University of Kansas Books

with over 20 stalingrad titles in my collection this book was impossible to put down,one of the best written well researched books i ve read in a very long time.at the price these are selling for it is an absolute steal!if i would have known how much i would enjoy it i would have payed double the going rate and never flinched.probobly the most absorbing aspects of this book is all the myth busting it does.stalingrad is one of those battles to which the "telephone game" syndrome has been deeply rooted a "fact" is used in some of the older less researched books and is re used by many authors without verification.this book disspells many of these,and proves with documentation why they are false.also does an excellent job at explaining how the 6th army wound up in the predicamement it did.lots of info on the crimea campaign and how this directly influenced the stalingrad battle. avery fairly priced book written in an excellent style .simply one of the best researched books i ve read in a long time worth every penny

You will not find a more diffinitive book on the Luftwaffe's activites in
operation Blau. I was happy to see that the siege of Sevastopol was well covered, I have found so little information in other books about that epic siege. The book does a very good job in explaining the terrible conditions at the outlying airfields trying to supply the 6th army,the lack of fuel,spare parts and the horrific weather conditions.
Hitler decided to try and take the Caucausas oil fields as well as Stalingrad. They had forces to take one,not both. They would have had much
greater success if they had just bombed the oil fields especially Baku which represented 80% of Russia's oil. Army group A and B could have bypassed Stalingrad,cutting the Volga river traffic and with a pincer movement, enveloped the Russian armies coming to the aid of Stalingrad.
Field Marshal's von Bock and List did all they could and were treated unfairly by Hitler. This book is great in showing the leadership qualities of Wolfram von Richthofen,clearly the most outstanding Lutwaffe commander of World War2.

This is a very good description of Luftwaffe Operations on the Eastern Front. It has good background information speciffically about the economic side of it. Decisions made based on oil supply's rather than military objectives. Very interesting material.
The only bad thing about this book is that the editing comes across as very sloppy. German names are often misspelled or incorrect. It is not Manstein, but von Manstein, not Bock, but von Bock, not Kluge, but von Kluge.
Also it is not Count von Sponneck but Graf von Sponneck. If you overlook those issues, it is a very good book

Very thoroughly researched book. Could have explained infantry operations in a little more detail after all most of the movements of the Luftwaffe happened in direct support of infantry movement. Could have given a little bit more weightage to characteristic traits of leaders involved in action. But all in all a very lucidly written book a definite buy for anyone interested in eastern theater of WWII

This book is a treasure. Saying it deals with just the Luftwaffe effort does not really address the scope of the book. In addition to the author's fabulous treatment of air operations, it has some great stuff on naval operations in the Crimea. This book is an absolute MUST for your WWII library. This guy is a lecturer at some college in New Zealand. Get him to some University in the USA!!

This is the story of an unpretentious, self effacing, little newspaper man, who once described himself as a "slightly used second hand man;" a man who through dedication, common sense, and a love for his fellow man and "the God-damned infantry," as they liked to call themselves, went on to become the pre-eminent war correspondent of World War II and likely of any other war -- past, present, or future. But, Ernie Pyle was much more than that. As the war wore on, Ernie, through his thoughtful and heart-felt reports from the European war zone became America's "everyman," a little fellow, who could be your next door neighbor, caught up in the events of war. Many of his readers came to see him more as a friend than as a reporter and, as America's situation improved, became more concerned about Ernie than they were about how the war itself was going.

Once known for his somewhat mundane traveling adventures, a column which he wrote for seven years prior to the war for the Scripps-Howard Newspaper chain, Pyle's reports from North Africa, Sicily, Italy, and eventually broader Europe took on a life of their own. His column spread to other papers and to a much broader readership. But this new found fame, and the prospect of fortune, never went to Ernie's head. He said that he was too old, he was in his forties, had been a reporter too long, twenty years, and had seen too much of the war to be impressed with such things. It seemed funny to him that he should be considering a deal worth $150,000 while soldiers were dying all around him on the battlefields of Europe for only $50 a month. Ernie didn't expect to live to see war's end anyway.

There was only one Ernie Pyle and it is unlikely that there will ever be another, for in his writings he caught the essence of the young men who were fighting and dying in war. His readers got to see what they saw, feel what they felt, and know what they hoped and dreamed of. And it was through his reports that the American people caught a glimpse of World War II and what their sons were going through.

This is a remarkably good book about a remarkable man; well researched and well told. In it, you will get meet the real Ernie Pyle and read some of the writings which won him praise and eventually the Pulitzer Prize. Among them are four of his finest: A Forward Airdrome in French North Africa (pg. 71); In the shadow of the low stone wall (pg. 133); Now to the infantry (pg. 262); and A Pure Miracle (pg. 271).

This is a fascinating book, and this from a reader more into fiction than historical biography - but the best fiction writer would be hard pressed to come up with a character like Ernie Pyle.

A page turning look into World War II from someone who could have been your neighbor but was far more than what you would have expected.

I have no idea why a modern rendition of this story has not hit the big screen - it seems a natural, captivating story that would educate as well as entertain.

this must be THE book to read on war - what it's really like in all of its aspects - his description of the beach, after D-Day was gripping and haunting and it has stayed with me many years later -

and how he relates the everyday and ordinary in war -

and how, in any group or organization, it's often a small percentage of the people who are carrying the load - that's just one example of the many insights and truths in this book that relate to all of life, not just life in a war zone -

and it is a great book for anyone to read - a stunning life achievement for ernie pyle -

James Toban has written a stunning book in "Ernie Pyle's War: America's Eyewitness to World War II". Toban has succeeded in giving readers the rare opportunity to see the human frailties concealed within one of America's greatest and most valuable World War II correspondents.

