Bradford Books

Excellent book! I read this in combination with the Governer William Bradford's Letter Book and Mourts Relations and Good Newes from New England by Edward Winslow. I am really glad that I have done it this way, because there is further information in the Good Newes from New England that fills in the gaps of certain events.
This is William Bradford's point of view, and the information in it is amazing. If you are into history, then it doesn't get any better than this. Its not very often that you have the opportunity to see events through someone elses eyes, and this does it.

Although this account of the pilgrams of Plymoth Plantation's first few years in the new world may not be entertaining to the student who is unfamiliar with first hand accounts from original source documents; for those of you who cherish these treasure troves, you have found a gold mine! I especially loved the carefull choice of words with which Bradford as well as other pilgrams from this era were known for. It would do our society well if we were to employ thier thoughtful and skillful use of words. I mention the above because it is so foreign to us, but it in no way eclipses the raw content of the book with respect to the first hand accounts of our fledgling country's history. This book will dispell many of the myths which in recent years have surfaced about the pilgrams motives for coming to America. This book is not only well worth the money, but it is also worth the time to read it!

I came across this book quite by accident and didn't think it would be much of a read. Generally speaking I don't read histories and one from the early 1600's was a pretty daunting task - or so I thought. In fact, it was a great tale of adventure and faith and an extremely insightful and thought provoking book about how this country was started and what it must have looked like to those who arrived here some 350 years ago.I really did love this book.

Bradford is an engaging writer whose prose isn't hard to understand. In places his understatement about the death and hardship faced almost constantly is even amusing. Nothing of the kind of challenges that the Leyden pilgrims faced in Massachusetts will seem familiar to a modern reader. Just the same, the fact that it all happened is fascinating. One can almost imagine being there, looking over the decks of the Mayflower and facing all that December gray and wilderness and wondering what you were doing coming here. Told in first person it reads like an adventure as much as a history.

The pilgrims here are also quite human and not at all the diorama characters of a first graders Thanksgiving craft project. They face social challenges and the horrors of death and disease. Attacks by natives actually occured on occasion. The dream of a sort of providence is one that proves difficult in the real world. Bradford mourns the loss of these ideals and the people who imported them. There's something a little sad in his later passages, whether it be age or a truly lost paradise one never really knows. But what Bradford imagined as a sort of religious nirvana clearly doesn't pan out in the end. Nevertheless it is well worth the journey. I highly recommend a read of this American classic.

I was suprised at how gossipy William Bradford was. He told tales about his neighbors and friends and described how the pilgrims constantly bickered with traders and their benefactors over money. My whole fantasy about what I thought the Pilgrims were like has completely changed. Now I consider them petty, self-righteous gossip mongers. The book was good for general information about preparation for their trip and what they actually did when they got here, but as far as historical fact goes, I was unimpressed. Bradford discusses people who stray from the flock, "outsiders" who get girls pregnant, drunkards, and preachers who were not to his liking. It was more like a "dish" session n the Jenny Jones show than something I would be proud to uphold as historical fact to the rest of the nation.

Contrary to a previous review, Bradford can in all accuracy be labelled a Puritan, though he himself would not have appreciated the title, it being a word used as a jibe by their opponents. Nowadays, the word has come to refer to a theological standpoint, independent of political positioning. Hence an Anglican might be a Puritan (see Master Alden who came over on the Mayflower), and a Separatist would be even more likely to be one. Puritans might also be called "the hotter sort" of Protestants, for their strictness in matters scriptural, and Puritan theology is entirely in keeping with Bradford's position and beliefs, both political and religious, as a Separatist.

Previous reviewers seem to have approached the book with differring expectations. If you want to read about John and Priscilla, go to Longfellow, and if you want to read about Constance of the Mayflower, then you won't find her here (except in the records for the 1623 land division, maybe) - and indeed few of the myths of the Pilgrim Story can be found in Bradford's history. This might dissappoint some people who like to paint their history with honest toil and romance, Plymouth Rocks and Thanksgivings, but to a more attentive reader, Bradford has delights enough to keep anybody satisfied. His style is at times cumbersome, and the language of the 1640s(ish) can often obscure the already confusing legal language of some of the letters and contracts in the book. The language and style, though, are part of the book's character. Bradford's reticence in always referring to himself as either "The Governor" or "Governor Bradford" is not only quaint but also instructive, and to dismiss is as tedious is not to give it its due attention.

Overall, Bradford still keeps a sense of adventure and dedication: adventure that the reader may share when confronted with sudden unfamiliar truths of the divisions which separated the Pilgrims, or the decidedly economic flavour to some of the reasons for their departure from Holland. Even to witness on a page before you the first time in any known source that the word "Pilgrims" was used to describe the settlers at Plymouth, is enough to make the reader feel privileged.

Morison's notes now look somewhat dated - his anachrinistic mention of Communism sticking particularly in the throat, but the reader might share some of his admiration which obviously emerges for the governor and his people. The Pilgrims at Plymouth can in many ways be regarded as adventurers and even (rather more dubiously) pioneers. Maybe if more people were exposed to Bradford's work they would see that although they weren't quite what popular culture would have us think of them, they were all the same resolute and brave people in most untoward circumstances.

