Truman Books

SCOUT is one of those titles which terrifically impacted the independent comics market back in the 1980s. Considered a cult classic, SCOUT is the futuristic story of the implacable Emanuel Santana, a Native American of Apache lineage who carries out a one-man assault on the corrupt post-apocalyptic American government. This series is marked not only by a gritty science-fiction texturing but also by Native American mysticism. Scout, as Santana is sometimes called, is often in conversation with the Gahn, his shapeshifting spirit guide (who most often goes around in the form of a wisecracking chipmunk). It was the Gahn who charged Santana with seeking and dispatching four monsters from Apache legend, now returned to Earth and disguised as humans who wield influential positions in the American government. As he persists in his acts of "terrorism" against the governing regime, Santana, himself an ex-Army Ranger, is hunted down by his old military friends, deployed by the President himself. But, at least, Scout's got the chipmunk on his side.

Timothy Truman branched out on his own, jumping ship from his illustrating gig at GRIMJACK (with co-creator John Ostrander's blessing) to create his own comic book. SCOUT, published by Eclipse Comics in 1987, lasted for 24 violent issues. This particular trade, published by Dynamite Entertainment, collects the first seven issues of that series and chronicles how Santana relentlessly took down the existing government. "Just another crazy Indian..." is what the military command deemed Emanuel Santana years ago when he mysteriously went A.W.O.L. I remember reading these first bunch of issues (the ones in this trade and a few more after), but I lost touch soon after. So I was never quite able to figure out whether Santana was actually hallucinating or not. I'm talking about the supernatural stuff (specifically, the Gahn and the four monsters), whether it was real or merely a figment of Santana's imagination, a representation of his tortured psyche, perhaps. Truman would create a second ongoing Scout series, SCOUT: WAR SHAMAN. There would also be two mini-series produced (NEW AMERICA and Swords of Texas (Complete Set), each four issues long and not written or drawn by Truman), taking place in the SCOUT universe and which bridge the continuity between the original SCOUT series and WAR SHAMAN. But, regretfully, I never had the chance to read these follow-ups.

To quote Truman in an interview, SCOUT was "conceived in response to the bizarre and scary right wing political climate of the 1980's." That was also when the Soviet Union was still an imposing power, America's hated rival. In a way, with the Soviet Union's collapse, SCOUT loses a smidgen of relevance, coming off nowadays as a dated science-fiction adventure. Yet, with regards to independent comics history and in the landscape of Tim Truman's career, SCOUT is very much an important work. SCOUT is where he built much of his rep. This series marked Truman as not only an artist but a complete storyteller in his own right. He wrote and illustrated the dang thing. These pages are rife with Truman's distinctive style, which he would refine thru the years. Sure, some of the artwork is rough, but the vivid energy and compositional techniques are right there. And, for a debut writer, the story is solid.

For fans of geopolitics, note that, unlike most post-apocalyptic stories, this one didn't come by way of a nuclear disaster. Rather, America fell prey to embargos imposed by its rivals and also to being bled dry and then discarded by its allied nations. Santana's tale is set in an impoverished United States, which has become a third-world country. Where ration cards are doled out, the bounties from its poisonous farmlands give one the squirts, and where the vice-president is drug-addicted. The seventh issue details how the land of the free and the home of the brave fell from grace, as well as presenting the origins of Santana and his sometimes friend, sometimes foe, Rosa Winter.

Emanuel Santana is a hard man to know. Guy is taciturn, a remorseless loner who will do whatever it takes to achieve his mission. He's not easy to like, but this makes him interesting. This series is rough and rugged and borders on the depressing, steeped as it is in its dystopian culture. The most lighthearted character may well be Santana's spirit guide. There's plenty of paramilitary action and of Scout using his Apache heritage to confound his enemies. I particularly liked it when Santana went old school, ignoring his guns in favor of the bow and arrow. This renegade Apache is a bad mother-- Honestly, I'm tempted to pick up where I left off reading, all those years ago.

Last paragraph: The stories in this trade are framed by a John Ostrander intro and a revealing 2006 Newsarama interview with Timothy Truman. Note that Eclipse Comics had put out two trade paperback collections of the comic: Scout : The Four Monsters (reprinting issues #1-7, which is the same as this Dynamite Entertainment version), and Scout: Mount Fire (#8-14).

