Wang Books

The book is good, but certainly not up to the other reviews I read. Surprisingly, it's purportedly used as a school text. That's surprising because there's absolutely NO theory inside this tome. It's strictly network by rote.

Especially frustrating were the Exercises and Case Studies *without answers*. Want answers? That's extra-$19.95 for the CD _after_ sending the publisher a "legal release form".

My advice-get a serious text, with extensive explanations (not just lists), good, tough questions and the answers in the back (right where they belong).

This is an awesome reference guide. I give it 10 stars! It is very well organized. All the information is presented in a no-nonsense fashion...perfect for the person who needs to learn this subject in a hurry or who wants to seriously study for the exam. I'm very impressed. After running into too many poorly organized computer guides, this one proves that you can organize technical topics logically and for any reader (at any technical level).

As an instructor of the Microsoft Certification curriculum, I can honestly say that this is by far the best book on Microsoft Networking Essentials I've seen. Whether your studying for the exam, or just looking for a concise, complete reference for network engineering, this book has you covered. It addresses topics in a manner that makes them easy to understand, while at the same time teaching you the tools you'll need to get, and keep, a network up and running at optimal efficiency. Its organization is excellent, and the referenced diagrams help to further explain the topics. Truly an excellent effort, this book will be an asset to both engineers and aspiring MCPs.

Honestly, I expected more of a book titled Modern Industrial Automation Software Design. Over half of the book focused on generally accepted practices for software development and the other half focused on case studies of existing systems most of which dealt with automated measurement. Avoid this book if you are interested in learning about software design for robotic equipment.

I decided to buy this book due to the recommendation from one of my colleagues. At that time I was embarking on a new project called "Flexible plant condition monitoring system design" for one of our customers--a large local safety-critical chemical plant. I read carefully each chapter of this book, and I paid special attention to the design philosophy the authors present. This gave me a lot of inspirations during the entire design and implementation of this project, which turned out to be a great success. I congratulate the authors for writing such a good and useful book!

I found the book quite useful in designing and developing real-world software applications. I have worked in the industrial automation domain for more than 16 years and feel it is good to have such a reference book on my desk. The representative applications reported in this monograph are particularly helpful. We have a very similar networked condition monitoring system developed about three years ago. After reading this book, we felt that the system architecture needs to be adjusted and some features should be enhanced, as advised in one of its chapters, to better meet the customer demands. Overall, I think the book is especially useful for the software engineers and system analysts in different industrial automation fields.

I'm bullheaded and will finish most every book which I did here but came close to putting it down for good.
I guess the thing I got out of it was the Chinese thought of "saving face" no matter how unredeemable the
situation is.

Don't Call Me Human is a shockingly fun read filled with off-color humor and disgusting detail. The plot revolves around a shady Beijing organization called MobCom, which is desperate to vindicate China's humiliating loss at the hands of an oafish American wrestler. MobCom's search for a modern-day Chinese hero who knows the secrets of the Boxers (who, among other things, mistakenly thought they were immune to the power of firearms) finds its unfortunate object in a Beijing pedicab driver named Tang Yuanbao. Written by China's most famous liumang (low-life slacker is an acceptable translation), Wang Shuo,the novel follows the miseducation and shameless promotion of Tang by MobCom, an endeavor which requires multiple press conferences ridiculously devoid of content, ballet lessons given by an octogenarian in an abandoned art gallery, an unbelievable mock-military excercise in which Tang single-handedly defeats more than one battalion, and even an eventual sex change. The rise and fall of Tang and his backers (who manage to consume 7,000 packages of instant noodles, 100 kilos of tea, and 14000 cigarettes in their first week of hardly working) is the best-told tale of slacking off and deep national/personal humiliation you're ever likely to read.

One of the funniest books I've read in a while, "Please Don't Call Me Human" goes way beyond being a satire of Chinese nationalism--it's an hysterical condemnation of how far people will go for fame. So original, each outrageous event is a huge surprise.

Maurizio Viroli ends "Republicanism" with an insightful, if very pessimistic, view of a contemporty malaise. "Democratic institutions today are suffering a serious malaise, a lack of passion, commitment, or loyalty that affects different democratic counstires differently but affects them all . . . Republicanism should propose itself in democratic multicultural countries as a new political vision of a civic ethos that reconnects the words 'liberty' and 'responsiblitity'.