Hobson notes that the purpose of this book is to develop a "three-way analogy between dreaming, psychosis, and psychedelic experience." These varied states of consciousness share underlying mechanisms mainly involving a subtle shift in neuromodulatory systems. He relates that the "larger implication of this goal is to promote the concept of a unified theory that could account for all spontaneous and induced alterations of consciousness, whether they are produced and experienced in the context of natural life, scientific experimentation, therapeutic treatment, or recreational use." Of that final topic, I enjoyed his rendering of hallucinogen usage as "recreational psychopathology." By this, he neither maligns psychopathology nor hallucinogen usage (at least as a productive research tool). According to the theory that unites this often dissociated book; dreaming, psychosis, and psychedelic experience are facets of the same gem.

While The Dream Drugstore: Chemically Altered States of Consciousness imparts numerous interesting points about dreams and dream physiology, its scope is much broader. Hobson's other books, such as Dreaming: An Introduction to the Science of Sleep or The Dreaming Brain: How the Brain Creates Both the Sense and the Nonsense of Dreams are surely the ones to consult for more detailed reviews of dream theories. An important point he relates is that during REM sleep, working memory and areas of the frontal lobe are inhibited. This helps to explain the capricious shifts in themes, plots, and characters that are typical of dream experience. Moreover, the disruption of these systems is linked to the sequestration of monoamines (esp. serotonin and norepinephrine) during sleep. During the day the dominance of aminergic over cholinergic systems is typical while at night the opposite ensues. He sees these two systems as locked in a competition that affects all aspects of consciousness.

Hobson provides a solid review of the main categories of psychotropic drugs and explains their mechanisms of action with a particular eye toward supporting his ideas about the diurnally shifting balance of neuromodulators.

Numerous long-winded accounts of Hobson's own dreams pepper the book. Reading others' dream journals is none too rewarding but Hobson's point is well made: dreams can be just as odd, transcendental, or psychedelic as any acid trip.

Though a psychiatrist, Hobson derides the casually prescribing druggists of his profession. He believes a more circumspect approach is necessary even in the use of well-tested psychotropics, such as the SSRIs. According to his research, SSRIs can profoundly affect the architecture of sleep and potentially lead to long-term change in neuromodulatory systems, some beneficial, others not. He's not an absolutist and would hardly eschew the use of drugs to treat serious conditions but insists that a more careful cost-benefit analysis be employed in all cases. As he notes, "the sad conclusion is that the medical profession and the pharmaceutical industry may be collaborating in an unwitting and unplanned program of experimental medicine." Hobson makes a reasoned critique of "selective" psychotropics by writing that even the selectivity of some drugs to influence a single neuromodulator or receptor type becomes problematized once we recognize the complex dynamics of neurophysiology; in short, we're talking about a `wet' system here, not a `dry' one. This is biochemistry, not a clockworks.

The book is extremely dense in some places. It's important to remember that insights from a 40 year career are compressed into these pages. The almost impressionistic way Hobson relates some complex issues can be hard-to-follow by the non-specialist. But the book abounds in fascinating ideas and theories. I found the last third especially fruitful, so reading all the way through rather than giving up too soon has its rewards.

If you plan to read this and don't have a degree in clinical psychology or brain physiology, plan to skip a lot or have an encyclopedia handy. It is by far the most difficult book I have ever read. There is, however very useful and interesting information. Beginning with a less technical explanation of how dreams and dream visions work, the book hits the ground running. Then very quickly, Dr. Hobson gets into what parts of the brain are activated in REM sleep, what occurs in REM sleep etc. REM sleep is really the basis for dreams and for the rest of the book. Here are some of the topics I found to be very educational: REM sleep, sleep cycles, neuromodulation, drugs that inhibit and prohibit dreams, how the brain works in REM, false awakenings and definitely lucid dreaming.

My problem with the book is partially my own ignorance or just plain ineptness in the subject matter. I don't have a degree in these areas, so probably half the book means little to nothing to me. I do believe, however that if Hobson was writing to a larger audience such as just a well-rounded college educated individual, he missed the mark by a long shot. The biology vernacular or language used is on a post-graduate level and even then only doctors of psychology or psychiatry would be able to make full use of this book. I've probably skipped 50 or 60 pages of the 200 I've read, just because I was completely lost in the speak of the prefrontal cortex, medulla, parietal lobe and reuptake inhibitors. I appreciate the science used to back up the claims made, but audience should really have been given more consideration here. I found Dr. Hobson to be rather fascinating in his usage of the English language however. Like another reviewer said, it is a big bite. A good book nonetheless if you have some serious time and want to put effort into understanding the mechanics of the brain in sleep.

This book is chock full of information and my sessions with it were spent with a highlighter in my hand, because there's a lot to go through.

Hobson doesn't dance around and gets right to work explaining brain function during sleep and the parallels between states of consciousness during REM sleep, neurosis and drug use.

Most of what Hobson discusses in this book can be found in his other texts, especially The Dreaming Brain, but this book is definately a worthwhile supplement.

I give the book 4 out of 5 stars because of its content. There's tons of well presented information, but it's hard for a layman to wrap their head around.

Hobson has written yet another very good book on the neurochemical mechanisms of conscious states. Certainly, there is not very much one has not read before on his books like Consciousness, Dream as Delirium or The Chemistry of Consicous States. But still, the book should be read because it cuts into some very deep issues regarding consicousness and neurochemistry, specially with regards to dreaming and sleep research. Now the thing is this book is supposed to be about the action of prescription and recreational drugs, but one gets Hobsons model of conscious states, and only then a little of how it explains the actions of those drugs. THis is not necessarily a bad thing, for models are good foundations for such explorations, but maybe a lot more space should have been given to drugs and their actions in the brain.