While doing some research for my own book I reread John Brook's well written book about corporate takeovers in the 1980's. I had forgotten how good a book it was, not only as a reference book but also as a "good read." Paul Samuelson, one of my old economic professors at Berkeley in the early 1960's, agrees with me and gave the book high marks before it was published in 1987. Samulelson said at that time "Proper public policy for dealing with takeovers is a thorny problem. John Brooks' The Takeover Game is required reading for a thorough understanding of the subject and is a very good read at the same time." I could not agree with him more or say it any better. D. Rowe, November 16, 1998

Over a decade after the Berlin Wall was torn down, the Cold War continues to fascinate both scholars and members of the reading public. David McCullough's biography of Harry Truman, which in part told of the modest man from Missouri's fiesty determination to stand up to Soviet provocations in the dangerous early years of the Cold War, was immensely popular in the early 1990s, and Blind Man's Bluff by Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew with Annette Lawrence Drew, the fascinating story of Cold War submarine spying, remains just a rung below the paperback nonfiction bestsellers list published by The New York Times. Scholars of American and Soviet culture realize that understanding the origins of the Cold War remains vital to a full appreciation of the titanic, 40-year military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, which was the dominant fact of the history of the second half of the 20th century, and John Fousek's To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism & The Cultural Roots of the Cold War is a splendid addition to this literature.

In recent years, American military missions have been sent to places as distant and diverse as Lebanon and Kuwait, Granada, Somalia, and Kosovo, but we must remember that avoiding foreign military commitments, especially outside the area covered by the Monroe Doctrine, once was a central tenet of American diplomatic policy, and that the U.S. stayed aloof after Japan and China went to war in the mid-1930s and during the first two years of the Second World War in Europe. It has been said that American isolationism died at Pearl Harbor, but Fousek, a historian and associate director of Rutgers University's Center for Global Change and Governance, is correct that, in August 1945, most Americans wanted to "bring the boys home."

Nevertheless, the United States had important global interests, if for no other reason than to prevent another surprise attack. It is central to Fousek's thesis that the white, male, Protestant upper- and middle-class elite created a globally-activist, anti-Soviet foreign policy. He is correct that the report presented to the National Security Council in early 1950 known as "NSC-68," which Fousek characterizes as the "primal text of American nationalist globalism," was inspired by Secretary of State Dean Acheson and written by Paul Nitze, both card-carrying members of the Eastern establishment. The reasons for the public's support of the narrow, Manichean world view are less clear. If, as Fousek asserts, the ideology of Cold War had come to dominate public life by 1950, it was not because of NSC-68, which remained classified for many years. The reason was more likely economic than strictly ideological. The Second World War was, of course, a tremendous boon to the United States' economy, and, according to Fousek, the United Auto Workers became strong believers in American global responsibility. Fousek provides a lengthy discussion of the meaning of victory. The obvious, but narrow, goal of winning the war had attracted public consensus in the United States. But, according to Fousek, African Americans believed that victory was meaningless unless it brought European colonialism and racial injustice in the United States to an end. The post-war wave of lynchings demonstrated that some things had not changed at all. Fousek devotes considerable space to African Americans in the late 1940s to demonstrate that, even in the moment of victory, American society remained divided racially, economically, socially, and ideologically. One of the most appealing features of this book is a marvelous 12-page "visual essay" demonstrating how corporate advertising and editorial cartoons were illustrative of the widespread belief in the United States mission to lead the free world. My favorite is the Coca-Cola ad in which bare-chested, "battle-seasoned" Seabees land on a Pacific island and introduce the indigenous inhabitants to Coke, "the happy symbol of a friendly way of life."

I would have liked Fousek to devote more attention to American technological superiority from air power to atomic weaponry as a source of the United States' confidence in the immediate post-war period. This necessarily would have led to a more extensive discussion of the end of the United States' atomic-bomb monopoly as an important Cold War turning point. Nevertheless, this book will establish itself as a standard text for courses covering the early years of the Cold War.

It was enjoyable reading this biography of Truman Torgerson because he was such an interesting an unique individual. His life story offers many lessons to those from all walks of life, but especially valuable for a new generation of agricultural leaders. There is much to be learned from Truman regarding the ability work progressively with others to develop and grow a respected organization such as Lake to Lake.

