Troops Books

One of the better histories of Washington's role in the Revolutionary War. Convincingly argues that without Washington, we would very likely still be an English colony today. Absorbing read!

The title is misleading, I assumed a book titled George Washington's War, would be a book about the his military exploits,tactics, and descriptions of the battles fought.....right? Wrong.

I should have realized that this wasn't a military/warfare book by the fact it didn't have any battle maps, actually there are no maps at all. By the 4th chapter I realized what I bought. An extremely comprehensive and detailed account on the struggles of the incredibly hard task Washington faced with everything from logistics, inflation, small pox, half naked soldiers, famines, lack of ammunition, Loyalist, greedy merchants, etc, etc....

It does start off with promise. The detailed information was fascinating about life in the military camp and showcasing Washington's incredible genius to be an administrator and his perserverance in dealing with extreme adversity. Then it falls flat.

At times I thought I was reading the same exact page word-for-word from a previous chapter. I expected him at some point to go back and describe in any detail at all, the battles of Lexington and Concord, Battle of Bunker's Hill, his retreat throughout New York, Battle Of Brandywine creek, etc,etc. But instead it is the same scenario over and over on the difficulties the soldiers faced, logistic nightmares, his numerous problems with Congress, lack of money, etc., chapter after chapter.

The author is well informed and has a great depth of knowledge, but he loses the audience with the incredible amount of repetitive details and too many people who are irrelevant to the story. This book is not for those who want any type of military narrative or details on the battles that were actually fought. They are only talked about as a passing thought. There is no build up to anything, the detailed information becomes so repetitive it is hard to finish reading.

Every kid in high school should be REQUIRED to read this book, Our founding father went through pure hell to fight for our country, establish democracy, freedom, and break from the British tyrants. The soldiers went through starvation. Eating the bark off trees, eating their dogs-anything to stay alive. Many times the Continential Army were at the breaking point, but the steady determination of George Washington, Nathaniel Greene, and countless leaders were determine to have victory at any cost. I could not lay this book down. It is very well-written, and you feel drawn into the book as if you were a part of the action. The winter's at Valley Forge & Morristown were harsh, and the epidemic of small pox would have destroyed the army if not for General Washington's orders of quarantine.
War is Hell, but the price of freedom is not cheap!

This book was excellent, if for no other reason, because it showed the true bravery and heroism of not only General George Washington, but those who followed him faithfully into the very jaws of oblivion! Such men as Knox (Washington's artillery commander -- whom the famous fort is named after) and Greene followed Washington through the war and faced a terrible and bloody end if they were captured by the British. What drove these men to follow one man on a quest for such an unheard-of dream?

"George Washington's War" chronicles the reasons why George Washington was so victorious not only in winning the American Revolution, but also in getting the men around him and those in the Continental Congress to put enough faith in him and grant him enough power to get the job done! As well, it shows how these very achievements were brought, by the glorified commander-in-chief, to the position of President of the United states several years later.

If you are a fan of the Revolution, you will find this book entertaining. However, if you are interested in how our nation's most celebrated office formed, and what that office trully stands for and is intended for, this book will be both entertaining and enlightening. Indeed, it made me yearn for politicians who thought the way this brilliant man did!

There are great overviews of the American Revolution: Angel in the Whirlwind, there are great analyses of critical moments: Washington's Crossing and there are many great biographies: John Adams, Alexander Hamilton, The First American. This tries to be all three fails miserably across the board. No insights, no new news and poor editing make this a real slog.

After the bombing of Pearl Harbour are several German accounts of a so-called "Phantom Armies" that seemed to appear and disappear out of nowhere causing chaos for the German soldiers and essentially aiding the Allied victory. However, none of these musing were ever taken seriously, particularly because the United States government never announced that any sort of special "distraction" forces ever fought in World War II. Then, in 1996, top secret information was declassified that the sole purpose of the Twenty-third Headquarters Special Troops of the United States Army was indeed acts of deception intended to mislead and deceive the German Military. These men were aptly nicknamed the "Ghost Army".

For over fifty years, the over one thousand men who served with the Ghost Army as virtual set designers, actors, and radio control misinformation officers were sworn to complete secrecy. The families of these individuals weren't even allowed to know where their loved ones were stationed. Few memoirs, diaries, and detailed records even exist as no one wanted knowledge of these special forces to be discovered by the Germans.

