Events Books

John English's "A Perspective on Infantry," and its revised edition, have been enduring residents on the bookshelves of military professionals since first publication in 1981. English's topic is the tactical role of infantry on the twentieth century battlefield. As a Canadian officer, his focus was primarily on the wars in which Canada participated, but this is not a history of the Canadian Army. His narrative closely examines the evolution of infantry organization and use in the American and British armies, and in their 20th century opponents such as the Japanese and German armies.

English discusses, in very accessible prose, how changes in warfare and technology tended to drive changes in basic infantry organization down to the fire team and squad level, and how infantry was used on the battlefield. He relies heavily on the historical record of the two world wars, but other conflicts are referenced. English's prose is straightforward and matter-of-fact, even sometimes moving, as in his description of the heroic performance of the U.S. First Marine Division in the breakout from the Chosin Reservoir in 1950.

English was a professional writing primarily for other professionals. The reader without military or historical background may not fully appreciate the value of this work.

The extent to which integrated joint and combined operations have come to dominate the actions of the U.S. military and to a lesser degree of its NATO allies is an event largely postdating this edition, as is the degree to which netcentric warfare is now commonly used. Nevertheless, the basis of the infantry continues to be the human soldier: on that basis, "On Infantry" endures as a very worthful professional read.

Books such as English's "On Infantry" are difficult to review because it is wise to examine source material in conjunciton with the text. I ordered this book a year ago and have been working on this review since.

Due to the scope of this book, I'll only talk about the evolution of the infantry squad as English and Gudmundsson outlined throughout "On Infantry." Please note that there are multiple interpretations.

The infantry squad had its roots in ancient times as an administrative unit, a sort of "family grouping" with a big brother serving to mold the younger soldiers. The authors pick this up in the first chapter, "The Open Order Revolution," in the period between 1854 the Crimean War) and 1914 (the outbreak of World War One.) A combination of rifling (extending range) and repeater mechanism (increased fire volume) rendered the earlier means of command, control, and concentration of combat power a certain means to defeat; the enemy would shoot the closed-ranks regiments to pieces in minutes. Dispersion while mutually supporting the rest of the regiment or brigade forced the very junior leaders to assume responsibility for what had been the regimental commander's decision-making, as the battlefield became "empty" in the face of the hail of accurate rifle bullets. Rapid fire weaponry, which included both the machine gun and the quick-fire field piece (one with a recoil mechanism that limited the necessity to relay the gun after each shot--and often used recoil energy to eject spent cartridge casings, increasing the rate of fire), only added to this revolution--and made the old Napoleanic tactics pure suicide.

The squad (often thought of as an American invention) became a tactical unit during the Great War, and its evolution from administrative element (for guard duty, for fatigue details, for grouping into mess elements for distributing rations or for issuing supplies) into a tactical element possessing independant internal manuever and fire elements is spread out through "On Infantry"-- but the most important chapter is 7, "A Corporal's Guard." Oddly enough, the French Army almost got it right during the Great War, and was one of the three models for the modern infantry squad. The French put an automatic rifle in the squad and formally divided the squad into two elements--one grouped around the automatic rifle for fire support, and one for manuever with "ordianry riflemen." The French squad leader went with the maneuver element and the assistant squad leader stayed with the automatic rifle--but the French failed to exploit this innovation. French Army regulations stipulated that the squad was indivisible and that the smallest element capablie of being assigned an independant task was the platoon. The Germans did it right (funny about those Germans) by exchanging the squad's automatic rifle for a light machine gun, keeping the squad leader with the LMG and making that element the main killing system, with the assistant squad leader running a manuever/assault element of riflemen that supported the machine gun's tasks. The Germans called this universal squad the Einsheitsgruppe, and then proceeded to reinvent the wheel due to deterioration in their non-commissioned officer cadre due to casualties to form a second, "guerrilla" formation armed (on paper) with the assault rifle and grenade launcher. Simplified tactics also reduced the ability of the squad for independant action--for a single objective (ie, taking or holding a single small building) the minimum maneuver element was the platoon or even battalion. It should be noted here that even though--on paper--the 1944 German Volksgrenadier squad was supposed to have eight men, it was more common for the actual strength to be four, five, or six. There was no assistant squad leader, and Germany relied upon indoctrinating every soldier to take charge of the situation and continue the mission even when leadership personnel became casualties. The third squad formation is one I was most familiar with, the USMC's three fire team rifle squad standardized in March of 1944. Derived from the Chinese Communist practice of grouping three men around a single automatic weapon, this system was first tried out by the Marines in the Second Raider Battalion under Colonel Carlson. Three independantly-maneuvering four-Marine "fire teams," each organized around the Browning Automatic Rifle, achieved a balance of mobility and firepower which could be controlled under chaotic battlefield conditions that was hard to improve upon. Too bad that it was squandered in mostly frontal attacks against an enemy whose defense was basically an area ambush, a trap that sucked in attackers for annihilation. It is a credit to the Marines and their lowest-level tactical organization that they managed to prevail over the Imperial Japanese infantry's defensive webs--something like the fly overpowering the spider after getting entangled in its web.

There are other subjects covered in "On Infantry," but for brevity, I've just covered the evolution of squad organization. This evolution was impacted by such things as changing American Army drill--instead of forming the squad as two ranks of four men, the "new" squad of 1940 formed as a single file of 12 men--or any other number. Another factor in the evolution of the squad was conversion from foot mobility to motorization--the twelve-man squad of 1940 became a six-Soldier dismount team aboard a Stryker or Bradley. Due to low priority given to "bayonets on line," these dismount teams may number a mere two soldiers at times. Infantry squads always suffer attrition-often administrative attrition (mess duty, guard details, "give me a guy for a patrol,") and frequently casualties due to non-combat accidents, illness, or combat injuries. This messes up tactics because it isn't unusual for a rifle squad to be missing as much as 2/3rds of its strength in combat. The American idea of men as interchangable cogs in a massive machine ignored the human element, but this has changed due to combat experience. When a bunch of "weekend warriors" who have limited training time, but have known each other for years and have built mutual bonds of confidence out-fight "better-trained" active-component soldiers in both war games and actual combat, something is obviously wrong with regarding the infantry squad as an ad-hoc grouping of individuals. Sports teams train together to develop team work. The best individual players tossed into a game as a mob will almost always lose to a team of mediocre players who are lead by a competent coach and who play as a team. Infantry combat is a "team sport" rather than an individual event, and the long-overdue recognition of this simple fact is one reason why American infantry out-fights the Iraqi "insurgents."