This book actually focused on the era, not the person.

What an era it was! As a society, we returned from our military triumphs to a series of huge adjustments at home. We were victorious but profoundly uneasy of who we were - and who we were to become.

To understand the fifties and sixties, you must understand this era.

As a pest control educator, I have LOTS of pest control reference books. "Truman's Scientific Guide" is my most used book. While others may have some higher levels of specificity at times, Truman's is the best overall!

I wish I'd known when I first owned this short collection that it would someday be selling for such a price!! I'd have bought five copies and retired rich! Vachss and Lansdale collaborated on a few Hap and Leonard short stories... Leonard was finally forced to go to court for burning down the crack house next door (a running joke in some of the Hap and Leonard novels). Vachss, a lawyer in real life, obviously ran with the courtroom proceedings in this humorous venture.

Also included was an excerpt from "Captains Outrageous" and an "interview" with some of the characters from the H & L novels. This was a very short collection, a sideline in the Hap and Leonard series. I would recommend it to fans, but not at such a high price... Where are the reprints? Writers make no royalties from the sales of used books... bring this back into print, please! One of these stories was reprinted in "Mad Dog Summer and Other Stories."

Every business cycle researcher should read this book. Truman Bewley, a leading economic theorist, had spent years theorizing about why businesses didn't cut wages when times got worse. After all, when workers are in a bad situation, why not take advantage of them? Then, Bewley did something that economic theorists almost never do: He went out and talked to businesspeople and asked them why they didn't cut wages during the 1990 recession.

What he learned contradicted every paper he had ever written. To dramatically and unfairly oversimplify, he found out that businesses were obsessed with the idea that wage cuts would hurt worker morale, which could hurt worker productivity. He found out that culture mattered, and that good business culture depends on perceptions of wage fairness.

To those who say that you can't quantify culture, I say go read Truman Bewley. He found out that one part of culture can be quantified quite easily: The optimal change in wages in a healthy corporate culture is generally bounded below at zero.

Nobel Laureate Robert Solow and Princeton professor Alan Kreuger have both written enthusiastic blurbs for this book. Bewley's book is evidence that economists can do great anthropological research, research that can help us better understand and better model the real world.

Thoroughly researched, sturdily written history of how Roosevelt and then Truman planned to deal with a defeated Germany after World War II.

Nothing earth shattering, but interesting and detailed insight into how policy got made and how it could have gotten made worse.

Also of interest is discussion of Roosevelt's silence on the developing Holocaust as news seeped out to a stunned and horrified world.

Any book about WWII, American History, and U.S. Presidents is an automatic read for me because they are my favorite subjects. That is why I am still perplexed about how Mr. Beschloss could have messed this one up. The story is told from people's points of view rather than independent investigation. I stopped reading about a quarter way through and passed it on.

Michael Beschloss's study of the Allied management of the end of World War II with Nazi Germany serves as a reminder that things are not always as obvious as they seem. At first glance the goal of hostilities in Europe could easily be summed up as the defeat of Hitler and Nazi Germany's Axis allies. But how does one define "defeat?" Is it territorial annihilation, Sherman to the Sea on a more massive scale? Is it discredit or even elimination of the warring military leadership? Is it national humiliation? Or is it business as usual in the conquered territories under Allied overlords, as would be the case of Japan?

This work is the story of how the United States, in concert with its allies, gestated its final plans for the conquest of Germany. One naturally gravitates toward Franklin D. Roosevelt as the leading man for such a drama, but in truth this book, like the events themselves, pivots around the persona of Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr. That Morgenthau was Jewish, one of few of his faith to achieve such status to that time, adds poignancy to the tale. Beschloss describes Morgenthau as perhaps Roosevelt's closest friend in the cabinet, a bond developed over their years together as neighboring self-styled gentlemen farmers in Dutchess County, NY. Despite Morgenthau's perceptions and desires, it was not exactly a friendship of equals. As was his wont, Roosevelt managed his communications with Morgenthau in the ethereal fashion of all his working associates. In truth Morgenthau enjoyed cabinet status because of difficulties Roosevelt had encountered earlier with the scrutinies of more independent men in the Treasury, Dean Acheson among them.