James Toban present a picture of the complex Ernie Pyle; a man that entered the World War II carrying only a broken Remington typewriter and a deep desire to describe the life and hardships of the horrific world of the infantrymen to the American public. The reader will learn of the contradictory Ernie Pyle. The Ernie Pyle who despised war, but who could not stay away from the physical and emotional anguish of battle. The Ernie Pyle who loved his wife, but who continually left her behind to travel to the front lines. Ernie Pyle, the seemingly frail and terrified journalist who demonstrated his bravery by traveling to the front lines to be with and write about "his boys". Ernie Pyle, a genius for writing about the common soldier, but who needed constant reminding that he was the best at what he did. His articles became legendary and the hope and news link for Americans with loved ones in the front lines.

James Toban's "Ernie Pyle's War: America's Eyewitness to World War II " is a must read for World War II readers and all readers who wish to know about the human spirit and about a plain old fashion brave American.

"Ernie Pyle's War" by James Tobin was a thorough read. Tobin described Pyle down to the very last detail, uncovering almost every aspect of his life. After reading this book, the reader had a clear view into Pyle's mind and was able to recognize the feelings he possessed about his professional and private life. The way Tobin intertwined Pyle's messages home with biographical details along with interviews of acquaintances, made this story an easy read. "Ernie Pyle's War" earned five "stars."
Tobin's style of writing was one reason this book was so effective. He used partial quotes from Pyle to title his chapters, which brought an immediate sense of intimacy to the story. Tobin began the book with a chronological introduction to Pyle. This style of writing, although typical for biographies, was well suited for this story and not at all cliché. Readers were able to become acquainted with Pyle as a young man and then mature along with him as he grew into an established adult. By describing Pyle as a young man, readers were able to understand more clearly why he was the way he was as an adult.
Tobin used vivid descriptions to paint a picture of Pyle in the minds of the readers. This was an important aspect because Pyle's physical demeanor was one of the main problems and/or benefits in his life. As a child and young adult, his size hindered his relationships. But, as a war correspondent, the people saw Pyle as more of a hometown boy rather than a studious journalist. This added to his success as a war correspondent.
After transitioning into Pyle's career as a war correspondent, the story line became more tedious. Pyle was in and out of combat and the surface facts of his life were boring. Tobin, understanding the paleness of biographical data, used Pyle's messages home to spice up the story. Like most people, Pyle's life was not what it seemed to be. Besides leading a "glorified" life as a war correspondent, he had major problems at home. Tobin showed the audience this by weaving together Pyle's biographical information with the messages he sent home. This gave the reader a sense of what Pyle was actually feeling. Using these messages instead of his columns allowed reader's to see the "real" Pyle.
Tobin uncovered personal feelings about his professional and personal life, which gave the reader a feeling of empathy toward Pyle. Showing that he did not feel like an outstanding reporter, let readers see Pyle was human. Tobin successfully showed the man behind the pen by opening up Pyle's mind to the audience. He did this by using Pyle's own letters and messages home that contained intimate details of his life. Without the added touch of Pyle's actual writing, the story would have failed to be as successful.

This is a lovely book, fantastic illustrations and a wonderful theme throughout. "Where are you going bear, please wait for me". Follow the bear and the boy through different places real and imagined. Suitable for 12 months - 3 year olds.

After reading it a few times to my son, I was surprised to hear him reciting the rhyme text back to me. We enjoy reading it together. The text is very simple but is perfect for a toddler. We learn names of different fruits, vegetables, and animals, as well as different ways of traveling. As all the Barefoot books he has, he loves it.

this book has vivid color. when you read to your kid. they love it too.

The illustrations are absolutely fantastic! they are beyond vivid its truly a feast for the eyes!
The story is simple and cause the illustrations are so perfectly done for a toddler it's very self-explanatory, Bear is traveling through the entire story on different means of transportation he goes to an island on a boat, to the market on bike, to a grand ball in a carriage and through the story the little boy is trying to keep up with bear but he just keeps missing "the boat" so to say. It's a very fun rhyming journey to introduce to little ones! This is our favorite of Stella Blackstone's Bear series its by far her best book!

We recently got this book out of our public library and I must say that it is a big hit with all of us. We (my son, my husband, and I) absolutely love the pictures and the text. I think this is a wonderful book that will get lots of mileage.

I love the Intruder, so I find this book very acceptable indeed......

As an officer on the USS Saratoga (CV-60) during this deployment, I found the book very enlightening. I grew up with LCDR Fred Wright, the Airwing Ops Officer, and was devastated when he was shot down. There were a lot of details which were new to me, as I had limited access to Airwing information, but on balance, the author did a splendid job of portraying the events in VA-75 during the deployment. The book presents an un-varnished recounting of the trials and tribulations of the period. I can personally vouch for the accuracy of many of the events recounted here.

Highly recommended!

I served in the maintenance department a West Coast A-6 squadron that deployed for Vietnam in 1971. Reading this book reminded me of many long since forgotten details and events that were part of life aboard a carrier at war. I enjoyed the authors look at the squadron, the individuals, and their families, and the impact of family separation, politics, duty, honor, fatigue, and endless routine. I read many passages and thought "a different squadron, but mine really was not much different". Life in a flying squadron aboard a carrier (and any other ship) makes people close and losses are personal.

