never.
Here's a life-time lesson for me (and perhaps some others): no matter how and what communists tell you, don't hastily believe them. Just look at what and how they do, and you'll see it for yourself. For many of them, human dignity and lives are trivial and cheap.

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Here's for the underdogReview Date: 2007-10-31
A Great ReadReview Date: 2007-07-05
BUT YOU'RE ONLY A HUMBLE PEASANTReview Date: 2000-10-07
A Chinese boy Cinderella like tale.Review Date: 1999-01-09

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A Must Read!Review Date: 2004-10-27
In Vietnam 1967-68, he served in every capacity from Platoon to Battalion Commander of Recon Marines. Later he served as the Ground Reconnaissance and Special Operations Officer on the staff of the I Corps Commander/CG Third Marine Amphibious Force. In that capacity he got to see the full spectrum of all special operations conducted in the I Corps.
With his extensive background, he very eloquently presents facts and makes the case that Marine Recon patrols along the DMZ were performed in the most dangerous combat environment of the Vietnam war. The battles of the Third Marine Division along the DMZ were with NVA divisions whose artillery out-gunned and out-ranged American artillery. He points out that the Marines were not dealing with an elusive enemy but rather were met with well equipped and numerically superior North Vietnamese regulars who utilized the camouflage of the mountainous jungle to their fullest advantage. They were able to move large concentrations of troops around without being detected from the air. To counter this, Third Marine Division utilized reconnaissance teams extensively and with great effectiveness.
This book reveals just how difficult and dangerous it was to be a Recon Marine up along the DMZ. It is a lasting tribute to those who served and sacrificed in that capacity.
A must read...well crafted...beautifulReview Date: 2004-10-07
As a writer I found the book to be well crafted and of course extremely informative; but, as a poet I found it to be something more, something that forces it's way into the heart of the reader conguring a smile or perhaps a tear. Though he will never admit it...this effort was not an easy task for the author. This is his gift to those that he led into what was then the "worst place on Earth". I, along with many others, watched as he unselfishly wrote about the "teen-aged warriors" that would have followed him into the depths of Hell had he asked. I am proud to be mentioned in this wonderful work of art. From all of us, thanks Bill.
Eddie Delezen 3rd Force Recon Co. Nov. 1965 - Dec. 1968.
Author of ...Eye of the Tiger...and ...Thoughts Etched in Jade.
3D FORCE RECONNAISSANCE COMPANYReview Date: 2004-11-08
Bill (Doc) Bentley, 3d Force Recon, 1966-67.
From one who served with W. C. Floyd in 3d ForceReview Date: 2004-10-31
When 3d Force Recon Co. was formed in October 1965 then Captain, W. C. Floyd was the initial executive officer. He took command of the company in June 1966 and remained in that billet until November 1967. He oversaw the training and preparation prior to and then the deployment to Vietnam. He has intertwined the accounts of the men in the company with historical notes from Ray Stubbe's Aarugha, the history of Marine Corps force reconnaissance, and his own perspective as the commanding officer. It is a story well worth reading.
There are many descriptions of patrolling in the field and enemy contacts. It's worth reading this book to benefit from the many "lessons learned" by recon teams working in extreme conditions. It's also an excellent account of equipment, tactics and techniques used in a war that is, for most of today's Marines, ancient history.
The book covers all aspects of company operations, from patrolling to support activities. Some of these, like the road convoys (called "rough riders") which inserted many teams and the communication network which kept the teams in contact with the rear, are important but little known parts of the overall recon operation.
One chapter is devoted to the courageous Navy corpsmen who were members of the company. These sailors were two time volunteers, first volunteering to serve with the FMF and second, to serve in force recon. Anyone who has served with corpsmen, particularly in combat, has the highest respect for these men.
I personally found the chapter titled "Reflections" the most moving part of the book. In this chapter, as the title indicates, members of the company, now all well into middle age, reflect back on what serving in 3d Force means to them. It, more than anything else, is a commentary on what was, for most of us, one of the high points of our lives.
I think present day Marines will enjoy this book, not only for the descriptions of combat in Vietnam but also for the deeper message of the bonding of men in war. I'm sure that many Marines who have served in Iraq can and will relate to the experiences and feelings in this book.
Related Subjects: Hmong American Vietnamese American Taiwanese American Indonesian American Thai American Burmese American Malaysian American Cambodian American Organizations Arts and Culture
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By way of full disclosure: I know the author and think highly of him, but had no idea of his involvement in this battle, so long ago now.
This is a small book mostly intended for military professionals, but full of interesting detail for the outsider. It appears neither as literature nor as a scholarly work, but more as a collection of eyewitness accounts, anchored by the author's recollections, to cast new light on the whole Khe Sanh debacle. Together, they fill a void in history, and the book will surely be welcome among both veterans and professionals.
Colonel - then Captain - Clarke states that his goal is to offer lessons that should be heeded today. I found that his and his compadres' plain narratives are the strongest part of the book, and the lessons more subject to controversy. A body of opinion holds that you can't learn from history; it is countered by the observation that there is nothing else to learn from. My view is that we must learn from history, but if we try too hard we sometimes learn the wrong things.
Those of us who haven't been shot at have to be cautious in commenting on such matters, so I will stick with general observations. Clarke felt that missing Unity of Command was a millstone for the Allied combatants; specifically that the USMC, the US Army, and the ARVN were fighting different wars and did not aid and inform each other as needed. Clearly, as an advisor working with ARVN and Montagnard forces, he did not see eye-to-eye with the USMC at the fire base, nor apparently with General Westmoreland's general strategy of attrition and the obsession with body count.