His affection for Roosevelt notwithstanding, Morgenthau felt a particular responsibility to Jews under persecution in Nazi occupied territory. Early in the conflict Morgenthau had focused upon relocation of Jews from Germany and elsewhere, but as the War unfolded and the scope of atrocities became gradually evident to policy makers, Morgenthau pressured Roosevelt to make rescue of Jews a major priority during the engagement. Such considerations collided with concurrent Cabinet debate about the status and treatment of postwar Germany. This was not a matter of hawks and doves as much as a question of priorities. Instinctually, most policy makers wanted a hard peace for both military and punitive reasons. The question was how much of Germany's industrial infrastructure to destroy or spare in response to its crimes, a critical matter as 1944 hurried into 1945.

By 1944 Winston Churchill had his fill of German militarism and would gladly have endorsed a Shermanesque solution to the German problem. Living through his second major encounter with the German military machine, he advocated utter annihilation of the nation's infrastructure, including its factories in the Ruhr Valley. Joseph Stalin, ever fearful of his west flank, would easily come around to Churchill's position as well, motivated not only by a will to survive but an opportunity to expand Communist hegemony.

Morgenthau, despite his closeness to Roosevelt, was gradually losing place in the Cabinet. His peers believed that his Jewish faith and priorities blinded him to other military, political, and economic issues that worried them, and with reason. Beschloss makes splendid use of official minutes and private diaries to trace the strategic shifting going on around Roosevelt--insights into the concerns and motivations of Henry Stimson, Cordell Hull, and particularly John McCloy, who at the end of the day would probably do the most to derail Morgenthau's postwar vision.

Roosevelt's 1944 Quebec meeting with Churchill, with Morgenthau in attendance, convinced the latter--wrongly, as it would turn out--that his boss and the Prime Minister were solidly behind his call for a hard and vengeful peace, the Morgenthau Plan. He returned home entirely justified, so much so that he felt emboldened to steer certain aspects of his peace plan toward the Washington Post, with added hints of opposition among certain cabinet members. The fallout from public disclosure ignited massive political difficulties in nearly every quarter. Joseph Goebbels jumped upon Morgenthau's plan as evidence that Allied strategic planning was aimed at reducing Germany to the stone ages. Morgenthau was blamed for stiffening German resistance and costing American lives. Thomas Dewey, then running for president in the 1944 campaign, jumped upon the strategy ["as useful as ten fresh German divisions"] and the now apparent disarray of the cabinet. Roosevelt distanced himself from the plan and from its author Morgenthau, a painful and humiliating blow for the latter. Mercifully, Morgenthau was unaware at the time that his own closest confidant, Henry Dexter White, was a Russian spy.

The Battle of the Bulge, reported by American intelligence sources as a German response to the Morgenthau Plan, was probably the last straw that ended his influence upon conduct of the war. But other factors were weighing heavily upon the Allies. As western armies began crossing into Germany itself, the enormous damage already wrought upon the country's substructure made it clear that economic chaos and starvation were very likely at the conclusion of hostilities. All parties to the conflict, and notably England, were heavily in debt. The idea of a post-war German welfare state worried the international business community [except, ironically, America's own chief treasury officer.] To destroy the existing mines and factories of the Ruhr Valley, for example, seemed less and less desirable. In addition, growing concern in England and the United States about Russian post-war ambitions led to a grudging recognition that Germany could not be entirely demilitarized.

On the other hand, Germany's heinous crimes of the half-century called for an appropriate response. Beschloss captures the dilemma of policy makers, torn between pragmatic and humanitarian concerns in the partition, punishment, and reorganization of Germany. The author presents his well researched account in a style marked by intimacy, immediacy and movement. He gives us another vantage point of the War. Assuming that we know something of how it was fought, Beschloss explains how it was ended--and how it could have ended.

I was quite disappointed in this book. The first 3/4 seem to be spent as Henry Morgentheau vs. Everybody in the Roosevelt Administration, and all it is how Roosevelt can't decide or won't commit on the Morgentheau plan while everybody else tries to persuade him otherwise. It picks up a little when Truman takes over, but not a great deal. It has enlightened me as to how all of this unfolded, but, in my opinion, could have been much better. I don't know if there's a better alternative.

Reading this book made me understand more about the complex war Roosevelt fought, against not only Germany, but also his own supporters and allies. Recommended.