Professor Reardon, while writing about one A-6 squadron, honors all the Navy's flying community.

Having served on 4 Carriers in my 20 years in the Navy,
I could relate to these fine men. I think this is the
finest book ever written regarding the life and terror
a Navy pilot faced on each and every launch from a Carrier deck. A fantastic job was done by the author connecting their family life with the everyday life
aboard ship while fighting a war. JOB WELL DONE
Jim Rice,U.S.Navy retired

It is written: now let us praise famous men. Professor Reardon,though an academic, has told a very human, very touching story about the men who answered their nation's call during turbulent times. They all served aboard USS SARATOGA. This book is a great tribute to that ship and her men. A momentous accompishment!

I seldom find a book that they come a lot of number. the design is cute too.

The author/illustrator is very talented. The pictures capture my 16-month-old's attention. He loves to look for the hidden cat on the pages and most often grabs this book first at storytime. Colorful, unique. Recommend this highly for kids >1.

We first checked this book out at the library. My daughter loved it so much that I went and bought the board book version. The artwork is incredible, and my daughter, who is 2, loves finding the cat on each page. She also loves all the animals, and, of course, the counting and number concepts in the book are an added bonus.

My son loved this book as a toddler. Unlike my daughter, he had a shorter attention span when we sat down for story time. I would keep his interest in other books by having him hunt for objects in the pictures. This was a favorite.
He loved searching for the cat in this book. "There he is!" he would shout and point. Most board books do not count as high as twenty so this left us with plenty of opportunities to search for the cat. The board book format makes for easy holding and durability that stands up to frequent reading.
As much as you love that your child is enjoying books, it can somethimes be hard with this age group for the parent to enjoy mulitiple visitations to the same book with the same excitement as the child.
I always ejoyed this one. The aplliqued felt illustrations are so attractive. The colors are beautiful. The pictures give you much to look at without being too cluttered for the age group for which it is intended.
Quite lovely. I give starter baby board book collections as shower gifts and this is one I always include.

My 2-year-old son has loved this book since he got it more than a year ago, and I love it too. The pictures are beautiful and fun to look at on their own, but now we like to count the animals on each page. Looking for the cat hiding on each page is the best part of all.

Dr. Megargee overturns decades of conventional wisdom about the responsibility for Germany's loss in the Second World War. Although unsparing in his criticism of Hitler, on any number of subjects, he goes further than any author that I am aware of in portraying the lack of strategic vision on major issues of national political and economic goals, the short-sighted and self-serving carving-out of personal empires in the byzantine structure of the German High Command, inter-office and inter-service rivalry, and the the emphasis on the spiritual over the material that manifested itself most dangerously in the long-standing institutional disregard for intelligence work and logistics that made Germany's loss nearly a foregone conclusion upon the launch of Operation Barbarossa in 1941.

Extensively researched and thoroughly documented, as well as clearly and engagingly written, this book is a significant addition to the scholarly literature on the German armed forces in WWII, as well as a refreshing antidote to the tiresome rehashing of the Führer's blunders and the self-exculpatory memoirs of numerous German officers that appeared in the wake of Germany's defeat. Strongly recommended for those interested in the subject, and another fine work of military history from the University Press of Kansas.

This is a great work of modern military history, by a top notch historian. Most good monographs rate 4 stars, but this is a case of using the Showalter formula even better than Showalter! Thorough, provocative, and very well written.

This book is one of the spate of recent works "proving" the guilt of the Germans in general instead of just Hitler and the Nazis, but is far better written than most and actually offers a point for discussion. I recommend a purchase and a close read.

There is little new information (if any) here, but the author's description of the functioning of the General Staff, the OKH and OKW from pages 17 to 101 is particularly easy to understand, and I say this as someone who first read Goerlitz's "History of The German General Staff" at the age of fifteen in 1954. It is this part that makes the book worth the price of admission.

Chapters 10, 11 and 12, offer nothing new except for one-sided cherry-picked references tending to support the author's far-reaching conclusions. Nonetheless, such support is weak at best. From time to time the author seems to understand this, but then he goes ahead and states his questionable conclusions anyway. For example, even though the author is quick to point out (& accurately) that memoirs are often self-aggrandizing, he uses a sole, questionable source (Lossberg) to describe Jodl's attitudes at the end of 1941 and his agreement that Manstein, at the time a newly-baked army commander, and someone who had never been responsible for more than one panzer division in his earlier corps and now 11th Army, was the leading general to assume overall command of the eastern front. Very doubtful, and something that cannot be verified!

The author correctly points out that many higher-ranking officers like Beck believed that Germany's only hope lay in winning a short, decisive military conflict rather than an economic or diplomatic course of action. Yep! Like a bridge player who carefully studies his cards and sees that there is only one course of action that might win the contract, he takes the sole option open to him. When it doesn't succeed, one should not criticism the player for not having used another strategy UNLESS IT CAN BE SHOWN THAT THE STRATEGY COULD (not would) HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL. Unfortunately, this is exactly what the author does without showing any realistic basis for alternatives. The player can be criticized for making the contract in the first place, but that was never the function of either the OKW or the OKH. I was also amused to see that the author took a similar position to the German defeat in World War I -- the high command again attempted to apply an operational solution to a strategic problem. Once more for the West Coast, what would the author have recommended they do? That he doesn't state.