Hobsons well known model of conscious states, AIM, standing for activation (high-low), Input output grating (internal or external information sources) and modulation (aminergic or cholinergic) is presented in the book, and is supposed to do the lot of the explanatory work. The model is useful in this sense, but I have doubts about its power to actually explain what consicousness is. Activation seems to determine waking, not consciousness per se, Input determines content, not consicousness per se, and modulation seems to be in the level of processing mode, and not processing itself. IN other words, it is not clear to me neurochemistry is the right level where one can find really interesting causal links, like neural correlates of consciousness. But the reality is that the model is grounded on firm evidence and good science, and does explain many things ABOUT consicousness. It certainly adds important things to the debate.

Another very interesting issue Hobson takes on is on the inadequacy of psychotherapeutic frameworks, of how these are mostly incompatible with modern brain sicence. I must agree almost completely here with him. Hobson also mainly concentrates on nonrephinephrine, serotonin and acetycholine as main players, the first two associated with waking and the last with dreaming. This move seems premature, for there are coutless of neurochemicals that may play also important roles. Nonetheless, these serve as the basis of his dream as delirium hypothesis: that psychosis is similar phenomenally and chemically with normal dreaming states, and thus involves alteration in the aminergic or cholinergic systems of the brain. Dreaming involves chcolinergic activity but in sleep. When such activity is present in waking, psychosis ensues. THis is one of the most plausible and defendable views on psychosis out there. By extension, drugs that cause psychosis, or aleviate it, must affect in some way the aminergic and cholinergic systems of the brain. In this way, Hobson explains the action of drugs, both recreational and clinical. (of course im simplifying. I omit the interactions of the other aspects of the AIM model, I and A. Dreaming and psychosis involve high activation and internal or hallucinatory imputs, for example). So in this ellegant framework Hobson frames the rest of his discussion.

Now if one thing can be said about the style of writing, usually good in HObsons books, is that there seems to be way too small a bibliography. For a book of such lenght and scope, one would expect extensive support in references and evidence coming from various diciplines and labs. In fact, Hobson lists about 10 references and onnly seems to present evidence either compatible with his views and coming from his own lab. This is to me a very bad thing for his book, otherwise a brilliant exposition of a promising thesis. The book is nevertheless a valuable addition to the consicousness litterature, and HObson is one of the main players in the game.

Having completed my honors thesis on the structure and function of REM sleep, I feel that I know a bit about the subject of dreams. I have read myriad scientific articles by J.A. Hobson and even another of his books, entitled Sleep. I got about 50 pages into this one and realized I still may have bitten off a bit more than I could chew. The audience Hobson was aiming at here must be the scientific community because I found myself skipping paragraphs at a time because of the tedious detail of neuro-pathways and receptor information that Hobson plows through with an expectation that the reader will need little or no introduction or explanation of the complex neuroanatomy and chemistry that he discusses. He is a great writer, but unless you are a neurochemist, I would recommend one of his other books on the topic of dreams and sleep.

I came across this book very recently. Although the actual events occured over 10 yrs ago, it still interested me.

As the author presents it, this seems like a very dramatic, compelling story. Unfortunately, the truth exists and this is not it. I was a student of Brad King's at the time these events took place and very obviously, this rendition is off.

The author should be ashamed that he wrote such a sensationalized account to sell books.

Another masterpiece by Mr.Cauffiel.He has the ability to make me feel I was actually there watching this sick scene play itself out. How could king do this to the mother of his kids?!This guy is actually one of Cauffiel's oddest killer's yet.How did he think he could get away with it? How could he have actually ever become a cop?? Also included in this book are some good family photos,including some unintentionally hilarious pictures of killer king himself,obese and bald in a cheap looking plaid suit.What did these women see in this absolute moron?A MUST READ

Lowell Cauffiel has done a tremendous job in detailing the investigation of Diane King's murder. Her husband, Brad King, was the main suspect after the initial interviews and crime scene reconnaissance, but with some police errors and departmental territorialism, the forensic evidence that could have tied Brad to the murder was lost or inadmissible. I felt the frustration of the prosecutors and Diane's family during the year after her murder, particularly after learning so much about Brad and what a very strange person he is. I also appreciated that Diane King was portrayed realistically - with both positive and negative attributes. It was very interesting to read the psychological profiles of Brad King and what behaviorists have written on criminals, and at the end of the book Cauffiel noted his own analysis of the man and the crime. It's a sad story, very well written.

This is another of those (in)famous "true crime" books that are a delight to read despite their subject matter. The research was stupendous but best of all was the ability of the author to create a compelling story from the disparate components. True, this is no FATAL VISION or HELTER SKELTER but it is a very good read. My only complaint is one heard often - too much unimportant detail that detracts from the power of the story. Bradford King was almost obscenely compelling as the "average Joe" who went over the top and committed the ultimate crime. Good Read.

Caulfiel's look at the sensational murder of Battle Creek, Michigan anchor woman Diane King is extremely detailed and encompasses a wide range of issues. To Caulfiel's credit, he avoids overdramatizing events and putting a distinct spin on the story. This is a pitfall some true crime writers fall into but Caulfiel does not. He also paints a vivid picture of the small town atmosphere of Marshall, Michigan. The comments from King himself are also intriguing.

My main complaint with this book is that it is far too long. Much of the more boring mintuae of the investigation is unnecessary and plodding to read. A lot of issues are rehashed several times. Also, very little detail is given about how King's children were faring with her family after the trial. That would have been time better spent.

All in all, it's a good effort but could use some paring down.

The book made me realize that enyone can do anything they wish. I wish it would have gone a little deeper into the life of harriet tubman, however I thought it was still a good book.

