Research Books

The role of the American army in the Pacific between the Spanish-American war and the Second World War is often forgotten. Most don't even know the American army ahd a role so far away from home. Indeed the army was small but the stakes were high. In the wake of the war with Spain in 1898 the U.S gained a number of small protectorates and colonies in the Phillipines and Samoa and elsewhere. Eventually this became part of a defense system, but it was not merely to defend against outsiders. The Army also had a role with the local people and creating institutions. Moreover it also had to fight insurgencies that took place in the Moro area of the Southern Phillipines where Muslim insurgents fought Americans. The insurgency goes on to this day. However at the time the likes of General Pershing were used to put down this uprising with the least possible loss in lives.

This fascinating and detailed book opens up a new history of the American army and its role in the Pacific.

Seth J. Frantzman

Linn notes that the big question of WWII is, "why, with almost four decades to prepare, these (US Army) military forces proved unable to defend the nation's Pacific possessions against Japan." The author notes that the traditional approach has been to focus on events in the short-term prior to Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, however his effort is to, "offer a somewhat longer perspective through a narrative history of the U.S. Army in Hawaii and the Philippines from 1902 to 1940....its task is not to delineate the road to Pearl Harbor, but to illuminate the numerous paths the army trod in its long search for a viable Pacific defense....For years it had foreseen both the threat and its own inability to ward it off." From a strategic perspective, this book does a good job of putting America's failure into context. It points out that although the surprise attack of 7 December 1941 was not detected, from a military capabilities standpoint there was little the Army could have done. Although I believe one needs to be careful with historical parallels, a student of strategy can see how political and economic considerations drive strategy. Indeed, a similar issue between today (2004) and then was the tension between what is required to hold ground when forces are deployed vs. the ability to deploy and sustain those same forces over a great deal of distance.

During the first forty years of the 20th Century the U.S. Army had the mission of protecting the Philippine and Hawaiian Islands from attack by the nation of Japan. Although Japan was not originally thought to be a threat, from the 1922 Naval Conference onward the army high command considered Japan as the only real threat in the Pacific. This book provides a unique and very good history of what came to be known and the U.S. Army of the Pacific.

The book provides a good deal of fascinating information on all aspects of the Pacific Army from the life of enlisted men to the strategic thinking that informed its planning. But perhaps the most interesting theme running through it is how the U.S. Army identified the Japanese threat to the U.S. Pacific Islands and sought to mitigate it.

Because of budget and manpower constraints imposed by congress, the U.S. Army in the period between the WWI and WWII was incapable of fighting any kind of war. Yet as this book shows that did not prevent the Army General Staff and the Department Staffs of the Philippines and Hawaii from developing often very well thought out strategies for the defense of the islands. In the case of the Philippines the Archipelago was first considered vital to U.S. interests in the Western Pacific and a keystone in U.S. strategy. Gradually this view changed and by the thirties, the Philippines were considered indefensible against Japan and a strategic liability. Army planners sought to minimize the U.S. military presence there. This same thinking made Hawaii and especially the Pearl Harbor naval base on Oahu the keystone of a defensive arc running from Alaska to Panama which was designed to protect the U.S. Pacific Frontier.

One thing that is clear from this book and that is that the Army General Staff and the Islands' Departmental Commands were quite accurate in their defining the potential threats posed by Japan and fairly realistic in planning defensive strategies against those threats. For example the army was only too aware that the elaborate harbor defense systems that defended Pearl Harbor and Manila Bay were obsolete almost from the day they were completed. Still army planners at both the General Staff and department level tried to develop effective defensive plans. The problem was, as this book states, that there was a tradition that developed early on that allowed department commands to override general staff planning and design their own defensive plans. Thus in 1941General Short of the Hawaiian Department defined the threat from Japan primarily in terms of sabotage while the General Staff correctly saw it as a threat from air attack.

Brian Linn believes that the American annexation of the Philippines damaged rather than helped the U.S. position in East Asia. Even before the outbreak of the Second World War, American military planners knew that the Philippines were extremely vulnerable to Japanese invasion but were relunctant to raise a native force that could also be a threat to the American Army. The security problems only became worse when before the attack on Pearl Harbor, MacArthur authorized the defence of the entire Philippines and not just the Bataan peninsular. As a result of America's fear of a native force to protect the Philippines and MacArthur's overly ambitious plans, the United State suffered a humiliating defeat to the Japanese in 1942. I would reccomend this book foy anyone who believes that a new American empire would enhance national security but has ignored the disasterous example of the American experience with the Philippines.

This is a splendid and pioneering study of the Army in the Pacific, a subject badly in need of more light that it has hitherto received. It brings the Pacific Army to life in a way that no one else had even attempted.

Like any book, however, it has its limitations, and as is usually true it is the ones that author was not aware of (at least at the time) and did not flag for our attention that we must take most care of. In this case the principal limitation lies in strategic view.

The Philippines, as the author makes clear, never had any intrinsic significance for the United States (or for the earlier colonial power, Spain, for that matter) -- no riches or resources to be reaped. The sole significance of the islands lay in their position. Initially, Americans had calculated (like the Spaniards before them) that possession of Manila would provide an important advantage in gaining the rewards of the rich China trade. Luzon and the rest of the islands simply came with the deal. Almost as soon as they had been seized, however, other events eroded Manila's importance in this role greatly. (Perhaps we should say "seeming importance," as there never were the prospects which had been envisioned in 1898.) Finding themselves in possession of a colony of little value, Americans not unnaturally felt reservations about spending large sums to garrison and defend it. Thus a purely nominal force was assigned to its defense, adequate only for internal security and the assertion of sovereignty. The oft-proclaimed "bastion" of the Philippines was in reality no more than a sentry post, bound to be overrun quickly in any serious assault. To invest in a real Philippine fortress or in mobile forces strong enough to quickly relieve it would involve an expense that few Americans could see as justified.