Yes, intelligence concerning the Soviets was almost nil, but military intelligence world-wide has been notorious for being poor except in combat conditions. The US was and is no exception to this rule, and Ultra (not mentioned by the author) was indispensable to the Allies (most notably in North Africa.) In a limited time frame like that for Barbarossa, one does the best one can. As far as logistics are concerned, the German economy was not put on a total war footing until Speer did it in 1944 with the resulting improvements in production. Of course, by then it was too late, and at any rate, that was not within the purview of either the OKW or OKH. And the US also used the term "supply" just like the Germans. With regards to personnel, the Germans only had one chance against the Soviet Union and that was denied them by Hitler's racial policies. The Germans needed to fight a "War of Liberation" against the Communists, setting up puppet governments in the non-Russian states and utilizing their manpower. In spite of everything, the number of Hiwis was enormous and Russian units like Cossacks and the Vaslov Army still opted to fight alongside the Germans. But again, this was not an option open to the OKW or OKH. So given the situation, what was the high command to do? The author is silent on this point, but condemns the General Staff anyway. One feels compelled to point out that Beck paid the ultimate price, Fritsch sought death before Warsaw, and Halder narrowly escaped execution before the war's end.

Yes, there was a culture in the General Staff that viewed the Versailles Diktat (it was not a negotiated treaty) as unbearable and to be torn up as soon as possible. Yes, they wanted to regain lost territories. That is hardly new or difficult to understand in the light of history. To the extent that Hitler's aims coincided with theirs, the German senior commanders supported him. To their regret, they found themselves riding on the back of the tiger. Even at the end, von Bock's last words were to Manstein, "Manstein, save Germany!"

For a much fuller treatment on the German officer mindset that the author only alludes to, see Robert Citino, "The German Way of War."

Military personnel are normally conservative (as the author points out), and the General Staff operated much like they did in 1870. Insofar as their opponents were incompetent like the Polish, French, and British, they won easily through aggressiveness and vastly superior training. The US Army adopted much if not all of the German leadership doctrine and training methods after World War II, recognizing that US performance in Europe was spotty at best. War gamers traditionally equate three American soldiers to two Germans, and Marshall's contention that over 40% of American infantrymen refused to fire their rifles in combat brings "the greatest generation" into question. Live-fire training has never been possible to any degree in the American Army, mostly due to objections by civilians for the casualties it causes. Of course, another reason the Germans fought so well is that they executed over 30,000 of their own military personnel in the course of the war for a wide range of offenses.

That the Officer Corps was not prepared to conduct a modern war with the necessary personnel, logistics, intelligence, and economic basis is correct. But neither were the French, Polish, British, Japanese or Russians. The Axis were defeated through a combination of British and American code-breaking, Russian manpower, and American logistics and economic power. The US struggled to put 90 divisions on the ground in Europe, but changed the Red Army into a mechanized force while the Wehrmacht became increasingly dependent on horses. Yes, the German machines were good, but German engineers tinkered their way to oblivion and prevented mass production.

The author sums up with the following statement: "The myth persists of a supremely talented, if politically naive and ambitious, German officer corps being led unwillingly into war and defeat by a ruthless dictator, a megalomaniac with no understanding of the military art." If one removes the word "unwillingly" and tones down "supremely", that "myth" would seem to be true. Nor do I know any serious scholar that believes in the myth as stated. Maybe some portion of the readership does, but only if they are not well-read on the subject. The author then states an untruth: "They (the officer corps) made strategic decisions, independently and in support of Hitler's, that started a war...." I know of no strategic decisions made independently by the German officer corps or high command that started World War II. Maybe the author can enlighten me. They didn't even make strategic decisions in support of Hitler that started the war unless you count their support of Hitler himself during the crises of 1933 and 1934. For that focus on Hammerstein-Equord, Blomberg, and those that refused to back Fritsch.

The author also castigates the Officer Corps for continuing the war after its futility should have been obvious. Gee, that was why Halder resigned. One is also tempted to castigate Robert E. Lee and Confederate commanders for continuing the Civil War after the fall of Atlanta. But like German officers, (& the German opposition had already been told in no uncertain terms that the Allies would not help them), they could not rise in rebellion -- they could only play their cards as they were dealt and hope for the best. Maybe a miracle would take place -- it has before. Only in hindsight is everything so clear.

Like I said -- this book is an excellent starting point for discussion. But I deplore the current trend by the author, Wolfram Wette, and others -- they represent the pendulum swinging too far in the opposite direction from the memoir literature of the 50s and earlier studies.

And lastly, I must register my objection to the author's dissertation advisor writing the Foreword and even being referenced on the title page. It should have been enough for the author to acknowledge Murray in his Preface. Moreover, Murray clearly shills for the author, using adjectives like "outstanding" and "extraordinary." Obviously the standards of objectivity and propriety in the academic world (or Ohio State at least) have changed, and not for the better.

This is an excellent study of the highest levels of the German Army during WWII. But I think the main lesson is that there was no high command, at least in the sense the British and the Americans had one. Hitler and the generals around him spent their time micromanaging the Eastern Front with occasional interference in African and European battles. Hitler acted as if he were the counterpart of Eisenhower, not Marshall or Brooke. It is as if Rosevelt were to have sent Eisenhower daily detailed instructions on where to attack and what to defend.

The problem was only partially Hitler's. The Germans never really created a staff to manage a global conflict. Hadler resented Hitler's inferference, but because it was usually stupid, not because Hitler should have been managing the war, not the battles. The Germans were superb at what they considered the "operational" level of command--the control of armies on a single battlefield. But they never looked at the "big picture."