An extensive bibliography and a very useable index enhances "On Infantry." This well-read book is an important part of my small unit tactics library.

John English is a brilliant tactician and historian who has written THE masterpiece on the origins of Infantry. I would have English describe infantry to about the Vietnam era and have Col Dan Bolger take the coverage from there to the future in his own book Death Ground: American infantry in battle. Bruce Gudmundsson was attached to the updated English book to attempt to bring the work up to date.

Taking the masterpiece for what it is, it delivers an important lesson mechanized maneuverists do not want to realize---that the German "blitzkrieg" died in the forests and cities of Russian when it met infantry that would not crumble if surrounded or cut-off from comfortable supply lines. Using a defense-in-depth, a nation on a total war footing can absorb and defeat another less committed nation that hopes to use a smaller force to penetrate and collapse. Many, maybe even most people mistake the German defeat in Russia--and hence WWII---with the cold Russian winter, and this is incorrect. The next critical---perhaps most important lesson and contribution English makes to the defense of freedom is---that a mechanized "combined arms" unit is ONLY AS GOOD AS ITS INFANTRY. When terrain and weather go sour, artillery and tanks will reach a point where they cannot contribute--and the entire battle then falls on the infantry. When this took place in Russia--the German infantry was NOT up to the task with inadequate numbers, clothing and bolt-action rifles. English points out and lesser historians should take note--that the German war machine was good together but not really that good because its PARTS were weak. When combined-arms technotactics could not be employed in the forests of Russia, the battle rested on the German infantry and it failed.

The cryptic lesson here is that we need GOOD infantry in large numbers and we don't get it by placing them into the back of armored vehicles in less than squad sizes, shut off from what's going on because they can't open a hatch out and see because we put a turret on the vehicle and we are afraid it will rotate into them. The Army made this mistake with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, is trying to correct it with its vehicle for the new Brigade Combat Teams while the marines are about to repeat the error with a huge autocannon turret on their next generation amphibious assault vehicle. The second lesson of English is still being ignored---those that do mechanized combined arms don't value infantry action---they ride too long in their vehicles and get ambushed by missiles and RPGs fired from enemies hiding in key terrain that should have been taken first by the infantry. To do this you need a large amount of aggressive, not complacent infantry. As the Russians found out in Grozny, when their armored vehicles became flaming coffins, the battle then falls on the infantry to clear out enemies hiding in urban terrain.

This is not to say English believes in a "Super Infantry" since we saw in Mogadishu the best light infantry in the world get shot up because it was without armored fighting vehicles to shield it from enemy fire. What English is saying is that we should start with quality infantry when building forces and not in the process of creating combined-arms organizations ruin the infantry capability by reducing numbers, battle awareness and use as a separate maneuver element.

On Infantry should be required reading for ALL U.S. military personnel coupled with Bolger's Death Ground. I'd like to see the book updated to the present with a fresh perspective for the 21st Century where we apply English's lessons to the future battlefield.

This is an excellent discussion (historical and schematic) of what goes on at the nitty-gritty level of infantry combat; the squads, platoons, companies, and battalions. It shows how various systems succeed or fail at tasks such as flexibility, manouver, combat cohesion and morale, and why the German army was generally qualitatively superior to both Western and Eastern rivals in both world wars.

That being said, the authors tend to overemphasize the capabilities of infantry on its own -- particularly unsupported light infantry, and particularly in the theoretical section which concludes the book.

While rightly critical of the excessive logistical tail some modern "armies of drivers" drag around, they lose sight of the fact that foot infantry by itself totally lacks operational mobility -- 20 miles a day vs. over 200 for forces with their own organic transport. And they neglect the degree to which infantry alone lacks even tactical mobility on a battlefield saturated with automatic weapons.

It's no accident that the armies which actually do a lot of fighting -- the Israelis, for instance -- structure combined-arms teams around honking great monster tanks like the Merkava III or the M1A2 Abrahms, 70 tons or so of massively protected lethality.

Mobility means the ability to move, but tactical mobility means the ability to move _under fire_.

This poses a genuine strategic dilemma; forces light enough to move rapidly _strategically_ are often too heavy to be mobile in the tactical and operational sense -- you can fly light infantry quickly to the other side of the world, but they can't move when they're actually fighting.

Still, an excellent book on the whole.

This is one of a series of surveys by Bruce Gudmundsson on different combat arms. (This book also has John English as a co-author.) As always, Gudmundsson's books are informative and delightfully easy to read. In this book the authors examine the evolution of infantry tactics resulting from the massive increase in firepower as muskets gave way to rifles and then to automatic weapons, in addition to the vast array of supplementary infantry weapons (i.e. grenades, anti-tank weapons, mortars, etc.).

They start off by looking at the effects of dispersing troops in open order to mitigate casualties and different armies' responses to this organizational and mental requirement. As the machine gun speedily became ubiquitous early on in World War I, some armies adjusted rapidly and easily, such as the Germans, while others lagged behind, e.g. British, Americans. English and Gudmundsson examine and compare the tactical infantry doctrines and small-unit organizations of the French, German, Russian, British, Japanese and American armies of World War II. Also examined are the Chinese Army from the Korean War and the Vietnam-era American army. In each case, they utilize real battlefield examples to demonstrate how this doctrine was actually put into practice, how effective the chosen tactics were, and their strengths and weaknesses (e.g. the American army's reliance on firepower instead of expert technique). They also examine the importance of psychological conditioning in preparing infantry soldiers for 'the emptiness of the battlefield'. The concluding chapter then briefly examines how different modern armies have organized their infantry arms, e.g. by reducing mechanization & heavy equipment.