Harriet Tubman was born to a free man and a slave woman. Her life was hard and she abhorred slavery for her people. She sustained a head injury while helping an escaping slave. Her free Black husband was not supportive of her activities. Learning she was to be sold, Harriet planned an escape, however her brothers made her return. She finally did escape, using the underground railroad. Harriet was a family woman, and could not rest until she helped her sister and brother escape. The Blacks truly considered her their female version of the Biblical Moses.

In 1868 after the war Harriet Tubman was induced to dictate her autobiography. In the various editions the story changed, becoming more militant over the years. She also needed the funds from the sale of the book.
Tubman was and is a great American hero. That can not be denied. But with the exception of a few newspaper articles, a few letters and this book, much of what we know about her has been passed from one author to another, each changing or embellishing the story as she or he saw fit.
Unfortunately there are some exaggerations, and or glaring mistakes in this book. Being that she was illiterate it could be that the story was just told wrong. I would hope so.

The Combahee River Raid during the American Civil War is a good example of the problems with her story.
While the raid did take place historians to this day have no documented proof of exactly what her role was and how extensive her involvement in the planning. Unfortunately the reports by the Union commanders are missing. In addition certain parts of the narrative, which are presented as fact, simply didn't happen. The raid never came within five miles by water of the railroad. Only private buildings, farms, plantations, mills were burnt or destroyed. No governmental supply depots were even in the area. Unfortunately this brings into question of what really did happen.
What we do know is she was on the raid, she had a major role in the raid. Most importantly over 750 slaves were freed. Many of these freed slaves eventually did serve in the Union cause.
A good story, but don't take all of the facts for fact before you really do your homework.

A very informative book. Prior to reading this book, I had assumed Mrs. Tubman took her people to the North, the land of "Freedom". I was wrong, Mrs. Tubman had to take her people all the way to Canada, to be free. In the North, with the passage of the fugitive slave act, Harriett Tubman knew her people would/and could be 'captured' by Northern slave catches, ( who frequently captured free African-Americans as well) and sold them back into slavery) Traveling at night, hiding in the swamps, carring laudnum to keep the crying babies from crying and giving them away, and a pistol for safety, and risking her very life should she be captured.

I regret there was never more recorded history on Harriett Tubman. Her bravery, and heroism are awe inspiring. She risked her life 19 times, to save her people, and bring them to Canada, for Canada was the end of the Undergound Railroad.

Mrs. Tubman serves as a true American Hero, that went far beyond and above, what the vast majority of us would do.

I take my hat off to you, Mrs Tubman. God Bless you.

I thought that this book was great. I enjoyed that it was written by someone in Harriet's time, except that some of the terminolgy is confusing. If you read this book, you will learn a lot about Harriet, and her adventures, but remember the dictionary!

There seem to be different kinds of truth:

valid deduction from true assumptions

agreement with observation

satisfaction of a definition

usefulness

consensus view

coherence, consistency

etc., etc.

Utility theory in economics is a contribution to formalizing a notion
of "useful" or "good." But we now know that traditional scalar
utility is unsound (Beardon, et al, J. of Mathematical Economics, 37,
17-38, 2002) and that utility must (in general) be a vector (Thrall,
Decision Processes, 1960, Wiley, NY).

I suggest that in the same way truth is a vector having different
components. It is these different components that are the different
kinds of truth discussed by Kirkham and other philosophers.

Certainly the best book on theories of truth I've come across
(and, believe me, I've searched wide and far). Kirkham writes
in an elegant, crisp style and provides the reader not just with
an overview and comparison of various theories of truth but gives
one a clear understanding of their respective shortcomings as well.
Highly recommended reading!

Truth is one of the most subjective and utterly elusive things humans have ever conceived, and this book makes it evident, while at the same time coming up with ideas and arguments which shed light on whether or not truth can be had and if so, to what extent. Very readable, and extremely insightful.

~jjg

I would like to point out I ordered the fifth printing of "Theories of Truth" and pages 307-338 are missing. To be more correct, they are replaced by pages 51-82. The most amazing thing is that the missing pages contain the material on the disquotational theory of truth--the ONE section I needed.

Perhaps my case is unique, but one would think the MIT Press could get this right.

By far the best introduction to theories of truth. The author has a preternatural gift for exposition. Even the twistiest corners of truth-theorizing are explained clearly without being oversimplified.

He comes down a little hard on James and the pragmatic theory of truth, but having opinions is a good thing, not a bad thing. Of particular interest is his chapters on the Liar paradox--an almost unbelievably lucid explication. Follow up with Scott Soames book on truth, and you'll be well on your way.

This is an update posted on October 21, 2008.

After I read this book, I tried to manage going about not being anyone. I ran into the same problem as Hume did so long ago... as soon as you make a move to do something, then you are someone.

This puzzled me, so I removed the positive review I had posted here in 2006. I then begin studying what the real problem was.

I have recently learned that the reason an intelligent individual can write a book about being no one is that the self we assume in moving about here is a fiction that the mind creates. It is the fictional "self" that can be dispensed with at times.

There is, however, a fully functional, intentional mind that works and lives and loves. Eliminativism is false.

For a detailed explanation of the relation between world, brain, mind and self, see Dale Jacquette's "Philosophy of Mind" and "Ontology."

This is a truly brilliant book, with some weaknesses. Anyone with a background in philosophy who reads any book about neurological disorders immediately sees the possibility of building a theory of consciousness and self based on those disorders. Metzinger has done just that.