The book also proves that the German army high command, such as it was, had serious failings. They simply did not understand the logistics of a campaign as vast as the Eastern Front. Nor did they have the intelligence gathering capacity to estimate what they were getting into when they attacked the Soviet Union. Worse, they did not even realize their problems.

This book can teach a lot about why people frequently fail to understand and act upon hard facts. Learning this can help avoid future disasters of any sort.

This book is an attempt to re-write what has been the conventional view of the relation between Adolph Hilter and the German General Staff. After the war, Hitler was conveniently dead and that allowed the German Generals to put out a version of history that was accepted for some years but was at odds with the truth. The German Generals had towed the line that they were politically neutral prior to the 1930?s and that they had not been supporters of Nazi aims. Further that they opposed some aspects of Nazi war aims and acted in a professional way. Lastly they were highly competent and might have won the war if it had not had been for Hitler continually interfering with their operational plans.

Megargee argues convincingly that the German Generals had a political agenda similar to the Nazis. That is they supported the abrogation of the Treaty of Versailles, they wanted an end to democracy and they wanted Germany to rearm and to become a great power again. A large number of Generals such as Rommel, Guderian, Zeitzler and Reichenau were if not committed Nazis, enthusiastic barrackers yelling support from the sidelines.

One interesting point is Megaree?s estimation of the ability of the German Generals. After the war a large number wrote memoirs in which they modestly estimated themselves as pretty good. Megaree concedes that from an operational point of view the German army did well. However it was vulnerable in a number of respects. The key mistake made by Germany in the war was the attack on the Soviet Union. It would seem clear that the planning for operation Barbarossa was deeply flawed. For instance the Germans knew nothing of the actual strength of the forces against them. (The Soviets had 5 million men, 20,000 tanks and 20,000 aircraft to the German?s 3million 3,200 and 3000 respectively) In addition the Germans had no clear plan of defeating the Soviets. Barbarossa was based on the hope that the bulk of Soviet forces could be destroyed near the Polish border. It was then hoped that the Soviets might give in or the government would collapse. However if this did not eventuate the Germans had massive supply problems. They had limited fuel, and they could not use the Soviet railway system until they changed the gauge. In fact when the Soviets failed to collapse the Germans suffered massive supply problems, not being able to supply their troops with winter clothing and struggling to maintain ammunition levels and fuel and spares for their vehicles and planes.

Thus throughout the war the German Army acted as if intelligence was not really worth worrying about and that supply was a problem which could be overcome by an act of will. This deficiency was not a problem in initial war in the west, as the distances were so small and the French and British acted incompetently when faced by the German advance. However against the Soviets it was fatal.

Megargee summarises the weakness of the German generals as one of a strategic weakness. It was one that they shared with Hitler and in fact it is clear that they had little insight into the reason for their defeat even after the finish of the war.

Another issue dealt with by the book is the question of the role of Hitler?s leadership in bringing about the loss of the war for Germany. Megargee clearly shows that it was only in the later part of the war (1944) that tensions arose between Hitler and the Generals. By this time the war was lost. Over the big decisions there was not a lot of disagreement.

This book although expensive is short and easy to read. It is interesting not just for those interested in the war, but it illustrates how history can be distorted by over reliance on self serving material.

Whether you have a passing interest or are a true political junky, this book is a must read to understand America's contemporary political landscape. Highly recommended.

Reinventing Democrats chronicles the efforts of the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) to shift the Democratic Party from its liberal orientation to a more centrist position. It details the DLC's strategies, its successes and its failures up to the 2000 primaries, before the Democratic Party had selected a candidate. It makes a compelling case that the Democratic Party needs to (1) select public policies that are fiscally responsible, business friendly, and, in short, consonant with middle-class values and (2) eschew or de-emphasize policies that are attractive primarily to the party's issue-activists -- this being necessary to occupy the mainstream of American political thought and avoid becoming politically marginalized. This message is particularly relevant now (2003) that some Democrats are panicking over the 2002 mid-term election results and calling for a shift back to the left, effectively seeking to reverse the successful course set by Clinton after the disaster of the 1994 mid-term elections.

Clinton was elected on a New Democrat (i.e. DLC) platform, but he commenced to govern, or was perceived to govern, with a liberal agenda. This led to his plummeting popularity and the mid-term disaster of 1994, and at the time it appeared he would be retired after one term. Since a good scare is always more valuable than good advice, he embraced a New Democratic agenda in his second two years and, with a little help from the Republicans, he won a handy victory in 1996, vindicating the DLC in the process. In all likelihood the New Democratic philosophy (embodied in Al Gore) would have achieved further electoral vindication in 2000 but for unfortunate lapses in the Oval Office and mis-steps thereafter -- the 2000 election was close; Clinton-exhaustion seems to have been a factor.

This book narrates events in a Democratic evolution that is still taking place, and the success of which is not guaranteed. If you care about public policy and the future of the Democratic Party, or just like to look inside the political process, this book is worth a read.

This book is a must read for anyone with even a passing interest in American politics. Baer tells the thrilling story of how a group of Democratic Party activists saved the party from itself and brought it back on the side of middle class values. This is the real "inside" story of how Bill Clinton became president and explains the politics of the 2000 campaign better than any other book I've read.

This intelligent and exhaustively researched book outlines -- in a style that both political junkies and normal readers alike will find engaging -- how Bill Clinton and like-minded Democrats, for all of their foibles, truly became the political "comeback kids" of the late twentieth century. George W. Bush and Bill Bradley would do well to stop ignoring the lessons Baer teaches, and aspiring leaders from around the world undoubtedly will turn to this book as an answer key for the tests voters put before them on election days.