This was a great survey on infantry organization and tactical doctrine. I highly recommend it as a brief introduction to the infantry arm. A more detailed study by Gudmundsson of the evolution of small-unit tactics can be found in 'Stormtroop Tactics'.

An anthology of Mencken's newspaper reports and analyses on politics between 1920 and 1936. Most of them, I think, do not appear in any of the other various Mencken anthologies. They are written in lucid and musical prose, full of refreshing honesty and vigor.

This book is a collection of political columns, written mostly for the Baltimore Sun, that H.L. Mencken penned in the early twentieth century. In virtually every piece, Mencken advances the view that politicians are third-rate men, devoid of convictions, willing to follow any platform that will make them electable. The only politicians Mencken likes are those that he believes have spine. He detests politicians that waver, particularly those that try to sit on both sides of the fence on the abolition issue.
Mencken is at his best when he covers presidential campaigns, as he does in many columns in this collection. He revels in the empty rhetoric he hears, and describes the bilge to the reader in truculent and uncompromising language. The whole art of politics, to him, is circus-like. The pols are clowns and their election speeches are the main act.
Anyone looking for sober commentary should look elsewhere. But anyone looking for extremely witty, well-written and combative columns should pick up this collection. There is probably no better example of attack-dog journalism out there, nor is there likely a more entertaining way to get a quick history lesson on the important political figures and issues of the early twentieth century. Enjoy!

If you are looking for a book on H.L. Mencken, I would highly recommend "On Politics." This book highlights Mencken at his most acidic through his constant verbal jabs at the "holy" Woodrow Wilson, "Silent" Cal, the "royalist" Hoover, Roosevelt Minor and the stupidity of Warren Harding.(Note: Take a look at what Mencken writes about Harding's mangling of the english language and then compare it to what some modern columnists write about George W's handling of the language. It is truly scary how history repeats itself.)

Besides being an utterly hilarious look at the aforementioned presidents and American society in general, this book is quite eye-opening in terms of showing Mencken's political leanings. I always thought that Mencken was a pure liberatarian with his constant attacks on the New Deal and FDR. Actually, Mencken somewhat liked FDR up until he was elected. Mencken also sides with progressive politicians such as Robert M. LaFollete and expresses sympathy (or as much "sympathy" as the great misanthrope can express) for jailed socialist leader Eugene Debs. Nevertheless, all of the aforementioned people also receive Mencken verbal lashings.

I would highly recommend this book for anyone interested in early 20th century American politics or for anyone with a slightly cynical bent. On days when you feel slightly misanthropic and (mad) at the world, read "On Politics" and you feel much, much better.

Favorite Mencken Quote: "All artists are idiots."

Mencken was the UberMensch. We are all monkeys beside him. Some of his best work, in my opinion, can be found in this collection. The America he covered (or uncovered) so masterfully almost a century ago is eerily similar to the one we live in today. In fact, nothing has changed. Computers may have replaced typewriters, but the Boobery remain the same, not to mention the politicians who so easily manipulate them. Read this book and evolve!

Buy everything you can find that was written by H. L Mencken, this collection is no exception. Mencken was one of the most influential and popular men of letters in America. He covered the Scopes Monkey Trial as a reporter for the Baltimore Sun, and was editor of two literary magazines: Smart Set and the American Mercury. His popularity waned for a variety of reasons. While he teased presidents Harding, Coolidge and Hoover, he gave no quarter when it came to FDR, referring to him "Dr. Roosevelt" and "Roosevelt minor." He had little use for the New Deal. "The New Deal began, like the Salvation Army, by promising to save humanity. It ended, again like the Salvation Army, by running flop-houses and disturbing the peace." This and his pro-German attitudes didn't go over too well in the depression and war years. But over the last twenty or thirty years Mencken has enjoyed a resurgence or interest and popularity. As a journalist, a wit and a social critic he has no peer today.

"On the Brink" should be on display in the Smithsonian. This book is a National Treasure that will inform people for generations to come on how one man with inestimable integrity; conviction to principle; and unwavering backbone, changed the world and did the impossible: Toppled Communism in eight short years, and launched Freedom and Liberty on a virtueous crusade around the globe. It's all in "On the Brink". This book is a MUST. Winik's years of tireless research has rewarded us with a timeless gem that will go down as one of the best political books of all time. David Monks E-Mail: monksd@nabisco.com

This is a wonderful, to-the-point saga of the years that changed history! It should be a textbook--and the only reason it WON'T be is that it crosses too many agendas!

BTW--why is this book out of print?

"On the Brink" should be on display in the Smithsonian. This book is a National Treasure that will inform people for generations to come on how one man with inestimable integrity; conviction to principle; and unwavering backbone, changed the world and did the impossible: Toppled Communism in eight short years, and launched Freedom and Liberty on a virtueous crusade around the globe. It's all in "On the Brink". This book is a MUST. Winik's years of tireless research has rewarded us with a timeless gem that will go down as one of the best political books of all time. David Monks E-Mail: monksd@nabisco.com

This was a very good book. The pace and detail kept me glued. I was surprised, however, at how little Reagan is mentioned in the book, given the subtitle. One of the other customer reviewers had it wrong, it was not *one* man (Reagan) who ended the cold war. Rather it was a collection of men and women, and this book brings you their stories (with particular emphasis on Richard Perle).

These were historic times, and while the biased official reviewer is correct in stating that few pages are given to the internal failings of the eastern bloc, to suggest that the hard-line stance of the Reagan administration wasn't the primary instrument of the Cold War victory is ludicrous. It was the Reagan administration after all who seized on the USSR's problems and pushed them over the brink.