Certainly this book, filled with concepts and ideas, can be read and viewed differtly and for many good reasons. A refresher course on what true Republicanism is. A background for students of U.S. history into the theory and theorists that influenced our own form of government. My own sence of this terrific discourse was that our own politics could be greatly influenced if read by pundits and politicians, party leader and voters alike. Step back. Think. Read. What are our guiding pricipals and what form of government do we want. What are we willing to give up in terms of priviledge and liberty for the "greater good" and what IS that greater good.

While this book was written by and Italian for Italians its application is truly universal. It is short. It is packed with ideas. Many, myself included, should read much, if not all, of it twice to comprehend the arguments. Whatever your politics, this book forces you to think about the greater, and more philosophical, aspects of any form of government or power.

I picked up a copy of Maurizio Viroli's "Republicanism" a few weeks ago in the Princeton U. bookstore. It has been a very interesting read, about the nature of republic, from an Italian (whose nation produced the likes of Caesar, Cicero, Medici, Machiavelli, Borgia, and Victor Emmanuel).

The book's 124 pages is a quick-read in civic consciousness. (I read the entire book on the brief journey home from the bookstore.) Viroli firmly documents his discussion with 12 pages of endnotes.

Viroli's analysis is refreshing and provocative. Avoiding contemporary North American political jargon he offers a different look at "direct participatory democracy". He suggests that all political theory is founded upon basic moral claims. These claims are the sovereign society's choices.

He suggests that republican theory is a desire to be free of dependence while non-republican theory (Viroli labels "liberal") begins with freedom from interference (or capabilities of performance). He believes that absolute republicanism is impossible (emancipation, he says, requires dominance).

Civic virtue (whose highest form is love of country) is the basic necessity of republicanism. This "patriotism" (as independent self-governing) is much different from "nationalism" (which reflect a collective will of dependence). Viroli sees ultimate problems with republics: they can be maneuvered to served unjust and irrational causes, steering them away from morality. Non-republics may lead to national common dependence and domination (or extreme restraint and restriction), which is capable of manipulating moral principles.

Viroli proposes other socio-political ideas through the book (liberty, revenge, glory, equality, freedom, democracy, etc.). It is an interesting and informative read.

"Republicanism" offers a significant political reflection for the 21st century. It could be well used for teaching politics and is a good gift candidate. It is highly recommended to all students of political science, sociology, and history.

Maurizio Viroli's book is a brief and engaging read, animated with a hopeful faith that the republican tradition has relevance in contemporary politics. Like Poe's purloined letter, Viroli would have us see the republican tradition as an overlooked political possibility. Viroli's task, therefore, is to bring out the distinct shape of republican thought from the more familiar trappings of contemporary liberalism. But secondly, he must make clear what has been lost in setting aside republicanism and enlist us in his revival of republican politics.

Viroli argues we should see liberalism as a derivation of the republican tradition not as a necessary successor. He calls liberalism an "impoverished or incoherent republicanism, but not an alternative to republicanism". What liberalism has lost, Viroli argues, is a conception of liberty that takes account of forms of domination that limit individual freedom. He also argues that republican patriotism offers a means of energizing civic life that liberalism lacks. This republican form of patriotism, however, remains distinct from the faults of nationalism or ethnic chauvinism (an argument made more fully in Viroli's earlier book, For Love of Country).

To a large degree, the theoretical points Viroli makes regarding republicanism are drawn from two other recent books, Philip Petit's Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government, and Quentin Skinner's Liberty Before Liberalism. Interested readers would do well to address those two books prior to taking up Viroli. But Viroli brings spirit to this revival of republican thought and his book adds a myriad of illustrative examples of republican thinking from the history of Italian political thought. The pages are animated by the hope that the republican tradition might make a return to the peninsula that has given the world so many great republican theorists (the book was originally written in Italian for an Italian audience) and it is here, in the practical advice for animating republican politics that Viroli demonstrates ingenuity in his use of history and argument. "Contemporary republican theorists should learn from the wisdom of their classical forerunners and think of disputes over political liberty as conflicts between partisan interests and conceptions, not as philosophical debates whose goal it is to ascertain or demonstrate the truth. ... Evaluations of all political actions tend to be partisan, subjective, driven by passions; disputes in the real world are neither scientific nor philosophical but, rather, rhetorical in the classical sense of the term." One hopes that the next evolution in Viroli's work will bring us more of this practical, rhetorical argument for the practice of republican politics, inspired (but not overwhelmed) by the history of republican thought, and thus succeed at even greater persuasion as to the virtues of contemporary republicanism. ~ J. D. Petersen

