Eastern University Books

There are no words adequate to convey the effect THE STONES CRY OUT had on me when I read it in 1986. It haunted me for years. I wanted everyone I knew to read it.

Just several years ago I met a woman whose entire family - her husband and all her children - died under the Khmer Rouge monsters.

Amazingly, after the stories Miss Szymusiak recounts: of the young girl who was killed for being too pretty, of those murdered for daring to exhibit signs of affection for one another, and of unspeakable tortures inflicted upon absolutely helpless and innocent people of all ages, the chapter which really drained my blood was the one detailing her witnessing the beginning of the purge. The author notes the young Communist cadres being themselves called in for interrogation and torture and disappearing one by one.

This is a chilling account of the darkest period in 20th Century history.

One of the earliest (1986) accounts from the survivors of the Pol Pot regime, "The Stones Cry Out" seems to have set the style and standard for another more recent child's-eye perspective on the same era, "When Broken Glass Floats". The minute details of everyday life, not abstract poltical assessments, form the basis for our childhood memories. The author's account carries an unvarnished realism which draws the reader into her film-like image of daily life under threat of starvation and execution. This is probably as close as a reader can come to the truth of events in Cambodia during 1975-79. Oral histories such as "The Stones Cry Out" are perhaps the best way for survivors of human rights abuses to indict the perpetrators. Sadly, tribunals driven by international politics are unlikely to have the same impact as the simple testimony of a victimized child. Highly recommended reading for all those with an interest in human rights, Cambodia, and Southeast Asian culture.

You need a strong stomach to read the grueling ordeal of a 12 year old girl in Cambodia under the Pol Pot regime.
The latter and his cronies turned a whole country into a concentration camp guided by the iron fist of a centrally planned economy which was based on rice production quotas.
Starvation and killing of whole families including babies were part of normal daily life. The author herself lost nearly all her family.
The slogan was 'be deaf and dump if you want to survive'.

Exceptionally, this book also relates the disturbing facts which happened in a Red Khmer camp in Thailand until one year after Pol Pot's defeat by the Vietnamese.

Molyda Szymusiak tells only the facts. She doesn't explain the overall picture of Pol Pot's regime, politically, socially, economically or internationally.
Therefore I highly recommend the eminent works of David Chandler as well as Philip Short's magisterial biography of Pol Pot (Saloth Sar).

This book shows painfully the disastrous consequences of a power grasp by ideological fanatics who created a one party state bureaucracy which wielded total uncontrolled power over the population.
This regime was a terrible shame for the left.

A very disturbing read.

My heart sank lower and lower with each successive chapter. This is certainly not a book one can read while couching comfortably on a sofa. If you are familiar with Cambodian history of the Khmer Rouge regime, this book is indeed a chilling read. But at the same time, one can't help feeling admiration for the author's fortitide in the face of unimaginable hardship and horror.

Actualy I would rate this 4 and 1/2 stars.

Having read "First they killed my father" by Loung Ung It would be difficult for me to review this book with out comparing it to Loung Ung's memoir.

Both are essentially the same story, a young upper middle class girl living in Phnom Phen in april of 1975 when thier life, family and happiness are torn from them by the khmer rouge.

Many of thier experinces are similar as you might expect (long hours in forced labor, family deaths, witnessing murder ect..) but each has a unique story of thier own.

The writing styles also vary greatly and this is where Loung's "First they killed my Father is the better" book. Molyda tells her story in a very straight foward manner. Her discriptions of murder, torture and rotting corpses are alomost clinical in tone as if she is afaid to visit or express her real feelings at the time (and who could realy blame her) we are giving only hints about her family and life before April 17th 1975 (to be fair this may be in part to spare distant family members still in Cambodia from retalation)

In Loung's book however we are treated to two light hearted chapters discribing her life in Phnom Pehn before April 17th 1975 this gives the reader a chance to feel they realy know her, her brother's, sisters and parents thier strengths and weakness'.

Loung's memoir is far more emotional in tone and feeling leaving the reader almost gasping for air at points.

For those overly squimish that makes "The Stones Cry Out" the better of the two books. It is also the better of the two books if your sole interest is the surrounding history of the killing fields.

But for those just wishing to read a great emotional book "first They killed My father" is the better choice but I would highly recomend both to all.

This book covers the history of "Ukraine" from time immemorial until the late 20th century, laying out all the important dates and leaders. It is without doubt the most extensive and lucid English-language account of the development of regions and peoples which constitute today's Ukraine.

Its crucial fault, however, is that it fails to overturn or even question the nationalist mythologizing of Ukrainian history. It assumes the permanent historical unity of the Ukrainian nation when in fact no such unity existed until at least the early 1900s. It marginalizes the role of Poles, Russians, and even Germans in laying rival claims to the territory and peoples now called Ukraine. It leads us to believe that Ukraine was destined to exist in its current form, when in fact the creation of Ukraine was highly contested and its current shape anything but pre-determined. This book presents the genealogy of regional figures and struggles which have been appropriated into Ukrainian nationalist mythology, but gives little sense how or when Ukraine actually came to exist, nor how its history fits into larger European narratives.

Mr. Subtelny's "Ukraine: A History" rates a notch above Mr. Magosci's. Well-written and very readable. This is the volume one reaches for when facts on the Ukrainian history are required.

Its full of knowledge and many interesting rarely seen historical photos. I have learned much more information that I ever knew before about Ukraine. Excellent book that I would recommend to everyone.

First published in 1988, Orest Subtelny's Ukraine: A History has again been newly updated in a third edition. This 736 page volume spans from the earliest times to the modern day, covering everything from ancient Greek colonization to the recent Ukraine diaspora. Orest Subtelny (Professor of History and Political Science at York University) goes into extreme depth and detail with a text that is significantly enhanced with maps, tables, and the occasional black-and-white photograph. Highly recommended for its lucidity, meticulous attention to detail, and scholarly precision, Ukraine: A History is a "must" for anyone who wants to learn about this fascinating land and its people.

Orest Subtelny's book on Ukrainian history is intelligently written and very readable, among the growing number of books on Ukraine. It's at the top of the list. A must for any Ukraine enthusiast!

I put this up there with the Vietnam novels of Tim O'Brien. I was blown away by it. Too bad more people have not heard of it. Please read this book!