Distant events changed all that. By the late 1930s, of course, the propensity of Japan for aggressive military expansion was manifest, but that did not seem particularly threatening in itself, given that the economic resources of the country were so small relative to those of the U.S. But the outbreak of the European War in 1939, followed by the Nazi defeat of France and threat to Britain in 1940, heightened American security concerns vastly. Then in September, 1940, Japan joined the Axis Pact, making itself an ally of Germany. Japan had intended this to change American perceptions and it did that, but not in the way that had been hoped. Japan ceased to be a disagreeable nuisance in a distant place and instead clearly became a potential part of a serious threat, to be blocked if possible and crushed if necessary. Very suddenly, the importance of the Philippines' geographic position changed dramatically.

It is this transition that Prof. Linn misses in focusing on the local realities rather than the global strategic picture that dominated the awareness of Washington decision-makers in 1940-41. This broader reality is well presented in Waldo Heinrichs, "Pearl Harbor in a Global Context," in _Pearl Harbor Revisited_, edited by Robert W. Love, Jr. (London: Macmillan, 1995) (ISBN 0312095937), and in more extended fashion in the same author's _Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II_, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988) (ISBN 0195061683). For the same issue from a different perspective see Gerhard L. Weinberg, "Global Conflict: The Interaction Between the European and Pacific Theaters of War in World War II," in _Germany, Hitler, and World War II: Essays in Modern German and World History_, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) (ISBN 0521474078), or his book, _A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II_, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) (ISBN 0521558794).

Beginning with the Japanese occupation of Vietnam in July of 1941, thereby making manifest their determination to continue down the road of active alliance with Hitler, the U.S. began to rush all available military power to the Philippines, reserving only that which was essential to the security of America itself. But years of penuriousness and neglect had left the cupboard largely bare, and re-armament was yet to produce major material results. So the Philippine defenders, like the exposed sentry, became casualties of the brutally inexorable logic of war. Brian Linn's book provides a major and largely-overlooked piece of this picture, but is somewhat weak on the overall context.

There are also other sources which the interested reader may wish to consult in order to get a fuller picture. These include John J. Stephan, _Hawaii Under the Rising Sun: Japan's Plans for Conquest After Pearl Harbor_, (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1984) (0824825500) and the article by Richard B. Meixsel, "Major General George Grunert, WPO-3, and the Philippine Army, 1940-1941," _Journal of Military History_, 59, No. 2 (Apr 1995): 303-24. Both offer insights not fully captured by Linn. In a more recent article, "Manuel L. Quezon, Douglas MacArthur, and the Significance of the Military Mission to the Philippine Commonwealth," _Pacific Historical Review_, 70, No. 2: 255-92, Meixsel introduces some new evidence regarding the events in the Philippines in the 1930s and uses it to call into question some of Linn's claims.

While I have focused on its limitations, I want to emphasize again that this is a very valuable and unique book, even taking them fully into account.

Dr. Megargee overturns decades of conventional wisdom about the responsibility for Germany's loss in the Second World War. Although unsparing in his criticism of Hitler, on any number of subjects, he goes further than any author that I am aware of in portraying the lack of strategic vision on major issues of national political and economic goals, the short-sighted and self-serving carving-out of personal empires in the byzantine structure of the German High Command, inter-office and inter-service rivalry, and the the emphasis on the spiritual over the material that manifested itself most dangerously in the long-standing institutional disregard for intelligence work and logistics that made Germany's loss nearly a foregone conclusion upon the launch of Operation Barbarossa in 1941.

Extensively researched and thoroughly documented, as well as clearly and engagingly written, this book is a significant addition to the scholarly literature on the German armed forces in WWII, as well as a refreshing antidote to the tiresome rehashing of the Führer's blunders and the self-exculpatory memoirs of numerous German officers that appeared in the wake of Germany's defeat. Strongly recommended for those interested in the subject, and another fine work of military history from the University Press of Kansas.

This is a great work of modern military history, by a top notch historian. Most good monographs rate 4 stars, but this is a case of using the Showalter formula even better than Showalter! Thorough, provocative, and very well written.

This book is one of the spate of recent works "proving" the guilt of the Germans in general instead of just Hitler and the Nazis, but is far better written than most and actually offers a point for discussion. I recommend a purchase and a close read.

There is little new information (if any) here, but the author's description of the functioning of the General Staff, the OKH and OKW from pages 17 to 101 is particularly easy to understand, and I say this as someone who first read Goerlitz's "History of The German General Staff" at the age of fifteen in 1954. It is this part that makes the book worth the price of admission.

Chapters 10, 11 and 12, offer nothing new except for one-sided cherry-picked references tending to support the author's far-reaching conclusions. Nonetheless, such support is weak at best. From time to time the author seems to understand this, but then he goes ahead and states his questionable conclusions anyway. For example, even though the author is quick to point out (& accurately) that memoirs are often self-aggrandizing, he uses a sole, questionable source (Lossberg) to describe Jodl's attitudes at the end of 1941 and his agreement that Manstein, at the time a newly-baked army commander, and someone who had never been responsible for more than one panzer division in his earlier corps and now 11th Army, was the leading general to assume overall command of the eastern front. Very doubtful, and something that cannot be verified!

The author correctly points out that many higher-ranking officers like Beck believed that Germany's only hope lay in winning a short, decisive military conflict rather than an economic or diplomatic course of action. Yep! Like a bridge player who carefully studies his cards and sees that there is only one course of action that might win the contract, he takes the sole option open to him. When it doesn't succeed, one should not criticism the player for not having used another strategy UNLESS IT CAN BE SHOWN THAT THE STRATEGY COULD (not would) HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL. Unfortunately, this is exactly what the author does without showing any realistic basis for alternatives. The player can be criticized for making the contract in the first place, but that was never the function of either the OKW or the OKH. I was also amused to see that the author took a similar position to the German defeat in World War I -- the high command again attempted to apply an operational solution to a strategic problem. Once more for the West Coast, what would the author have recommended they do? That he doesn't state.