Ghost Army of World War II has wrangled together what little knowledge is known about these men and their 21-55 different operations. This book contains all sorts of declassified information, photographs, memoirs, and interviews with those veterans still alive. It is such a shame that so many brave, extremely creative individuals never really got recognised for their important contribution to the war effort.

This is the second book I've come across about the 23rd Headquarters Special Troops, a unit of the US Army, active in Europe during WWII but unheard of by very few due to it's being kept secret until unclassified in 1996.
The first book, Secret Soldiers by Philip Gerard, was a well-written book and I encourage readers to check it out as well as this book by Jack Kneece.
"Ghost Army" gives a little more personal view of the this unit that used deception as it's weapon. It has many more personal accounts, photo's from personal collections and even a couple of chapters based on diaries written by soldiers in this outfit.
What I got from this book that I didn't get from the other was that these guys, with their use of camouflage and sonic deception may have indeed drawn artillery fire upon themselves that may have otherwise been directed toward my father's field artillery battalion (see my book "ALL MY LOVE, FOREVER:Letters Home From A WWII Citizen Soldier")as they fought to capture the heavily defended port city of Brest in Brittany, France during the late summer of 1944.
I thought one poignant item in the book is an illustration of their ghost embellished unit shoulder patch, which due to the secret nature of their activities, they were never permitted to wear. The only identifying patches they could use were of those divisions that they were portraying to in order to deceive the enemy. -Dale Lane

...are probably turning over in their graves about this one.

While the book promises some fascinating reading, it quickly becomes tedious and a chore to read. There seems to be almost no structure to it, as if a collection of repetitive anecdotes were simply slapped between two covers. There is also no mention made of who edited this work, and I'm not surprised, since errors abound within its pages. Not simply typos, but entire paragraphs repeated, misspellings, missing and incorrect punctuation, the list is seemingly endless. If you're looking for a historical reference to the 23rd Headquarters Special Troops, this isn't it.

I have never written an Amazon review before, but this book is so terrible that I am compelled to post something.

I simply want to add my voice to the other negative reviews of this book because the positive reviews are bogus. As the others have said, this is a rambling collection of half thought through points with much repetition and out of context quotes.

I write this as I'm half way through the book (will I even finish?!) and Kneece has yet to clearly document an entire action the 23rd served in. Instead, the reader is left to piece together the larger picture from almost no hard facts except supposedly entertaining anecdotes from the very few participants Kneece interviewed. Someone has mentioned that there is no index... there is also no bibliography.

Save your money - a search on the WWW would probably yield better fruit.

I wanted to read this book. I really did. It sounds fascinating.

I got about one-quarter of the way thru before I gave up. The writing style is difficult to read. The author jumps from incident to incident with no discernable pattern. It feels like a bunch of collected stories lumped together. It was hard to maintain a sense of progress.

Reading the first chapter felt like an intro to the rest of the book. I expected some more detail, chronology, etc. While the author did present those, he presents the material in a way that made chapter two feel like an intro; chapter three felt like an intro... when is the story going to begin!?

I wouldn't quite term this 'military history', but more in line of 'military non-fiction'. I'd also skip this particular version.

Although generally quite enjoyable, the book has distracting repetitions and irrelevancies. We'll often get the same, not-particularly-important quote twice. The tail number of a plane is mentioned at least 3 times, as if its identity would somehow be thrown in doubt or it would be modified but... nope. It reads as if the final editing pass was skipped in order to get the thing into print.

I will not recite the many details already cited by the publishers and reviewers. What should give this book its second life (its first was not bad) is this ongoing saga STILL unfolding... Simon Mann recently turned over to EG authorities and promptly set to the dreaded Black Beach Prison (How many times has he said SORRY? And given his present plight, he will say that many more times)... new information in April-May 2008 on the "real" coup plotters. EG not shy to part with its oil money to extradite (Sir) Mark Thatcher through efforts with the Interpol on new information received. I've been to EG last June - just let me say it's a very interesting place. Read the book, follow the story still unfolding. The whole thing is quite an adventure... and as REAL as it gets!

It really is quite an interesting story. I just personally feel that it is a little slow and overly detail oriented - semi repetitive, slightly lacking. Once again, this is a great story, but I think that you would be able to find all the information you would find in this book on wikipedia. There aren't enough quirky facts given to make someone interested in this subject want to read this book. Download it offline, research the names on wikipedia. The End. Thank you and Good Evening!