This is one of the best books written by a combat soldier in Vietnam. You travel with Ehrhart from his home in Perkasie, PA to boot camp and then to some of the most harrowing fighting of the Vietnam War. But this isn't just another great war story. There's a personal voyage of discovery--as there is in many war stories. But this one is into a deep and broad wondering, not just about the nature of war and the feelings roused by killing and seeing death, but into a broader horror about the truth of this war. Ehrhart slowly peels back the layers of his awakening, not so much to any truth, but to a series of questions about his own gullibility (perfectly understandable) and a nation's gullibility. The truth as it is revealed seems too simple to Ehrhart; the twisting of honorable intentions too obvious. But if he get's it, many of those he faces upon his return do not. What to do? Write about the simple yet profound truths he found in Vietnam, and keep writing about them since the follow-up books are very moving and affecting portraits of a man being honest about himself, and in the process divulging powerful insights about our nation. The personal in this case makes big points about who are all are as Americans. Can't recommend his writing highly enough.

In this story, Ehrhart beautifully tells of the I Corp Marine's experience in '67-68. The cost, both physically and spiritually,to the soldier has to my mind never seemed so true. Can the innocence and ignorance, if indeed they are different things, last in the face of the reality of war's warped and mishapen environment? What happens to the soldier when faced with his own ignorance and the evils of war, for which he is in many ways responsible? The tension between the two different Ehrharts in the book lies in the attempt to justify his actions in Viet Nam to himself, and if nothing else, to find some comfort even from outside himself. He is both proud and disgusted (I wish I had a stronger word here) by his "accomplishments" in Viet Nam. Where do we find ourselves when the conflict is over? The answer is perhaps nowhere, perhaps in the shower. (You must read the book to understand my last statement):)

Was required reading in a class I took about the Vietnam War. Reading this memoir rapidly went from a school assignment chore to pleasure. I read the next two books in the series the following summer. Ehrhart exposes his inner self on the page to the point where it can actually be somewhat difficult to read. He gave a lecture to our class at the end of the semester, and it was quite moving. Do check it out.

The Vietnam war, what was it like for a combat marine? Read this book and its sequel to find out. Mr. Ehrhart is a gifted storyteller. His story is unique. It's amazing how little it is referred to in bibliographies.

This large, high quality book is an exhaustive reference of maps and related commentary regarding the various stages of Armenian history. It is a must have companion for any aspiring Armenologist and a nice coffee table book for all Armenian families.

This is an amazing atlas presenting in-depth covering of the long and turbulent history of Armenia. There are numerous publications on Armenian history, but they either contain plain maps, or plan text. This one not only presents an enormous number of extremely valuable and rare historical maps covering about three thousand years' history, but also presents in a very reader-friendly style unbiased historical facts associated with every single map. More than that, it presents invaluable statistical information, such as the population by regions. It also presents very intriguing architectural data. One of invaluable features of the book is the coverage of the Armenian genocide and the first republic.
This is more than a book - it is a great treasure that anyone interested in history in general and Armenian history in particular MUST have.

A comprehensive collection of cartographic information related to Armenian History and Geography. The acompaning text is also very informative.

Although it is published as an atlas, through both historical and contemporary maps, diagrams and text, Robert Hewsen manages to trace all the important cultural, military, geopolitical and geographic influences and changes within Anatolia and the Caucasian region. For those interested in Armenian, Roman, Persian and Ottoman/Trukish history, it serves as a comprehesive, yet easy source, for both scholar and non-scholar alike.

Robert Hewsen's "Armenia A Historical Atlas" is a true masterpiece. This atlas contains 278 detailed color maps that chronicle Armenian history from antiquity to the present day. The maps are meticulously accurate, very detailed and visually appealing. They also show precise topographic, political, religious, onomastic and historical details. There is a mixture of many regional maps, detailed local maps, city maps and even building plans.

Each map is accompanied by a very detailed overview of the time period and theme covered in the map. The work is a remarkable feat of research, drawing on countless primary and secondary sources in numerous languages.

The real strength of this work is that it chronicles, in both visual and written form, Armenian history from generation to generation over millennia. As such, this book is an invaluable resource for all histories that coincide with Armenian history, especially the regions of regions of Eastern Anatolia, Western Iran and the Caucasus. You will find numerous historical details about Byzantine, Persian, Eastern Christian, Seljuk, Georgian, Ottoman, Russian and Soviet histories not easily found in other historical atlases.

I highly recommend this atlas to anyone interested in Armenian history or in the history of this region.

I read this book before the US invasion of Iraq after reading an article in 2002 by Philip Gold, a Seattle-area conservative, who spoke highly of it. He believed the US was going to end up repeating its mistakes in Vietnam, for similar reasons. He was right.

I'll list just one example: the myth that technology is a panacea, and a substitute for troops on the ground. Donald Rumsfeld appeared to believe that he had discovered a revolutionary breakthrough that would allow for an easy victory in Iraq, one no one had ever thought of before. In fact, he'd just fallen for the same exact myth as the planners of the Vietnam War, for the same reasons.

Numerous other comparisons can be made reading this book. It's not a moral critique of the war, but rather a chronicle of bureaucratic disaster, and a blueprint for what was to come.

Every politician should read Loren Baritz's analysis of the delusional thinking that got us into the Vietnam quaqmire. It bears directly on how we got ourselves into the Iraq War.

Loren Baritz describes the complete ignorance of foreign cultures, the complete inability to predict consequences, of the presidents, politicians, and military commanders who dragged us into a no-win war with "north" Vietnam. In his preface Baritz says:

"The war presidents beieved in what they were doing. I have no doubt they were sincere. Victims of Cold War jitters, they meant to curtail the spread of communism. With deep-seated American idealism, they intended to engineer a more sanitary and more democratic Vietnam. LBJ desperately wanted to "win their hearts and minds," and Nixon described the war as a "noble cause." They wanted to save the Vietnamese, sometimes from themselves, always from their ideologically crazed brothers. Our sense of moral superiority to the rest of the world, our missionary compulsion, is a story as old as the settlement of America. . . Our commanders lusted for a massive conventional battle . . . [but] There was never a front line -- never any line at all -- and no territory to be won and held. The Vietcong looked exactly like our allies in South Vietnam, never appearing in uniform and easily blending into the village life of the countryside. . . . For the GI grunts in the field, it was a grisly nightmare. Think of the soldier "lucky" enough to have his laundry done by a sweet old woman who, after dark, changed into a Vietcong guerrilla, laying mines on the path to the mess hall."

Nothing has changed. We are still putting our GI's at unnecessary risk due to presidential delusions. We are still labeling our real enemies (Iraqi's, Saudi's, Pakistani's) as friends -- just to keep that oil flowing. And soon we will be importing thousands of so-called Green Zone Iraqi "friends" into the US when we cut and run.