Yes, intelligence concerning the Soviets was almost nil, but military intelligence world-wide has been notorious for being poor except in combat conditions. The US was and is no exception to this rule, and Ultra (not mentioned by the author) was indispensable to the Allies (most notably in North Africa.) In a limited time frame like that for Barbarossa, one does the best one can. As far as logistics are concerned, the German economy was not put on a total war footing until Speer did it in 1944 with the resulting improvements in production. Of course, by then it was too late, and at any rate, that was not within the purview of either the OKW or OKH. And the US also used the term "supply" just like the Germans. With regards to personnel, the Germans only had one chance against the Soviet Union and that was denied them by Hitler's racial policies. The Germans needed to fight a "War of Liberation" against the Communists, setting up puppet governments in the non-Russian states and utilizing their manpower. In spite of everything, the number of Hiwis was enormous and Russian units like Cossacks and the Vaslov Army still opted to fight alongside the Germans. But again, this was not an option open to the OKW or OKH. So given the situation, what was the high command to do? The author is silent on this point, but condemns the General Staff anyway. One feels compelled to point out that Beck paid the ultimate price, Fritsch sought death before Warsaw, and Halder narrowly escaped execution before the war's end.

Yes, there was a culture in the General Staff that viewed the Versailles Diktat (it was not a negotiated treaty) as unbearable and to be torn up as soon as possible. Yes, they wanted to regain lost territories. That is hardly new or difficult to understand in the light of history. To the extent that Hitler's aims coincided with theirs, the German senior commanders supported him. To their regret, they found themselves riding on the back of the tiger. Even at the end, von Bock's last words were to Manstein, "Manstein, save Germany!"

For a much fuller treatment on the German officer mindset that the author only alludes to, see Robert Citino, "The German Way of War."

Military personnel are normally conservative (as the author points out), and the General Staff operated much like they did in 1870. Insofar as their opponents were incompetent like the Polish, French, and British, they won easily through aggressiveness and vastly superior training. The US Army adopted much if not all of the German leadership doctrine and training methods after World War II, recognizing that US performance in Europe was spotty at best. War gamers traditionally equate three American soldiers to two Germans, and Marshall's contention that over 40% of American infantrymen refused to fire their rifles in combat brings "the greatest generation" into question. Live-fire training has never been possible to any degree in the American Army, mostly due to objections by civilians for the casualties it causes. Of course, another reason the Germans fought so well is that they executed over 30,000 of their own military personnel in the course of the war for a wide range of offenses.

That the Officer Corps was not prepared to conduct a modern war with the necessary personnel, logistics, intelligence, and economic basis is correct. But neither were the French, Polish, British, Japanese or Russians. The Axis were defeated through a combination of British and American code-breaking, Russian manpower, and American logistics and economic power. The US struggled to put 90 divisions on the ground in Europe, but changed the Red Army into a mechanized force while the Wehrmacht became increasingly dependent on horses. Yes, the German machines were good, but German engineers tinkered their way to oblivion and prevented mass production.

The author sums up with the following statement: "The myth persists of a supremely talented, if politically naive and ambitious, German officer corps being led unwillingly into war and defeat by a ruthless dictator, a megalomaniac with no understanding of the military art." If one removes the word "unwillingly" and tones down "supremely", that "myth" would seem to be true. Nor do I know any serious scholar that believes in the myth as stated. Maybe some portion of the readership does, but only if they are not well-read on the subject. The author then states an untruth: "They (the officer corps) made strategic decisions, independently and in support of Hitler's, that started a war...." I know of no strategic decisions made independently by the German officer corps or high command that started World War II. Maybe the author can enlighten me. They didn't even make strategic decisions in support of Hitler that started the war unless you count their support of Hitler himself during the crises of 1933 and 1934. For that focus on Hammerstein-Equord, Blomberg, and those that refused to back Fritsch.

The author also castigates the Officer Corps for continuing the war after its futility should have been obvious. Gee, that was why Halder resigned. One is also tempted to castigate Robert E. Lee and Confederate commanders for continuing the Civil War after the fall of Atlanta. But like German officers, (& the German opposition had already been told in no uncertain terms that the Allies would not help them), they could not rise in rebellion -- they could only play their cards as they were dealt and hope for the best. Maybe a miracle would take place -- it has before. Only in hindsight is everything so clear.

Like I said -- this book is an excellent starting point for discussion. But I deplore the current trend by the author, Wolfram Wette, and others -- they represent the pendulum swinging too far in the opposite direction from the memoir literature of the 50s and earlier studies.

And lastly, I must register my objection to the author's dissertation advisor writing the Foreword and even being referenced on the title page. It should have been enough for the author to acknowledge Murray in his Preface. Moreover, Murray clearly shills for the author, using adjectives like "outstanding" and "extraordinary." Obviously the standards of objectivity and propriety in the academic world (or Ohio State at least) have changed, and not for the better.

This is an excellent study of the highest levels of the German Army during WWII. But I think the main lesson is that there was no high command, at least in the sense the British and the Americans had one. Hitler and the generals around him spent their time micromanaging the Eastern Front with occasional interference in African and European battles. Hitler acted as if he were the counterpart of Eisenhower, not Marshall or Brooke. It is as if Rosevelt were to have sent Eisenhower daily detailed instructions on where to attack and what to defend.

The problem was only partially Hitler's. The Germans never really created a staff to manage a global conflict. Hadler resented Hitler's inferference, but because it was usually stupid, not because Hitler should have been managing the war, not the battles. The Germans were superb at what they considered the "operational" level of command--the control of armies on a single battlefield. But they never looked at the "big picture."

The book also proves that the German army high command, such as it was, had serious failings. They simply did not understand the logistics of a campaign as vast as the Eastern Front. Nor did they have the intelligence gathering capacity to estimate what they were getting into when they attacked the Soviet Union. Worse, they did not even realize their problems.