For my part I never understood why the USMC is fighting land battles. I thought the Marines were supposed to board enemy ships. Perhaps they are not the first choice for COIN (counterinsurgency) duty.
Clarke and his hard-pressed, multinational team did not have this problem with the Air Force. If I saw a lesson here it was surely to not even think about "trying stuff like this at home" unless you have a superb FAC (I suppose UAVs today) and air power on demand, night and day. And clearly, that was Westmoreland's idea: let Giap try his Dien Bien Phu Nr. 2 and he'll see what difference B-52s make. Indeed, the report included calls Khe Sanh a "Dien Bien Phu in reverse." Air Power is usually oversold, but not when used in tactical support of troops. Just look at the "wrong lesson learned" by Israel in Lebanon, thinking to duplicate NATO's air-only campaign in Kosovo, a big enough disaster in itself.
Cpt. Clarke was most upset that his village was evacuated after having withstood a ferocious onslaught of three NVA battalions over 36 hours. It seems logical though - the place would either have to be majorly reinforced, or it was a goner eventually. And it bears mentioning that the NVA thought it was their victory, not Clarke's, as they forced the Allies to withdraw. (A 50-1 kill ratio means nothing to the Politburo.)
The lessons I was most interested in were classical COIN methods like the CAP (Civil Action Program) and the strategic villages concept. Clarke implies that these were the true path to victory, not "body count." Because of all the propaganda out there, it is worth noting that the ARVN fought bravely, the Americans had especially trusting relations with the Montagnards, and few in this area at least seem to have wanted to be under Communist rule. As in 1975, almost all headed for the helicopters, or the road to the coast.
When the first reports came back from Iraq of US soldiers kicking in doors and confiscating weapons, I thought of the praised CAP effort in rural Vietnam and went uh-oh, not good. Surely in COIN you work with the people, as Clarke did, not against them; you don't take their weapons, you give them weapons. If they turn them against you, you shouldn't be there to start with.
As everyone knows, William Colby got his idea for the strategic villages from the Rif-Kabyl situation; but in a general sense it is really the cornerstone of colonial or civilizational development. It was the idea behind the Roman colonias. It may be the only thing that works for Western governments, genocide being off-limits. Thus the ink-blot theories from Iraq - secure the people first, then agonizingly slowly, institutions can take hold. And no one can occupy the whole place. So when Westmoreland asked for 206,000 more troops, he might as well have said: My strategy (attrition) sucks.
Has there ever been a general who thought he had enough troops? When Clark Clifford became SecDef, he asked "what's the strategy for victory?" - There was none, except more of the same. Colonel Clarke reinforces my suspicion that it needn't have been that way. The VC was crushed during Tet, and there was no uprising. The rest was basically NVA against ARVN with diminishing US support. Before the 1972 offensive, it appears the Republic of Vietnam had the wind with it, except that American determination had collapsed at home.
Clarke sheds new light on an old plan. It always seemed that certain moves were critical to win: cut across to the Mekong and stop the NVA directly in Laos; close Sihanoukville, which turned out to be more important for resupply than first thought; and interdict the two railways to China and the harbors (which did happen in 1972). I remember Westmoreland writing (A Soldier Reports) in an offhand way that he thought the Laotian panhandle was the key to victory, but it was never tried. Or at least not until 1971 (Lam Son 719), which was a bloody nose for the ARVN, who could not do this by themselves. Clarke recounts how the plan for such an operation was floated in continuation of Khe Sanh, only to be shot down when LBJ went on TV and declared that he'd had enough, both in office and in Indochina. Thus Vietnam became a disaster squared - dumb to go in, wrong to leave. McArthur is always quoted as warning against getting sucked into a war of attrition on the Asian continent (and he should know) - but his point was that if you're not going for victory, you shouldn't be there in the first place.
I found lots new and interesting in this book: The Royal Laotian Army joining in with the Allies; Cambodian mercenaries being used by the USMC; close combat with rats and rabies, and so on. When all this was going on I was just a boy listening to the news, but I recall that this was expected to be culmination point of the war, which it sort of was; and I recall the posturing about "escalation" by going into Cambodia (and secretly, into Laos). Clarke makes clear what nonsense that was. The first rule in guerilla warfare is you cannot defeat an enemy who has sanctuary. Do the niceties of diplomacy apply to us but not to the enemy?
Finally, some words about presentation. This is a poorly edited book. Dropped punctuation,"it's" as a possessive, "Calusewitz", open-ended quotations, repetitions - you don't expect this from a major publisher. It makes for choppy reading in places. The author's practice of referring to himself in the third person can be disorienting, especially as he slips into the first towards the end. Some trivial errors: The O-1 is not a Piper Cub, and the speed of sound certainly not a kilometer per second. Reviews would have caught things like that.
One non-trivial slip stands out: Not once, but twice - as bookends, so to speak - the Colonel refers to Coventry as an example of how Churchill sacrificed a city to protect the Ultra secret, just, as he asserts, Westmoreland left the young captain exposed so as not to alert the NVA that he knew what was coming. Army folks might not have heard this, but this is one of the hoariest old saws in air power history; it is such a good story, like that of the Danes with their yellow stars, that no matter how many historians you throw at it, it will not go away. There's not a shred of truth to it, and if you thought about it, it couldn't have. The PM could not have saved Coventry if he had tried, and he couldn't have tipped off the Germans; for, unlike the RAF fighters, radar does work at night, and the enemy would have been none the wiser.
Just had to get that out! But it is irrelevant to the book's purpose. It is very good and interesting, and recommendable to all with both a general and specific interest in the subject.