Personally, I find Metzinger's arguments persuasive, and I think he has developed something truly original and valid. (Metzinger himself would admit, however, that not all aspects of his theory will turn about to be correct.)

The primary weakness of the book is its highly abstract nature. Multiple pages can pass by, all of a purely theoretical nature and without a single concrete example along the way. Moreover, for some of his subsidiary theories, Metzinger even creates acronyms which he uses afterwards throughout the book--which can be annoying. I often found myself trying to remember exactly what PMIR stands for. But given the depth and breadth of this work, I suppose acronyms are justified. This is just not a book intended for the general public.

One small criticism on vocabulary: Metzinger uses the terms "transparent" and "opaque" with their opposite connotative meanings. Metzinger's "transparent" is meant as invisible, like a transparent model not being visible as a model. But, unfortunately, for most English speakers, transparent usually connotes something being visible: a "transparent form of government" is one in which the citizens can peer into and see what's really going on. Something in the reverse direction happens with Metzinger's use of the word "opaque." English speakers sometimes use "opaque" as meaning obscure or difficult to understand--which is not what Metzinger intends at all. So when reading "transparent" or "opaque" in this book, I found myself having to take any extra cognitive step to consciously reverse my normal connotative expectations.

It may be possible to access some of this book without reading everything. What I would suggest is the following: the first chapter, Neurophenomenological Case Studies I and II (good discussion of concrete cases), and the first and last sections of the last chapter ("The Neurophenomenological Caveman" and "Being No One").

If you are not an expert in this field and have no intention of becoming one, it might be better to go to some different books. I would suggest Antonio Damasio's "The Feeling of What Happens." Damasio's book can be difficult in its own right, but with some cognitive effort it should be possible for most educated readers to get their minds around it. Better yet is Ramachandran's "Phantoms in the Brain," which is very readable and fascinating as well. Ramachandran focuses on concrete cases--with very little philosophical discussion. (In fact, Ramachandran seems to have a distaste for philosophy.) Indeed, "Being No One" includes many long quotes from "Phantoms." Just by reading through "Phantoms" you should be able to get a general notion of how a theory of consciousness and self might be developed from a study of neurological disorders.

One final point I'd like to make is a defense of Kant. Near the end of the book, Metzinger writes: "This phenomenally transparent representation of invariance and continuity constitutes the intuitions that underlie many traditional philosophical fallacies concerning the existence of selves as process-independent individual entities, as ontological substances that could in principle exist all by themselves, and as mysteriously unchanging essences that generate a sharp transtemporal identity for persons. But at the end of this investigation we can clearly see how individuality (in terms of simplicity and indivisibility), substantiality (in terms of ontological autonomy), and essentiality (in terms of transtemporal sameness) are not properties of selves at all."

When I read that sentence, I immediately thought of Kant's Paralogisms in the Critique of Pure Reason. Metzinger's point is almost exactly the same as Kant's (although Kant takes a purely theoretical approach devoid of discussion of neurological cases). All three properties of the self (1) the substantial "I," (2) the simple soul and (3) numerical identity over time are expressly described by Kant as being "illusions." I even thought that Metzinger must have been thinking of Kant when he wrote that sentence--just without citing him. But Metzinger does not seem to be familiar with the Paralogisms. No book of Kant's figures in Metzinger's long list of references, not even the Prolegomena (which includes an abbreviated discussion of the Paralogisms). Metzinger even criticizes Kant's "transcendental unity of apperception" as being undermined by a study of certain neurological disorders. Somehow, Metzinger believes that Kant "conclude[d] from the fact that, in standard situations, all of us experience ourselves as initiators of our own thoughts or that the 'I think' can, in principle and in the large majority of phenomenal configurations, accompany all states of consciousness, that some kind irreducible entity (e.g., a transcendental subject) must exist." Kant never concluded anything like that! Just the opposite. For Kant, the unity of apperception is transcendental: it does not exist in emperical reality. And in the Paralogisms, Kant wrote 50 pages of detailed, explicit arguments to that effect. What's even more exasperating is that Metzinger's entire point of the self's "substantiality," "essence" and "individuality" not being "epistemically justified" was prefigured by Kant himself two hundred years earlier--and Metzinger seems entirely unaware of the fact.

But in the end, my criticism of Metzinger's understanding of Kant is a minor one. The modern world is becoming overwhelmed with information, and an unfortunate side effect is that Kant is being forgotten. "Being No One" is still a great book.

I came to this book from a footnote in Peter Watt's new novel 'Blindsight'. As an older layperson, I can say that Metzinger assumes a background and vocabulary in philosophy that I don't have. But, he has a habit of summarizing and clarifying his points that gives you a thread through the discussion. It's been like an immersion course in another language, and oh the joy when you can grasp a concept or some of his ideas flash out at you. I can think of nothing else I've read in the past few decades that has repaid my hard work with so very much food for thought.

Being No One (and note the specific grammar: it's not 'Being No-one) is more than worth the work. Highly recommended for anyone interested in how consciousness relates to brain activity.

Brevity is the essence of wit. How true. Metzinger's book shows just how true this adage is.

"This book was written for readers" Metzinger imperiously informs us at the outset. He should have qualified this phrase by referring to "readers of drivel," and not otherwise intelligent and observant people.

This book is ineffably BORING. Don't look for the clarity of Doidge or Gladwell here, boy. You ain't gonna find it. And to add insult to injury, Metzinger trots out non-existent words like "processuality" (p. 23) and phrases like "not approaching syntacticity" (p. 32). OMG. You've got to be kidding me! If God changed his mind and decided to flood the earth once more, I'd go find this book, cuz it would still be dry.