This book can teach a lot about why people frequently fail to understand and act upon hard facts. Learning this can help avoid future disasters of any sort.

This book is an attempt to re-write what has been the conventional view of the relation between Adolph Hilter and the German General Staff. After the war, Hitler was conveniently dead and that allowed the German Generals to put out a version of history that was accepted for some years but was at odds with the truth. The German Generals had towed the line that they were politically neutral prior to the 1930?s and that they had not been supporters of Nazi aims. Further that they opposed some aspects of Nazi war aims and acted in a professional way. Lastly they were highly competent and might have won the war if it had not had been for Hitler continually interfering with their operational plans.

Megargee argues convincingly that the German Generals had a political agenda similar to the Nazis. That is they supported the abrogation of the Treaty of Versailles, they wanted an end to democracy and they wanted Germany to rearm and to become a great power again. A large number of Generals such as Rommel, Guderian, Zeitzler and Reichenau were if not committed Nazis, enthusiastic barrackers yelling support from the sidelines.

One interesting point is Megaree?s estimation of the ability of the German Generals. After the war a large number wrote memoirs in which they modestly estimated themselves as pretty good. Megaree concedes that from an operational point of view the German army did well. However it was vulnerable in a number of respects. The key mistake made by Germany in the war was the attack on the Soviet Union. It would seem clear that the planning for operation Barbarossa was deeply flawed. For instance the Germans knew nothing of the actual strength of the forces against them. (The Soviets had 5 million men, 20,000 tanks and 20,000 aircraft to the German?s 3million 3,200 and 3000 respectively) In addition the Germans had no clear plan of defeating the Soviets. Barbarossa was based on the hope that the bulk of Soviet forces could be destroyed near the Polish border. It was then hoped that the Soviets might give in or the government would collapse. However if this did not eventuate the Germans had massive supply problems. They had limited fuel, and they could not use the Soviet railway system until they changed the gauge. In fact when the Soviets failed to collapse the Germans suffered massive supply problems, not being able to supply their troops with winter clothing and struggling to maintain ammunition levels and fuel and spares for their vehicles and planes.

Thus throughout the war the German Army acted as if intelligence was not really worth worrying about and that supply was a problem which could be overcome by an act of will. This deficiency was not a problem in initial war in the west, as the distances were so small and the French and British acted incompetently when faced by the German advance. However against the Soviets it was fatal.

Megargee summarises the weakness of the German generals as one of a strategic weakness. It was one that they shared with Hitler and in fact it is clear that they had little insight into the reason for their defeat even after the finish of the war.

Another issue dealt with by the book is the question of the role of Hitler?s leadership in bringing about the loss of the war for Germany. Megargee clearly shows that it was only in the later part of the war (1944) that tensions arose between Hitler and the Generals. By this time the war was lost. Over the big decisions there was not a lot of disagreement.

This book although expensive is short and easy to read. It is interesting not just for those interested in the war, but it illustrates how history can be distorted by over reliance on self serving material.

This sourcebook is outstanding. I have read many similiar books but if you had to purchase one, this is it. It has everything and more than most others. It is packed with information. The first few chapters deal with Italian history which is invaluable. Without understanding Italian history you will not be able to understand how and why to search Italian ancestors in a way that is going to provide results. This books explains it all, has all the forms you'll need and is clear and concise. You will not be disappointed if you buy this book.

For those of you in search of your Italian heritage need look no further. Everything you need is right here in this relatively cheap book written by, get this, a non-Italian! Whether you just want to get your grandparents birth records from the 1890's or go all the way back to the 1700's to get your 5th great grandparents marriage record, this book will tell you how, in easy step by step instructions. Can't read or write in Italian? Mr. Cole's book does that for you, too. Don't know your Italian history? Guess what? Mr. Cole does, and he shares it with you in his book.
There are many illustrations of actual Italian records from the 1800's to going back almost 1000 years, and he explains what each is and what the records say. This author covers the history of surnames as well.
With the information in this book, it would be virtually impossible for someone who's ancestors were Italian not to discover their heritage.
I strongly recommend this book.

Don't get me wrong, this is an excellent book. But I found it to focus too much on providing general information rather than specific break-downs on actions to take.

It may have been better if it were divided into two books- one giving the necessary history and background needed to understand how Italian records work, when they came into existence, etc. And another giving specific information and tips on how to obtain them.

Italian records are as complex as it's history. So two books may have been in order, there is just so much information there. Or one book, with less information, but more specifics on each category that they chose.

It left me a bit overwhelmed with knowledge, but still no clear direction to go in.

It's kinda like when you are lost and try asking for directions and they tell you 3 different ways you can go, and all they do is confuse you more-so you have a lot of information but are somehow more confused. I'd rather have them tell me one way, that will get me there... I think that explains how I felt after reading this book.

Thank heavens this book came into my life as a dedicated heritage researcher, first generation Italo-American. Since I am alone in this, as are many out there I have founf doing this, I especially appreciated the wonderful sources, shortcuts, and information given to the noviate, although anyone can learn something from this complete guide. A great addition to the literature.

This was the first book I bought on Italian genealogy several years ago and it is still the best source for understanding Italian records. Using the form letters I have been successful in obtaining information from a variety of Italian sources. What is especially useful is the balance between the how to chapters and the background on the records. Highly recommended.

This is one of the best military history books out there. Its an account of a raid to free POWs carried out during the Vietnam war. What is so good about it is that it gives a truely comprehensive from top-to-bottom account of the mission from conception to execution and even following through to the political aftermath. while the mission was not successful in its objective (the POWs were moved before the team arrived), the plan involving a raid deep into North Vietnam was carried out flawlessly.

While many things have changed since the time the book was written, people, organizations and politics have not. The book is a case study with wide ongoing application. Its also a fun read for anyone interested in politics, the Vietnam war, special operations or military history in general.