A must read for anyone interested in our political system! At the dawn of the 21st century, the face of politics and parties is changing at an alarming rate. Reinventing Democrats takes an insightful look at the underlying truthes of government today. Baer is a thoughtful and intelligent writer who sheds light on what fuels the actions and decisions that affect the lives of all Americans. This book definetly can't be missed!

Glantz's book is a must read for any serious student of the Eastern Front in World War II. While it may be long and dry, it covers the Soviet Army at an important time in the war. It is not a book for those who are new to the conflict. Glantz covers it all, so if you want to understand how the Red Army beat the German Army, this is one you have to read.

David Glantz may not write in the most exciting way or use tons of hyperbole or focus alot on the human facet of his stories on the Russo-German war, however as far as wealth of information on the Soviet side of things go there is no one better equipped in the western world to write about The Great Patriotic War. His access to Soviet military information is unprecedented and his attention to detail of the military operations second to none. When I first began reading Glantz's tomes on the war I had preconceived notions about this conflict. If Hitler had stayed on course for Moscow after the battle of Smolensk, if he had not split Operation Blau into a Stalingrad and a Caucauses dual front and kept those troops together for a concerted drive to the Volga, if Barbarossa had been launched in May instead of late June, if the Rasputista and bitter Russian winter had not intervened, if if if. And i truly believed Hitler could and should have won this war. After starting on Glantz's books around the year 2000 or so, and truly realizing the awesome potential in manpower and equipment the Soviets had, and realizing in these readings how unprepared materially and logistically the Germans were to fight this war my whole mindset has changed. I believe even if the Germans had taken Moscow Russia would still have won this war. Other then the Germans developing atomic weapons before anyone I have radically altered my view on Germany's chances here. The Soviet Union was destined to win this war no matter what the cost. Barbarossa more then anything else, was Hitler's greatest mistake in the war. I owe this new view to the works of David Glantz. His information is incredible, his summaries superlative, his conclusions inescapable. Dry and technical it may be, but for my money there is no better writer on The Great Patriotic War then David Glantz. Remember, Germany lost the war and 90 percent of her casualties on the Eastern front. Remember, the Soviet Union lost 27 million dead and most of her agricultural and economic bases and STILL won this war. She probably could have done so, although at even greater cost, without a second front in Italy in 1943, and in France in 1944. The Russian contribution to World War II must not be downplayed in the west. The war against Germany was primarily a Russian one, and David Glantz deserves accolades for being one of very few western writers to acknowledge this fact.

So, this is something that's only for professionals and hardcore fanatics, but it is highly recommended for them. It contains everything you ever wanted to know about the Red Army between 1941-43, and even more.

OK, nothing's perfect (5 stars means it's as perfect as it could be in our imperfect world), I can tell you one complaint. At one point he claims that command turbulance wasn't that bad even during Barbarossa. He cites statistics. But what I would've needed is some comparison. It's fine to know that less than X% of certain types of commanders were relieved of command, but it would've been nice to read some comparison: how was it with other armies... Without those, the data just hang in the air... (There were a few similar points - it's not much in a book well over 600 pages. So I still give it the 5 stars.)

Glantz does his usual excellent job on the Soviet military in World War II. He covers the campaigns, and the structure and development of the red army during the early part of the war. Separating much of the formation, commander and OoB material into the companion volume is actually a plus. Both volumes are easier to handle becuase of the size and it is easier to use two books to cross reference material.

Although hundreds of histories of Soviet-German war have been published in the last decade or so, they have for the most part either focused on large-scale operations, told the story from a predominantly German perspective, or, most likely, done both. Another unfortunate result of this has been the number of revisionist works, in some degree or another based on Viktor Suvorov's Icebreaker. In part this was out of necessity due to a a number of factors, including the lack of access to former Soviet archives as well as the repression of histories deemed embarrassing to important wartime heroes. David Glantz has once again answered this dearth of reliable Soviet-perspective war history with his newest volume Colossus Reborn. Using a massive number or Soviet primary sources he has written the comprehensive history of the Soviet-German war.

Glantz' book is divided into three parts to tell this story. The first is a chronological discussion of the first 30 months of war, subdivided into the initial period, which covers the war up to the Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad and then the second period, which covers the remaining 12 months. This first part of the book not only discusses the conventional view of the war but also clearly exposes the many Soviet operations that have lay hidden in virtual obscurity since war's end. Glantz also does a fine job showing how the Soviet-German war affected the course of WWII in general. Perhaps out of necessity this part of the book is rather concise. In any case it is still eye opening to have the vast number of counterstrokes, counteroffensives and strategic offensives laid out as they are here. As he himself points out, prior histories of the war have led to an almost constant and simplistic portrayal of operations as smooth periods of Wehrmacht offensives in the summer and Soviet offensives in the winter. He also clearly dispels the myth that the Red Army was simply along for the ride after the surprise attack and shows how Stalin and the Stavka repeatedly during the initial period of war attempted to organize counterstrokes as well as full counteroffensives.

