Research Books
Related Subjects:
More Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250

An Examination of InfantryReview Date: 2006-08-14
Painful development process detailedReview Date: 2006-03-14
Due to the scope of this book, I'll only talk about the evolution of the infantry squad as English and Gudmundsson outlined throughout "On Infantry." Please note that there are multiple interpretations.
The infantry squad had its roots in ancient times as an administrative unit, a sort of "family grouping" with a big brother serving to mold the younger soldiers. The authors pick this up in the first chapter, "The Open Order Revolution," in the period between 1854 the Crimean War) and 1914 (the outbreak of World War One.) A combination of rifling (extending range) and repeater mechanism (increased fire volume) rendered the earlier means of command, control, and concentration of combat power a certain means to defeat; the enemy would shoot the closed-ranks regiments to pieces in minutes. Dispersion while mutually supporting the rest of the regiment or brigade forced the very junior leaders to assume responsibility for what had been the regimental commander's decision-making, as the battlefield became "empty" in the face of the hail of accurate rifle bullets. Rapid fire weaponry, which included both the machine gun and the quick-fire field piece (one with a recoil mechanism that limited the necessity to relay the gun after each shot--and often used recoil energy to eject spent cartridge casings, increasing the rate of fire), only added to this revolution--and made the old Napoleanic tactics pure suicide.
The squad (often thought of as an American invention) became a tactical unit during the Great War, and its evolution from administrative element (for guard duty, for fatigue details, for grouping into mess elements for distributing rations or for issuing supplies) into a tactical element possessing independant internal manuever and fire elements is spread out through "On Infantry"-- but the most important chapter is 7, "A Corporal's Guard." Oddly enough, the French Army almost got it right during the Great War, and was one of the three models for the modern infantry squad. The French put an automatic rifle in the squad and formally divided the squad into two elements--one grouped around the automatic rifle for fire support, and one for manuever with "ordianry riflemen." The French squad leader went with the maneuver element and the assistant squad leader stayed with the automatic rifle--but the French failed to exploit this innovation. French Army regulations stipulated that the squad was indivisible and that the smallest element capablie of being assigned an independant task was the platoon. The Germans did it right (funny about those Germans) by exchanging the squad's automatic rifle for a light machine gun, keeping the squad leader with the LMG and making that element the main killing system, with the assistant squad leader running a manuever/assault element of riflemen that supported the machine gun's tasks. The Germans called this universal squad the Einsheitsgruppe, and then proceeded to reinvent the wheel due to deterioration in their non-commissioned officer cadre due to casualties to form a second, "guerrilla" formation armed (on paper) with the assault rifle and grenade launcher. Simplified tactics also reduced the ability of the squad for independant action--for a single objective (ie, taking or holding a single small building) the minimum maneuver element was the platoon or even battalion. It should be noted here that even though--on paper--the 1944 German Volksgrenadier squad was supposed to have eight men, it was more common for the actual strength to be four, five, or six. There was no assistant squad leader, and Germany relied upon indoctrinating every soldier to take charge of the situation and continue the mission even when leadership personnel became casualties. The third squad formation is one I was most familiar with, the USMC's three fire team rifle squad standardized in March of 1944. Derived from the Chinese Communist practice of grouping three men around a single automatic weapon, this system was first tried out by the Marines in the Second Raider Battalion under Colonel Carlson. Three independantly-maneuvering four-Marine "fire teams," each organized around the Browning Automatic Rifle, achieved a balance of mobility and firepower which could be controlled under chaotic battlefield conditions that was hard to improve upon. Too bad that it was squandered in mostly frontal attacks against an enemy whose defense was basically an area ambush, a trap that sucked in attackers for annihilation. It is a credit to the Marines and their lowest-level tactical organization that they managed to prevail over the Imperial Japanese infantry's defensive webs--something like the fly overpowering the spider after getting entangled in its web.
There are other subjects covered in "On Infantry," but for brevity, I've just covered the evolution of squad organization. This evolution was impacted by such things as changing American Army drill--instead of forming the squad as two ranks of four men, the "new" squad of 1940 formed as a single file of 12 men--or any other number. Another factor in the evolution of the squad was conversion from foot mobility to motorization--the twelve-man squad of 1940 became a six-Soldier dismount team aboard a Stryker or Bradley. Due to low priority given to "bayonets on line," these dismount teams may number a mere two soldiers at times. Infantry squads always suffer attrition-often administrative attrition (mess duty, guard details, "give me a guy for a patrol,") and frequently casualties due to non-combat accidents, illness, or combat injuries. This messes up tactics because it isn't unusual for a rifle squad to be missing as much as 2/3rds of its strength in combat. The American idea of men as interchangable cogs in a massive machine ignored the human element, but this has changed due to combat experience. When a bunch of "weekend warriors" who have limited training time, but have known each other for years and have built mutual bonds of confidence out-fight "better-trained" active-component soldiers in both war games and actual combat, something is obviously wrong with regarding the infantry squad as an ad-hoc grouping of individuals. Sports teams train together to develop team work. The best individual players tossed into a game as a mob will almost always lose to a team of mediocre players who are lead by a competent coach and who play as a team. Infantry combat is a "team sport" rather than an individual event, and the long-overdue recognition of this simple fact is one reason why American infantry out-fights the Iraqi "insurgents."