It's fifty years after the Vietnam debacle, and Repubs and Dems are just as clueless as they ever were about the dangers implicit in anti-Western, anti-rule-of-law, cultures and value systems. Now our democracy-sloganeering president has put our soldiers into Iraq, as Nixon said about Vietnam, to "win their hearts and minds." But for the GI grunts, it's a nightmare even more surreal than Vietnam was: This time our clueless military commanders are not only inviting the enemy Shia into the Green Zone to do the GI's laundry and translation, this time they are forcing the naive, young GI's go on patrol with Shia gunmen, who could easily shoot them -- the infidels -- in the back at any moment and in good Islamic conscience. This time the oil-blinded leadership is TRAINING the enemy.

I can't add to the description of the book, except to say that it's too bad more people haven't read it. Especially our leadership. It's horrendously important to recognize the failures that we're repeating in Iraq.

John Sweet
Book review #3

Baritz, Loren. Back Fire: A History of How American Culture Led Us into Vietnam and Made Us Fight the Way We Did. Baltimore: The John's Hopkins University Press, 1985.

Loren Baritz takes a look at the Vietnam War in a way that lets us understand why we decided to fight and why we fought the way we did. Unlike most surveys of the war that focus on the logistical elements and command decisions which explain what the war was Baritz explains why it was. "To understand our present role in the world" Baritz explains, "we must understand the Vietnam debacle." (p.9) Indeed, if we are to learn anything from our mistakes, and virtually everyone now agrees that Vietnam was a mistake, it is essential to know why something happened and not just what happened. To explain why Vietnam happened the way it did Baritz proposes that there is "an inherent connection between war and culture [that is] present in all nations." In our case, Vietnam was fought the way it was because our culture left us no other way to fight it.
Baritz divides the book up into three parts. The first part, Tinder, explains why America decided to fight in Vietnam and the myths that forced us to make war half way around the globe with a people that we did not understand. The second part, Fire, explains how we fell into an ever deeper war in Vietnam and how our means of fighting determined how we fought and why we were unable to effectively combat a vastly inferior military force. The third part, Backfire, is the most telling part of the book for it presents an explanation of how our culture forced us to fight the way we did, why we ultimately lost, and why we are still making the same mistakes today.
In Tinder, Baritz convinces us that Americans firmly believe that we are the best. We are a "chosen people" inhabiting a "city on a hill" doing "Gods work" bringing a "Great Society to Asia." Such blatant solipsism is part of our entrenched American dogma. So ingrained is this self righteousness that we truly can not comprehend someone who does not wish to be like us. One GI put it simply "The Vietnamese are so stupid that they can't understand a great people were trying to help a weak people." So it was, as Baritz explains, that Gods Country went to Vietnam to save them.
Our almost total ignorance of the Vietnamese culture is now legendary but at the time it did not seem important. Our sense of righteousness and invincibility was so complete that we never even considered the possibility that we were the real enemy to the South Vietnamese. One of the greatest blunders of the Vietnam War was the refusal to see the indigenous forces of the South as the main target. Instead, we assumed that the North was behind our failures to win the hearts and minds of the "backwards" South Vietnamese. Baritz is careful to explain that all nations have myths about their own greatness, but it is when these myths of inherent superiority are combined with power that terrible things happen. As was the case for us in Vietnam. Indeed, Baritz's book is now routinely quoted to expose the similarities between Vietnam and Iraq in an attempt to put the brakes on what is turning out to be a similar debacle.
Our moral superiority has often been derived by our technical superiority according to Baritz. Our obsession with the power of technology is absolute. It has been, and is today, the firm belief of most Americans that technology is the answer for most problems. This dependency on technological solutions, according to Baritz, blinded us to the proper response in Vietnam which was counterinsurgency. To truly win the hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese, intelligence and human interaction, practiced on a national scale might have handed the US a victory. But such a strategy offered no stage to display our superior technology. Even when our use of technology was obviously not working the Army responded in a typically American way. "When something failed to work we did more of it."(p.233) While such insanity is self-evident today, at the time it was perversely logical to the American generals who were so caught up in their own myths that to do otherwise would be tantamount to admitting the entire American way of life was wrong. After reading Backfire the belief in American military strategy as an extension of what is essential about America is not such a slippery slope. Baritz is very convincing connecting American culture to the way we fight. We are a technological nation and, more than anyone, dream of winning wars by the push of a button. "Shock and Awe," "smart bombs," and "stealth" are all extensions of our desire to separate us from harm and have the wonders of American ingenuity save the day. In Vietnam, as well as in the war on terror, where there is no front line intelligence gained from good foot soldiers and not bigger and better missiles are the deciding factors in achieving victory.
If all of this is so clear now why do we continue to make the same mistakes? In the third part, Backfire, Baritz explains that we have no choice. We fight the way we do because our culture defines who we are and how we fight. As long as our culture remains the same we will continue to be more efficient in our fighting but no more effective. This is because we are prisoners of our faith in technology. In order to maintain a high tech society the functioning of government, business, and the military must reside in a bureaucracy. As Baritz explains "when the technological mind is turned to the problem of organizing human activity, the result is bureaucracy." (p.48)
Baritz demonetization of the effects of bureaucracy on the military is total. With clarity and logic he explains how the fighting of such a technological war necessitated the bureaucisation of the military and its tragic consequences. The most damning of the outcomes is the development of careerism within the officer corps. The shift of officers from "leaders to managers" created such hazards as a drop in morale, insubordination, lack of responsibility, lack of experience, and unimaginative tactics. When officers are working to "get ahead" the job takes precedence over the mission and the mission suffers as it did in Vietnam.
The combination of bureaucracy and technology in Vietnam led to the eventual, extreme conclusion in strategy, that of having no strategy; the body count. When killing becomes and end unto itself the morality of war breaks down quickly. War becomes cold and passionless. Baritz correctly finds fault with such thinking claiming that "passion is an appropriate response to war." Without passion and debate the bureaucratic ship will be on autopilot. Incidences such as My Lai are the tragic results.
Did we learn from Vietnam? Baritz claims that "one antidote for folly is experience" and the experiences of Vietnam should have cast our invincibility myth into the ashcan as well as our reliance on technology as a panacea. Yet, it seems that the lessons of history are nothing in comparison to the American Myth that we are a city on a hill. Ronald Reagan against the Soviets, Clinton against the third world and the Bush Doctrine of preventive strikes and the forced spread of democracy all have repeated some of the mistakes that we made in Vietnam.
Baritz concludes that "our power, complacency, rigidity, and ignorance have kept us from incorporating our Vietnam experience into the way we think about ourselves and the world." (p.349) To fight a different, more humane, more effective war, will require more than a change in the military structure but a change in American cultural thinking. Looking at the current global policy of the United States, this does seem likely to happen any time soon and so we will continue to fight the way we do: with a national myth that shows us that we are good, with technology that makes us strong, and a bureaucracy that gives us standard operating procedures. Unfortunately, it has proven not to be a winning combination.