Fantastic book! It's a real pleasure to see some of the lower level staff/cabinet people given credit for an historic 8 years. Before I read this book, I had no idea who Richard Pearl was and now I understand why the Reagan Presidency was noted for it's "hawkish" pro-defense policies. The best history reading is one that reads like a novel while still able to get across all pertinate points and this book does so overwhelmingly. "On the Brink" doesn't necessarily cover in detail all the policies and activities of the Reagan administration (like Lebanon or Iran-Contra...read Lou Cannon's "Reagan" for this) but those it does cover, it does so in "delicious/readable" prose. Highly recommended!

If you're like me, a book lover who enjoys interesting, non-fiction, concise reads this book will satisfy your desires. I love reading about Chicago. Getting to know the characters who serve and protect the city was a treat. I think Smith is truly an emerging author. I find myself bringing it up in conversation and recommending it to friends and family so why not recommend it to the world? Enjoy.

On the Job is simply OUTSTANDING! Author Daniel Smith provides an original insight into the highly touted and predominantly mysterious Chicago Police. Smith threads history, poetry, and human interest through a series of interviews that produce a compelling and surprisingly easy to read-and relate to-book. This book is bound to challenge your perspective and raise new questions and support for the men and woman who were the star and serve the city. The contents of the book are electrifying and appropriate for people of all ages and backgrounds. On the Job: Behind the Stars of the Chicago Police, read it today!

Daniel Smith's book about the culture and history of Chicago Police was a fascinating read. Anyone who enjoys Chicago history as much as I do will love this book. Smith gives us a treat with insight into what exactly goes into the job of being on the most famous/infamous police department in the world with candid interviews of the officers who do the job every day. The 19 officers Smith interviewed all had unique stories to tell that will take you on a emotional roller-coaster. Enjoy!!!
-Graham Waller

This book is written by an author who was born and raised in a Chicago Police family. Smith provides you an inside look into the real lives of Chicago Police officers who have gone above and behind their duty to "serve and protect." A collection of many short stories, the book takes you through the lives of 19 distinctly different police officers and their dedication to the Chicago Police Department while also providing you the history of the Department and the great city it serves. A must read for history buffs, fellow Chicagoans, police officers, and anyone who aspires to live their life with honor and courage.

This book is not an account of a group of rock 'em sock'em tales. The book let's us in on what officers feel, deep down in their hearts. We learn what goes on in the hearts and souls of the "Real Police". If you want to read about the lives of the men and women who sacrifice daily to protect us, buy this book.

ON THERMONUCLEAR WAR was controversial when it was first published - and still is, today. No light reading, at well over 600 pages it packs in details from across disciplines and was widely read on both sides of the Iron Curtain: today its many insights on military strategies, issues, and the logic of amassing thermonuclear armaments still apply. It was the first book to examine the underlying logic of making and keeping nuclear weapons, originally created from a series of lectures, and provides both military and college-level collections with strong insights on military might and strategy.

On Thermonuclear War is a work from 1960 that runs counter to the conventional wisdom of his day, and which still exists to this day. He attacks the so-called "cataclysmic" view of nuclear war. Kahn provides numbers to show that a total nuclear war is survivable, and that our society could eventually recuperate. Make no mistake, at no point does he advocate nuclear war, he merely makes us face the fact that it could happen, and that we had better be prepared to deal with it. After all, the Soviets did. Although this book would seem to be dated in this Post-Cold War era, remember that we and the Russians still possess hefty nuclear arsenals, and the world is a much less stable place than during the Cold War. This book can be hard to read, given the plethora of technical information, but it is worth it.

Herman Kahn has had many epithets hurled at him in his day. It is even rumored that Stanley Kubrick based his Dr. Strangelove character after him.

But the truth is he does a job someone has to do when countries possess nuclear weapons.

In this book Kahn discusses the unthinkable: how would a nuclear war be fought and what would be the consequences. He does this in the only way it can be done-in a dispassionate way. He asks such questions as to whether civilization can survive a nuclear war and if so how long it would take for it to recover.

His conclusion based on the facts and technology of the time he wrote the book (1962) was that nuclear war was winnable. Detractors of the book saw it as advocating nuclear war which is far from the truth. How easy it is to shoot the messenger.

From many accounts of Kahn the man he was far from bloodless and he was in fact optimistic about the future.

As one reads this book one enters into the mind of a great thinker. He was a highly logical man who dared to take on a problem others saw as taboo. Some may not like the way he deals with the subject but as long as we possess nuclear weapons the problems and all of their ramifications must be considered.

A frightening yet interesting read.

Jim Connell "Hallstatt Prince"

Knowing the historical significance of this book at the time, I can say that it definitely deserves the 5 stars given. The fact that I disagree with just about everything written in the book does not lessen its importance. The application of game theory and brinksmanship, along with the outright censorship of the multiple side effects in a nuclear exchange such as radiation, firestorms, etc, in my opinion, brought us closer to the edge of destruction than was ever generally known. His arguments that it was somehow survivable if only the proper planning was applied, clouded the clear vision of nuclear limitation talks achieved later.
This is an important book to read, if only to get a glimpse of the mindset of one of our "Bland Corporation" cold war planners.

Probably the scariest book that I have read in 10 years!!!!

Although it was written in the 60s, this book has great relevancy to today. Mr. Kahn has the backbone to state his opinions without sugarcoating or clouding the facts. It is a little on the technical side, but is an enlightening read.