The tone is satiric, never sarcastic. The artwork is tasteful, never exaggerated, even in this "Comic Strip" format. The beautifully written narrative carefully outlines the many "fumbles" of the guy whose image is associated with Football as much as The Presidency?
Ultimately, the big question is, did his "Vision" outweigh all the dramatic, critical blunders, which cost lives; which cost the American people in ways far beyond galactic deficits and debt? Is the President primarily aa Visionary? Or the *most accountable* Public Servant?
For those who feel that the book contains too many secondary mistakes of a great leader, I submit that they were kind in omitting plenty of stuff: his failed Immigartion Policy; 1986 Payroll Tax; his Military Budget increase on top of Carter's Military Budget increase; the Graham-Rudman "March To The Sea" on presumptive cost-effective, necessary programs; unnecessary tax breaks for the super rich who have 11 Accountants to brainstorm on the issue. George Will pointed out many years ago that his man gave us "93 months of growth". I say, based upon four trillion dollars worth of debt dropped at the front door of the "workin' man" that Reagan thought he was fighting for.

Graphic nonfiction novels are not easy to review because they exist on two planes: they are both art and information at one time. But they must generally considered to be more nonfiction than art. If the content isn't any good, it's hard to enjoy the art. This book has that problem The art is very, very good...cartoony while still doing a good job at resembling the actual people and events. However, the content is biased at best and inaccurate at worst. If this were the only thing you knew about Reagan, you would be forced to assume (as the authors do) that the country believes nothing true about Reagan, and that the mass of them were simply deluded about the way things work in the world. If you do, that's fine, but it's not the truth. The authors here give Reagan no credit for anything and assign all of his successes to either deceit, luck, or pure stupidity. So, in the end, great art + wildly biased factual information = below-average book. If you know enough to separate fact from opinion, you'll like it. If this is the only book you care to read on Reagan's legacy, don't bother.

What makes this book fascinating is that it is an illustrated biography, with a comic strip format, and covers the span of Reagan's political career.

The book is very clear and easy to follow. The details in the book are very educational.

This would be a great book to use for High School students studing Government or History.

Steven Diner's A Very Different Age is a social history of the common man during the "Progressive" years in American history (circa 1890's through 1910's). Rather than focus on specific events or people, the book investigates society as a whole. In effect Diner is saying that while individuals make the history books, the group is what makes history happen.

Diner organizes the book in a mostly chronological manner. He starts with the crises of the 1890's in his prologue and ends his final chapter dealing with World War One in the late 1910's. Every time period in between deals with a different set of people, but follows in a roughly chronological fashion.

If Diner is arguing that the people are the protagonists of history, then what they are acting for seems to be a better station in life. Business owners struggle against managers at the turn of the century in order to establish a more efficient factory, while managers strike back in order to preserve their well-being and way of life. Workers square off against their managers and business owners in order to establish safer working conditions and fair pay, while the owners attempt to suppress such uprisings to keep their profit margins high. Immigrants strive to raise their status by scooping up whatever work they can find (mostly low paying factory jobs) so that they can achieve a better life either in America or in their home country, while native-born Americans and previous generations of immigrants ostracize them as being a different and therefore inferior race. Meanwhile American farmers become sucked into the capitalist system, unable to remain autonomous sustenance farmers any more they must submit to the whim of the supply and demand forces of capitalism at the same time subjecting themselves to the invisible man who established their commodities' prices. African Americans struggle for freedoms given to seemingly everyone else, the white collar middle class emerges as a powerhouse in the American economy, professionalization occurs in such fields as medicine and law requiring doctors and lawyers to be adequately educated and organized, politicians begin catering to the public's demands for a more active government, and eventually the era comes to a close soon after the first World War.

Diner presents compelling cases for everyone's contributions during the progressive era. The book reads more like a narrative than a presentation of facts and events. It is this narrative that makes Diner's argument so strong because it makes the book feel more human. People tell stories in a different way than a textbook does. If Diner is arguing that the masses are the most important part of this period, then the style of the book allows for the reader to assume the "people" are speaking directly to them.