This is a remarkable book that I found very hard to put down. If you are interested in discovering why we went to war, and how we lost it, Backfire if for you. The author avoids the usual mantra of both the left and the right and gives us what may be the most comprehensive analysis of this war written to date. Although I will take issue with some of the authors assumptions, this book should be must reading for the politicians and military who wage war, and for parents who send their children to fight wars.

It is difficult to find fault with the author's contentions that we fought the wrong war. Our enemy fought a political and psychological war, a war against American culture; whereas we fought a conventional war and were trapped by our own cultural assumptions of American invincibility. It is the author premise that American foreign policy was, and is, driven by our cultural myth of America as the City on a Hill. Baritz observes that as Americans we see ourselves as the new Israel, God's chosen people. The author contends that because of this myth the American people see themselves as a moral example to the world, Baritz wrote: It means that we are a Chosen People, each of whom, because of Gods favor and presence, can smite one hundred of our heathen enemies hip and thigh. . . . We believe that the people of the world really want to be like us, regardless of what they or their political leaders say. So Baritz takes the Ugly American approach to our foreign policy.

In a sense, he is right. Our belief in our own invincibility, and that the Vietnamese people wanted to be like us and welcome us drove the war. It was inconceivable to us that they would not share our values, applaud our intentions or embrace our presence. It led us to trust in our guns and to our failure to state our national objectives for this war.

Here are a few of the remarkable insights the author gives us:
There was a tendency for American war planners and policy makers to think the job was done when their plans and policies were approved, leaving no one to monitor whether or not what they decided was effective. He points out that we supported a regime that had little popular support and our conventional military tactics made the problem worse because bombing, artillery, napalm and Agent Orange would wound and kill the very people whose support we needed. After Tet, the Viet Cong insurgency was defeated and the Phoenix program of the assassination of Viet Cong leaders had decimated the leadership of the Viet Cong. By 1970 General Giap had concluded the only way the North could win the war was through regular war, the very kind of big-unit engagement American Generals had hoped for. But by this time, the political war at home was lost. Yes, the press was partially to blame for our defeat. The constant stream of defeatism by the Press, especially during and after the Tet offensive cannot be underestimated in turning American opinion against the war.

Baritz takes issue with the claim that the war could have been won if the military had been allowed to fight it differently. Not because we could not win, but because the American culture at the time precluded such a victory. Vietnam was not perceived as a  threat to American, there was no anger in the American public to support such a war.  In the end, the North Vietnamese understood American culture, they believed they could win if they did not lose. All they had to do was to outlast American patience. The Americans war leaders believed that they would lose if they did not win. The failure to achieve quick and decisive victory doomed the American war effort.

Has the America changed? Are we now willing to do what we were incapable of doing in the 1960's? that is to wage an effective war? Or has the American public, like that of ancient Rome as the barbarians gathered on their frontiers, grown tired of defending its freedom? Only time will tell.  

I read this book when I was 19, and I still remember it vividly. It tells you about China's Cultural Revolution from the perspective of a Chinese young man. The author writes about his experiences as a witness, a perpetrator and ultimately a victim of those crazy times. He doesn't gloss over his own crimes, everything appears vivid and touchable, like you were there at the time. His fight with his father, destroying 1000-year old temples, humiliating their teachers and being humiliated themselves. Ultimately it leaves you with a sense of bitterness of the story not continuing and glad that most things have changed for the better in China. Get this book for a firsthand account of the Cultural Revolution from a perpetrator who has redeemed himself by writing about his experiences.

Gao does a wonderful job in writing a really engrossing memoir of his experiences during the Cultural Revolution. His is a story that should be told.

I was a bit surprised by other reviewers who saw this book as evidence of the stereotypical "easily-brainwashed Chinese." Such generalizations feed an overly simplistic view of history - if you read this (and other books on the Cultural Revolution) without attempting to project preconceived notions onto the characters, I think you'll find that Gao and his friends had their own reasons for their actions, and the story will seem much more rich for it.

Two things have always amazed me in people's attitudes toward dictatorships: (1) The lengths to which supporters, particularly intellectuals, of the ideology (usually state socialism) go to refute, ignore, explain or justify the brutalities occurring under those regimes. (2) Once sanity has returned, there is an utter lack of apology, self-criticism and recognition of support for such evil.

Unlike Germany, neither China nor Russia have been particularly singled out by the culturally elite, despite the recognition that both nations behaved abhorantly toward the academic and intellectual community. This was nowhere more true than in the "People's Republic". How is it possible for such an ancient culture to descend into madness on such a grand scale? But in a hermetically enclosed place and with an ideology that promoted irrationality people, and particularly youth, can be manipulated into performing awful deeds.

Yuan Gao was away at school and was swept up in a fervor that gripped a nation far worse than any religious trauma. China was turned into a nation in which every citizen was suspect unless they participated fully in the madness itself. It was something so horrible and so unbelievable that even today the subject is rarely broached. The human cost of communism is a subject that should receive more attention (but hasn't) and this story, as terrible and heart-breaking as it is, should help this lack of focus.

In the end, he did escape the madness but the horrors of those times will remain with him - and CHina - forever. It is only slowly that Mao has been transformed from a god into something approaching his true, unstable self.

Here Gao Yuan provides a personal account of the political insanity of China's Cultural Revolution, which he was swept up into as a teenager. Chairman Mao's instructions to the youths of the countryside to ferret out those who weren't "revolutionary" or "pure" enough quickly lead to the real-life "Lord of the Flies" scenario that we can see in this book. Now I'm certainly no expert on Chinese history, but Mao's attempt to lead the people to a glorious revolution through the elimination of so-called enemies hardly made the population stronger and ready to move forward to his glorious communist future. This would require teamwork and cooperation among all people. Instead the Cultural Revolution made everyone suspicious of everyone else, as people were desperate to prove how righteous they were by ferreting out class enemies. If you couldn't find any enemies, you just made them up. Whoever was the loudest and most violent won the battle, and proof went out the window.

Gao Yuan was swept up in this insanity, and in the beginning of his narrative he enjoyed proving his revolutionary zeal by "outing" the teachers at his school who supposedly were not righteous or revolutionary enough, and participated in destroying many of their careers. But Gao stopped having so much fun when the lives of his friends, his family, and finally himself were destroyed. Instead of the unified force of revolutionary youth that Mao envisioned, the logical outcome was the disintegration of the youth movement into smaller and smaller factions, who merely used Mao's instructions as an excuse to bully each other and consolidate power. Gao is not afraid to admit to his own evil acts, such as when he participated in the beating of a teenage girl, pulled a meat cleaver on his own father, or when he helped destroy a hospital, all because he was lead to believe that his politics were more righteous than everyone else's. He then watches helplessly as the countryside descends into factionalism and anarchy. Some parts of this book are quite alarming, as the youths digress into torture and warfare, and many of Gao's friends are severely injured or killed in the factional fighting.