The Son Tay Prison Raid was a good idea but was based on poor intelligence. Benjamin Schemmer did a good telling the story. It's too bad it doesn't have a happy ending.

Sam McGowan
Vietnam Veteran, author "The Cave"

Great account of the brilliantly executed 1970 special operations mission to rescue POWs, and the breakdown in intelligence which resulted in the rescuers coming away empty handed. If you've read about the mission to rescue the hostages at the embassy in Iran a few years later, you'll recognize a number of the names. (See Delta Force by Charlie Beckwith for details on the Iranian mission.)

First published in 1976, "The Raid" is the story of the heroic attempt to rescue 61 Americans from the North Vietnamese POW camp at Son Tay in November, 1970. It is thoroughly and meticulously researched. Its' 3 reprints attest to the quality. Author Schemmer had some obvious command cooperation in its' compilation. "The Raid" devotes more effort -and pages- in depicting the painstaking step by step preparation and practice that was dedicated to the rescue than the actual time on the ground. That is understandable, since the mission lasted less than 30 minutes. The camp was empty and no one was rescued! The author examines the intelligence "considerations' behind that unpleasant fact. More time and space is given to the inevitable damage control that the Pentagon and White House had to tackle. That easy to appreciate as well, given the frantic antiwar feelings in this country at the time. The raid took place less than 4 months after our troops were withdrawn from Cambodia. That incursion had sparked huge domestic protests. There are three outstanding traits to this tale: The first is the obvious bravery and courage shown by the men involved. The second is the sheer amount of logistical support and inter -service coordination that the effort required. There is an impressive array of those Command acronyms. As any veteran would rightly suspect, there was a bit of infighting as well. I appreciated reading that General Ryan, Air Force Chief of Staff, gave an open letter to some of the chief planners directing they receive complete "no questions asked" cooperation. Those who felt unable to comply were to call the General directly! How many calls do we think Ryan received? Finally, we the author incorporates the human beings who were the actual prisoners. We read of some of the more distinguished, such as Robinson Risner and Jerimiah Denton as well as those not as famous but who suffered as much and more. "The Raid" is almost a mini-history of the POW saga-one that extends to this very day. Over 1,800 men remain unaccounted for. Some claimed the raid to be a failure. It strikes this reviewer as an outstanding success. That's because after Son Tay, most POWs were consolidated into the big Hanoi area prisons. There was safety-not to mention a command structure-in numbers. Treatment improved, especially since many prisoners could help themselves. This reviewer would like to compliment President Nixon and Defense Secretary Laird for supporting a military action they knew would be unpopular and suspected might be unsuccessful. Canceling the operation would have been the easy way out; they courageously chose the difficult course. To this day, Mr. Nixon remains the only Chief Executive to seriously address the POW issue. Those buying "The Raid" should strongly consider Frank Anton's "Why Didn't You Get Me Out?" It's time frame perfectly complements Mr. Schemmer's tale. Finally, there is the virtual Bible on the subject, "Code Name Bright Light". That may be a lot of reading but what subject is more worthwhile?

On November 21st, 1970, a rescue mission would be launched inside North Vietnam that would eventually gain status as being possibly the most incredible operation ever conducted during the Vietnam war.

The culmination of months of grueling planning and training, intensive coordination through military channels, extensive secrecy, and special operations wizardry would lead to the daring raid on the Son Tay POW camp just 20 short miles outside of Hanoi. So well prepared was the team that after the raid's accomplishment, no lives were lost and everyone returned safely after just 26 minutes on the ground. Everyone except U.S. POW's, that is, who were unfortunately not at the POW compound being that it had been abandoned only months previously. Information discovered as to why the Son Tay facility was empty would prove to be both revealing and disturbing to the raid planners and executers.

In assessing the aftermath of the mission itself, although deemed a failure by the mainstream media and squabbled over by Congress, the military, and intelligence agencies, positive aspects would eventually come to light to justify the raid a success after all. Unknown to many outside the purview of the POW's themselves, the raid was an eye opener to the North Vietnamese who now fully realized that America would defy the greatest of odds to repatriate their POW's and show them that they were not forgotten. The Son Tay rescue mission was a serious morale booster for our U.S. captives and also hastened their improved treatment from their North Vietnamese jailors.

Benjamin F. Schemmer has written a fascinating and in-depth study into one of the most sensational rescue missions ever accomplished in the history of warfare. Richly detailed and researched, included are photographs, maps, and appendixes with a multitude of statistics and operational facts. Whether just a casual reader or an avid fan of Vietnam era history, The Raid is an excellent book from start to finish. For those readers interested in the complete story of POW rescues in Vietnam, I would highly recommend the book "Code Name Bright Light: The Untold Story of POW Rescue Efforts During the Vietnam War" by George J. Veith.

I am one of the three Pathfinders with 2/12 and was in the foxhole to the left of Mr. Krohns. He did a wonderful job of telling it exactely the way it was. I can still remember that night as if it happened yesterday. I returned later with 5/7 and recovered the deceased troopers we had left behind.
Juan C. Gonzales(Night Jumper 4-2)

I have read this book. I was with A Co., 3rd. platoon during this time at Hue. It was a very trying time for all of us. I was also one of the people who was with Capt. Helvey when we went on our little night trip. The book talks so much about the first few days of the month of Febuary. In fact we were there for the whole month. It was Feb 24 that My machine gun crew was killed as we were trying to advance toward Hue, "AGAIN". To Broadus Dale Hilyer, "Rest in Peace" You were a great friend.
The book also reflects on the Que Son Valley. I have since had the pleasure to meet Jim Hietz who was wounded on Jan. 7, 1968. Jim was also in the 3rd platoon. We met for the first at a 1st Cav. reunion this year(2002), Wow, what memories we had to talk about. I will also add that I was and will forever be impressed with all the many fine people that I met at this reunion. History is in this book, good, bad, or indifferent, it is there for everyone to read.