I was required to memorize the Constitution of the United States as well as that of the state of Illinois and the State of Arkansas before graduating eighth grade. This was a bit of a refresher course for me, though I keep a copy of the Constitution in my desk. I had always maintained that nothing in the Constitution forbade secession and when a student in Illinois, was called "secesh" for my simple and irrefutable argument. My family were Unionist Arkansans and Georgians but were, upon reflection mistaken. Lincoln trashed the Constitution as has every administration since that time. The South had the legal right to secede and exercised that right. The Confederacy offered to compensate the US government for improvements on their territory but were never heard by President Lincoln. It seems quite apparent that Lincoln was the direct cause of the worst war in US history and contrary to my earlier belief was more sinner than saint in the business. The first two thirds of the book makes a Constitutional case for secession as a right reserved to the states. I simply can't argue with that and can't find any provision in the Constitution declaring the Union eternal or secession illegal. It seems that the states formed the Union and had every right to depart from it.

The last part of the book deals with violations of the Constitution on the part of President Lincoln. There was not only inconsistency and violation of the Constitution which Lincoln had sworn to uphold but there was the logical inconsistency of saying that states never left the Union but in some sense must be readmitted to the Union. If they never left, how would they be required to be readmitted? It goes downhill from there to all sorts of violations of the civil rights of people both North and South.

Unfortunately, such has been the pattern of the federal government ever since. Perhaps it was right to free the slaves. I would ask was it right to violate the rights and therefore enslave all Americans as a result of the illegal suspension of habeas corpus or the other violence done to the rule of law by Lincoln? My perception of the man has changed from almost hero-worship to revulsion.

I have thoroughly checked references in this book before commenting. I even questioned the quality of the references and found all but one to be reliable. The one I could not verify was due to lack of time.

~One Nation, Indivisible? A Study of Secession and the Constitution~ is a fascinating overview of the constitutional issue of secession in the context of American constitutionalism. Hawes offers a sweeping point-by-point refutation of the unitary nationalist doctrines of Joseph Story and Daniel Webster. He also makes light of Webster's conflicting stance as he affirmed the right of state interposition at the Hartford Convention, and later reaffirmed the compact theory of the Union tacitly at his Capon Springs speech in the 1850s. Hawes offers an astute defense of the doctrine of secession, which was affirmed in express terms by three states in the state ratifying conventions of the late 1780s. In the most express terms, the founding fathers denied that the general government of the United States had any right whatsoever to coerce a sovereign state. Such naked coercion was diametrically opposed to the principle of rule by consent of the governed.

What this book does is manifest the illegality of the United States government under the Lincoln administration in the 1860s. Prior to Lincoln's election, the general government controlled by northern majority aggravated the continuance of the Union by pursuing a course of irrational tax policy which compelled southern secession. The Union was not founded on the principles of the inviolability of the national sovereignty, but on popular sovereignty and rule by the consent of the governed. Nearly two centuries after the adoption of the Constitution, the United States' fortieth President Ronald Reagan could proclaim, "[T]he Federal Government did not create the States; the States created the Federal Government." That probably explains why Reagan said he would belonged to the other party had he lived in the mid-nineteenth century too.

This book is a nice supplement to Thomas DiLorenzo's book, and much more meticulous in examining the constitutional issues behind the secession issue. It offers a two-pronged defense of the actions of the Confederate States of America and a defense of the constitutional doctrine of state secession in general. I highly recommend it.

Hawes shares quotes from the founders: Jefferson, Madison, and many others. Included are Congressional Records going back to secessionist feeling in the 1830's, speeches from Daniel Webster and John C. Calhoun and Lincoln's speeches upholding the right of secession. The book documents the historical evidence supporting States rights to secession. Saving the Union was not seriously considered by New England in 1814 when it wanted to secede.
The book refutes that the war was over slavery. Lincoln is quoted speaking in favor of slavery. Slavery was Constitutional. The Emancipation Proclamation applied only to Northern slaves, not to slaves in Confederate territory. A Constitutional amendment voluntarily ratified by the States was not tried. Instead Lincoln waged war and then forced Southern states to ratify that amendment.
The book documents how Lincoln turned from swearing to uphold the Constitution to subverting it -- such as ordering Northern newspapers against the war to be closed -- with force. The book explains how Lincoln usurped Congressional power: declaring war, calling out the militia and suspending the writ of habeas corpus even for civilians. Lincoln also ordered the arrest of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court -- all to "save the union."
Confederate ambassadors seeking peace before the war were refused an audience with Lincoln. Meanwhile Union troops threatened South Carolina's harbor with their actions at Fort Sumter. Lincoln's provocation to get South Carolina to fire the first shot is documented.
The book explains how the war was waged against civilians: homes burned, crops and livestock destroyed, fields salted, cities leveled, children murdered and women raped. All this upon the orders of union generals who, in turn, were supported by Lincoln. The South was conquered and occupied. Votes by Southern States are shown to be not by Southerners but by Northern puppets and carpetbaggers put in charge of Southern State governments.
This book is a powerful, well documented, heavily researched study of the real reasons for the War of North against the South. It also makes a strong Constitutional case in favor of near future secession of any group of States such as the West Coast, the Northeast, or Midwest -- all have which have talked of secession in recent years.

This is a most intriguing book which debunks many of the myths surrounding Lincoln, an easy read, easy to follow and most thought provoking.

This book was the first I found in my look for books based on the politics of secession and while I haven't quite finished it, it is quite excellent and should be read by any serious student of politics.

One of the better books on dealing with terrorism. I bought the book after seeing the author on one of the interview programs. I was impressed with his vision and ability to simplify portions of the problem. I started the book convinced it was worthy of a 5 star review. However, the loss of a star is the reflection of a persistent bias.

The author does a great job of dividing the threats into those which we must defend against and those which our best defense is preparation to deal with the consequences. The two examples used are bioterrorism and nuclear weapons.

He makes a great case that terrorists are not going to send their one and only , $250 million nuke into the country in a shipping container where they lose control. He misses an opportunity to bolster his argument with the thought of the enemy of intelligence gathering is velocity. The time a ship takes to load cross an ocean at 30 knots and unload ( or detonate in the harbor) is perhaps 20 times the time required to deliver the components via private jet.