The social history angle also provides a refreshing change of pace from "normal" history books. While stories of strong individuals or decisive events throughout history can be inspiring to readers, it is easier to relate to stories about common people. The reader can identify with Joe Smith and his fight for a better life in the factory than they can with Teddy Roosevelt and his globe-trotting manly-man adventures.

Overall Diner is effective as an author with A Very Different Age. His organization, research, and presentation allow accessability to anyone interested in studying the time period. Diner also provides a comprehensive index (not necessarily a given as one might expect) for readers or researchers to easily find specific topics and references in the book.

The only place the book stumbles is in the bibliography. Rather than a typical bibliography that catalogues the different books, articles, essays, and such that the author used to create the work, Diner attempts a "Bibliographical Essay". In said essay Diner attaches short sentences to citations and connects everything together in mostly incoherent paragraphs. The whole process seems un-necessary and frustrating to read. It could be assumed that Diner is trying to retain his narrative presence from the body of the book, but the effort is lost. Set between traditional (and academically formatted) end notes and index sections, this narrative bibliographical essay just seems out of place.

However, the average reader -and even the casual academic reader- would not be hindered by the previously mentioned flaw. Therefore, Diner provides an excellent piece of work worthy of reading and further study by any person interested in either the specific time period or a story about the strength of human will and the desire for fair treatment.

This book offers personal stories of those involved in the changing times of the Progressive Era. Diner drives home the point of the competition between Americans at this time. The competition for jobs, leisure time, consumer goods, etc. Someone who already is familiar with the Progressive Era would be bored, but for those just starting it is a good book.

This is a relatively short but cohesive social history of the progressive era. Diner's primary aim is to decipt of the attempts of many sectors of American to adapt the demands of industrial capitalism. This book is written well and a nice complement to other histories oriented towards politics and legislation. Diner also does well to review the efforts of groups not typically covered in conventional histories of the period, such as managers and professionals. An insightful and useful book.

They say hindsight is always 20/20. Whoever they are, they haven't read much alternate history, in which the passage of time serves only to multiply the might have beens. Could the Americans and British have finished Germany more quickly? This could have saved millions of lives, mostly Soviet, Jewish and German. John Grigg thinks so, and he has a definite idea about how to do it: a cross-channel invasion in 1943.

Was this viable or just a dream? He argues that there were four necessary material conditions: air superiority, sufficient troops, transport, and the ability to stop the Germans concentrating; and that the Allies had, or could have had, all of them.

Air superiority is often used as an argument against a 1943 invasion, since the German air force was not decisively defeated until early 1944. However, if the Americans could single-handedly defeat the German fighters at long range over Germany, hampered by extra fuel tanks and the need to escort bombers, surely the Americans and British together could have prevailed at much closer range over and across the Channel, even a year earlier.

As for the troops, the numbers were certainly there - over a hundred divisions. One wonders whether they were all adequately trained and in the right place, but as Grigg points out, in Sicily there were 150 000 troops ashore in the first three days and a total of over half a million. In shipping, the problem was similarly one of allocation: during the Sicily invasion nine divisions were simultaneously afloat, as opposed to seven at Normandy; and there were sufficient landing craft if they hadn't all been sent to the Pacific.

The last condition is the most problematic. Perhaps the Allies could have landed in comparable force a year early, with sufficient air superiority to stop the Luftwaffe disrupting the invasion. Yet if the Germans had been able to concentrate their armor against the beachead, it would have been in trouble. This was prevented in the actual invasion, mostly by an intense two month bombing campaign which destroyed railways and roads, bridges and tunnels all over France. Even if the Luftwaffe was defeated, seizing air superiority is one thing; using it effectively quite another. And it is not clear that the Allied bomber force in 1943 could have done the job that it did in 1944, particularly if the strategic air offensive had been put on the back burner to concentrate on an earlier invasion.

Thus the material factors all seem plausible, except perhaps the last. But good alternate history must take account of subjective factors - consistency with the knowledge and ideas of the time - as well as the objective material situation. This test is passed easily, since no less an authority than George Marshall was strongly in favour of a 1943 invasion. (Stalin and the western Communist parties, of course, were pushing for the operation a year earlier.) Even Churchill was not so much against the idea as distracted by all his other enthusiasms - "he wanted to do more or less everything", as good a one-line description of Churchill as I have ever read. In the end it was the opposition of Brooke, King's agitation in favor of the Pacific, and the fixation on finishing off North Africa that doomed the operation. Grigg is also realistic about the psychological need for some kind of victory in 1942, despite the cost, risk and dubious military value of Torch and El Alamein. His argument does not depend on a complete abandonment of the Mediterranean, but rather a willingness to seal off the German position in Tunisia by land and sea instead of completely reducing it. And, of course, giving the invasion of France priority over Sicily and Italy.