George Patterson

Charles, I want to thank for writing this book. For years I lived with the memories, questioning what had happened. I was in Company D, and on Jan 3,1968 they did use a flame thrower, the guy just missed me. I became a WIA just days before the end of your book and I was able to relate my experience during this time. Again, Thank You, it really helped.

Charles Krohn has presented a well researched book that sheds new light on a complicated battle, the fighting for Hue City during Tet. His book is a valuable addition to history because it specifically deals with a regularly overlooked topic: the 2/12 Cavalry's involvement in the battle for Hue and it's fight against the NVA headquarters there. He was there. In addition, he touches upon the battalion's earlier fighting in the Que Son Valley.

I was the 2-12 Cav S-2 from January 2000 to July 2001, this book is everything a staff officer should and must read. I came upon the book because it was about my unit, it has been deliberately overlooked by army professional reading lists. Mr. Krohn's account highlights the unfathomable value of honesty and integrity in our profession; the lack thereof causes lives. An excellent read, a heart-wrenching story even today for those who were not there. "Those who do not study the past are doomed to repeat it." Thank you Mr. Krohn.

The book was delivered on a timely basis and was in pretty good shape for being so old.

Not exactly the place to start but for those interested in an easier read this is it. Karl Menninger is awfully Freudian but this becomes a bit of a page turner. Introspective, incredibly insightful and definitely worth the time and money. This is an essential for your collection. If you like this one you will love his "Love Against Hate" (but it may be out of print).

This review is not a hoax: I read this book while in solitary confinement for assaulting another prisoner. It was my first exposure to analysis of self-destructive behavior and its damning cyclical pattern. I was a two-time loser. A career criminal who had followed the all too familiar progression from juvenile home, jail, to prison. This book change my life. After serving a decade and a half in prison, I am now at the top of my class in graduate school. It is never too late to pick up the pieces, but we must first learn what those pieces are and how and why they were smashed into pieces in the first place. This book will teach you how to do just that.

ALL I CAN SAY IS: READ THIS DELIGHTFUL, ORIGINAL, AND FASCINATING WORK. IT WILL GIVE YOU MUCH TO REFLECT ON! A TRULY CLASSIC AND TIMELESS WORK BY KARL MENNINGER.

Dr.Karl Menninger was Topeka(KS)-based psychoanalytic-psychiatrist and believed the Death-Instinct in the human. Therefore some readers may think this book, which is almost-perfect based upon the Death-Instinct theory, is nothing but the pessimistic. But we shouldn't forget a simple-but-hard fact that we ourselves live in the auto-pessimistic era;the post-9.11 terrorised era. In this realistic-and-therefore-neither-sentimental-nor-romantic book Dr Menninger teaches us that some people destroy themselves with using the others and therefore they NEED the others. Of couse,not everyone may believe his theory and,ultimately,not everyone needs to believe,but-or-still this book,I believe,is the best starting point of thinking about the human;ourselves.

A short, well-written exposition of maneuver warfare theory, as explained by one of its most well-known advocates. The book was originally written during the 1980s as a capstone piece for the U.S. Marine Corps' self-conscious transition to a new warfighting doctrine emphasizing out-maneuvering the enemy, as opposed to wearing him down through attritional warfare and firepower. The theory portion itself consists of about half the book, with the rest containing various case studies for the reader to outline what he would do in a given situation, and after which Lind presents his own comments.

Reader should obviously keep in mind that, as with all theory, the books message is not necessarily going to be the definitive solution to every military problem. That depends on the army and the circumstances.

Professor Terry Tucker, Senior Doctrine Developer, Saudi Arabian NG Modernization Program;
This book is an important and must have classic. For those that think that contemporary maneuver war has been replaced by post-modern insugency, don't bet the farm on it just yet. Certainly Mr. Lind in recent years has taken serious heat for his unconventional views ( no pun intended) on warfare; and if you are familiar with some of the controversy or have read his material you must set all that aside and buy this book anyway.
Despite the fact that this author does not have military experience, in hindsight, as a career soldier, I wish now that I would have had the benefit of this book when it was first published in 1985. This book is clearly written, provides first class examples and is the best book on manuever warfare, bar none.
If you are exploring insurgency and asymmetrical warfare you will still need this book.
For students of insurgency and terrorism you will need to buy this book and think about what the author conveys in terms of asymmetrical warfare, you will have new and wonderful revelations about the conduct of insurgency if you do.

Bill Lind has written the bible of manuever war. This consise little book is used as a text by the US Marine Corps. They must know something and you would be well-advised to follow their example. Get this book, otherwise manuever war will be just another phrased you will hear from talking heads.

This is a truly influential book. It explains the concept of "Maneuver Warfare" and contrasts it with the US Army's attrition based "AirLand Battle Doctrine". It covers topics such as mission orders, recon pull, decision cycles and tempo, use of the reserve, commander's intent, and other key concepts that teach a junior military leader HOW (vs what) to think.

Based on Boyd's revolutionary OODA cycle theories, it shows how a quick acting, agile force can constantly beat larger, heavier equipped foes. After reading this book you will understand exactly why the German Army of 1940-1941 was so effective against the larger and better equipped French-British, and Soviet Armies.

The book is divided into two halves. The critical part is the first half which explains in clear, understandable terms how maneuver warfare works. The second half is a series of tactical decision games that offer practical examples to teach junior leaders these concepts.

This ideas in this small book were adopted almost verbatim by the USMC for their land war doctrine. This doctrine was so effective in combat against the Iraqi's in 1990 that the US VII Corps had to move up its attack by approx 48 hours to prevent the Iraqi's from completely escaping before the marines pushed them completely out of Kuwait.