And I'd like to know how I can get my money back for my 700 pages of nonsense. I tell ya: if the price of horse manure ever goes up, this book will be worth a fortune.

This book is very hard to review. There are many reasons for this. One is that I may be biased: I think this may be the most important book written about consciousness in the last couple of decades. Then there is the fact that the book is enormous in scope, (and not far in size either- it is 650 pages long), brilliantly written and argued, and succeeds in doing something few other related books do. Reading this book makes you feel that consciousness has been explained. It makes you feel that the monster has been tamed, that progress can be made, that those who believe there can be no sensible exxplanation for consicousness are just wrong. Now in reality, it is not obvious that consciousness HAS been explained. But one feels like it has. And this is why I think this book is superior to Daniel Dennetts ¨Consicousness explained¨, arguably the book regarded as the most significant and influential philosophical contribution in the field. After reading Dennett, few believed consicousness had been explaied. Even few felt like it had. This book is unique, and I believe it is a matter of time until its impact is made apparent.

Metzinger wanted to show that the self can be explained in subpersonal terms, using representational analysis. He quickly noticed that since Selves are usually consicous entities, that he would first have to do this for consciousness. Imagine that. Having to explain consicousness to try to explain the self. And so, the book could be seen as divided in two. First, a theory of consicousness, and second, a theory of the self. I am by far more impressed with the former, although undoubtedly the latter is extremely interesting as well.

Before proposing a number of theorethical entities supposed to play the explanatory role, Metzinger carefully analyses the conceptual tools necessary to understand the problem, and formulate solutions. Thus, he analyses the concepts of representation, mental model, phenomenal presentation, etc. His account is also almost completely positive; that is, he almost does not stop to defend his ideas, or to analyse other philosphical theories. He focuses on arguing step-by step for a conceptual edifice that may lead to the explanation of phenomenal states in terms of non-phenomenal objective relations. This part of the book alone seems to me to be one of the strongest formulations of a representational theory of mental states.

Metzinger, then, is able to answer the question of what makes a mental state a conscious state. He argues that mental states have representational, and these states can have phenomenal content if the representational states meet some constraints. Consciously experienced content is content of an active phenomenal model, and phenomenal contents are all representational. The various constraints are the conditions that the representational content must meet in order for it to be a phenomenal content. Examples of these constraints are globality (integration into a global whole), activation in a window of presence, transparency.

The constraints are what makes these ideas powerful. Metzinger analyses the constraints in representational, phenomenological, information-processing, functional and neural-implementation terms. He gives what could be seen as necesary and sufficient conditions for a mental state to be a consicous state. He presents a theory of consicousness. And a very sensible, conceptually simple, naturalistic, and powerful one.

After doing this, he shows how his analysis can acomodate some abnormal phenomenons like blindsight, agnosia, and neglect. He then does much of the same last steps with the problem of the self. He defines concepts like subjectivity, self-hood, self-models. Then he proposes theorethical entities like the phenomenal self model, or the phenomenal model of the intentianality relation, to try to show how the conscious self might emerge. Here too metzinger argues that self content must meet some constraints to be considered phenomenal self content. He also tests his constructs against cases like anosognosia, multiple persoality, lucid dreams.

In sum, Metzinger deals with everything from mental representation, to content, qualia, subjectivity, intentionality, self, and does it in carefully ordered and convincing ways. Metzinger is a philosopher, and the theory is mostly philsophical. But few philsophers include such careful empirical and neurobiological observations. Few philosophers have such knowledge of the extensive literature. Few are as convinced of the central role that scientific objective theorethizing must play.

I must repeat that it is in no way evident that consciousness is explained in Metzingers book. But if there is a book that will set the conceptual framework that leads to such an explanation, it is this one. It is virtually imposible to explain his ideas concisely, and to understand them one has to follow his discussion completely. Therefore, I can do not much but to recomend that anyone interested in consicousness read this book. The book is quite technical and it is fairly long, however I believe that this should not stop the lay reader. The book is in my opinion simply too important. I have reviewed close to 100 books now, most of them on consicousness. I have said on numerous times that such or such a book is a must read. This one is the one I think more closely matches that description.

Philosophers are always in danger of mistaking an obsolete scientific model for what they consider to be reality. Nowhere has this been more of a problem than in the philosophy of action and intention, which has relied on a billiard ball notion of causation inherited from Newtonian mechanics. In this remarkable book, Alicia Juarrero applies the new scientific paradigm of complexity theory to these issues. In doing so, she creates a philosophy of action and intention that actually works with complex biological systems and with the intricacies of human motivation; in other words, a philosophy that finally confirms and supports what has been learned about human beings by psychologists and psychoanalysts. "Dynamics in Action" is another very successful demonstration of the general applicability of complexity theory to the understanding of structure, process and organization everywhere. It is a must read for specialists in these fields and for anyone interested in the revolutionary changes taking place in the contemporary world view.

The book seeks a set of terms in which to discuss the actual complexities,and indeterminacies of human conscious intentions and actions. Who acts consciously, why and how ? It first reviews the history of causality from Aristotle onward, to see how present scientific models of causality have developed, such as Newtonian mechanism, and why they are useless in discussing messy real life. It then succinctly develops the terms of information and chaos theories as used in dynamical systems theory, applies these to real life situations, and develops a whole new language to discuss conscious thought and action. It then reconciles this sort of discussion with the explanatory values of traditional interpretive narrative, as in history and fiction. The crown of the work is to discuss the implications of this new description of conscious human behavior and action for such questions as free will, ethics, education, personal identity and the future. It is a quiet book, but its actual, and revolutionary, achievement is to return philosophic discourse to the real world with a set of terms adequate to its inescapable ignorances, unpredictabilities,uncertainties, contradictions and open-endedness. The range of material usefully invoked, from Aristotle to Prigogine, Eco,Thom, Gadamer, Ibsen and Flaubert, is matched only by the energy and clarity of the writing. It is one of the important books of philosophy for our time.