All in all, Grigg makes a good case. I am not sure I would go as far as he does in, for example, saying that the Mustang could easily have been in production a year earlier, that the Germans could have won the war with guided missiles or nerve gas, or that the unconditional surrender demand made a big difference (no desirable deal was possible with the Nazis, and the generals' plot failed anyway). But he provides solid evidence that the specialist vehicles and other devices (amphibious tanks, Mulberry harbors etc) could have been developed earlier if the demand was there.

Yet along with the concentration problem, there are two somewhat vaguer factors that leave a lingering doubt. The first of these is experience. Even if there was no technical breakthrough in 1944 that was not available in 1943, there were still a thousand and one little things that could go wrong but must go right. Would they all have been identified without the experience of operations in the Mediterranean and Pacific? Would the troops and their commanders, with that much less experience of battle and victory, had the skills and the confidence to do the job right the first time? The second is logistics following the invasion. Was all that fuss about the climax of the Battle of the Atlantic really much ado about nothing? Yes, the Germans were not sinking ships faster than the Allies could build them, and there was sufficient shipping for Torch, Husky and Anvil. Yet surely the battle against much larger German armies would require much more support over a longer period, even if the landings themselves did not.

Even then, with hindsight, it seems a risk worth taking. After all, Torch was highly risky and promised much less gain, and the historical Normandy landings were hardly a sure deal. And in some ways the Germans were weaker in 1943 than in 1944. The fortification of ports and beaches ranged from weak to non existent. The Eastern Front was further east, making it harder to transfer troops. Another point, which Grigg strangely ignores, is that German tanks were qualitatively inferior in '43. Much harder to push the Allies back into the sea with Panzer IVs than with Panthers. Perhaps the ultimate argument is the tradeoff between costs and benefits. If successful, the war could have been ended perhaps a year earlier. If it failed, try again next year. At worst, the Bomb in August '45. Now we just need a working time machine . . .

Grigg's book is not a perfect piece of history and historiography, but it is a very intriguing one. He lays out why a 1943 D-Day (invasion of Europe by the Western Allies) both could have happened, and should have happened. Anyone who enjoys alternative history (what-if) will be engaged by this line of argument. If you like to study grand strategy, again you likely will enjoy this book.

There are flaws in the book, but they are pretty minor, and most are arguable points anyway (as much of history is). The end result, for me (and I believe a 1943 invasion would have been better for the world, overall) was an acceptance that it could have been, and might have been a better result than the 1944 invasion. By going through the exercise of arguing for and explaining mechanics of a 1943 invasion, you can gather a reasonably good understanding of the challenges facing allied military (and political) leaders, and the realities of and America that was not ready for a world war.

Basically, that's it in a nutshell. Below I'll lay out just a few key items that I recall from reading it some years back, for anyone interested.

Among the points he makes in the book as to why a 1943 invasion could succeed (or was possible), or was a better plan:
* The Atlantic Wall - it was far weaker in 1943 than it was a year later, as Rommel took command, inspected and ordered a massive fortification effort to take place. Previously, German defenses were largely focused on the ports (Dieppe, Calais, Cherbourg, etc.), and the British Channel Islands, not on the long lines of beaches.
* The German army was engaged much more deeply inside the USSR in 1943 than it was a year later. This is true, and easily seen when one looks at map of the eastern front in 1943 vs. 1944 (e.g., before Kursk), where the Germans were well into the Ukraine, on doorsteps of Leningrad (St. Petersburg now), and still held the Crimea. This means that the German army is further away, and it is harder to redeploy forces to the west.
* German occupation forces - they were much weaker in 1943 than they were in 1944. Although the German army overall suffered a great deal of losses in that year, the first rate formations assigned to western europe in 1943 were small compared to 1944. The primary reason for this was simply that Hitler and the OKW understood that the Allies WOULD attack in 1944, and that this invasion must be repelled.
* France - Grigg believes that it is more important to get France back into the war, than it was to get Italy out of it. While I cannot be so sure of this argument, you will have to make your own decision. One thing to note (which I don't think Grigg did) is that the Italians switched sides, they didn't just quit the Axis. Though their MILITARY assistance to the allies wasn't that significant, they did commit combat troops and a lot of logistics/labor troops to the cause, in addition to large numbers of partisans in northern Italy.