An extensive bibliography and a very useable index enhances "On Infantry." This well-read book is an important part of my small unit tactics library.
Infantry won WWII, English explains whyReview Date: 2000-08-13
Taking the masterpiece for what it is, it delivers an important lesson mechanized maneuverists do not want to realize---that the German "blitzkrieg" died in the forests and cities of Russian when it met infantry that would not crumble if surrounded or cut-off from comfortable supply lines. Using a defense-in-depth, a nation on a total war footing can absorb and defeat another less committed nation that hopes to use a smaller force to penetrate and collapse. Many, maybe even most people mistake the German defeat in Russia--and hence WWII---with the cold Russian winter, and this is incorrect. The next critical---perhaps most important lesson and contribution English makes to the defense of freedom is---that a mechanized "combined arms" unit is ONLY AS GOOD AS ITS INFANTRY. When terrain and weather go sour, artillery and tanks will reach a point where they cannot contribute--and the entire battle then falls on the infantry. When this took place in Russia--the German infantry was NOT up to the task with inadequate numbers, clothing and bolt-action rifles. English points out and lesser historians should take note--that the German war machine was good together but not really that good because its PARTS were weak. When combined-arms technotactics could not be employed in the forests of Russia, the battle rested on the German infantry and it failed.
The cryptic lesson here is that we need GOOD infantry in large numbers and we don't get it by placing them into the back of armored vehicles in less than squad sizes, shut off from what's going on because they can't open a hatch out and see because we put a turret on the vehicle and we are afraid it will rotate into them. The Army made this mistake with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, is trying to correct it with its vehicle for the new Brigade Combat Teams while the marines are about to repeat the error with a huge autocannon turret on their next generation amphibious assault vehicle. The second lesson of English is still being ignored---those that do mechanized combined arms don't value infantry action---they ride too long in their vehicles and get ambushed by missiles and RPGs fired from enemies hiding in key terrain that should have been taken first by the infantry. To do this you need a large amount of aggressive, not complacent infantry. As the Russians found out in Grozny, when their armored vehicles became flaming coffins, the battle then falls on the infantry to clear out enemies hiding in urban terrain.
This is not to say English believes in a "Super Infantry" since we saw in Mogadishu the best light infantry in the world get shot up because it was without armored fighting vehicles to shield it from enemy fire. What English is saying is that we should start with quality infantry when building forces and not in the process of creating combined-arms organizations ruin the infantry capability by reducing numbers, battle awareness and use as a separate maneuver element.
On Infantry should be required reading for ALL U.S. military personnel coupled with Bolger's Death Ground. I'd like to see the book updated to the present with a fresh perspective for the 21st Century where we apply English's lessons to the future battlefield.
Excellent, but a bit extremeReview Date: 2001-04-07
That being said, the authors tend to overemphasize the capabilities of infantry on its own -- particularly unsupported light infantry, and particularly in the theoretical section which concludes the book.
While rightly critical of the excessive logistical tail some modern "armies of drivers" drag around, they lose sight of the fact that foot infantry by itself totally lacks operational mobility -- 20 miles a day vs. over 200 for forces with their own organic transport. And they neglect the degree to which infantry alone lacks even tactical mobility on a battlefield saturated with automatic weapons.
It's no accident that the armies which actually do a lot of fighting -- the Israelis, for instance -- structure combined-arms teams around honking great monster tanks like the Merkava III or the M1A2 Abrahms, 70 tons or so of massively protected lethality.
Mobility means the ability to move, but tactical mobility means the ability to move _under fire_.
This poses a genuine strategic dilemma; forces light enough to move rapidly _strategically_ are often too heavy to be mobile in the tactical and operational sense -- you can fly light infantry quickly to the other side of the world, but they can't move when they're actually fighting.
Still, an excellent book on the whole.
Interesting survey of modern infantry's evolutionReview Date: 2004-09-01
They start off by looking at the effects of dispersing troops in open order to mitigate casualties and different armies' responses to this organizational and mental requirement. As the machine gun speedily became ubiquitous early on in World War I, some armies adjusted rapidly and easily, such as the Germans, while others lagged behind, e.g. British, Americans. English and Gudmundsson examine and compare the tactical infantry doctrines and small-unit organizations of the French, German, Russian, British, Japanese and American armies of World War II. Also examined are the Chinese Army from the Korean War and the Vietnam-era American army. In each case, they utilize real battlefield examples to demonstrate how this doctrine was actually put into practice, how effective the chosen tactics were, and their strengths and weaknesses (e.g. the American army's reliance on firepower instead of expert technique). They also examine the importance of psychological conditioning in preparing infantry soldiers for 'the emptiness of the battlefield'. The concluding chapter then briefly examines how different modern armies have organized their infantry arms, e.g. by reducing mechanization & heavy equipment.
This was a great survey on infantry organization and tactical doctrine. I highly recommend it as a brief introduction to the infantry arm. A more detailed study by Gudmundsson of the evolution of small-unit tactics can be found in 'Stormtroop Tactics'.