To be successful the terrorist organization needs to obtain highly enriched uranium or other materials as they are very unlikely to be able to produce it. Once in possession of the materials the fabrication of a weapon becomes a far lesser challenge.

Bio weapons represent the opposite end of the scale with production well within the capabilities of a small organization using materials commercially available around the globe. Thus the challenge becomes the response to an attack.

Larsen's message that government is not the answer needs to be carried to the four corners of the country. People who would never think of allowing their health, life, car or pet insurance simply refuse to take the few essential steps which will greatly add to their family security in the event of a natural disaster or attack. He uses the example of people waiting in line for water hours after a hurricane has passed in Florida. They are angry that the government has not yet provided them with water and yet they had 3 days warning of the approaching storm and probably left a home with 5 gallons of clean water in the toilet tanks and another 30 gallons in the water heater.

Larsen does a great job in taking the problem from the strategic issues down to what the individual citizen needs to do to prepare for something that is nearly as certain as death and taxes.

My sole reservation is that his bias shows up clearly in the way he describes problems or effective action, depending on which side of the political spectrum is involved.

Recommended read

"Our Own Worst Enemy is the single best thing that has been written on homeland security and, as Randy Larsen suggests, every American should read it. Straight talking, full of common sense and written in an entertaining style that makes it hard to put down, this book asks the right questions and provides concrete recommendations that government officials, corporate executives and every citizen need to understand and apply."

ADM Steve Abbot, USN (Ret)
Deputy Homeland Security Advisor to the President
2001-2003

"Larsen advocates a seldom used tool to fight terrorism--common sense."

Bob Schieffer, CBS News

"Larsen explains how to ask the right questions---from the Oval Office, to the front office, to your kitchen table."

Bruce vanVoorst,
former Senior Correspondent for National Security, TIME

"This book should be required reading for all who are concerned about national security--and that is everyone...An all-absorbing, page-by-page tableau, comprised of provocative ideas, eminently rational concepts, and well-skewered current ideas and initiatives."

Donald A. Henderson, MD, MPH, Professor of Medicine
and Public Health, University of Pittsburgh,
Johns Hopkins University Distinguished Service Professor

"Post 9/11, there are now many experts on homeland security. But Randy Larsen is a pioneer...This is a pragmatic and valuable book for average Americans, not just experts."

John J. Hamre
President and CEO
Center for Strategic and International Studies

"This is a must read for at least one member of every American family. Larsen is an unparalleled expert and tells us all what really matters for our security in this age of lethal unpredictability."

Arnaud de Borchgrave, Director of Transnational Threats,
Center for Strategic and International Studies

This guy knows his stuff! I learned more about how we ARE and ARE NOT prepared for terrorism (as a country and as people) from reading this book than I have from about 2,000 hours watching news programs. He obliterates the sense of helplessness so many of us seem to feel about terrorism. I'd seen Larsen on TV and come to respect his sage opinions, so I bought the book. In it, he simplifies complicated political mumbling and sleight-of-hand into real language about what's going on and what we should do. His position makes great sense. His opinion on immigration, on controlling nuclear supplies and personal preparedness are so logical you'll be wondering how the whole topic ever looked overwhelming. He does it all without talking down to people who didn't spend their time at West Point. It's an immensely readable, deeply grounded, reassuring book. It takes a genius to distill a complicated subject so eloquently. I recommend it most highly.

This was an amazing book which pushes beyond the partisan struggle over policy making in homeland security. He discusses not only the problems, but also the successes and solutions that exist. It will entertain you, enlighten you, scare you, and reassure you. It is a must read for all Americans.

I just saw Randall Larsen on C-SPAN's Book TV and I am about to order his book. He puts a healthy emphasis on the fact that the government is not able to help citizens in every situation, nor is it the government's job. To show how far we have come from the self-reliance we need, he told of a well-dressed woman who 36 hours after Katrina was demanding the government supply her with drinking water. She knew Katrina was coming; couldn't she have filled her bathtub, or bought a supply of water?, he asked. How dependent and childish can you get?

He told the story of a sheriff in Texas who is in charge of a county a third the size of Delaware, with 27,000 people. How would he deal with a security emergency? "I'd posse up," he replied. That is, he has all the backup he needs in citizens trained to help in law-enforcement.

Larsen is telling us to "posse up." Become aware of how to keep our families safe, and get training to be a part of law enforcement when the government can't supply enough manpower for our needs. We need to take responsibility for our security and be prepared to act when there is a crisis, instead of expecting the government to take care of us in every situation.

This book pretty much just made me mad. The terrorist group M-19 attempted to take government workers hostage in order to get political consideration. The first time(s) is worked. The "macho" new President decided not to negotiate and a large number (unknown) of the hostages were killed. From the few witnesses left, the terrorists killed some soldiers, but no hostages. The un-identified bodies were buried and had acid poured on their graves to prevent later identification. Fortunately for the Government, an earthquake provided hundreds more bodies to dump over the killed hostages further hindering later identification.

Bottom line, I ain't ever going to Columbia and thank GOD they don't run our police forces. The President allowed the military to kill all of the terrorists and all of the hostages that couldn't get away from the army.

The author is a good investigator and writer. She's also VERY lucky to be here.

"The Palace of Justice" is a brutal story of life in Colombia. Carrigan is a tier-one journalist who lived in Colombia and used many first hand accounts to expose the flaws in the government's coverup.

.
This is an utterly brilliant book.
.
Ana Carrigan provides a meticulously researched and detailed
account of a climactic event in the ongoing Colombian violence.
The significance of this saga is not in its direct effects but
the insight into the workings and priorities of the Colombian
government and military revealed to us by this moment of crisis.
The author gives the critical background to the saga and covers
in detail the political maneuvering and subsequent
Orwellian "official explanation" of what really happened.
.
Read this book. If it's out-of-print, harangue the publisher.

