Bradford Books

With all the sophisticated tools available today such as OpenMP, this book may seem quaint. However before grasping at concepts or just using tools with out any understanding or their make up it would be wise to add this to your learning curve.

This book gives a good basic understanding of Pthreads. Of course you will later have to apply it to the real world but as a learning tool this is pretty darn good. The website or path on the sight has changed since publication; but the examples are still there. Because I am using AIX it does take a little time to convert from a gcc format to an AIX format. Then a little more time to apply AIX specific advantages.

As you go from the front of the book to the end the samples get added to and new concepts become available. There are plenty of diagrams for the visual learner. I personally found the signal handling of great use.

Any way this book is not the end-all, be-all, of threads but it sure cleared a lot of concepts up for me.

1. Why Pthreads
2. Designing threaded programs
3. Synchronizing Pthreads
4. Managing Pthreads
5. Pthreads and UNIX
6. practical Considerations

Using OpenMP: Portable Shared Memory Parallel Programming (Scientific and Engineering Computation)

This book does a nice job for describing the pthread API. When I have read this book, my multithread programming experience was mainly with Win32 threads and reading this book was my first exposure to the condition synchronization objects. With the help of this book, it has been a breeze to learn how to use conditions. What is missing from this book written 10 years ago, which is also missing in all multithread books that I have read of that era, is coverage on issues with parallel processing. If all you have to do with threads is to launch a background job while keeping UI responsive or asynchronous I/O on a single core processor, you will be fine with this book.

However, if you try to crunch an array of data with multiple threads each processing their own chunk of the array, you could fall into cache line alignment problems even if your threads does not access the same memory locations. Those problems are platform dependant. I have written such a program that was working wonderfully well with a Sparc station and a PowerPC based station but once ported to a x86 architecture, the program was actually becoming slower than the single thread version. It is very hard to get it right. You have to be careful about the array alignment in memory and where the boundaries of the chunks of data that you assign to threads are. What will happen if 2 threads located on 2 different processors access to the same cache line is that one processor will have to flush that cache line back to the main memory and the other processor will have to fetch the values back from the main memory to its cache. The overhead of this is so huge that processing the array from a single thread could be faster.

I still have to find a book that addresses these problems. I expect it to come soon with dual and quad core processors becoming mainstream but this is not this book.

This is the best Pthreads book. The writing style is conversational, very easy to read and interlaced with code examples. The reader will progressively learn the subject, building on the accumulated knowledge. Coverage of multi-theading concepts is very complete. There are some excellent diagrams.

Despite the publication date, this book is still very much relevant, because the Pthreads standard has not undergone any substantive change since then.

There are the usual O'Reilly book problems: a few typos and some errors in the example source code. The source code errors will cause problems for inexperienced programmers (they may think they, not the bad code, are the cause of the problems). There are a few places where a more complete explanation would have been nice. Despite these problems, overall the book is excellent. Don't take my word for it, compare it to other Pthreads books and you'll immediately see the difference.

Enjoy!

Adrien Lamothe

The book along with the code examples provided in O'reilly's web site provide an excelent starting point to the Pthreads programmer.

It's not a reference book, and don't ask me why I rated it 5 stars,

It also presents Pthreads and multithreading in a passionate way as if to convince the reader that multithreading is the way to go.

And it is!

I read the book a number of years ago to learn pthreads.
I found numerous errors in the examples -- speaking
at work to a colleague I recall we laughed at this book --
It was such a disaster.

I may read the book again (over the last few years I learned a lot about
pthreads) and give a careful analysis of it.

I had a first printing -- there were gobs of errata on
Oreilly's site -- maybe they put in enough corrections so
the examples run -- but I'm amazed how shoddy the first printing was.

Stay away from it...

This book was quite a disappointment and is very overpriced. If you have an academic background you will find it lacking in rigor. If you do not you may be fooled into the "illusion of understanding" but I would see that as a bad thing. Many people (myself included) read books on quantum physics or relativity for the layman just for enjoyment, and rationally seek the "illusion of understanding." This book does not rate highly in the "fun" scale. It is rather dry, and the subject matter itself is not as amusing as Schrodinger's cat or time travel. So I can only assume that non-academic readers really want to figure out how things really are, to trade their portfolios, and this book cannot satisfy that desire. This for two reasons: 1) researchers have not really solved the puzzles associated with the equity risk premium, 2) the non-technical reader cannot understand the subtleties of the subject matter. Given this, the "illusion of understanding" becomes a dangerous thing.

Save your $65 and buy some stocks for the long-run.

The real dillema regarding ERP is that the real ex-post ERP is irrationally different from the the ex-ante ERP required for CAPM valuations. Prof. Cornell does explore this issue well for a general audience. However, this book does not diminish my skepticism of CAPM equilibrium valuations and ex-ante ERP estimators.

The book seems to be targeted towards University researcher types more than people interested in learning about investing. If you are looking for a book that helps to explain how to value individual stocks for investment, skip this book.

There is a lot of detailed analysis of past history or stock market performance and other fundamentals. There is a comparison of dividend trends and lots of other stuff. Almost all of the book treats the entire market as a whole rather than analyzing individual stocks. I believe the conclusion of the book is that the stock market as a whole is over priced based on the extensive research performed by the author.

This book, with its many references, is a great guide to the academic literature on stock valuation. It was easy to read, very logical, and educational.

The author, Professor Bradford Cornell, gives an analytical, yet very readable, explanation and forecast of the decline of the stock market during the past couple of years. In this regard Professor Cornell makes a similar conclusion about the value of equtiies and slightly earlier than did Robert J. Shiller in his book, Irrational Exuberance. It is unfortunate that Professor Cornell and his book did not get the same attention that was accorded to Professor Shiller at the start of the stock market decline.