I wrote a formal review of this book for the June issue of _Philosophical Psychology_....

Basically, I think this book is a good idea, but poorly executed. Juarrero makes an interesting conncetion between problems in action theory, the branch of philosophy having to do with human action and its place in the world, and information theory. And it is an interesting project to solve some of these traditional problems using modern neuroscience and dynamical systems theory. So I laud the attempt.

But no matter how interesting the project, a book has to sink or swim with the details, and Juarrero gets many of them wrong. She misinterprets Donald Davidson's theory of actions as causes, uses mathematical terms such as bifurcation in non-standard ways, and gets the laws of thermodynamics plain wrong. The casual reader may be impressed with her expansive technical vocabulary, but ultimately it detracts from the interesting ideas in the book. Read through the first 200 pages, and you'll realize that the most contentious issues in dynamical systems theory are not even discussed; indeed, Juarrero takes too much of the science for granted.

And so, while it's an interesting topic, the book could have used a lot more research and done a lot more "connecting the dots" for readers. If you're after some other books on causality, I would suggest instead Judea Pearl's new book _Causality_. If you are interested in dynamical systems theory, I would read the later works of Andy Clark (such as _Being There_) or some of the papers published by Chris Eliasmith (available on the web).

Hope this helps :) --BNT

Choice (November 00) calls Dynamics in Action (together with Judea Pearl's Causality, which Choice reviews together with Pearl) "a radically new perspective on causation and the explanation of human behavior. Juarrero proposes a new framework for explaining human action. She probes deeply into the springs of human action to explicate the secret link between mental intention and physical behavior. She begins with a critique of Aristotle's legacy in attempts to understand human agency, arguing that modern philosophy has largely lost the insight of his distinction of four causes countenancicing only mechanistic efficient causes, while perpetuating Aristotle's erroneous principle that nothing moves itself. Juarrero's work is a paradigm of the integration of philosophical analysis with neuropsychological research, evolutionary theory, complex systems theory, and the physics of nonlinear systems. Causes of human action appear as dynamic constraints on complex adaptive systems. She draws implications for the practical understanding of human freedom and responsibility, even proposing bridges between the literary world and science... Both works are highly ambitious in rejecting traditional views. Both are written clearly and enthusiastically... Juarrero's and Pearl's books will greatly interest philosophers and scientists who are concerned with causality and the explanation of human behavior."

While this book is worthwhile reading for cognitive scientists it is too speculative and fails to support most of its claims with technical detail. The only "detailed" example of a "dynamic system" referred to by Juarrero is a neural network with feedback and experiments with just those systems have failed to scale to human levels of performance (see Judd, Neural Network Design and the Complexity of Learning). Many cognitive scientists hope that this problem can be overcome with a modular network design. This is not considered by Juarrero. I reject Juarrero's claim that constraints constitute a new sort of cause. In fact actual experiments with constraint-based reasoning and with neural networks are performed on von Neumann computers composed of AND, OR, and NOT gates, that is relays/transistors. When looked at on a fine scale of granularity constraints are composed of many small causes/forces acting in the conventional way. In fact, I would argue that granularity and abstraction are the real issues Juarrero should have been addressing.

at least a table of contents would let me know what is inside!

We are all sick and tired of the exaggerated claims of some of the ostensive "EI" "gurus" (prime example, Mr. D. Goleman, who, unbelievably, has made a bundle selling books that have zero substance). It was about time that real academics, like Matthews et al. informed the uniformed about how to go about determining whether a factor can be considered as an individual-difference predictor of behavior/performance/etc. As readers will see, there is nothing much to EI, beyond that which we already know from the personality and general intelligence literature. Fans of EI will be let down; however, it is time that they let go of this mirage called EI and start to see the world from a more pragmatic perspective

As a Phd student in this field I find that although many words have been shed on that matter, few have bothered to take upon themselves the task of putting an order into this exciting yet very ambiguous concept.
This book, which I was eager to buy and read hoping for an updated and comprehensive review has far exceeded my expectations. To put it in simple words, the authors chose the prominent reserches to focus on, and they reviewd them in a critical manner. That sets the first milestone in the route of turning EI from an exciting yet evasive concept into a scientific discipline.
This book is therefore a must for both the scholarly and the popular reader who wish to expose themselves to what will soon become the cornerstone of this field.

Enjoyed it very much.
Zeidner and company did a wonderfull job explaining, refreshening and innovating EI.
Way to go.

This is a superbly scholarly work reviewing existing theories of emotional intelligence (and in passing social intelligence). The authors have carefully combed through various researchers' views on EI, often changing incidentally. They are quite critical of the popular uptake that followed Goleman's much cited work on EI. However, this is not a tarted up version of Golemans's work for a more high brow audience. Rather it is a sustained inquiry into the criteriology of EI. In other words are their scientific criteria separating EI from other human competencies and skills?

In many ways the meat of the book is taken up with the 'myth' aspect of EI rather than the alleged science. The book might have been better titled 'Emotional Intelligence: Fact or fiction?' And the authors are not shy to answer.