Excellent Tool for Any Researcher of Library PatronReview Date: 2004-01-08
A MUST have for anyone who spends time in the library. You do not have to be a professional researcher or academician to get useful tools from this book. My kids have read the book as well, and their research projects for school improved dramatically.
I strongly recommend this book is you plan any research projects in the future.
He just keeps getting better!Review Date: 1999-11-16
A Researcher's Best FriendReview Date: 2006-01-09
And you can't hope for a better guide. A reference librarian in the Main Reading Room of the Library of Congress for 25 years, Dr. Mann's firsthand experience in helping patrons get the most out of their library experience is evident in this book. While some would consign libraries and the outmoded technology they were built to house (known as books) to the dustbin, Dr. Mann reveals how computers have done more for library research and serious scholars than for the search for general, often disorganized and unreliable, "information" on the Web.
In the early days of computerization there was a popular acronym for the uncertain results of Internet searching, GIGO (Garbage In Garbage Out). It has been supplanted nowadays by the kinder, gentler "I feel lucky" or, for the happy-go-lucky, the "sloppy search." Use these methods, whether on a search engine or a library computer catalogue, you'll likely lwind up with thousands of hits. (Good luck.) But here's Thomas Mann to the rescue. In his chapters on subject headings, on keyword searches and on Boolean combinations and search limitations, he sets out to help you define your subject concisely and precisely, and choose the search methods that will get you to the best sources for your project, instead of settling for what is "good enough." (Is it?)
In "The Oxford Guide to Library Research" you will learn how the indexed subheadings in a subject browse on the library computer catalogue can turn up unexpected sources - instant bibliographies, so to speak - that are just right for your topic, as well as how to negotiate such as the electronic databases with full-text articles from thousands of journals and newspapers. The rest of the book is devoted to the range of print and electronic resources: the specialized encyclopedias on topics that you would never imagine have encyclopedias of their own; microform and CD-ROM databases; online programs that can locate books in a more distant library if it turns out that what you seek is not available in your local branch. An innovation in this edition of the "Oxford Guide" is facsimiles of the actual search pages of major databases to illustrate examples in the text. His invaluable chapter, "Hidden Treasures," has grown by half again from the one in the second edition, now noting print collections that are also available in online databases, as well as a selection of collections exclusive to the web.
Dr. Mann's major goal is to get you to the sources you want, and ones you don't yet know you want, in the most direct and effective way; to make you think, not like a librarian, but as someone with a specific personal research goal, and to give you the knowledge and skills to accomplish it. He peppers the book with anecdotes from his firsthand experiences with researchers, the college student, the accomplished professor and the weekend scholar, while relating information in a conversational, descriptive fashion with sparing use of professional jargon. With "The Oxford Guide to Library Research" at hand when you get to work on your next project, you may discover that doing the research for it is half the fun of getting there. Or, maybe, all of it.
Learn in-depth ways to use library information!Review Date: 1998-12-31
This book should be mandatory for all studentsReview Date: 2005-09-02
Used price: $0.53
Collectible price: $22.00