The thesis of the book is that the equity risk premium for stocks, which is the compensation given to equity investors for holding shares of risky common stocks, was below, perhaps much below, what was historically normal. This implied that investors came to view common stocks as being a much less risky investment than stocks had been in the past. Indeed, a quite common view of many investors before the recent fall in the stock market was the view that common stock were an appropriate vehicle for "savings" rather than just for "investment." The implication of this perception by some investors is that equities in general were likely to continue to rise in price over time and thus represented a "safe" or at least low risk vehicle for discretionary income that was not spent.

However, periods of relative low perceived risk usually do not last and are followed by periods of relatively higher perceived risk. The current period we are now in appears to be one in which the uncertainties regarding the stock market have increased and thus investors are now demanding greater compensation, that is, a higher risk premium, for bearing those uncertainties.

The reason the book does not get five stars is that the book misspecifies the constant dividend growth model equation that forms the basis for the author's explanation of the adjustment in the equity risk premium. However, this oversight should not prevent the reader from getting a great explanation of how the prices of common stocks adjust to risks from this fine book.

The 20th century was certainly a century of amazing accomplishment in so many fields. How could the human mind make such discoveries and advancements in a few generations?

As with so many science overviews, physics rules, with Einstein and the quantum physics revolution. Much of the book is taken up with a scan of scientific history leading up to 1900, so we are deep into the text before we arrive at the dawn of the 20th. From the table-setting, we get considerable detail on physics and some related chemistry. After that, we learn about biology and the climax with the seminal work on genetics and DNA. Good topics, all of it.

I actually wanted less detail and more subjects, expecting more of an overview than extended essays on subatomic particles, cell division, and so on. So many potential topics didn't even get a whiff of recognition, or barely that. Think about medicine, psychology and other social sciences, electronics, flight, telecommunications, meteorology and many more. I was hoping for a summary of how more scientific fields advanced in the last 100 years.

The style chosen for illustrations was unusual and largely ineffective for me.

The book closes with ill-fitting non-scientific comments about the UN's initiative to deal with poverty.

While some may disagree with this statement, I believe the twentieth century will go down in history as the first in which science and technology played the penultimate role in the lives of those living in it. Not only were the practical details of daily life transformed by the application of scientific discoveries, but our very sense of self, how our minds work, how our world came to be, how it works and our proper role in it, our ultimate origins, and our ultimate fate were all influenced by scientific thinking as never before in human history. And both good and ill has resulted from this new relationship. It has brought both cures for deadly diseases and weapons of mass destruction. The awesome and awful nature of science and technology in the century just past is the subject of this once- over-lightly book.

While no field of study is handled in a completely satisfying manner, this book is adequate as a broad overview. Unfortunately, and this is largely because the subject is so large and complex, Piel cannot supply more than a cursory overview of any individual topic. Many subjects deserving of attention are given short shrift, including spaceflight.

Gerard Piel makes a huge effort trying to synthesize 100 years of science (and by that I mean a really extensive part of it) in one book. The book is written in a very understandable language and is addressed to the lay person, so don't expect deep explanations, but an overall overview. Too much has been said in other reviews about errors in the book. To tell the truth that is the only reason I gave this book four stars, but still is a pretty darn good synthesis and shouldn't be neglected. For anyone interested in a concise review of science in the twentieth century this is a great place to start.

In his review below, A reader suggests we overlook the "small errors" in this book "in the interest of the greater whole."

First, if an error of 50 MILLION percent is small, I'm curious to know what he would consider a significant error.

Second, I challenge his notion that it is in the interest of the greater good to ignore these errors. It is my understanding that the primary purpose of science is to dismantle misconceptions, not to dispense them... too better our understanding of the world not to worsen it. If we value science, we must value the social necessity of challenging what is presented as scientific fact. We must shine a light on these errors as errors, not turn a blind eye to them. (By the way, no one has challenged the accuracy of my initial review below.)

Personnally, I feel the value of this book can only be enhanced by correcting these errors and eagerly await the next edition.

The long and thoughtful comment below may, in fact, be accurate. Mistakes do creep into the publishing process, unfortunately. But as someone who has been involved in the professional science community for many years, I feel these small errors should be overlooked in the interest of the greater whole. This is a major, highly readable work by one of the most important scientists and journalists of our time. Beautifully illustrated, each of the chapters is compelling in its own right and can be read by anyone with a keen sense of curiosity about the scientific discovery process. To see it as anything less is quibbling indeed. Fans of "Uncle Tungsten" by my neighbor Dr Oliver Sacks and the current popular hit "Tuxedo Park" will love this beautifully packaged book and find it every bit as accessible and riveting.

I had read this series before and really enjoyed it! The book was in good condition, but I have not had time to read it again. I am in college classes again and have been busy reading other material. However, I will start reading for pleasure again at Christmas break.

Hold the Dream is the sequel to "A Woman of Substance". While it does document the next generation, the flaws are sort of obvious, and hold no real threat to the empire Emma Harte built.

Frankly, the threats Paula faces after taking control of the busines empire Emma built are pretty minor-leauge. The betrayal of two cousins, the worthlessness of her Fairly husband, and a few problems along the way are nothing compared to Emma's struggles.

Indeed, I was left wondering if Paula's eventual decision to marry her lover Shane would work at all. Would either be content with their own empire - or would each try to dominate the other.

I hope the novel was a bridge work to "to be the best",but I can't help but wonder at the wisdom of following AWOS any further. I don't think it was worth it.