I had high expectations for this book. It let me down a little. It just wasn't that engaging. Some of it is very well known like JFK's battle with civil rights. I was looking for a good analysis on the different presidents and their actions. I didn't find that. I found that Mr. Beschloss just told about the different incident but didn't offer any new insight to it. I was hoping that he would even use them to give perspective on what is happening now but he didn't. I rated this book 3 stars because he does include several presidents and topics that I was unaware of. For that it was worth my time reading it. This is a very basic book so I would recommend it to people that are wanting to learn about the presidents and their thought processes concerning major events in their presidencies.

This is an interesting review of some history. Some of it was in high school textbooks but long forgotten. The author includes details that probably weren't in the textbooks. One aspect that I really like is the author makes links between past and present, e.g. the grandson of a person in one administration turns up in the another president's administration.

It is not dense history so a history-buff probably would find it too simple. But for most of us, it is a quick read (short paragraphs) that is interesting. We can see how difficult governing really is.

I recommend this book be read by everybody in America-in order to learn more about some of our finest Presidents. I was educated on things that I had not learned before-FASCINATING!

Like the rest of us, our Presidents have been flawed people -- each with his own limitations, prejudices, and conflicts. And yet, through our history, at times these men have risen above their limitations to exert extraordinary leadership: grasping a moral imperative with uncommon clarity, and finding the strength and passion to use the powers of the office to follow that imperative despite great risk to their own political fortunes -- and, in some cases, to their very lives.

"Presidential Courage" tells the stories behind nine such moments of courageous leadership. In none of them is the protagonist portrayed as an all-knowing superhero. In each, we see the President wrestle with a challenge in a profoundly human way -- beset by the uncertainties, self-doubts, pride and fear that are familiar to all who struggle with a moral dilemma. In each case, the President ultimately comes to the painful decision that the right course of action is contrary to what his advisors recommend or public opinion demands. And yet he chooses to throw himself into the breach.

The author's research is impressive, drawing upon unpublished papers and (for President Reagan) interviews with people who witnessed personal dimensions behind publicly reported events. As a result, the stories contain many human details that do not make it into our school curriculum or popular awareness. These details are not always flattering. Kennedy, for example, is portrayed as being dragged only reluctantly to the "right" side of the fight for racial equality. And for Truman, his own anti-semitic bias was a key obstacle that he had to overcome. But to a large degree it is precisely the humanity of the way these men struggled with -- and triumphed over -- their personal limitations that gives these stories such inspirational impact.

One aspect of the book that I particularly enjoyed was the transitions between chapters. The author searches out connections between these men, suggesting almost spiritual ways in which the legacies of past Presidents have in effect enabled them to reach forward through time to inspire their successors. It gives hope that the best moments in our presidential history will yet empower future leaders, at least from time to time, to rise above their limitations to achieve great things as well.

How did Michael Beschloss get to be "America's Leading Presidential Historian?" I can only assume it is because he has a talent for getting himself on TV again & again...because it certainly isn't because of dreadful efforts such as this.

Setting content aside for a moment --- how can any literate person regard this as well-written? It reads like a Power Point presentation, or more specifically, like research notes which were never revised into a coherent narrative. It's hard to have narrative at all when your chapters are only 5 pages long! Suffice it to say, I found the writing to be such an irritant that I ultimately never finished the book. Life is too short to read crappy writing.

As for the content itself, this is all ground which has been well-covered many times before and Beschloss' conclusions are generally quite unremarkable. When he isn't stating the obvious, Beschloss is dumbing down the subject matter to make it appear more simple than it really was.

Just as an example, I would point to Andrew Jackson & the Bank War. Exactly how is this courageous? Jackson was enjoying tremendous popular support when he went in for the kill against the 2nd BUS, and he was as convinced of his own rectitude as any man ever has been. Also, it is grossly inaccurate to characterize the 2nd BUS as corrupt. Nicholas Biddle may have been a ruthless autocrat, but nobody could accuse him of corruption. That label would be more accurately applied to Jackson's "pet banks" into which Jackson put government deposits, and which were largely responsible for the catastrophic Panic of 1837. Does Beschloss provide anything more than the most shallow of analysis? Of course not.

I never would have purchased this in the first place, but it was part of a book club shipment which I opened by mistake, thinking that it was another (better-written) book. It was only the first of many regrets.