Arguments against - which he usually acknowledges and notes strategies to mitigate them:
* German airpower - the Luftwaffe has not been defeated in 1943. They are being beaten (for ex., many folks know about the attrition of German transport and bomber planes resupplying Stalingrad, but fewer know that a similar loss occurred in trying to supply the Axis forces in Tunisia in early 1943). Without air supremacy over the invasion (beaches and sealanes), the allies lose a major advantage.
* Allied airpower - the USAAF was rapidly expanding, but that expansion took a lot of time and effort. While we could have sent more planes to Europe (UK) than we did, those would be green pilots, AND the plane types had a serious flaw - range. In 1944, the allies had fighters with sufficient range to easily cover all of northern france in huge fighter sweeps. In 1943, besides having many less squadrons, they had far less range and were more green. The probable impact of this is to limit the locations to invade. Forget Normandy as too far - Pas de Calais is the likely invasion sector, meaning the most expected and most defended location.
* Landing craft - the US/UK will have FAR fewer landing craft in 1943 than in 1944, even if they focus on this effort (which is a virtual requirement - to cease or severely curtail other operations). What is esp. missing are the larger landing crafts which were just coming out of the shipyards, like the LSTs. Having fewer of these means that the SIZE of the invasion must be smaller, and the size of the follow-on forces (vital to success of the campaign) are also smaller.
* Finally, German army itself is larger, less bloodied. German losses in 1943 summer fighting in the east were quite large, and they continued on with each successive soviet offensive (which drove Germany almost out of the USSR by the time of Normandy). A larger German army, even if not deployed initially in France, is a grave threat to the allies.

Regardless, well worth the read! I would like to see him revise it and put out a new edition, perhaps drawing on the work of other historians like John Ellis (Brute Force), etc.

Tom

I would recommend this book to anyone interested in studying Lincoln or the Civil War. The author does an excellent job in presenting a mostly unbiased opinion. By stating in the introduction that he allows room for error in his opinions, he sets himself aside from the fanatics and characterizes himself more as a historian in search of the truth than as a man trying to paint Lincoln as he thinks he should be viewed. Moreover, the breath, not sacrificing the depth, of this book is incredible. It covers Lincoln's family and personal life and carries the reader all the way through his assassination. The Lincoln Nobody Knows presents Lincoln as both a down to earth man and as a complex, indispensable historical figure. It causes one to revaluate what he previously held to be fact about Lincoln and it allows room for interpretation-the author doesn't always give an opinion for the reader. Most are "inclined, quite naturally, to discover in Lincoln the beliefs that they themselves espouse," (57). This remains feasible since Lincoln will always be an enigma, but to his credit Current presents sound facts for his arguments and presents both sides, drawing upon many respectable sources. He begins by describing Lincoln's personal and family life-his mother's possible illegitimate birth all the way to Lincoln's relationships with women and Ann Rutledge specifically. It then goes into his involvement in the beginnings of the civil war, his policies and their changes, and the way he conducted the war. That being done, the author finishes by discussing his larger role as a politician, an emancipator, a commander in chief, a martyr and a myth. All of this does well in presenting the multidimensionality of Abraham Lincoln, and it makes one realize that there are not easy answers to questions about good old Abe. It is important to note that much of this text is controversial and a portion of it has implications beyond his contributions to American history-it attempts to define who Lincoln was as a man, not as an idol.