This book runs a poor second to a Woman of Substance. Bradford should have quit while she was ahead.

I loved this book, but I'm reading them backwards. I started with the last book in the series, this one is the second. However I loved it. Some people may get confused with all the different ties between the families, but the book is a classic among romance novels. Highly recommended for a good albeit long read.

Hold the Dream is the continuing saga of Emma Harte and her vast empire. This book picks up where A Woman of Substance ended. The focus of this book is Emma and her grandchilden with Paula taking over as the head of the family. This is a family that still doesn't get along and has more than it's fair share of jealously, lies, and backstabbing mixed in with love, happiness, and grief. This is a well-written book that keeps the reader interested in this family and all of their successes and failures. A must read for any fan of A Woman of Substance.

Putting its concision (~100 pages) and extremely attractive presentation to one side, *The Mind Doesn't Work That Way* is actually Jerry Fodor's most ambitious effort to date and (grant protectors aside) the reigning champ of cogsci critiques. But the Giant of New Brunswick knows when to say when, and what is frequently presented as an "autocriticism" is really *nothing of the sort*: Fodor's task here is to align his version of the Computational Theory of Mind (capitals required) with Chomsky's somewhat "formalist" version, rather than the cooked-up "massive modularity" of Darwinian dreams -- Fodor is among the Coke-drinkers rather than head-splitters, and in this book (*not* soon to be a major motion picture) he begins to ask some well, Humean questions about *our* grasp of inferential processes in a way which derails nearly every major psychological research program of the present. A must-read from the veritable artiste of philosophers of mind, but how is that?

This book is an attack by an "insider" on the contemporary disciplines of cognitive science and evolutionary psychology.

Fodor does not deny that there are some valid aspects to these two disciplines. Rather, he rejects their extravagant claims to have successfully explained "The Way the Mind Works," to quote the title of a recent book by Steve Pinker, who is one of the leading evangelists for cognitive psychology and evolutionary psych.

Fodor's central complaint against evolutionary psychology is quite simple. Anyone who claims to offer an evolutionary explanation for the wings of birds can start with a great deal of solid knowledge about how bird's wings are in fact constructed, about how wings make flight possible given the laws of aerodynamics, etc.

But no one in fact yet possesses the equivalent information for the brain and the mind.

We do not yet know how the neurons are connected and in what manner they function so as to produce thought. More basically, we do not understand what "mind" really is from the viewpoint of the underlying physics of the brain (see, e.g., David Chalmers' "The Conscious Mind" or Colin McGinn's "The Mysterious Flame").

Fodor also has more specific objections. He is highly concerned with the issue of "abduction," the ability to make global judgments of simplicity, relevance, etc. over a broad intellectual domain. Fodor believes that humans are very good at this, but that the current "modular" approach pursued by cognitive scientists and evolutionary psychologists cannot explain how humans could be good at this.

I'm not sure human judgment is as powerful as Fodor believes, but he is correct that modular systems have difficulty making broad global judgments.

In his final chapter, Fodor directly addresses the issue of evolution, arguing that, for a feature to be the product of natural selection, it must be built up by a small number of steps. Using the example of the giraffe's neck, he argues, "Make the giraffe's neck just a little longer and you correspondingly increase, by just a little, the animal's ability to reach the fruit at the top of the tree; so it's plausible, to that extent, that selction stretched giraffe's necks bit by bit."

This example is somewhat misleading: there is no reason in principle why a single mutation could not have created huge giraffe necks in one fell swoop and natural selection then stepped in to preserve the mutation.

But Fodor is correct that such a "saltationist" explanation is not available to evolutionary psychology. The plethora of specialized mental modules favored by evolutionary psychologists (a language module, a "cheater detection module," a face-recognition module, a theory-of-mind module, to name only a few) are supposed to be carefully honed adaptations exquisitely polished by natural selection to serve human needs in the "ancestral environment" (the Paleolithic). Just as a complex organ such as the eye could not realistically be created in one single fortuitous mutation, so neither could these complex mental "organs" hypothesized by evolutionary psych.

But why does Fodor reject a gradual, multifaceted evolution of these hypothetical mental "organs"? He does not say, but there is a fairly powerful argument from the human genome project. We only have about 30,000 genes; most of these are shared with lower mammals and many with non-vertebrates and even non-animals. There just are not that many genes left which distinguish us from mice.

A change in a relatively small number of regulatory genes can bring dramatic changes in development -- our much larger brain, for example. But to actually create a number of new specialized "organs," not possessed by mice or cows places much greater demands on the genome. It's doubtful we have enough genes to handle it.

The evolutionary psych response, as made in Pinker's "The Blank Slate," to this argument is in essence that since these mental modules _do_ exist, our genes _must_ be able to produce the modules. That of course assumes what is to be proven, i.e., that the human mind is based on evolutionarily-derived specialized mental modules.

Fodor completely demolishes the claim that the unity of science demands that evolutionary psychology be true. The degree to which the science of evolution is relevant to the science of psychology is, he rightly argues, an empirical matter, just as (to use his example) it is an empirical matter whether "the theory of lunar geography constrains the theory of cellular mitosis." Not every science has to be relevant to every other science.

Fodor also shreds what he calls "neo-Darwinist anti-intellectualism," the view (he is quoting from Patricia Churchland) that "looked at from an evolutionary point of view, the principal function of nervous systems is to get the body parts where they should be in order that the organism may survive...Truth, whatever that is, definitely takes the hindmost."