Part two of the book is a very thorough look into the force structure of the Soviet army. This section is as comprehensive as one could possible ask for and retain a modicum of readability. Even as such, it is certainly the most difficult section to work through as it is basically a detailed look into how every aspect of the Soviet forces were reorganized from Front down to battalions in some instances. As such is feels at times to be comprised of endless tables of organization. This should not be overstated however, as this type of attention to detail is what most readers of Glantz have come to expect. Furthermore, it is this level of detail that sets him apart from most other widely published WWII historians. He does not simply explain to the reader that a particular type of unit was employed in a particular defensive or offensive action. He thoroughly explains how that type of unit came to be and gives the prior organization of similar units and why they failed to work.

Part three is a thorough analysis of the leaders of the Red Army and those that they led. The first subsection is broken up primarily into mini biographies of every major general, commanding every Front, Army, and Corps and all of their variants. It does so and gives a very interesting breakdown and percentages by year of the surviving and thriving general staff as well as command failures and traitors. Glantz then gives a very enlightening look into the soviet soldiers; who they were (ethnicity and gender are investigated here) how they survived, why they fought and what methods were used to keep them toeing the line, particularly after the hideous and demoralizing losses of the first six months. This section is probably the most readable of the three and is a very well written look into the human aspects of the war.

Finally, Glantz has once again written a history of the Soviet-German war that is groundbreaking, to say the least. Using sources that only he seems to be able to gain access to, he has delved more comprehensively into the factors that allowed the Red Army to first survive and eventually defeat Hitler's Wehrmacht, than anyone else before him. Yes, this volume reads quite dryly at times and the tables of organization can seem daunting but it must clearly be understood from the beginning that this is not a book for the casual history reader by any stretch. This book is meant for the dedicated historian of the Soviet-German war-those who need more than a basic overview of the military operations and geopolitical ramifications of the war. With all that said the only weakness that this book has are some instances of sloppy writing and subsequent poor editing. At times-particularly in Part I-this poor editing is truly frustrating and frequent. For the most part though, this is never more than a minor irritation. As a whole Glantz can, once again, be said to be the undisputed master of Soviet-German war history.

For a Confederate examination, Steven Woodworth's book is essential reading in understanding the complex relationships between President Davis and his western theater leaders. Peppered throughout the book are insightful examinations of such generals as Beauregard, Polk, Van Dorn, Albert Sydney Johnston, Joe Johnston, Bragg, and Hood. Woodworth delves into Davis' leadership weaknesses by showing that his health problems and his lack of humility and people-skills (he would have six different War Secretaries) increased his inability to cooperate with others. His unyielding loyalty to promote incompetent friends to high positions routinely injected failure and casualties in campaigns, but Davis refused to bow to the facts and remove them. Woodworth wraps up his analysis with a fair theory that interconnecting these problems was Davis' hesitancy and indecision. The president often submitted suggestions and not orders in correspondence and he falsely believed backbiting and arrogant generals would just cooperate towards the common cause. His inability to provide unifying command authority, especially over the Mississippi River region further fractured what little strategy existed. Woodworth's analysis is a rare addition in the often-neglected study of western command. It is insightful, extremely well-wrttien, and engrossing.

Seemingly endless Civil War books are written rehashing every minute move of Robert E. Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia. There are far fewer that cover the situation of the Confederacy's western armies and generals, despite, or perhaps because of the fact that it was in the west that the Confederacy lost the war. With Jefferson Davis and His Generals: The Failure of Confederate Command in the West, Steven E. Woodworth steps up to fill this gap with a first rate book that every serious student of the Civil War should read. He presents a clear and reasoned argument that the failure of the Confederacy in the west was not due to the quality or quantity of its armies or even of its supplies, but a direct result of a monumental failure in its high command.
Woodworth writes of Jefferson Davis as a man who seemed to be eminently and uniquely qualified to become commander in chief of the Confederacy. He was a West Point graduate, a Mexican War hero, had served as a particularly effective secretary of war under President Franklin Pierce, and had been a United States senator. He understood politics, and he clearly understood war. His resolve for his cause, like his loyalty to his friends, was unshakable. Contained within these impressive qualifications and traits, however, were flaws and blind spots that would severely hinder Davis' management of the war in the west, where he had no Lee to take charge. Foremost of these faults was a lack of judgement when appointing friends as generals, and unreasonable loyalty to them thereafter. Compounding these problems was a fierce pride in his own military judgement that left him unable to acknowledge and correct mistakes. Finally, his pride led him into bitter personal feuds with key generals that hindered his ability to utilize them to the fullest.
Woodworth follows Davis' moves in the west, from his initial organization of the Western theater, through the high stakes game played and eventually lost to gain Kentucky for the Confederacy, to the crisis at Shiloh, where with the death of General Albert Sidney Johnston, the Western Confederacy lost its best hope for competent command. The catastrophe of the loss of Vicksburg, the disastrous infighting among the generals under Bragg in the Army of Tennessee, the loss of Tennessee, the Atlanta Campaign, and Hood's final failed campaign are all covered. In each instance, Woodworth notes the command decisions that Davis made, or failed to make, in the crisis. At the end of each chapter, he summarizes and critiques Davis' performance, highlighting areas where Davis was at least partly responsible for the problems, as well as pointing out where he performed as well as could have been expected.
Woodworth clearly has a strongly opinionated point of view. He is nearly unique among the Civil War historians that I have read in his spirited defense of General Braxton Bragg as a competent commander, and lays all of the blame for the failure of Bragg's campaigns on incompetent and insubordinate generals under his command, chiefly Davis' personal friend General Leonidas Polk. He also repeatedly accused General Joseph Johnston of lacking a will to win, and of never believing that the Confederacy could win the war. While many will disagree with these positions, his boldness in stating them is characteristic of the bold approach that is evident throughout his book.
Jefferson Davis and His Generals is a bold, original work, that addresses a theme that is too often neglected in Civil War studies. It is consistently engaging, insightful, and controversial. It is clearly written, well researched, and a pleasure to read. I consider it to be among the very best books that I have read on the Civil War, and would recommend it highly, especially to those with a specific interest in the war in the west.