I would recommend this book to anyone interested in studying Lincoln or the Civil War. The author does an excellent job in presenting a mostly unbiased opinion. By stating in the introduction that he allows room for error in his opinions, he sets himself aside from the fanatics and characterizes himself more as a historian in search of the truth than as a man trying to paint Lincoln as he thinks he should be viewed. Moreover, the breath, not sacrificing the depth, of this book is incredible. It covers Lincoln's family and personal life and carries the reader all the way through his assassination. The Lincoln Nobody Knows presents Lincoln as both a down to earth man and as a complex, indispensable historical figure. It causes one to revaluate what he previously held to be fact about Lincoln and it allows room for interpretation-the author doesn't always give an opinion for the reader. Most are "inclined, quite naturally, to discover in Lincoln the beliefs that they themselves espouse," (57). This remains feasible since Lincoln will always be an enigma, but to his credit Current presents sound facts for his arguments and presents both sides, drawing upon many respectable sources. He begins by describing Lincoln's personal and family life-his mother's possible illegitimate birth all the way to Lincoln's relationships with women and Ann Rutledge specifically. It then goes into his involvement in the beginnings of the civil war, his policies and their changes, and the way he conducted the war. That being done, the author finishes by discussing his larger role as a politician, an emancipator, a commander in chief, a martyr and a myth. All of this does well in presenting the multidimensionality of Abraham Lincoln, and it makes one realize that there are not easy answers to questions about good old Abe. It is important to note that much of this text is controversial and a portion of it has implications beyond his contributions to American history-it attempts to define who Lincoln was as a man, not as an idol.

This is a great book. The author shifts the thinking about the start of this country. Griffin takes democracy and federalism out of the misty clouds and sinks it into the mud of the frontier and in the dirty hands of the people. It was such a good read, and so thought provoking, I bought copies for each of my brothers and for my father -- all of whom are history buffs.

Once again we are treated to what passes for scholarship today -- a politically correct analysis of (this time) the problems & wars with the Indians west of the Proclamation Line before, during and after the Revolutionary War. The most accurate portion is the British viewpoint and policies, treating the colonies only as providers of a market for English goods and a source of materials and commodities for the home country. In short, a colony and people to be exploited. In this light, the Indians were simply a segment of the British empire, and a curb on colonist ambitions.

However, the Indians are seen by the author as noble savages living in a state of nature, whereas the white settlers west of the Proclamation Line (a temporary expedient) are seen as low life, savage, ruffians, and not worthy of being called white. Amazingly, the author contends the Indians did not as a rule kill innocent women and children. No? Then I guess all those wives and children of settlers who were butchered or tortured to death after capture didn't exist. He only mentions in passing the murder of a woman and her newborn baby that precipitated the Gnadenhuetten Massacre and doesn't mention that the prepetrators were tracked to Gnadenhuetten. John Carpenter had seen them, but they fled Gnadenhuetten before the whites arrived but after leaving evidence of their being in the village.

The author makes liberal use of the explosive term (today) of racism to tar the settlers. The Americans were either poor squatters staking a claim to the land by right of having improved it (like the Israelis would claim in the 20th century), or wealthy and greedy speculators (the author mentions George Washington and Patrick Henry as two examples) using their political connections to obtain the land for almost nothing. He touches on the most interesting facet of the subject by showing that the revolution started in the West through the settlers defying the British in 1774, and offers up the question of whether the revolution was driven from the people upwards, or from the colonial elite downwards. This is an interesting question, and the author should be able to answer it without making both parties seem excessively venal.

Indeed, the author's lack of scholarship and understanding of the times are clearly evident in his attitude toward the Western Pennsylvania settlers and warfare. Evidently the author had never experienced combat (probably not even military service), and does not comprehend that ferocity in battle leads to victory and potential survival. He scolds the whites for their savagery in fighting, as if observing decorem and polite niceties while one is fighting for one's life is the correct approach (this sounds like current questions over the rules of engagement in Iraq.) He also mentions the predominance of Irish names in the West, but not once mentions the term "Scotch-Irish", the people who are primarily the focus of his group. Presbyterian and rebellious, these people made up almost 70% of the Continental Army and Pennsylvania Militia, and counted George Rogers Clark, Daniel Boone, Simon Kenton, Daniel Morgan, Anthony Wayne, and many other notables of the era among their numbers. The author is either unaware of the impact of the Scotch-Irish, or wishes to re-write history to meet his own agenda, whatever that might be. It was the Scotch-Irish that provided the bulk of the settlers west of the Proclamation Line, fighting the Indians in Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Kentucky, the Carolinas and Georgia. The author should know this and have made this easily identified group the focus of his writing. The British at the time generally defined the American Revolution as a Presybterian revolt, fueled by emigrants from Ulster and the lowlands of Scotland. Why can't the author?