One interesting side effect of this book is Gao's descriptions of the personality cult Chairman Mao built around himself, and how he bullied the people into worshipping him as a supreme deity. This man succeeded in making a billion people think he was a god. That's an interesting study in politics and sociology.

"Born Red" is a fascinating and horrifying book recounting one boy's experiences during the Cultural Revolution. As an American, steeped in our culture from birth, I find it is nearly impossible to truly grasp a culture that would permit the kind of reflexive parroting of official party line to take hold as it did in China (and continues today in North Korea).

The book does a fine job of painting Mao as a cult leader that succeeded in making himself a virual infallible god in the eyes of the citizenry, pushing one socialistic national program after another that were universally irrational and doomed from the get-go. The book showcases a unique traditional asian culture that promotes/permits this lemming-like following of "the leader", migrating blindly into disaster.

To me, one of the most fascinating aspects of "Born Red" is the apparently honest and heartfelt attempts by the citizenry to, at one level, mentally embrace and pursue the communist paradise promised by Mao while, at a much more personal and everyday level, actions that are more practical, rational, pragmatic, selfish, carnal, and capitalistic prevailed. In "Born Red" one sees students memorizing entire books written by Mao, formally criticizing others/themselves endlessly, and violently persecuting those that are PERCEIVED to be even one iota less than 100% loyal to the official party line (as they see it) -- all the while these same students guiltlessly steal, cheat the system, seek and peddle influence, lie, rape, even murder. The contrast is striking and impossible to reconcile.

The other horrific lesson one takes away from "Born Red" is how easily these chinese students (representative of the entire nation) could so easily be compelled to completely and quickly alter, even reverse, their allegiances and internal mindsets -- those who were enemies could, overnight, become allies; that which was wrong one day would (upon authorized dictate) be considered right the next day; a political system (Capitalism) that was seen as the greatest evil in the world would, within a decade, be officially lauded as the road to national success -- all of these flipflops seemingly being accepted by everyone without the batting of an eye or otherwise questioning the irrationality of it all. This aspect of the tale is strikingly reminiscent of Orwell's "1984".

My biggest single criticism of "Born Red" is the level of detail in which the author recounts his lifestory. Countless conversations are recalled word for word; minute details, complex sequences of events, names & places are described in apparently flawless detail in spite of the decades that have passed. I don't begrudge dramatic reconstructions "based upon factual events" but I do think they should be identified as such.

"Born Red" is a quick and easy read -- it should be manditory reading for all High School govenment or social studies classes.

Glantz's book is a must read for any serious student of the Eastern Front in World War II. While it may be long and dry, it covers the Soviet Army at an important time in the war. It is not a book for those who are new to the conflict. Glantz covers it all, so if you want to understand how the Red Army beat the German Army, this is one you have to read.

David Glantz may not write in the most exciting way or use tons of hyperbole or focus alot on the human facet of his stories on the Russo-German war, however as far as wealth of information on the Soviet side of things go there is no one better equipped in the western world to write about The Great Patriotic War. His access to Soviet military information is unprecedented and his attention to detail of the military operations second to none. When I first began reading Glantz's tomes on the war I had preconceived notions about this conflict. If Hitler had stayed on course for Moscow after the battle of Smolensk, if he had not split Operation Blau into a Stalingrad and a Caucauses dual front and kept those troops together for a concerted drive to the Volga, if Barbarossa had been launched in May instead of late June, if the Rasputista and bitter Russian winter had not intervened, if if if. And i truly believed Hitler could and should have won this war. After starting on Glantz's books around the year 2000 or so, and truly realizing the awesome potential in manpower and equipment the Soviets had, and realizing in these readings how unprepared materially and logistically the Germans were to fight this war my whole mindset has changed. I believe even if the Germans had taken Moscow Russia would still have won this war. Other then the Germans developing atomic weapons before anyone I have radically altered my view on Germany's chances here. The Soviet Union was destined to win this war no matter what the cost. Barbarossa more then anything else, was Hitler's greatest mistake in the war. I owe this new view to the works of David Glantz. His information is incredible, his summaries superlative, his conclusions inescapable. Dry and technical it may be, but for my money there is no better writer on The Great Patriotic War then David Glantz. Remember, Germany lost the war and 90 percent of her casualties on the Eastern front. Remember, the Soviet Union lost 27 million dead and most of her agricultural and economic bases and STILL won this war. She probably could have done so, although at even greater cost, without a second front in Italy in 1943, and in France in 1944. The Russian contribution to World War II must not be downplayed in the west. The war against Germany was primarily a Russian one, and David Glantz deserves accolades for being one of very few western writers to acknowledge this fact.

So, this is something that's only for professionals and hardcore fanatics, but it is highly recommended for them. It contains everything you ever wanted to know about the Red Army between 1941-43, and even more.

OK, nothing's perfect (5 stars means it's as perfect as it could be in our imperfect world), I can tell you one complaint. At one point he claims that command turbulance wasn't that bad even during Barbarossa. He cites statistics. But what I would've needed is some comparison. It's fine to know that less than X% of certain types of commanders were relieved of command, but it would've been nice to read some comparison: how was it with other armies... Without those, the data just hang in the air... (There were a few similar points - it's not much in a book well over 600 pages. So I still give it the 5 stars.)

Glantz does his usual excellent job on the Soviet military in World War II. He covers the campaigns, and the structure and development of the red army during the early part of the war. Separating much of the formation, commander and OoB material into the companion volume is actually a plus. Both volumes are easier to handle becuase of the size and it is easier to use two books to cross reference material.

Although hundreds of histories of Soviet-German war have been published in the last decade or so, they have for the most part either focused on large-scale operations, told the story from a predominantly German perspective, or, most likely, done both. Another unfortunate result of this has been the number of revisionist works, in some degree or another based on Viktor Suvorov's Icebreaker. In part this was out of necessity due to a a number of factors, including the lack of access to former Soviet archives as well as the repression of histories deemed embarrassing to important wartime heroes. David Glantz has once again answered this dearth of reliable Soviet-perspective war history with his newest volume Colossus Reborn. Using a massive number or Soviet primary sources he has written the comprehensive history of the Soviet-German war.

