Bernard Books
Related Subjects:
More Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250
Collectible price: $13.99

An unknown gem of a bookReview Date: 2005-11-20


Ice-Bound on Kolguev - the book for naturalists and adventurersReview Date: 2006-11-10

Used price: $47.99

Bosanquet's ontology of rightsReview Date: 1999-12-18
But thanks to the efforts of William Sweet and a handful of other scholars, a renaissance in Idealist studies is afoot. And the present work is as fine a contribution to it as I have seen.
In this volume Sweet sets himself the task of recovering Bosanquet's doctrine of _rights_. That Bosanquet even _had_ such a doctrine may come as a surprise to anyone who knows of Bosanquet only through secondary sources, but he did indeed develop a fairly thorough account of rights in _The Philosophical Theory of the State_ and elsewhere. Since the table of contents of Sweet's marvelous work is helpfully listed on this page, I shall keep my comments brief.
Bosanquet's account of rights is thoroughly teleological: he holds that both rights themselves and their moral authority derive from their contribution to a common end which consists at heart of a society in which everyone is able to live a "good life." For him, the existence and action of the "state" are justified precisely insofar as they contribute toward this end. Central to this account is Bosanquet's doctrine of the "real will," of which Sweet provides an excellent exposition.
Basically, in my own paraphrase, one's "real will" consists of what one _would_ explicitly want, all things considered, if one were fully and completely rational. Sweet provides a thorough and careful explication of this centrally important concept (including an admirable account of why it should be called our "_real_" will).
This doctrine, which strongly influenced Brand Blanshard's similar account (in _Reason and Goodness_) of what he called the "rational will," has been attacked on any number of grounds (notably by Hobhouse early this century), and part of Sweet's concern is to defend it against contentions that it e.g. leads to statism, fails to assign the proper place to individual good, and so forth. He handles the task well, and to my mind makes a case that should be heard by libertarians and free-marketers of all stripes.
(My own view, for what it is worth, is that Bosanquet's teleological account of rights is essentially correct and with almost no modification can be invoked to provide the real basis of the libertarian society. I do not think statist conclusions follow from Bosanquet's premises at all; indeed, I think Austrian economics would benefit from placing its analysis of "market process" on such a philosophical foundation.)
Sweet's volume is enormously helpful for another reason: Bosanquet's own prose style has been found somewhat uncongenial by many readers. Despite a brilliance that repays close reading, he does at times stand in need of a more felicitous expositor who can make clear what Bosanquet himself leaves rather obscure. Sweet is a fine expository prose stylist and handles this task with clarity and skill.

Used price: $9.32

Authentic masterpieceReview Date: 2008-09-02
may all beings be well,
moksa7@yahoo.com
Collectible price: $10.95

Deep, complex, and beautifulReview Date: 2003-06-24

A rare find!Review Date: 2005-12-20

Used price: $9.00

A deft treatise on Christian love and how it should be applied Review Date: 2008-09-07

Used price: $35.00

Imagination and Kant's Moral PhilosophyReview Date: 2006-06-09
Freydberg's approach is masterful for two reasons. First, instead of planting himself only within a textual analysis of the second critique, he bridges the first critique with the second. That is, he shows how the first critique informs and "opens up" into the second critique by appropriating the relevant passages and concepts from the "Critique of Pure Reason," most notably the role of synthesis/image-making and the imagination that powers it. This allows for an analysis that doesn't arise in a vacuum. Freydberg also examines the relation of the second critique to its successor, the "Critique of Judgment" much the same way as he does with the first. Second, in the bridging of the first critique to the second, Freydberg foregoes what could have been a more trouble-free appraisal. Instead of utilizing the A Deduction alone where imagination is prominent, he relies heavily on the B Deduction where Kant seems to have given imagination a "lesser" role. Thus he treads the more difficult path to make his case while also reaping the rewards that this type of journey brings at its conclusion.
Although Freydberg takes his cue from Heidegger (and in turn Sallis), his insights are original. Heidegger, in his book "Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics," claimed that the imagination is the root of both sensibility and understanding but that "Kant recoiled in the face of this unknown root." What makes this account both provocative and exciting is Freydberg's treatment of this "unknown root." He demonstrates that imagination, even when it seems to be absent, is in fact always, already deeply at work even in the construction of our moral framework.
For example, Kant says of the Triebfeder (incentives of pure practical reason) that they are the subjective ground of the determination of a will. As finite beings, we are subject to our pathological incentives. Yet through moral feeling that human beings are also subject, we are aware of the moral law as well (an a priori concept), which is the only law that qualifies as a moral incentive. Bridging this chasm is the imagination. Freydberg reveals how any determination of the will of a finite human being has already undergone the synthesis of imagination. In this case, imagination has generated an incentive out of the pure, moral law as well as bringing it (this moral incentive) into opposed play with our sensuous inclinations.
There are many more examples throughout this work that exemplify imaginations disclosing and synthesizing role. Freydberg's arguments are precise and well thought out. Although working within the continental tradition, he provides a close reading of the text, supporting his position with a logical rigor that should garner the respect of those in the analytic tradition.
In the last analysis, Freydberg's inquiry achieves the notable goal of disclosing how the imagination beats at the heart of the second critique in particular, and all three critiques in general. Suffice it to say that "Imagination in Kant's `Critique of Practical Reason'" is a work that adds sorely needed scholarship to the Kantian corpus. Ignored for too long by many Kant scholars, Freydberg discloses that which, although hidden, plays the crucial role in the "Critique of Practical Reason." Imagination at the heart of Kant's second critique...who would have thought?

Used price: $17.64

Absolutely beautiful.Review Date: 2007-07-19

Used price: $50.70

A Four-Point Model for Transformational LeadershipReview Date: 2000-10-10
I found this book to be well-written and easy to read. The authors apply the model to a wide-range of organizational situations. The only limitation to this book that I found, was a question that I posed to the model, which questions the validity of the model if the culture does nor support the leadership and vision. I suppose though, that the authors would counter argue that if the culture did not support the leadership and vision, that the basis of their model, the four I's were not being implmented properly.
Related Subjects:
More Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250