In short, the author writes on an interesting subject, but takes a modern revisionist view that negates the value of his study. His treatment of George Rogers Clark is particularly troubling, and he even fails to describe the extraordinary feat of Clark's march across Illinois to attack Vincennes. Apparently if he decides an individual is evil, it is impossible for him to include evidence to the contrary. The book is also a boring read as the author constantly repeats himself as if he needs to reach a certain number of pages. His work is only recommended for readers who are already intimately familiar with his subject and can put the author's biases in perspective.

I recall with pride the sure comfort, during the years of struggle against the American war in Vietnam, afforded by Bertrand Russell's pungent opposition to the same war for the same reasons, all of his astonishing intellectual gifts poised like a sword against the daily lies and betrayal of ideals perpetrated by Washington. While Russell's mathematical exegeses are beyond me, the thrust of his intellectual activity has remained attractive. This concise book (indeed thin, but not incomplete), while not diminishing that attraction, comes a bit like a diatribe exposing those elements of Russell's character that were no doubt conflicted, and yet were more likely an integral part of his intellectual capacity. Ryan's writing is informative, but not terribly appreciative. One feels distanced by Ryan's doubts, rather than educated by his conclusions. Clearly Russell was a complex fellow, inconstant and, in a certain respect, embittered by a life of singularity; it seems however that Ryan does little to penetrate the conflicts down to the bone of understanding them and integrating them into the whole picture of Russell's turbulent life, rather he presents the externals as elements sufficiently interesting in and of themselves, a disservice, I think, to one with a legacy as lingering and controversial as that of Bertrand Russell. The prose is intelligent and clear, and the volume is a typically attractive Oxford Univ. Press offering, small and supple, the presentation suiting the book's tone and content perfectly. I recommend this volume, but it's not everything it could have been.

In Alan Ryan's book there is good, overdue criticism concerning Russell's view of world-government And on the subject of government in general, an interesting observation is that "Russell takes no interest in the creation of legal obstacles to government misbehaviour; he does not suggest a Bill of Rights, for instance. On the whole, Russell assumes throughout that what checks government is the power of social groups rather than the provisions of the legal system...". Russell's exact views on inheritance have always been of interest to me, but they can be confusing.As far as other biographers' reports are concerned, on one hand, one reads that "he rejects the institution of inheritance, and proudly earns his own living" and that "He had given away his inheritance because he thought it wrong to have such an unfair advantage" On the other hand, Russell himself explains that "While I was writing Principia Mathematica I felt justified in living on inherited money, though I did not feel justified in keeping an additional sum of capital that I inherited from my grandmother. I gave away this sum in its entirety...to various educational objects." There are also reports that "he...lived on the income...he had inherited at twenty-one," at that at the turn of the century, at least, "the kind of life led by Russell obviously depended on a small but sufficient independent income" I think this book provides the most concise description of the Russell and his inheritance saying that "He always treated his own money as a social fund,...not in the least alarmed at the prospect of earning his own living once it was gone." A point brought out in this book more than any other biography of Russell is that "For much of his life he plainly felt a contempt for uneducated people which is entirely at odds with the sentimental profession of solidarity with humanity's sufferings....Max Eastman recalled an alarming moment when Russell observed, after a very successful public debate in the 1920s, `Anyone who takes these debates of ours seriously must be an idiot.'...Russell was more vulnerable than most to the temptation to treat his readers like fools." Moreover, he evidently felt that the financial hardships of Beacon Hill School were such as to be "making him give pot-boiling lectures to stupid audiences and write silly little articles for American newspapers." I was interested in reading Ryan's accounts of how Russell loathed American universities as "departmental, hierarchical, uncollegiate places, dominated by the kind of professionalism which might be acceptable in a law firm but hardly in the groves of academe," and how "Russell was right to think Huxley had stolen almost every idea for his novel from him" Interesting tidbits I learned were that during his 1918 six-month prison term "He read 200 books and wrote two." He acknowledged "the social value of dancing," and that he was "something of a cinema addict." There is confirmation of his belief that "fresh air" is better for children than "towns," and that he "had always taken refuge in his passion for the sea and the mountains." Regrettably, there are reports about Russell that "Many men found him unbearable at close quarters." Also, this biography is quite clear about how Russell had "in 1892...a freedom from acrimony which would have tested...Russell himself in later life." In short, "Russell got angrier as he got older." Things don't seem to change much considering a statement like "what passed for American democracy in the 1920s and `30s was a sham where businessmen pulled the strings which made the politicians dance."