Comprehensive!!Review Date: 2007-08-03
Great Book!!!!Review Date: 2006-08-08
I enjoyed reading itReview Date: 1998-06-16
A comprehensive, yet brief summary of the psi research.Review Date: 1997-12-21
Kürsad Demirutku, Middle East Technical University
Well done!Review Date: 1999-12-07


Col. Burton - a True American Hero!Review Date: 2008-08-26
When I saw the HBO movie based on this true story, I was a bit offended at first that it was presented as a comedy. But I changed my mind -- the movie brilliantly got the story out. Oh, that there were more Col. Burtons in our world!
The Old Guard still wants our men to ride in deathtraps!Review Date: 2002-10-27
The sad thing is that the 1980s military reformers are now gone and not on duty to stop the current round of Pentagon losers like the lav3stryker, V-22, AAAV and F-22 all stricken with the disease of Tofflerian gadgets while ignoring sound physical robustness, reliability and combat effectiveness at their own level. The current generals runnng DoD have simply transplanted their bureaucratic pass-the-buck mentality to the foot Soldier and pilot by hoping a computer "mouse-click" will deliver some magic firepower to solve the battlefield problem instead of empowering lower ranks to fight and win at their own level.
What makes this book so haunting is that its a true story that is repeating itself before our very eyes with the Army's thin-skinned, air-filled rubber-tired LAV-3 Stryker armored car boondoggle that will get our men killed in combat. The book shows the exact same PR tactics and lying "spin" the Army and DoD use to put people second and their programs/promotions first. The depiction of how the Army will cheat on tests to masquerade that "all is well" with a program is common as seen by the recent efforts to deceive the public by flying overweight lav3strykers a short distance by C-130 aircraft with less fuel inside to compensate--exactly how in the Bradley's fuel tanks were filled just with the minimum fuel to drive in front of the audience grandstands and to the aim point for the test anti-tank weapon to hit it.
The tragedy is that after 2 decades, the Army today is rushing the lav3stryker deathtrap into production without ANY live-fire testing against fully fueled and ammo loaded vehicles fired at by RPGs or 14.5mm heavy machine guns thanks to a loophole in DoD procurement. Too bad Colonel Burton wasn't on duty now in the Pentagon. When they make the movie sequel to this book, "Pentagon Wars II: the lav3stryker" it looks like the ending will not be a happy one with a better vehicle (upgraded M113A3 Gavins) going into service. The horror of hundreds of dead American Soldiers Colonel Burton wanted to prevent will be our "wake-up call".
If we ignored the film and Col Burton's book its based on, what makes us think the Pentagon Old Guard will change after needless deaths?
MeremisingReview Date: 1999-04-22
Right is Might!Review Date: 1998-03-30
Good ReferenceReview Date: 2004-06-20
The DOD politics that the author experiences are fascinating, and remain relevant today. One example is the discussion of the A-10, its amazing record in the 1991 Gulf War, and how the Air Force really hates it and the close air support role it plays (today the Air Force is moving towards replacing the A-10 with higher flying, faster planes for the close air support missions).
Overall this book is an important read for anyone interested not only in defense procurement, but DOD politics and modern warfare as well. A good book to have as a reference.

Powerful biography of a fascinating manReview Date: 2002-12-24
just plain rageReview Date: 2002-02-28
FascinatingReview Date: 1999-05-04
Reads Like A ThrillerReview Date: 1999-01-13
Smashing history of Congress and Phil BurtonReview Date: 1998-12-16