Glantz' book is divided into three parts to tell this story. The first is a chronological discussion of the first 30 months of war, subdivided into the initial period, which covers the war up to the Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad and then the second period, which covers the remaining 12 months. This first part of the book not only discusses the conventional view of the war but also clearly exposes the many Soviet operations that have lay hidden in virtual obscurity since war's end. Glantz also does a fine job showing how the Soviet-German war affected the course of WWII in general. Perhaps out of necessity this part of the book is rather concise. In any case it is still eye opening to have the vast number of counterstrokes, counteroffensives and strategic offensives laid out as they are here. As he himself points out, prior histories of the war have led to an almost constant and simplistic portrayal of operations as smooth periods of Wehrmacht offensives in the summer and Soviet offensives in the winter. He also clearly dispels the myth that the Red Army was simply along for the ride after the surprise attack and shows how Stalin and the Stavka repeatedly during the initial period of war attempted to organize counterstrokes as well as full counteroffensives.

Part two of the book is a very thorough look into the force structure of the Soviet army. This section is as comprehensive as one could possible ask for and retain a modicum of readability. Even as such, it is certainly the most difficult section to work through as it is basically a detailed look into how every aspect of the Soviet forces were reorganized from Front down to battalions in some instances. As such is feels at times to be comprised of endless tables of organization. This should not be overstated however, as this type of attention to detail is what most readers of Glantz have come to expect. Furthermore, it is this level of detail that sets him apart from most other widely published WWII historians. He does not simply explain to the reader that a particular type of unit was employed in a particular defensive or offensive action. He thoroughly explains how that type of unit came to be and gives the prior organization of similar units and why they failed to work.

Part three is a thorough analysis of the leaders of the Red Army and those that they led. The first subsection is broken up primarily into mini biographies of every major general, commanding every Front, Army, and Corps and all of their variants. It does so and gives a very interesting breakdown and percentages by year of the surviving and thriving general staff as well as command failures and traitors. Glantz then gives a very enlightening look into the soviet soldiers; who they were (ethnicity and gender are investigated here) how they survived, why they fought and what methods were used to keep them toeing the line, particularly after the hideous and demoralizing losses of the first six months. This section is probably the most readable of the three and is a very well written look into the human aspects of the war.

Finally, Glantz has once again written a history of the Soviet-German war that is groundbreaking, to say the least. Using sources that only he seems to be able to gain access to, he has delved more comprehensively into the factors that allowed the Red Army to first survive and eventually defeat Hitler's Wehrmacht, than anyone else before him. Yes, this volume reads quite dryly at times and the tables of organization can seem daunting but it must clearly be understood from the beginning that this is not a book for the casual history reader by any stretch. This book is meant for the dedicated historian of the Soviet-German war-those who need more than a basic overview of the military operations and geopolitical ramifications of the war. With all that said the only weakness that this book has are some instances of sloppy writing and subsequent poor editing. At times-particularly in Part I-this poor editing is truly frustrating and frequent. For the most part though, this is never more than a minor irritation. As a whole Glantz can, once again, be said to be the undisputed master of Soviet-German war history.

It has to be courageous to attempt translating the celebrated works of one of the most revered ancient Chinese master philosophers, Chuang Tzu (Zhuangzi), 370-319 B.C., whose teachings espouse freedom and spontaneity and who can forget his "Butterfly Dream" - the dream like nature of reality - which is to some extent explored in Mircea Eliade's novella and Francis Ford Coppola's latest and most defining film "Youth Without Youth".

Of course, there's nothing like reading the poetic and beautifully written original Chinese text which is inevitably lost in translation. But if you don't read Chinese, this is the next best thing of the complete thirty-three books inclusive of the inner and outer chapters in the one volume. Professor Burton Watson's translation is thoughtful and readable. Highly recommended.

I have read many different translations of Chuang Tzu. I find many of them either too awkward, wordy, biased or incomprehensible. Admittedly, it is not possible to learn Taoist philosophy without a teacher's explanation. Unfortunately, books do not always answer questions. However, given that limitation, this translation is the clearest I have ever encountered.

Excellent work! I have read on numerous occasions and from numerous sources that Burton Watson's Chuang Tzu is the best one out there and this book is no disappointment! The text is clear and holds well to the original, he includes helpful footnotes at the bottom of the page instead of at the end in a huge appendix. The footnotes themselves are even extraordinary, they include notes on why he translated as he did for those who can read chinese, and can be very helpful with some of the more esoteric passages. His footnotes can even be humerous, making you feel a little better about being totally lost in some of the latter chapters! A wonderful book that I recommend to everyone!

THE COMPLETE WORKS OF CHUANG TZU. Translated by Burton Watson. 397 pp. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1968 and reprinted.

Anyone who may be coming to Chuang Tzu for the first time is in for a treat. Although Chuang Tzu is sometimes described as the most brilliant of all Chinese philosophers, what we find in him isn't what we normally understand by 'Philosophy' and isn't technical at all.

His appeal is not so much to the intellect as to the imagination, and he chose as a vehicle for his philosophical insights, not tedious and lengthy abstract treatises, but brief and witty anecdotes and dialogues and tales. His humor, sophistication, literary genius, and philosophical insights found their perfect expression in his brilliant fragments, and once having read them you never forget them.

Not much is known about Chuang Tzu, other than that he seems to have lived around the time of King Hui of Liang (370-319 B.C.). The received text of his book, which is sometimes referred to as 'the Chuang Tzu' (CT), is made up of thirty-three Chapters. Most scholars seem to feel that the CT is a composite text, and that only the first seven - the Inner Chapters - plus a few bits from the others are Chuang Tzu's own work, the remainder being by his followers.

Among the better known of his translators, all of them excellent, are Arthur Waley, Lin Yutang, A. C. Graham, and Burton Watson, though only the latter two translated the complete text. An abridged version of Watson's complete translation was later made available for those who only want to read the Inner Chapters.

The present book, 'The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu,' was first published in 1968. After an interesting 28-page Introduction, which includes bibliographical information, Burton Watson's very fine translations follow, all of which have been set out as prose and lightly annotated. The book is rounded out with an Index.

Watson has always struck me as an eminently civilized scholar and as a brilliant translator. His many translations from Ancient Chinese Literature are of uniformly high quality, and are well worth collecting as they are books one often returns to. Enthusiasts will certainly want to add the present gem to their collection.

The Chuang Tzu (rendered Zhuangzi in pinyin, which is becoming the standard transliteration these days) is second only to Lao Tzu's Tao Te Ching in its popularity and veneration in the Taoist world. If you've not heard of or read this book before, you're in for a real treat! The first time I read the Inner Chapters of the Chuang Tzu was like a revelation--the thoughts and ideas expressed in these passages still resonate today for their acuity, humor, satire, stabbing profundity, and life-changing potential. Indeed, after better understanding the thought this book expresses, I felt like so many loose ideas and insights I'd gleaned from other philosophy, literature, music, and poetry had been tied up together and formulated into a concise and elegant package that is urgently relevant to every day life--pretty amazing for a text that is well over 2000 years old!