Theo Logos

I re-read Woodworth's excellent treatise on Jefferson Davis and his involvement in the Western Theater. The chapters are succinct and focus more on strategy than in specific battle details. My favorite parts are the reviews at the end of each chapter. I have always believed that Lee's strategy to invade the North rather than deploying his forces in the West was a major blunder. If there is one salient point that screams from this book it is that Jeff Davis' personal relationships with his generals (Polk??) definitely was a detriment to his decision making. This book should be required reading for high school and undergraduate students. Indeed any leader could profit from the analysis and history rendered here.

This book is a must read to understand the generals, campaigns, strategy, and the thinking of Jefferson Davis in the Western Theater. The book is well-written, informative, and features good analysis of the differing generals, Davis' actions, and some very good mini-biographies of the major players. Although the book does not go into major detail about specific battles, Woodworth does give a good overview of the major campaigns and battles of the West. The book also has some interesting theories on why Davis failed in the West. Although I disagreed with some of Woodworth's conclusions, especially regarding Braxton Bragg's capabilities as a commander, I found his arguments well-reasoned, although I thought he went out of his way to bash James Longstreeet. The major sticking point I had with the book was Woodworth's analysis on Bragg and his theory that J.E. Johnston thought the CSA's cause was doomed so he didn't really try to win. I thought that was utter nonsense, but that was really my only quarrel with the book. Well-written, informative, just an excellent book.

Insightful and thought provoking analysis of what Davis did and did not do to save the West. I feel this is a very important book and one that a serious student of the war should read. Additionally, I feel that this book should be read after Connelly and Horn to preserve a balanced picture. Woodworth presents a more favorable view of Bragg than I have seen from other authors. Some of this is fair and some maybe the author's perceptions of Bragg. It takes getting used to and the more you know about Bragg and his failings the better off you are. He scores many good points and made me modify my view of Bragg and the problems he had with Polk and Hardee.

His treatment of Jefferson Davis is very fair. His points are valid and well supported, showing where Davis did well and where he did poorly. The reasons for the decisions are supported and logical, given Davis' personality. This is the best part of the book and balances the blame the "Eastern Block" that is found in other books.

I am less happy with his treatment of Longstreet, feeling that he has accepted the "Lost Cause Myth" and not explored the situation. Rather than dismiss Longstreet, I would have liked to see an explanation of his relationship with Davis and Lee's influence in this area.

This is a well written, easy to read informative book. Not without faults but a valuable addition to my ACW library.

Enjoy one of the biographies of John Adams, then read this superb book to complete the story of this great man. Mr. Thompson is a fine writer and can be seen on an old CSPAN segment giving a lecture on Adams. His grasp of President Adams's work and his ability to explain it are unmatched.

I am floored! I started reading biographies of John Adams after the musical "1776" piqued my interest in him and have absorbed at least 20 of them since then. I don't know how this 1998 title flew underneath my radar until 2004 but it did ... and I think NOW, after the 2004 election, is the time when every American needs to know what he did for us ... or TRIED to ... including: pointing the way for those of us who CAN to start doing something about the mess we're in now. His insistence on basing our government structure on actual human nature instead of a fantasized ideal of how human nature ought to be may be the only reason we've lasted even this long. Communism went down because it flew in the face of this wisdom. We could be next. Thompson shows that Adams was not only a political theorist, he was a scientifically oriented psychologist. So am I. And I know that he had a handle on psychological reality that exceeds what most modern psychological theorists can lay claim to. He was an Adlerian more than a century before Adler was a gleam in his father's eye. May ALL the Gods bless C. B. Thompson for what he has done ... and may his publisher start doing a better job of getting this book before the public.

I just finished reading C. Bradley Thompson's "John Adams and The Spirit of Liberty," and am in awe; not only of John Adams but of Dr. Thompson's masterful explication of Adams' political thought.

I had no idea what a debt of gratitude I owed to one man, John Adams, who more than any other Founding Father developed and provided the intellectual framework that became the Constitution of the United States. At the very least this book should be required reading for any person who is interested in pursuing a career in politics.

To all of you who are interested in understanding the intellectual founding of this country I urge you to read this book. You won't be able to put it down.

And to C. Bradley Thompson, I salute you and thank you for your efforts in resurrecting the reputation and honor of this great man.

The most critical period of American history actually occurred after the revolution. The instability of anarchy threatened to make the ideas expressed in Jefferson's Declaration of Independence and the heroic successes of Washington nothing more than a forgotten dream. Another hero, one who would be willing to chronicle all previous forms of government and guide the architects of the constitution in creating something entirely new was what was needed. He was more than just another name on the list of American presidents. That hero was John Adams.
Thank you, C. Bradley Thompson, for this inspirational account of an often overlooked and undervalued intellectual giant among the American John Adams and the Spirit of Liberty by C. Bradley Thompson
founders.

To return America to its original foundation of freedom and individual rights, it is vital that we know the ideas of the men who created that system. This important task will be easier thanks to this book by C. Bradley Thompson. Readers interested in the Founding period and its legacy for our own time will not want to miss this book.