This book is truly the most complete investigation on those two intense and definitive days in recent Colombian history. Told with gripping narrative, it is hard to put down: it took me only three days to read. As a Colombian, for me it is also a source of profound sadness, because the book, through its tale, illustrates all the workings of colombian politics, with all its lies, manipulations, self-interests, and lack of any decent statemanship and generosity. Except for a few personalities, all the actors in this drama show an inmense human mediocrity, from the president of the nation on down. Also, it shows the brutality of an armed force that has always been distinguished by its corruption and incompetence in the field of battle. This book should be mandatory reading for anybody interested in Colombian politics, history and society.

A very enjoyable book about a very bloody and unfortunate event in Colombia`s recent history. As a Colombian I can vouch for the accuracy of the events the author describes. I want to congratulate the author and at the same time recommend this book to everyone.

Throughout the ages the "paranoid style" has been used to arouse public indignation and to attack established institutions and/or entrenched traditions that have grown ineffectual. Usually, the darkest and most abhorrent aspects of the accuser's personality are projected onto the hated enemy. Moreover, the true menace is sometimes seen as a malaise that lurks in a nation's midst rather than as something that exists outside its borders. And these chimeras tend to be the shadow projections of the idealistic personality (that is deeply concerned with the moral decay of the society around them) rather than realistic assessments of the true dangers that exist in the objective world. It gives the paranoid the illusion of control since there is little or nothing they can do about world opinion outside his or her borders, although they often imagine this to be so. As a consequence, many foreign policy initiatives are doomed to failure because a distorted picture of the world is being refracted through what amounts to a narrow, insular prism. That is, instead of viewing startling political developments throughout the world as complex historical processes that are unfolding for entirely legitimate reasons they might be seen as betrayals or acts of deliberate defiance. Especially when the vital interests of the observer are threatened.

Then too, Americans have often seen any failure as the work of people within our own government who allowed such things to happen. For if some of our own people are to blame for our weakness, then we do not have to deny "the myth of American Omnipotence."

This is an ideal time to read Hofstadter's book. It was written in the 1950s and 60s, so you get an excellent feel for postwar America (after the bomb) and the advent of the Cold War. Hofstadter's account of the McCarthy Era and Barry Goldwater's presidential campaign (of 1964) is quite instructive. An astute reader will notice many parallels with today. But he also discusses earlier periods of our history when the paranoid style was in its infancy, and yet was destined to become the genesis of the "liberal-conservative" split that is with us to this day.

One fascinating period was the 1890s, the era of Populist William Jennings Bryan and the "Free Silver Movement," which went down in defeat to William McKinley in the presidential election of 1896. Prior to McKinley's victory there was also public outrage over Spain's oppression of Cuba. And although McKinley did not advocate war with Spain, nor did Republican business leaders that had financed his campaign, he was swept into the Spanish-American War by the spirit of the times. Having filled up the continent with Westward expansion and the dream of "Manifest Destiny," many Americans felt a sudden lack of opportunity and purpose. But after Admiral Dewey's sudden victory in Manila Bay Americans began to grapple with their "Duty and Destiny" in an increasingly imperialistic world that they thought was filled with decadent and dangerous foreign powers.

There is no way to summarize the exquisite detail in Hofstadter's book. One must read it and ponder its many lessons. For the sum of its parts are greater than the whole. Good history always makes us realize that there really is nothing new under the sun, and yet, there most certainly IS! Mark Twain said it best when he joked: "History doesn't repeat itself, but it rhymes."

Though wacky folks here and there may be offended by Hofstadter, social and political scientists recognize this work as the perennial analysis of American paranoia as a social phenomenon.

Granted that Prof. Hofstadter's evaluation of the "pseudo-conservatism" of the Goldwater campaign is rather patronizing, and that, too optimistically, he predicted that the paranoid style was condemned to permanent minority status. Otherwise, the book is a prescient and devastating analysis of the breathless mindset on display, mainly from the Right, over the last ten years or so. Just last November right-wing commentators as bright and well-educated as George F. Will were fulminating against Gore's "slow-motion coup" in Florida, and lesser conservatives were passing the word that President Clinton was about to seize dictatorial powers. The fact that the most conservative president since Reagan--maybe since the Roaring 20s--is currently sitting in the Oval Office, courtesy of a hypocritical decision by a quintet of conservative Supreme Court justices, means nothing to the conservatives immersed in the paranoid style. THEY didn't subvert the system; they saved the U.S. from the liberals, the liberals, the liberals.

Back in 1964, Prof. Hofstadter noted that people who think like this tend to imitate the massive conspiracies they imagine threatening themselves. Writing in an era that still resembled the stereotypical 1950s more than the stereotypical 1960s, Hofstadter did not forsee the current power of the paranoid style. But the title essay of his book nails it right to the wall. Reading it, I feared for my country.

This book is as relevant now as it was when it was first written. An excellent blend of accuracy and eloquence.

During the fifties, and up to the time of his death in the sixties, Richard Hofstadter was one of America's most renowned historians with two Pulitzer Prizes to his credit. He was at his intellectual peak when, as one of America's eminent authorities of his country's political ideologies, he tackled the developing phenomenon of the early sixties' right wing extremism under the guise of conservatism. He differentiates between the traditional American conservatism espoused by the likes of President Herbert Hoover and Senator Robert Taft alongside the venom of Robert Welch's John Birch Society, in which, as the group's idea man, Welch referred to Dwight D. Eisenhower as a "dedicated and conscious agent of the Communist conspiracy."

Hoftstadter delineates how fringe rightist elements took over the Republican Party and rallied behind the banner of Arizona's Senator Barry M. Goldwater, resulting in one of the party's most calamitous losses in the 1964 presidential election against incumbent Democratic president, Lyndon B. Johnson.

The work has a timely ring as an historical analytical measuring rod in comprehending the activities of current right wing movements, such as the Christian Right behind the banners of Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson and its link to the militant anti-abortion movement, alongside earlier rightist political philosophies and their vigorous adherents such as Welch and television commentator Dan Smoot.