Fodor counters that for humans "a cognitive system that is specialized for the fixation of true beliefs interacts with a conative system that is specialized to figure out how to get what one wants from the world that the beliefs are true of..." or, in simple English, humans engage in "rational actions predicated on true beliefs."

We are designed to pursue both truth and our own well-being -- there is no contradiction here. Not action instead of truth, but action based on truth.

Despite the brief length and Fodor's engaging style, this book is not easy reading. But it does raise questions which, if not adequately answered by Fodor's opponents, cast grave doubts on the grandiose claims of contemporary apostles of cognitive science and evolutionary psychology.

Cognitive science is a failure. AI is a massive failure. Cognitive scientists know their computational theories of mind are wrong but they are in "deep denial". Fighting words from famous philosopher Jerry Fodor's response to famous psychologist Steven Pinker's "How The Mind Works". With fighting words like that, i was expecting a really good fight, with facts being offered, stats being analyzed and Pinker's analysis of topographical cortical maps and the visual processing map dissected

And instead i got... this

Let's start with writing. It's typical Fodor, which means it would put a coked-up Tigger to sleep and requires a Latin dictionary and the patience of Job to slog through. It's boring and difficult to read. But since it's a Fodor book, you probably already knew that. He's a fun guy and in previous books had some good points but man is he boring

But i didn't expect good writing, good structure or brevity. i expected good ideas. But unless they're hiding on the last page (sorry, i can't keep reading this thing), there are none in this book. You might wonder why a philosopher whose interest is in symbolic logic and grammar is writing a book about psychologists who use a very loose analogy about the mind being like computer software. After reading this book, so am i

So why is Pinker and everyone else in cognitive science wrong? Fodor's argument in a nutshell - because computer subroutines can't access information outside of the subroutine. To use Fodor's example (of which he has *very* few), you want to go to Chicago. It's not windy. Is that good? If you're sailing a boat, yes, otherwise no. A computer can't figure that out because it lacks context - it needs to know how you're traveling before judging the meaning of wind conditions. And computers, Fodor argues, can't do that. Since computers have subroutines and subroutines have no access to relevant data, computers can't solve simple problems and so the mind can't be like a computer. Take that Pinker! Makes sense? Of course not

Fodor approaches the topic of psychology and computers from a logician's standpoint, which is to say he makes some really bad, sweeping assumptions then uses really high level logic to prove that reality doesn't exist. For Fodor, it's just 5 steps - 1.A mental representation must have a syntax, 2.If you change the sytax the "Turing machine" can no longer function, 3.Therefore syntax can't vary by context, 4.Therefore mental processes can't be affected by context 5.But they are so the mind isn't a computer and cognitive science is wrong. (He later adds Principle M(CTM) which says sunroutines can access external data but an exhaustive search/tablescan of all memory would be needed and that would be stupid so cognitive science is stupid)

The book is a one trick pony. Computers supposedly can't solve the simple problems he describes (logical abduction), they are required to solve them based on the way he chose to define his terms and therefore the field and its theories are irretrievably broken. The book is laced with numerous, sweeping, unfounded assumptions that are glaringly wrong to anyone familiar with computers. The book lacks common sense. The book's main and only objection is an academic exercise completely divorced from anything resembling cognitive science

The "How The Mind Works" (Pinker) vs. "The Mind Doesn't Work This Way" (Fodor) debate is well captured in a reply by Pinker. Worth reading before opening your wallet and purchasing TMDWTW.

Google "Steven Pinker." Click on his Harvard page. Go to "Articles." Look down to 2005, "So How Does The Mind Work?" Click, get the PDF download, and enjoy a good read.

Me? I'm descended from monkeys, the proud product of natural selection. Doesn't bother me in the slightest. And given my ancestry, I'm amazed and grateful I can use this MacBook here... Pretty cool, actually.

Kirtland Peterson

This critique of the computational theory of mind and the pan-adaptionist tradition is clearly so honest that it goes after the ideas promoted by Fodor's own 1983 watershed book "The Modularity of Mind". In brief the essay is an attack on massive modularity by saying that there are things after all that escape the programming (encapsulation and opacity are key: how can we talk about something OPAQUE? We know nothing about a few critical things...).
Granted the book is horribly written (that is Fodor's charm after all) but his argumentation is so ferocious that he ends up loud & clear.
The man is critical of his own ideas, and of the current in thought that he he helped create --one may use Fodor-1 against Fodor-2. Perhaps persons I hold in highest respect are those who go after their own ideas!
Bravo Fodor. Even if I do not agree I can't help admiring the man.

As much as I respect Paul Churchland as a philosopher, I can't say this book is very good (he's written much better!)

His coverage of the main positions in the philosophy of mind leaves much to be desired. For one thing, the arguments he uses in favor of dualisms and the objections he brings against it are quite bad. Most dualists would probably cringe at the idea (John Foster, William Vacllicella, W. D. Hart, Richard Swinburne, C. J. Ducasse, David Chalmers, William Hasker) that their position can be so sloppily defended (and refuted). Of course there are a number of differences between these dualists, but that is not the point. It is also true that Churchland's book is intended as an introduction. All the more reason for a bit more balance. Frankly, as a dualist I was no impressed--not to mention unmoved.

Churchland goes from there to arguing later in the same chapter (ch. 2) for eliminative materialism. He uses a very bad argument. He argues that an objection against eliminative materialism which appeals to introspection begs the question. After all, this is the very thing which Churchland is calling into question. So far of course, this is only an assertion, as much in need of justification as he claims the non-eliminative materialist advocate requires. He then claims that introspection is as 'theory-laden' as empirical judgments (I suppose a la Kuhn). But this claim is very weak. For the claim itself rests on a sort of introspection, and requires that Churchland's critics accept the a number of controversial claims (the empirical judgements are theory laden, and that introspection is somehow analogous to empirical judgments). It would also seem that his view of introspection is a bit simplistic (straw man).