While the book is a review of relatively current research (some chapters appear not to reference almost anything after 1995), the authors main target is the lack of sustainable pyschometric tests. Their argument is that when one examines the variety of 'measures' of EI, one finds a variety of mismatched and often contradictory criteria which sometimes confute 'ordinary' measures of IQ with those of EIQ. Where IQ stops and EIQ begins is very unclear. A large number of test instruments are examined in this book and almost without exception found deficient.

The book concludes with a negative appraisal of EI as a distinct capacity that can be accurately measured by psychometric tests. Moreover, the authors are equally pessimistic about the validity of social intelligence as a distinct phenomenon. Perhaps gratutiously insulting to the the EI community are their later points to the effect that EI might be vacuous but we should still let the research run in the hope that something useful might arise in the future. It may be rubbish but sure let them at it anyway; what harm are they doing?

Overall I found the book provocative and one sided. The authors exhibit a form of analysis based on saying what EI is not, or could not be, without subjecting their own position (such as can be discerned) to sustained analysis. That is acceptable, but it is less informative. Secondly, lurking in the background is a strong IQ position, namely that all skills are ultimately manifestations of standrd IQ capacities. By this token the bright should be very socially skilled and the less bright not, but we know that society doesn't divide neatly on that point. Thidly, there is much in early child development about prosocial development that isn't covered in this book. Combining this with the absence of any discussion of conversational pragmatics, and a lacuna is exposed. To be fair however, the authors are taking on the EI community in terms of itself, hence they don't feel obliged to make arguments for them (presumably). However, it was something I noted. A final small point is that a few references in the text don't appear in the bibliography (e.g. Archer 1988 doesn't appear) which suggests the proof reading could have been more thorough.

This book lists a short description of most wild edibles. It has only passable drawn illustrations.

This is a really mediocre book with even more mediocre line drawings and the layout is poor. The "recipes" are integrated in narrative style right into the same area of the book that contains botanical information about the plant. The book also contains useless information about what Native Americans did with the plant 150 years ago. Personally, I find it very hard to identify plants from simple, black and white drawings, particularly when said drawings are small and not very good, and most particularly when it is a plant I intend on eating! I am really sorry I purchased this book, but I purchased it together with another book called "The Forager's Harvest" by Samuel Thayer which is, by contrast, EXCELLENT.

I really enjoyed this book! It is broken down according to type of wild edible (ex. fruit, pot herb, salad, beverages, nuts, etc. The only thing I would change would be the layout under each plant. It's hard to discern where the recipes are because they are incorporated right into the paragraph. It would be nice if the recipes were titled and had lists of ingredients and then directions.

This is the first book I've found that ever really tells you what wild plants are edible.

It's not a "read through" book, but it is eminently valueable for finding out if specific nuts/berries/roots are edible. There are line drawings and Latin names to help with identification. The writing style is informative but not persnicketty. Each plant has 'receipes' and occasionally anecdotes. Infact there are so many 'receipes' that it occasionally comes over as a frusterated gormet cookbook!

But don't worry; the first and best purpose is finding out which plants are edible. How to prepare them is merely a bonus.

In short, this is what I've been looking for for years: a consise, trustworthy guide to identifying wild edibles.
THE book to own on the subject.

amr

Watch Video Here: http://www.amazon.com/review/R3JNP9ROB2RCUV

TV war correspondent, Nicky Wells, is is once again reporting the breaking news, this time in Tianamen Square at the time of the Beijing massacre, when her life is saved by her colleague Clee Donovan. They both realise that the close friendship that they've shared for 2 years has developed into love and begin a passionate affair. Nickys' past life returns to haunt her when she sees the face of her supposedly dead fiance, Charles Devereaux, on a TV news release and sets out on a journey across Europe to find the truth.
This book is quite a delicious mixture of European travelogue, international intrigue and steamy love affair which would make a wonderful and colourful, light mini-series for tv (if it hasn't been done already).

Whoever compares this book with mills and boons must be crazy!!! mills and boons is a total trasy cheap romance! whereas Remember is a very sophisticated and for mature readers who understands Literature!
i enjoyed this book alot!!

I found this book extremely boring. Worse than a Mills and Boons novel. Your money would be better spent on anything else.

Fate sometimes takes away the one you think you loved most, but it is really making space for the true companion. In Remember, Nicki Wells is devastated by the "suicide" of her fiance for many years until she discovers love right under her nose- Clee Donovan. After an affair in Provence (and an obvious change in just a business-only relationship), Nicki Wells discovers that Charles, her fiance is not necessarily dead.

Remember was a GREAT book! It is one of those books that you can read over and over again Filled with excitement, suspense (and a litttle romance) Remember narrates the story of Nicky Wells, a war correspondent and reporter. Three years before, her fiance, Charles Devereaux, "commited suicide" and she is still very emotionally scarred. However, after a friendship with Cleeland Dovonan, a fellow war photagrapher, develops into more than just a friendship, Nicky wonders if she might be able to love someone again. Suddenly, she is forced to remember Charles when she develops disturbing suspciions about his double life. There are some things that you just can't forget, as hinted at in a poem at the beginning of the book by Christina Rossetti: "Remember me when I am gone away, Gone far away into the silent land, When you can no more hold me by the hand, Nor I half turn to go yet turning stay. Remember me when no more day by day You tell me of our future that you planned: Only remember me; you understand It will be too late to counsel then or pray. Yet if you should forget me for a while And afterwards remember, do not grieve; For if the darkness and corruption leave A vestige of the thoughts that once I had, Better by far you should forget and smile Than that you should remember and be sad."