This book has served for years as an underground "bible" by maneuver warfare officers looking for a resource to help train junior leaders critical maneuver warfare concepts. While many look to technological answers to 4th Generation Warfare, this book give ideas that apply instead to people and tactics. It leaves the reader with a solid understanding on how men make decisions in combat, as well as how to translate that knowledge to a military advantage. It is a MUST HAVE book for Combat Arms officers and junior leaders.

Though never a U.S. Marine himself, Bill Lind has done more to safeguard the Marine rifleman than any living general. During the Corps unsuccessful attempt in the late 80's to tactically evolve at the squad level, Bill Lind was the Commandant's personal adviser. His book-Maneuver Warfare Handbook-formed the backbone of that effort. It was required reading throughout the Corps at that time. As that tactical evolution has yet to occur, the book is still vitally important. It takes self-sufficient light-infantry squads to beat guerrillas/insurgents.

On the treadmill of front-line marketing, it's easy to get caught up in the never-ending lists and deadlines, rather than stepping back to think more broadly and deeply about who we really are, who we're trying to reach and what we're really trying to accomplish.

As I read the Zaltmans' Marketing Metaphoria, it felt like a sudden holiday getaway that whisked me away from my lists and deadlines and into a calmer, almost meditative place. Readable and engaging, this book helped me step back and reflect on the great metaphors that make humans tick. The Zaltmans' genius is in not only identifying these metaphors, but also helping the reader understand their relevance in marketing and communication strategy. The book does a beautiful job illustrating how "deep metaphors" are the story elements and images that create meaning and purpose in people's lives. With many great examples they also illustrate how insightful marketers can use these deep metaphors to create meaning and purpose for companies, brands and products in people's lives.

Like any great holiday getaway, at the end I was not only refreshed and rejuvenated, but I was changed for the better. This book's vivid examples and passion for the subject make it irresistible for marketing professionals to look for themselves, their customers, brands and companies amongst the metaphors - and to begin "deep thinking" about their work.

For anyone interested in more than just superficial communication, marketing, image or brand, this book will provide gratifying insights that change how you understand and craft the stories you tell.

The Zaltmans' new book can truly be described as insightful. By way of transparency, I should point out that I am priveleged enough to have Jerry Zaltman's endorsement on the back cover of my own recently released book, "Brand Meaning." Though I have never met him, I know Jerry to be an astute and visionary commentator on consumer behavior. Anybody who has read "How Customers Think" will know that. What "Marketing Metaphoria" illustrates so well is that only by probing deep into the way people think about and view the world around them can one hope to connect with consumers in a visceral and enduring way. The book provides a framework for identifying such "implicit cognitive influences" (see back cover) - here in the form of deep matephors - and that is what makes it important reading.Brand Meaning

...as a professional who has introduced neuroscience into leadership, I can personally attest to the importance of "thinking more about our thinking" when it comes to why we do what we do. Though we all on some level know this, Zaltman has written brilliantly and pragmatically these sometimes forgotten truths that truly affect decision making. This is a classic!

By way of full disclosure, I was a graduate assistant for Jerry Zaltman when he was a Professor at the University of Pittsburgh. Naturally, I've followed Jerry's many publications for these past 20 years and have never found the time I've invested in reading his latest ideas less than incredibly worthwhile.

Interestingly, I bought this book based solely on the title and my expectation that it would be full of new ideas and insights about how using metaphors in marketing tactics would influence consumer behavior. While this book does cover material related to that sort of thing, it really covers so much more. The first two chapters on thinking deeply, "Workable Wondering" and focusing on consumer similarities set the stage for how to take the insights and ideas from the next 7 chapters (one per each deep metaphor) and incorporate them into your own thinking. The last chapter ties things together and presents a number of ideas for how Deep Metaphors may influence a number of marketing strategies and tactics.

This book is written to stimulate your thinking about how Deep Metaphors apply in many areas of marketing and consumer behavior. It doesn't present a list of "to dos" or lay out a plan of action that you should follow. Instead, you'll find yourself seeing what you, your consumers and your competitors do in a new light.

Another great book from Zaltman, with more excellent insights into the way people think.

I found it a more straightforward read than the excellent 'How Customers Think'. And it has an even blunter message for managers: "Start paying proper attention to how your customers really make their buying decisions, or miss out!"

As a metaphor elicitation specialist I was wowed by some of the fine detail, such as the description of the relationship between deep metaphor and emotion. But if most readers focus on the high-level message - the crucial importance of deep metaphor in guiding human behaviour - I'll be absolutely delighted!

If, like reviewer Dave Lakhani, you're disappointed by the book's lack of a detailed methodology for eliciting metaphors, why not check out a non-proprietary technique such as Clean Language? Though I suppose I would say that, wouldn't I... :-)

As a medical research scientist, I can say beyond a doubt that a flu pandemic is brewing that may change modern civilization in ways that will go beyond our wildest imagination soon. Physicians are observing the creation of a super strain of the avian influenza virus, H5N1, so-called bird flu, that has the potential to kill millions of men, women, and children in every nation. According to the World Health Organization, the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, a recipe for disaster is clearly in the early genetic-mixing stage. We stand on the abyss of a global wildfire event that will start with the flick of a "viral" matchstick, burn everything in its path, leaving civil disorder and misery in its aftermath on an unprecedented-scale. But what can we do other than prepare ourselves for the inevitable death of our society as we know it? Other than prudent safety precautions, we can also boost our immune systems psychologically against the true number one killer: s-t-r-e-s-s.

Just look at what happened to millions of people impacted by natural disasters in the past year alone from earthquakes, hurricanes, and tsunamis worldwide: They are suffering from PTSD--Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. Guess what stress does to your ability to fight bacterial and viral infections? Do you know that when a pandemic strikes within 30-days 100% of the population will be exposed to the virus, but that only 50% will get ill? Did you know that a pandemic comes in 3 phases with the second being the most deadly? Did you know that the most susceptible age group when the virus "hits" is not the young or the old, but the tender-age group 20 to 30? In plain terms, this book will give you the rest of the story; how nature ensures the "survival of the smartest!" Indeed information is power and it will make the difference between life and death in the coming pandemics!