I recently completed reading the last of three complete translations of the Chuang Tzu, and I decided to wait until I read all of them before reviewing any of the three. Since this text is written in ancient Chinese, a language that was reserved for the intellectual and cultural elite two thousand years ago and has been considered effectively "dead" (like Latin) for quite a while, even understanding what the author(s) were trying to say is difficult, let alone translating the words from Chinese to English. So I figured reading a few different translations is probably the best way to get a broad and deep understanding of the text, and the cumulative effect would make up for each translation's weaknesses. This proved a good strategy--the other translations I chose were Victor Mair's Wandering on the Way: Early Taoist Tales and Parables of Chuang Tzu and A.C. Graham's The Inner Chapters. All three were rewarding and worthwhile reads (I mean, it IS the Chuang Tzu!), but I still come back to Burton Watson's Complete Works as my favorite. For the rest of this review, I'll try and explain why, and try to be helpful in pointing different types of readers to a translation that suits their individual needs. I won't go into depth about what the Chuang Tzu says, since the writing in the text is so eloquent and vivid that any description won't do it justice, and because I would probably ramble on forever about either the academic issues and questions regarding the text's authorship, historicity, and philosophy, or about how mind-blowingly intellectually stimulating it is!

In a nutshell (I'll be writing complete reviews for both), A.C. Graham's translation of the Chuang Tzu is the most philosophically rigorous translation and commentary of the Chuang Tzu I've read, but more often than not the actual text of the translation is very awkward and difficult to read. Victor Mair's goal in translating was to create the most philologically accurate translation possible (i.e. directly from Chinese to English, with as few alterations or ornamentations as possible), but it occasionally reads a bit flat and can be confusing because it contains no footnotes whatsoever regarding the philosophical nuances of the text. In my opinion, Burton Watson best captures the spirit and feel of Chuang Tzu's thought and character in the actual text of the translation. His translations seem to bring more laughs out of the humorous passages, and more oomph into the hard-hitting and breathtaking wisdom of the most philosophical sections. The predominate attitude of the most famous and moving passages in this text is a mystical one--the author's goal is to attempt to convey the powerful, ineffable feeling of contemplating and experiencing the Tao (that is, the way existence--the universe, life, and the patterns and very fabric of their being--works). Watson doesn't attempt to gut the effortless beauty of the Chuang Tzu by picking apart the ideas piece by piece or getting overtechnical with the terminology. His translation exudes the type of intuitive easy flow that Chuang Tzu is always arguing for in the anecdotes the text relays. Although he doesn't spell it out explicitly, Watson's wording has it all--when you contemplate the ideas to the point that they click, you'll find out just how good of a job Watson did.

Of course, the Chuang Tzu is what it is--a very uneven text composed by different authors and including very different philosophy in some places. Watson offers some helpful footnotes in the Outer and Miscellaneous chapters, which are generally not as sparkling as the Inner chapters, though there are always flashes of brilliance. If you're brand new to the Chuang Tzu, I highly recommend you start with Chuang Tzu: Basic Writings, translated by Burton Watson and including all of the Inner chapters and highlights from the rest of the book. It's the same translations you find here, but packs a more direct punch without the confusion and diluted quality of some of the other chapters. If you're already very familiar with the Chuang Tzu and haven't read it, go for A.C. Graham's translation--his introduction and chapter prefaces are some of the most illuminating commentaries I've read on this text (if only I could get Watson's translation with Graham's commentaries!). I'd only really recommend Mair's translation if you're interested in getting a slightly different perspective on the text and have read it numerous times. By the way, this book is a hearty hardcover with a gorgeous binding (it's more maroon than Amazon's picture lets on). They're selling it for cheaper now than when I bought it, and a good hardcover version of this text is an investment that will last a lifetime--I'm sure I'll still be awed by it for decades to come.

Avigdor Haselkorn provides a very serious examination of the weapons of mass destruction available to Iraq during the Gulf War and presents a sobering insight into the dangers that the possession of these weapons by the Iraqi regime presents to it's neighbours and the West today.

A very well-timed book in view of current events.

The book also examines the circumstances surrounding the reasons why the Gulf War was so abruptly terminated. Some arguing that the coalition might have collapsed if any further advances had been made into Iraq, others of the opinion that such allied actions would have forced the use of Iraq weapons of mass destruction. Other opinions leave the matter open to some debate.

Although a military defeat for Iraq, it was a conflict that did not remove the Iraqi dictator's regime from power. We now face the inevitable consequences and the world is in a turmoil as to how to approach the present situation.

The contents of this book are disturbing. The weapons of mass destruction available are examined in some detail together with the effects that the delivery of these weapons could have on the military or the civilian populace. One cannot but remain convinced that this matter is as dangerous and significant now as it was at the time of the Gulf War. Recommended read.

Excellent book!!! Haselkorn brings a new dimension to our understanding of the Gulf War. In a nutshell Haselkorn argues that the reason the Coalition did not go "all the way" to Bagdad was due to the Chemical/Biological threat posed by Saddam. This is a fascinating thesis, though Haselkorn, in my opinion places to much weight on some flimsy evidence. Haselkorn argues that when the Iraqis fired a Scud missile at Israel with a concrete block attached instead of a warhead it was intended to warn Israel and the coalition that Saddam was prepared to fire missiles with biological warheads. Haselkorn further argues that the concrete block was intended to be seen as some kind of biological delivery vehicle. Is it not far more likely that in the heat of battle the Iraqis fired a missile with a dummy training round or that due to the pressure of the coalition bombing explosive warheads were not available? There are any number of reason why the Iraqis could have fired a missile with a concrete warhead, I think its a stretch to say that because the Iraqis fired a concrete warhead they were signaling their intenion to escalate to Chemical and Biological weapons. Nonetheless, this is an informative, well researched and well written book; moreover, it forces the reader to take a new look at the more conventional histories of the Gulf War. Good read, worth the money!!!!

"[The Continuing Storm] is the mother of all books on the gulf war written by one of today's most brilliant political-military analysts, Avigdor Haselkorn...The author's extraordinary documentation--the encyclopedic footnotes alone are a sort of volume two--and reasoning must be attended two."

"'As long as we accept the arguments of Bush and his colleagues as they struggle to explain their stated reasons for ending the war,' writes Mr. Haselkorn,'it will be impossible not to conclude that the president was either dangerously out of touch with the events at the close of the war or was simply acting irrationally. It is far better to believe that he and his cohorts are simply less than truthful.'"