Used price: $4.99

Learning From the Past from a Pro- as we try to save MedicareReview Date: 2008-01-06
One of a KindReview Date: 2000-08-21
If so, Theodore Marmor's reissue and revision of The Politics of Medicare is the book you want to pick up. There is no comparable book of its kind. Other scholars have studied Medicare's origins. Journalists trace the ebb and flow of contemporary Washington battles over Social Security and Medicare. But Marmor, a Yale professor and health policy guru, has written the definitive analysis of how the political battles waged over health insurance and Medicare from the 1940s onward powerfully shape the debate over the program to this day.
Wondering why Medicare, unlike almost all major private insurance plans, fails to cover most prescription drugs? The seeds of an answer may be found in the fears of 1960s legislators that the unpredictable cost of drugs could swamp the program at its outset. Unsure why medical expenditures took off in the 1960s and 1970s? Partly because doctors, who had led the charge against a government-sponsored social insurance program for the aged, benefited enormously from generous rules that were designed to assauge their fears about participation. Puzzled how Medicare became such a political hot potato after years of uninterrupted popularity? Marmor deftly shows how the Reagan administration reoriented widely-held fears about medical inflation into narrower fears about the supposedly unsustainable cost of public programs.
Another reason that this astute volume bears reading, or rereading: Marmor shows that elections can really matter. In the absence of the Democratic majority in Congress that emerged from the 1964 elections, passage of Medicare would have been delayed or forestalled altogether.
Within the cozy world of health policy analysts, Marmor is known for being a staunch proponent of national health insurance and a skeptic about the potential of HMOs and different forms of "managed competition" to control health costs and delivery quality care. His convictions enliven the text rather than detracting from its rigorous logic. This is a book that anyone interested in the politics of health care, and in American politics in general, will appreciate.
One thing alone mars this otherwise impressive book: its packaging. Sadly, any seven-year old with access to Microsoft Excel could have improved on the volume's rudimentary and unappealing charts and graphics. But the reader shouldn't let this superficial flaw detract from Marmor's important and unusually well-written book.
Master Political Scientist Provides Timely UpdateReview Date: 2000-11-10
The analysis of Medicare in the 1990s, found in the current volume, is excellent. This is an ideal time to read or reread the book since Medicare program changes will face our new President and the newly elected or reelected members of our House of Representatives and Senate during 2001. This fall I read the second edition and found the book very informative and enjoyable.
A Valuable Update to a Public Policy ClassicReview Date: 2000-06-23
The (revised) Politics of Medicare: reviewsReview Date: 2000-06-23

Excellent Review Date: 2007-01-13
Finance understandingReview Date: 2007-01-09
A brilliant intellectual featReview Date: 2001-08-30
What a book!Review Date: 2005-11-21
The original classicReview Date: 1997-04-27

Used price: $0.49

must read for product architectReview Date: 2004-07-13
Software portion is not recommended since the example it provide is not solid enough to work out the argument to apply the same concept to software. However, you may workout your ideas from original platform concept in software planning. Maybe. It remain as a question to me until now.
A new follow up to the Power of Product Platforms coming....Review Date: 2000-03-16
We are now in the 4th edition and have published it in Spanish with a Barcelona publisher.
Companies that Marc Meyer and I consult with have found it extremely informative and useful.
Our follow up book will be an extension of this book, filled with rich examples of applications to goods, services, software and processes.
Included will be workshop materials for easy application to the users' unique products and business services.
Keep looking.......
Al Lehnerd
Fantastic book, easy to read, to the point, insightfulReview Date: 1999-02-11
A must readReview Date: 2002-09-23
Position a product line for sustained success.Review Date: 2002-03-06

Collectible price: $24.95

A must read for anyone dealing with the mediaReview Date: 2008-05-10
Best in Class!Review Date: 2005-06-21
Presentation Training A-Z is the #1 book I've found on this topic and I recommend it highly to beginners who want to learn the basics of good presentation skills, regular speakers who want to take themselves to the next level, as well as expert presenters who are going for the gold!
Saying goodby to presentation panicReview Date: 2005-05-30
Roger Landry MD
Presestation Training A-ZReview Date: 2005-05-20
His ability to convince the reader, that this, is an opportunity to combine 'Substance and Style', goes down rather well, with effective examples. The Author's ablity to enable the reader 'experience' his examples and test the methodology of this art and science of story telling makes it compelling and extremely readable.
A must read for pro's who want to 'make it' in life!and pass the 'Water-cooler' test that he so clearly enunciates!
Excellent follow-upReview Date: 2005-02-24


LONG OVERDOReview Date: 2000-04-13
A GemReview Date: 2000-02-29
Excellent ReferenceReview Date: 2000-02-13
Everything And Anything About RacehorsesReview Date: 2000-05-08
a must-have reference for every horseman....Review Date: 1999-08-15
Related Subjects:
More Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250
English discusses, in very accessible prose, how changes in warfare and technology tended to drive changes in basic infantry organization down to the fire team and squad level, and how infantry was used on the battlefield. He relies heavily on the historical record of the two world wars, but other conflicts are referenced. English's prose is straightforward and matter-of-fact, even sometimes moving, as in his description of the heroic performance of the U.S. First Marine Division in the breakout from the Chosin Reservoir in 1950.
English was a professional writing primarily for other professionals. The reader without military or historical background may not fully appreciate the value of this work.
The extent to which integrated joint and combined operations have come to dominate the actions of the U.S. military and to a lesser degree of its NATO allies is an event largely postdating this edition, as is the degree to which netcentric warfare is now commonly used. Nevertheless, the basis of the infantry continues to be the human soldier: on that basis, "On Infantry" endures as a very worthful professional read.