But at the very least, the argument is unconvincing.

The mind-body problem, as it is called in Western philosophy, still has the attention of philosophers, despite centuries of debate. It will no doubt occupy more of philosophers time in the upcoming decades due to the resurging interest (and advances) in artificial intelligence. But the goal of most research in A.I. is now geared towards computational algorithms that are able to learn and can discover new knowledge or data patterns. The "hard A.I." problem, that of creating conscious machines, is not top priority it seems.

But philosophers will continue with the analysis of the nature of conscious intelligence, and the author is one of these. Interestingly though, and correctly, he asserts that progress in this analysis has been made, and he notes that philosophy has joined hands with psychology, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, ethology, and evolutionary theory in making this progress. And this will no doubt continue as advances in these fields are made, and the 21st century will see the advent of the "industrial philosopher". Once thought to be a purely academic profession, the ethical considerations behind genetic engineering and the legal rights of thinking machines will require the presence of philosophers in the rank and file of engineers, technicians, and managers. And because of this, these philosophers, and their coworkers will themselves have considerable knowledge outside their own field.

Again, the refreshing feature of this book is that the author believes that philosophy has made considerable process on the nature of mind. This was done, he says, by understanding the mind's self-knowledge, by providing a much clearer idea of the nature of the different theories of mind, and by clarifying the sorts of evidence that must be acquired in order to distinguish between these different theories. Empirical evidence, he states, has enabled the making of these distinctions much more rational and scientific. But he is careful to note that the evidence is still ambigious, and much work still needs to be done before the these ideas can be differentiated with more clarity. He discusses in detail the different theories of dualism and materialism. An entire chapter is devoted to discussing substance dualism, property dualism, philosophical behaviorism, reductive materialism, functionalism, and eliminative materialism. The author asks readers to start anew and throw away their convictions while analyzing these conceptions of mind and matter.

For the author, the mind-body problem cannot be solved without considering three problems: 1. Semantical: The meaning of ordinary common-sense terms for mental states. 2. Epistemological: The problem of other minds and the capacity for introspection. 3. Methodological: The proper methodology to use in constructing a theory of mind. Entire chapters are devoted to these, and after reading them the reader entering the debate on the mind-body problem for the first time will have an over-abundance of food for thought.

An entire chapter is spent on the topic of artificial intelligence. If this book were updated, this chapter would probably have to be considerably expanded, in that many advances have been made in A.I. since this book was first published. Research in A.I. has been rocky, and many promises that were unfullfilled were made in the past about it. But now it seems a more rational and realistic attitude is taken about the claims of A.I. Most everyone involved in it understands that it is an enormously complex problem, and have concentrated their efforts on building intelligent machines from a piece-meal, microscopic approach, i.e. from solving the simplest problems first before tackling the more difficult ones.

A chapter is also devoted to neuroscience. Thanks to imaging technologies and other approaches to mapping the brain, this field has mushroomed in recent years. The author only gives a cursory overview of the brain and the nervous system in this chapter, due no doubt to lack of space. The reverse engineering of the human brain has been pointed to by some researchers in artificial intelligence as being the best hope for building intelligent machines. The dramatic increases in chip technology and bus design have made this belief certainly more feasible. It remains to be seen, via actual empirical research, whether the reverse engineering of the human brain, and then its subsequent implementation in electronic devices, will indeed result in the rise of intelligent machines.

Whatever the future of artificial intelligence and neuroscience, the mind-body problem will no doubt be of interest to philosophers for decades to come. It will be fascinating to see what kinds of conceptual frameworks and methodologies will be employed in attempts to solve this problem. Without doubt some new ideas would be welcome in this regard, as proposals for solutions to the mind-body problem seem to be stuck in a local minimum. But, as the author argues well for, the solution will bring in many areas and possibly some radical ideas, all supported by painstaking experimentation.

"Matter and Consciousness" is a very accessible introduction to basic issues in the philosophy of mind. Paul Churchland divides the book into several sections, with each one serving to give a broad overview of the relevant issues, the main positions and controversies, as well as the major lines of research inquiry that have been developed in the past few decades as ways of approaching the study of brain/mind.

The first problem that Churchland addresses in the book is the ontological one - that is, what is the real nature of mental phenomena and in what relation do they stand to the physical world? He surveys the different types of dualism, including substance dualism, property dualism (a category which subsumes epiphenomenalism, interactionist property dualism and elemental property dualism). He also gives a flavor for the many different species of materialism such as reductive materialism/identity theory, functionalism (which currently serves as the main philosophical position for those involved in the fields of cognitive science and artificial intelligence) and eliminative materialism. Some really important questions are addressed in this first section, such as the feasibility of reducing mental states to neurobiological states. The history of science offers plenty of examples of successful intertheoretic reductions - for example, the theory of optics being reduced to the theory of electromagnetism. However, different arguments have been made (not just by dualists, but also by materialists) as to why mental states will not be capable of reduction to neurobiological states. For the functionalists this is because there are no universal correspondences between physical and mental states (there are many potential physical states that can instantiate mental states) and for the eliminative materialists, this is because our current folk psychological framework is radically wrong. Instead of intertheoretic reduction, the eliminative position holds that there will instead be a full-scale elimination, with our folk psychological concepts going the way of phlogiston in the physical sciences.