Arnold Beichman in WASHINGTON TIMES, April 18, 1999

"This is an impressive and well written book about the part played by biological and chemical weapons in the Gulf War, their impact on in-war deterrence and their continuing relevance as the war drew to a close and thereafter. There are lessons to be learned from the Iraq experience that must be applied in the future not only in Iraq itself but further afield. quiescent alongside the Kosovo turmoil, we should stay aware of savagely unfinished business of vital interest." part played by biological and chemical weapons in the Gulf War, their impact on in-war deterrence and their continuing relevance as the war drew to a close and thereafter. There are lessons to be learned from the Iraq experience that must be applied in the future not only in Iraq itself but further afield. quiescent alongside the Kosovo turmoil, we should stay aware of savagely unfinished business of vital interest." Rear Admiral Richard Cobbold, Director Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI, RUSI Journal, London, August 1999

"[This book] is an essential companion to whatever other reading one does on the Gulf War. The Continuing Storm is a highly readable and extremely valuable book for understanding not only the American decision to end the war and the continuation in power of Saddam's regime, but also the impact of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of ruthless regimes and the psychology of 'terrorist deterrence.' Its insights are keen and its scholarship is thorough, as evidenced by more than 900 footnotes, many of them containing multiple citations and informative content. This is not a book just for scholars and experts, however; it is written also for the interested layman."ÿ

A really great, fascinating book. I've read a lot of holocaust literature, but rarely review it, because what can I say besides that it "literally caused me to have nightmares" - should I say that I "enjoy" reading these accounts?

But I can't let this masterpiece go unnoted by me. Dawid Sierakowiak's notebooks are enormously interesting and inspiring. Very similar to Victor Klemperer's diaries but more terse and to the point. I found it very interesting that both Klemperer and Sierakowiak seek refuge in books, and even (as I recall from my reading Klemperer years ago) both mention reading "The Forsythe Saga" while undergoing starvation and persecution.

Of particular interest in Sierakowiak's diaries is his accounts of what news he heard from the outside world (for the most part he is surprisingly well-informed) and what "current events" signify to him. I found it very interesting, for example, not only that he was aware that Anthony Eden was visiting Washington in early 1943 (which I assume is true - I really have no idea) but also that he hoped for some kind of decisive announcement or action to come as a result of that meeting.

The diaries get bogged down a bit in extremely depressing detail of what little food he and his family managed to eat but then explode with lucidity when his Mother is selected for deportation.

Really one of the most memorable books I have ever read.

Teen-ager Dawid Sierakowiak, imprisoned with his family in the Lodz Ghetto, at first carries on a "normal" life, discussing politics with his friends and keeping up with his studies.
More and more restrictions on the population-- illness, lack of food, hygiene, fuel and money, eventually take their toll on everyone. Existence deteriorates to the point at which Dawid knows he will soon die, and he does so 4 months later.
Every aspect of this slow death to the ghetto residents who are not murdered was planned by the Germans.
There are many photographs, which enhance the narrative.

This review is based on the 1996 Oxford hardback edition. Sierakowiak devotes a considerable number of entries to the 1939 German-Soviet conquest of Poland. On Sept. 14, it rained. Sierakowiak notes that, had this been going on since Sept. 1, the German tanks would've gotten stuck in the mire (p. 38). On Sept. 19, Sierakowiak repudiated Hitler's lies, in which the Fuhrer, in a radio broadcast, had blamed Poland for starting the war and for mistreating the German minority (p. 42).

A radio program from London mentioned the Germans' vain seeking of Prince Janusz Radziwill to form a collaborationist government (Nov. 5, 1939; p. 59). This adds refutation to the claim that there was no Polish Quisling because the Germans never wanted one.

No sooner had the German entered Lodz then they began to persecute both Jews and Poles. On Nov. 17, 1939, the Germans forced Polish priests to destroy the Kosciuszko statue with sledge hammers. This being ineffective, the Germans resorted to dynamite (p. 63).

A common Polonophobic Holocaust theme is the one about Poles habitually delighting in Jewish humiliation and suffering. In contrast, Sierakowiak writes (Nov. 18, 1939; p. 64): "The Poles cast down their eyes at the sight of the Jews with their armbands; friends assure us that `it won't be for long.'" In view of the fact that Sierakowiak otherwise never mentions Polish attitudes, and that negative incidents are more likely to be remembered and recorded in diaries than positive ones, this takes on further significance.

Sierakowiak was irreligious (p. 38). And, not only was he pro-Communist, but in fact he praised Communists and condemned capitalism many times (p. 88, 92, 102, 105, 155, 220, 260, 263, etc.).

As for leader Chaim Rumkowski (Rumkovsky) and his privileged Jews, Sierakowiak elaborates on the inequities between the well-fed, well-clad Jews and the starving, ragged Jews (p. 176, 198, 245). When Rumkowski ordered the timely and obedient fulfillment of the German order to deport Jewish children and the elderly ("useless eaters" for extermination), Sierakowiak noted the many kinds of privileged Jews whose children and elderly relatives had been exempt from this order (pp. 216-217).

The Germans used some Jews to beat other Jews (March 16, 1943; p. 258). During the deportations, one unarmed Jewish policeman each was assigned to supervise the loading of about 100 Jews onto the trains (p. 270). Armed Germans didn't usually get involved until the latter phases of the day's loadings.

Owing to the fact that the Jews in the Lodz ghetto had been exploited for German war production, they were spared for most of the duration of the war. Not until August 1944 did the Germans liquidate the Lodz ghetto.

Simply put, Dawid is an amazing young man. Unfortunately for this world, he probably had to suffer to make a long lasting impact. True greatness rarily comes to those of us who contribute daily to the ENHANCEMENT of life and young Dawid is proof of this. His sometimes yielding but never breaking spirit of joy and hopeful speculation makes him a true hero. While his tragic, and "all too early" death are sad, the important things left behind in his words are timeless. He reminds us all that no matter how (supposedly) bad things get in our (truly) rich lives, a thing such as maniacal tyranny and slavery can never be tolerated. The light at the end of Dawid's tunnel never came to him, but by his words and actions hopefully we will all see that inspiration and determination will also glow.

This book is the most powerful and memorable book on the Holocaust I have ever read. Kids in school read Anne Frank, I suppose because it is so popular. It was the first memoir found, not the most telling or interesting. This book is also a great psychology book as it so graphically shows the heirarchy of needs as the situation becomes more desperate. I wish that teachers of senior or junior honors classes would consider this over Brave New World where the main character gives up. Dawid, is a much more positive book of the human spirit in that he continues to deal with the ever worstening cards he is given and works hard to survive. This book hits on so many topics: history, psychology, the power of the human spirit, man's cruelty and literature as Dawid was an exceptional mind for his age.