World War II is often cited as a prime example of how empire can be benevolent and even necessary. Spritzler's argues this assumes nation-states are sovereign actors and the final arbitrators of politics. His thesis is that when WWII is viewed through a class lens, there is ample evidence to show that those in power used nationalism and even cooperated with other elites across national lines in order to suppress worker movements for true democracy.

For those already familiar with radical traditions of internationalism this should be no surprise. Yet Spritzler provides a wealth of well researched historical facts that you won't find in government sanctioned textbooks (US, China, or otherwise) or on the history channel. From Ford and Firestone selling supplies to the Nazis (with FDR covering up) to blatant Allied suppression of grassroots resistance movements (Italy, Greece, Germany and elsewhere) to inspiring accounts of Japanese and Chinese worker solidarity, Spritzler provides ammunition for gunning down many of the status-quo reinforcing myths of WWII.

Browsing the bookstore, first, I just liked the cover and the title, "The People as Enemy"-- caught my attention!!

Then, expecting to be bored with WWII history, etc. etc. what I found out (couldn't put the book down!)..was all this hidden agenda stuff that went on, which we never knew about, were never directly told, but.. clearly from this author's extensive research and investigation... was beyond a shred of doubt,going on.

The book is easy to read, even for someone who is not a history buff per se-- but who has an active and inquiring mind.

Thank you, John Spritzler, for hugely shedding light on this misconception of the "good war," and for letting us know the real motives behind it. It's almost hard to believe, but with all your direct references and direct quotes, it's impossible to not believe. Ya mean, it wasn't so "good" after all!? Who woulda thunk it.....

And thank you for making such obvious, in the end, brilliant comparisons to the "good war" (Bush's) we just fought.

I urge everyone who can, to read this book!

John Spritzler's The People As Enemy: The Leaders' Hidden Agenda in World War II is a powerful, necessary, and inspiring book. Read it and you will never see World War II in the same way. More to the point, you will never see contemporary capitalist society in the same way. Spritzler explodes the myth of "the good war" by taking apart, piece by careful piece, much of the structure of lies and myths designed to buttress capitalist rule and exposes the system in its ugliness and ultimate weakness.

Spritzler shows too that there is a powerful counter-force to capitalism at work in society: working men and women fighting everywhere for a better world, a force so threatening that the most powerful elites on earth waged a world war to extinguish it. This counter-force was not defeated on the field of battle in World War II so much as misled and betrayed by Communist leaders in a little-known history from which we have not yet recovered. The People as Enemy is a giant step toward understanding and breaking free of that history.

There are three key myths about WWII which this book lays bare: that the war was caused by conflicts between nations; that the top priority of the Allied leaders in the war was to defeat the Fascists; and that Allied bombing of civilians was part of the effort to defeat the Fascists.

World War II was a desperate means of social control undertaken by the elites of the warring nations as the only alternative to working class revolution. In four of the countries which Spritzler examines-Germany, Japan, Great Britain, and the U.S.-government leaders were driven to war not chiefly by fear of other countries but by fear of their own people. The ruling elites of these countries went to war because they saw no other way to stay in power.

The book has profound implications beyond World War II. Echoes of the past in the present and specifically a consciousness of the Iraq war are never distant in this book. It suggests that the real force driving the history of the twentieth century was working class struggle for a new world and ruling class efforts to contain it. The rhythm of the century was revolution and counterrevolution-a rhythm in which we are still caught. Seldom has a work of history been more acutely relevant to understanding our present and our possible futures.

The book is going to be very offensive reading material. However it is very carefully researched and recasts the narrative of WW2 in an original way. The unseen hand of Krupp, IG Farben, Ford, GM IBM etc and their mysterious relationships during the war have remained unfathomable until now. The book puts the strands into a coherant package. Why do ordinary farm boys and factory workers die in modern wars instead of powerful business and political leaders?

It's not easy to believe a few people are so greedy and powerful that American soldiers can be sent to war without any real debate by either party, to make powerful and wealthy people even more powerful and wealthy. Can anyone really be that corrupt?

A few weeks ago, a 22-year old Marine Sgt. named Kirk Strasesskie jumped into a canal south of Baghdad when a helicopter hit the water. Kirk drowned trying to save his Marine friends. His friends back home in Beaver Dam, Wisconsin said he could barely swim. In high school, Strasesskie had played sports and spent much of his free time with kids who struggled with their learning disabilities. His dad, an Army veteran, questioned whether the Iraq War was just and why his son should have been there at all?

Kirk Strasesskie's always going to be a hero for me, just like my Army uncle who fought in WWII in New Guinea and those Marines at Iwo Jima and those paratroopers at Bastogne and Chosin. Heroes all, just like my auto worker friends who battle each day and night against their Vietnam experience. Their lives are such a contrast with those boundlessly powerful, elite, selfish few who so easily send them into our constant wars.

I lump them all together today, those heroic figures whose lives were risked or ended fighting for their friends in wars that all were so unnecessary except for WWII - the "good war" of course.

But, as it turns out, while WWII saw heroic soldiers dying on South Pacific beaches and in the frozen foxholes at the Bulge, the most powerful people in our country did business with the Nazis and Fascists making enormous profits on the deaths of 50 million people and laying the groundwork for post war elite control. It was not such a "good war" after all.

After reading John Spritzler's "The People as Enemy" I am as angry about the unjustness of WWII as I ever was about Vietnam or as I am about Iraq. Every library in every VFW and American Legion Hall should stock this book and make it required reading for members. Anyone interested or active in the Peace Movement should read this book to understand who really causes and profits from war.

Every American of conscience should read this book then stand up and demand that never again should our government be allowed to send our brothers and sisters and sons and daughters off to wars that are meant to defeat the values of democracy and solidarity and make the rich richer.