So get smart and raise your I.Q.: "immunity quotient!"

Dr. John Jay Harper is executive director of the not-for-profit, American Delphi Academy, Spokane, Washington, author of Tranceformers: Shamans of the 21st Century, and a bird flu report website at johnjayharper.com

David Kennedy believes that government health officials and the medical community at large are in the hip pocket of big drug companies. This conspiracy has caused important, effective, powerful remedies, like vitamin C, to go unnoticed and unsupported. History will tell whether he is right about that.

What may be more important is that Kennedy and others believe Vitamin C can prevent and treat the avian flu. If this is true, Vitamin C can provide an inexpensive, powerful, effective treatment for a lethal virus.

It now seems clear to every serious-minded person that the Asian Bird Flu is going to attack, the only question is when. When the epidemic strikes, it will be deadly and fast. According to Kennedy, mega-doses of Vitamin C will be effective in protecting people against the flu. For those that have it, he believes that mega-doses of Vitamin C, administered intrvenously, may save many lives.

This book is mostly about the curative effects of Vitamin C. Based on studies and reports of it curing polio, cancer, and other deadly conditions, Kennedy, Linus Pauling, and others state that the health benefits of it are dramatically understated and even unknown.

I don't know if Kennedy is right about the pharamaceutical industry, time will tell. If he is right about Vitamin C and the bird flu, our family will be protected by an inexpensive, easily-available remedy. If he is wrong, we will have taken a lot of Vitamin C.

The highest potentcy in tablet form I am able to find are on amazon.com at 2000MG. Forget Tamiflu and pass the orange juice.

I was a little disappointed that the information in the book, I already had most of in my head, due to the fact that I'm a Linus Pauling fan when it comes to nutrition. However, if you don't already know what I'm talking about, then this book is very important to you because it offers you the opportunity to embark upon a personal oddyssey beginning with a most critical, ubiquitous nutrient your body is not capable of producing, due to genetic damage that everybody has. You need this book.

To Mr. Doubting Thomas... why don't you just read the book and then weigh in. That's part of the problem with Americans and this country's sick-care system... too close-minded. Americans take what health officials tell them as gospel and fail to seek out truth and knowledge for themselves. I received this book Saturday and read through it carefully. I found it to be a valuable read. Knowledge that serves good.

After having read this book I now feel I can do something to protect my family and will be starting us all on vitamin c!
I really felt this was information that could help us especially since it came from people who are considered tops in their field and had scientific studies to back up what they are saying and in some cases were Nobel prize winners.

I loved this book it puts a different view on things. It has an easy read feeling to it. I enjoyed it very much

Great book and an inspiring insight into the life and research of a zoologist... even for a non-biologist. You don't have to be a biologist, a zoologist, or even a scientist to enjoy this book. Passive fear gives insight into a common reaction of a diverse group of animals to fear, a somewhat unexpected reaction. But, the book is much more than a book about animal reaction to fear, the book gives the reader fascinating insight into the life of a science researcher and the paths research takes one along the way. I highly recommend the book.

For many not grounded in science, the process of scientific discovery is difficult to comprehend and somewhat mystical. Many books describing science are dry and sprinkled with incomprehensible words. "Passive Fear: Alternative to Fight or Flight" is completely different.

Dr. Norbert Smith has condensed and clarified some of the methods by which scientific discoveries are made in this exciting, autobiographical book. He has a gift of drawing the reader into his quest so that we begin to ask the same questions he was compelled to answer. Along the way, he chronicles the story of his boyhood interest in animals and the wonders of nature.

Readers will begin to understand the differences between research conducted in the laboratory, with artificially bred animals, as opposed to Dr. Smith's field research using animals born and raised in the wild. Readers will enjoy Dr. Smith's discussion of the problems in using those artificially bred lab animals to understand what really goes on in the world.

Dr. Smith clearly and succinctly describes the thrust of his research. He wished to understand a response many animals have when confronted with a fear-inducing situation. He observed a slowing of heart rate, as opposed to popular wisdom stating that heart rate should increase. He details his groundbreaking work in fitting devices to animals to gently measure their heart rate and body temperature. He worked with such unlikely research animals as alligators, woodchucks, swamp rabbits, gray squirrels, and box turtles.

Readers will agonize with Dr. Smith as he describes the difficulties in procuring funding for his novel research. They will also rejoice as Dr. Smith's research findings turn traditional science on its head, but gradually come to be accepted. A bibliography lists 17 of his publications which have appeared in prestigious journals such as The Journal of Applied Physiology.

In summary, this book opens readers to the joy of science. Young readers contemplating a career in science will better understand the exciting road ahead of them. Seasoned scientists and researchers such as myself will benefit from reading the trials and travails of a fellow scientist. However, above all, any reader wishing to gain an expanded view of science would do well to pay close attention to Dr. Smith's book.

Finally! A science book that I can easily read and understand. Dr. Smith captures the reader's attention with humor, mixed in with science. What a great combination. I don't think I learned as much in my college biology class as I did reading this book -and I sure laughed & enjoyed myself a lot more. I highly recommend this book to everyone - it's easy, light reading and you'll learn something in the process. Keep the books coming Dr. Smith! I can't wait to read the next one.

Wayne Frair

For Amazon

This interest-holding scientific autobiography commences with an exciting biology fieldtrip. Author Smith, then a new graduate student, saw the eyes of an alligator. He called to it, and this 6' wild male swam across the pond to his feet. He captured it for brief study and release.

This account introduces a main theme of the book--study organisms in their natural environments. Smith designed new radio telemetry systems, and these were employed mainly in field studies of reptiles and some mammals.

The 15 short chapters are sequential and bursting with the author's enthusiasm. The book is a good read and easily completed at one sitting--also a nice gift for your biologist relative or friend.