Churchland also focuses on the semantic problem -- where do our mental terms derive their meaning from? He suggests that this problem can be resolved by the network theory of meaning in which the meaning of a term derives from the term's embedded status in a larger theoretical framework. He addresses the epistemological problem (the problem of other minds and the problem of self-consciousness) and the methodological problem. What should be the structure of a science of mind? Churchland reviews several traditional approaches - idealism/phenomenology, methodological behaviorism, the cognitive/computational approach and the methodological materialist approach.

In the next two chapters Churchland offers a cursory overview of the fields of artificial intelligence and neurophysiology. These sections are meant to give the reader a flavor of some of the research projects that have been initiated in these fields and the manner in which they bear on the problems discussed in earlier portions of the book. For example, can intelligence be represented computationally? How can we develop programs that simulate aspects of intelligence? Churchland reviews fundamental concepts such as universal Turing machines in a very readable manner. However, it should be noted that Churchland sometimes seems to conflate consciousness and intelligence -- intelligence need not imply consciousness, though he sometimes seems to use these two terms almost interchangeably.

The last chapter of the book is devoted to some thoughts on the possible distribution of intelligence in the universe at large. Overall this book should serve as a highly readable introduction to some very difficult problems. Given the amount of the material covered, it is to be expected that many issues will be dealt with in a cursory manner. Some of the author's biases are reflected in the work. However, Churchland does a decent job in trying to present the main arguments and he also provides suggested reading lists at the end of the chapters for those who would want more in-depth coverage.

Richard C. Vitzthum discusses this book in his "Materialism: An Affirmative History and Definition." He explains the animosity certain kinds of philosophers express towards anyone who insists on physical causation of mental processes. Thus, the negative reviews below are understandable and should be ignored.

Now that I understand the nature of the incessant bickering that occurs among philosophers of various biases, I am ready to take this book up seriously. If an individual, trying desperately to understand the nature of the situation here in the world, must choose eventually between physical causation of thought and non-physical causation of thought, then it seems reasonable to me to choose physical causation.

Throughout history, physical causation has ended up explaining away non-physical, i.e., wishful, fantasies.

This book is dated when it comes to AI coverage. Among other things, it talkes briefly about the backpropagation algorithm , invented some 15++ years ago. While this book is about philosophy, it would be nice to have an updated version of this book giving a short overview of how the AI field is borrowing more and more ideas from natural evolution and real neural networks. Backpropagation is a specific (and really usefull ) algorithm, and sparked a new wave of excitement about artificial neural networks in the mid 80s. Still, one problem is that the algorithm, as far as I know, is not biology plausible. More recent criticism agains the algorithm would be really really usefull. A short overview of _recent_ AI progress in language understanding/image understanding among other things, would also improve this book.

Also, the book contains a chapter on neuroscience. I found it pretty hard to follow all the details here, because of the technical term used. But remember,- its not the easiest subject around, and carefull reading through the chapter will help.

The more philosophical part of this book is interesting, but to be honest its not my favorite subject, and I didnt know much about dualism and other philosophical problems before reading this book. Well, as a master degree student in artificial intelligence, I probably should have been more interested in philosophy, and in some areas this book is an eyeopener.

Michael Lynch's "True to Life" makes the case that truth is objective and that a concern for truth is necessary to a good human life. As Lynch notes, nothing is more certain than the fact that humans make mistakes -- and the possibility of mistake proves that the world is independent of our beliefs.

"True to Life" is short, readable, and wise. However, I'm unsure whether anyone untainted by post-modernism would find it necessary to defend the reality or value of truth. Reading the book mainly left me wondering why anyone bothers to read or write analytic philosophy at all -- and wishing that I had read "Going After Cacciato" instead (Lynch uses Tim O'Brien's novel to illustrate the importance of knowing what is truly important to us).

The copyright is 2005, that many years after a man arrived who said he was the way, the truth, and the life and who said, under what for you and me would be great duress, that he came into the world to testify to the truth and that everyone on the side of truth listened to him. Wiggenstein, Satre, Bertrand Russell, they're all here, though they will be soon forgotten. Odd that a book on truth and which ventures beyond the observations of the scientist would omit treatment of the man whose life, death, and, many believe, resurrection dates the very book written. Isn't that still the only question: "Who say you is Christ?"

Please check out the review on this book over at barnes and noble. The attorney/judge who takes the author to task reflects my own experience with books that promise truth, but deliver the author's opinion. Caveat emptor.

Michael Lynch offers a thoughtful account of the import of truth as it applies to our lives individually and collectively. His is not an introduction to theories of truth (Thus, suggestion that he takes for granted the trouble in defining truth is unfair). Rather, it is an exposition on the value of truth as objective in contrast with relativism in general. As individuals, we can value truth and pursue it for its own sake and collectively, we can and should demand truth, particularly in light of tenuous political claims that affect our lives globally. Such demand is inherently predicated on a sense and endorsement of truth as objective, which is precisely Lynch's point, among others.

One wants to resist the need to criticize a basically good book, for serious logical, ontological, epistemological, and causal errors. If these landmines were not so glaring, this lay approach to inductive reasoning and sophistry would be worth recommending. But the errors are too serious to do anything other than pan.

One of the many forms of human reasoning is the search for truth, and these forms can take several different approaches, with greater or lesser degrees of approximation. Overall, Lynch's objective is meritorious and commendatory, and many of his intuitionist claims will probably receive nods of approval. But philosophy of all enterprises does not end with intuitions. And, any author who commits the Fact/Value Fallacy right out of the gate is too sloppy to take seriously.

Among our many axiological (value judgments) concerns, is the valuation of the truth. Our system of justice, our interpersonal relations, our understanding of ourselves and our world, all depend on making value judgments, and one of those values hopefully is to value facts.

But values are neither "true of false," only "facts are." Values are either "good" or "bad." Values are relative measures to some perceived good. Facts, stand in and of themselves as to "true" or "false," and are determined solely on reason, correspondence, experience, and tests. So, while we value the truth for its usefulness in making value judgments (we don't want to make values on the wrong facts), values are not facts, nor are facts values.

That's a fallacy, exposed by David Hume in 1740 and slain by G. E. Moore in the early 20th C., which our author commits repeatedly, all the way to "Truth and Happiness" through "Truth as a Means to an End" (that should jar some ethicists and scientists). FROM a purported philosopher? Not even Aristotle commits these errors (Aquinas does big time), and this philosopher is oblivious to the is/ought, fact/value, "Naturalistic Fallacy" he commits repeatedly?

Since no bibliography is included (by MIT imprint, no less), it is noteworthy that numerous individuals are omitted in the Index, but there on page Ninety our author cites Hume's is/ought fallacy, and there on pages 88-91 is G. E. Moore (no mention of Moore's "Naturalistic Fallacy," but a lot of metaphysical conceptualism (at least he mentions Moore's observation that the word "good" is unanalyzable, which is untrue, because "good" and "bad" are valuative terms of approval and opprobrium we analyze one way, compared to "factual" STATEMENTS, which are analyzable by "true" and "false" standards). Moore's "Principia Ethica" can be consulted if Lynch leaves you unclear, and Hume's "Treatise on Human Nature," III.i.1 is also useful.

Overall, many of Lynch's observations are fairly well understood, several observations worth making, but repeatedly repeating the Naturalistic (fact/value) Fallacy is done only by Holy Mother Roman Catholic Church and her application of Aquinas's Natural Law Theory. Aristotle did not do it. Hume repudiates it. Moore slays it. But our pop-philosopher pops away, boldly conflating Aristotle's theoretical reasoning in the Physics (facts) to his instrumental reasoning (values) in Nichomachean Ethics ("truth as a means to an end" is unconscionable phrase for a philosopher to state, much less use as a Chapter).

PASS. BURN. Or USE pedagogically.

In response to previous reviews --

The hardcover 1st edition I am holding in my hand includes a sticker on page 18 (after the preface and intro) that reads:

"BIBLIOGRAPHIC ENTRY AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The Mountaineers Books and the authors would like to gratefully acknowledge the valuable work of Robert M. Bryce in _Cook & Peary: The Polar Controversy Resolved_, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA (1997; 1133 pages) The work covers the life of Dr. Frederick A. Cook and is illustrated with photos, maps, and sketches, and fully annotated with over 2,000 footnotes. The authors relied on this seminal reference for important factual information not previously published about Dr. Cook's early life and his subsequent claims to have climbed Mt. McKinley. We regret the omission of proper credit and citation in the original bibliography for _The Dishonorable Dr. Cook_."

As interesting as this book is, it cannot be considered the definitive work on the controversial Cook. Bradford Washburn is one of the most important names in American mountaineering. His photographs rival Ansel Adams. However, in publishing this book at 91, with a co-author, he seems to have failed to source his material. Robert M. Bryce published several years ago an exhaustive treatment of Cook and his claims. He consulted Washburn, who wrote him a note warmly congratulating Bryce on his work when the book was published. However, when this book was published, which lacks footnotes, Washburn failed to credit Bryce in any way. This was a complete error, as his co-author admitted; he submitted a bibiography that identifies Bryce as a source. But when reached by the Washington Post, and asked to explain the omission of Bryce's book, Washburn told the Post, "I don't know Bryce" and "to the best of my knowledge I've never laid eyes on his book. But you've got to remember you're dealing with a 91-year-old guy here." The sad fact is that Washburn is probably telling the truth based on his present memory, but that memory is just not very good. Washburn's coauthor admits that he "naturally" drew facts and sequences from Bryce's book, since it was both the most comprehensive and the most recent biography of Cook. The entire controversy is well covered in a February 4. 2002 article in the Washington Post. Apparently the omission of any mention of Bryce was due to someone who lives at Washburn's retirement home retyping the bibliography.

There is no doubt that Washburn drew on a vast amount of his own research for this book, although how much he wrote and how much was written by his coauthor is not clear. It is also clear that he reached his conclusion concerning Cook's false claim to have climbed Mount McKinley long before Bryce started his work. This is not a case of deliberate plagarism, and it not clear that Bryce's text was copied. However, it is unfortunate, that such a distinguished career ends on this note.

Nevertheless, if you are really interested in this subject, and Cook is very interesting, you need to read Bryce's book. He has footnoted his sources, discussed the matter at greater detail and his conclusion seems irrefutable.

Late Bradford Washburn is no stranger to Mount McKinley, its history and its environment. So I am bit surprised that people don't give him his due credit when he came out with this book that centered around Dr. Frederick Cook and his false claims to be the first man to climbed Mount McKinley.

One previous reviewer wrote about the book Robert Bryce did on the same subject and how Washburn failed to credit him. It could be that maybe Washburn did forget. But then it could be that Washburn knew enough about the subject himself to come up with a book that centered strictly around Dr. Cook's fraud-ridden McKinley climb, using Cook's own photographs to discredit him completely.

This book is well illustrated to prove beyond the shadow of any doubt, that Dr. Cook faked his story about climbing Mount McKinley. Washburn uses Cook's own photographs and compared it with modern ones and pointed it out on the map to show where Cook was at each photograph. Authors also showed how Cook's photos were cropped to create a fantasy to support Cook's claims of conquering McKinley when he came no where close to it. The book is very clearly written, easy to read and follow.

I highly recommended this book to anyone who have any interest in the history of McKinley, plus the photographs inside, even Cook's, proves to be quite noteworthy as well. At least for me, this book settled all accounts on Dr. Frederick Cook's big hoax.

Pete did a wonderful job in this book, Cook clearly was a fraud. No more question in my mind. Hope Pete gets in touch with us soon, its been far to long. Great Work! Ron & Anita

Washburn is a thorough detective who leaves no doubt Cook was a fraud. His photography from airplanes, and the illustrations show the true scale of the mountains, peaks, glaciers, etc. surrounding McKinley. This makes it easy to understand why his companions back at camp immediately recognized Cook's claim as a lie. They knew he could not have covered all that distance, climbed that mother of all mountains, and then come back in so few days.

What fascinates me is how Cook got the public to believe it by working the media. His magazine stories and photos, books, lectures, all created the illusion that he had done something spectacular. But he had not! He only went camping ...

Washburn is a remarkable individual, a fine writer, and a photographer on a par with Ansel Adams. This work is a masterpiece from a mountaineering genius. It is too bad he had nothing more than Cook to use as a foil.

By the way - the publisher made a serious mistake using the smallest type font used for body text I have ever seen in a book. One could increase font size several points and still have generous margins. What were they thinking? This is tiny text! A flaw I'll try to overlook from this magnificent end to the Cook debate.

I cannot give you a review both items were returned do to a mishap on my professor's end. The item was returned about three weeks ago and I have not received a return as of to date.. Truthfully, I'm unhappy with your service and will tell other individuals not to purchase items from your company :( Still awaiting refund.

i only looked at the book once because the professor didnt require us to use the book for studying purposes. im sure it's a useful book, i just didnt get to use it.

This text book has been by far the worst text book for any class I have taken in my 4 years of college. The text is laid out in such a fashion that learning in nearly impossible. Normally I would enjoy a class like this, because I enjoy solving problems that are used in real life situations. I have not found this book to help me learn The Fundamentals of Corporate Finance at all.
For everyone who has to use this book for a class I hope that your professor is able to explain what you are supposed to be learning because this book will not help at all.

I really enjoyed using this text book. It is clearly written and the student CD really helped me learn the material.

I purchased this book for a class where it was required, but saved $ by purchasing through amazon. I paid about $120 and see that the price has gone up in the last 2 months. This book seems long but is filled with examples of calculations and process. I found that reading the book gave me a clearer and more thorough explanation than even my teacher could give. I have learned a lot and would highly recommend this book to anyone trying to learn finance.

Tim Bradford, a cartoonist by trade for a weekly British football magazine, has a random encounter with Shane MacGowan outside a London tube station and is inspired to travel to Ireland in order to sell a car expecting to get a better return there than in England.

What follows is an often very funny description of some offbeat places and the people who either inhabit or visit them across Ireland. Bradford writes amusingly for the most part but once in a while he goes off the deep end looking for a laugh.

Overall a quick, mildly amusing travelogue. Not a guide, and the book has nothing to do with Shane MacGowan except for the opening setup.

Me and my wife went to Ireland and took Tim Bradford's excellent and massively funny book with us. As travel books go, Tim's is unorthodox, packed with information while always a funny, bizarre and entertaining read. Thanks to Tim me and the missus, among many other things, went to tiny Doolin on the west coast for the "world's best pub walk" and a wonderful session in a wonderful Irish bar. Never did get to see Ted though!

I've read, re-read and cross-referenced to this book so many times I soon will know it by heart. Bradford writes excellently and in a manner which makes "Is Shane..." a difficult book to put down at all. That, coupled with funny drawings, a view of the world firmly tongue-in-cheek and the most stupid scheme for selling a car ever made makes this book great for entertainment value, very helpful as an introduction to what Ireland and "irishry" is all about and, as was the case for me and my wife, essential if you're planning a tour of Ireland!

Buy it today!

I'm a big fan of both Tim Bradford and Ireland, so when me and my wife went on our honeymoon there this book (sectioned, obviously, just next by "Bryson" for some free publicity, as Tim himself points out) was an absolute must.

Bradford has a fantastic way with words which makes the few sections in the book when he drones on a bit entertaining, even if longish.

Under the cover of going to Ireland to sell his girly car for a quick buck, Bradford takes us on a marvellous journey around this fantastic island. The highlight for me was the part on Doolin and "the greatest pub walk in the world". Well, we went to Doolin, took the pub walk as prescribed in the book, and although Ted McCormac was nowhere to be seen, went home both drunk and happy!

The book is full of interesting references to things and sites of interest in Ireland which otherwise might pass the visitor by and as such works very well indeed as an unorthodox travel book. We certainly weren't preparing for a two-day round-trip in the Drogheda area, but having been enlightened by the historical wisdom of Tim we got a fantastic experience out of the Boyne valley with surrounding historic magnificencies, and that's merely one example.

Add that to Bradford's magnificent self irony, sarcasm and talent for witty one-liners, and this book is one to buy. Nice work, Tim!

I'd hoped for an entertaining romp through all things Irish. Instead, the book delivered a few random drinking stories. They're well-written and occasionally entertaining, but the book's premise is really just a starting point for a series of meandering adventures.

This account of a trip around Ireland never really reaches the heights it should. Although well written the problem is that the writer simply isn't that funny. Two things to remember: 1) this has nothing to do with Shane MacGowan, and 2) I reckon any reasonable writer could turn out this standard fare.