"The Wonga Coup" is a fascinating piece of investigative journalism from Economist journalist Adam Roberts. Roberts has to synthesize a tale that includes events unfolding in Equatorial Guinea, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Angola, Congo, Canary Islands, Mali, Spain and the UK.

Roberts gets firsthand contributions from most of the failed coup's frontline participants, the notable exceptions being Simon Mann (still jailed in Zimbabwe) and Nick du Toit (still jailed in EG). Mark Thatcher comes across as a ill-tempered blunderer. Roberts interviews him and Thatcher - true to form - addresses him with some none-too-subtle physical threats (Roberts notes that he's unable to tell whether they're meant to be jokes).

I like the tone of Roberts's effort - he expresses a degree of admiration at the gumption and bucaneering spirit of the plotters, while at their same time laying bare their brazen openness (essentially talking openly to just about everyone, sealing their own fate) and, in the case of Mann, venality. He shows us contractual documents drawn up by Mann re. his post-coup financial reward that serve to deny any attempt by the plotters to justify their proposed actions on the basis of their inherent rightness or goodness.

Fascinating, humorous, and ultimately human and touching look into a world few of us ever see.

Ok, just up front, let's mention in bold type: being in prison in Africa really, really sucks. I think this book makes that abundantly clear.

Second: having a lot of excess time and money on your hands, and then being British or South African to top it off, and living in Africa also tends to create "mischief", apparently (especially if you have military experience and know other guys with military experience and time on their hands, plus wives who don't mind them going on some "reality adventuring" every 5 years).

I have been reading a few books about Africa recently (by the way, the "Zanzibar Chest" is totally amazing). Wong Coup is very good and I read it fast (2-3 days). It tells the story in an amusing and human way of mercenaries who tried to overthrow a small African country. On the one hand, a "fun" read, on the other hand, very harrowing. And yes, it does give us a picture into the human being, because it shows how people react under pressure (for instance, Simon Mann writing "we" from prison, not just about himself, but at least having some notion of being responsible for others, not just himself).

While the author does mock the men who tried the coup, at the same time, he does have a bit of sympathy I think for them. For instance, the statement by one of the South African mercenaries as to "would you try it again", was "Yes. Life is for living" sticks with me. Life is not for holding one's cards to one's chest, but for living out life. Let's face it, most of us sit at boring desk jobs until we retire, with no real risks involved, and no real great rewards either. These guys rolled the dice big-time and lost. I go home now to a Heineken and some reading, or a bar or movie. They spend their time in a hell-hole prison cell in Africa, made for one man, but that now houses 4, shackled and beaten and with food that would make us sick. Their life is terrible. They risked it and lost. At the same time, you do kind of have to admire their courage and sheer moxy for trying this. I am not saying it was ethical or morally desireable. The fact that the men did not keep the coup details private, and tried to just fly the guns in, is pretty much a joke, and the author portrays it as such. The coup itself was a joke, and the read is entertaining. These were men trying to live in the 21st century as if it were the time of Cecil Rhodes, in 1880s Africa. We can laugh at them, but let's face it, few if any of us will role the dice the way they do. I found it interesting to learn that there really are men like this out there. I was very interested in how the "world" works in Africa, of private armies, and dictators exchanging prisoners, mercenaries in their "mercenary frat house" (!), the wives, the media, etc, etc. It was fascinting because I knew so little about this world.

By the way, if you want to see one of the main characters (plotters) in the movie - Simon Mann (ex-SAS and British officer), rent or buy the Paul Greengrass DVD "Bloody Sunday". Mann plays Colonel Wilford. You can get a good idea of what Mann is like. (Mann has since lost weight, so he is heavier in the film than he is now. That "African Prison Diet" took the pounds off).

Another wonderful story by Palmer. This had lots of excitement. Great characters.

ok - the basic story line is lisa was recently married and widowed, and now is pregnat. cy decides to take care of her. subsequently they get together, sort of, and the bad man who killed her husband decides to come after her.

my first issue with this book is that it feels like it was written in the 80's. lisa can't work the ranch she inherited from her father, she can't control the men that work from her, basically, she is a failure as a ranch owner. the problem i have with this is that she grew up on the ranch - you are bound to pick up something during that time, regardless of whether or not your father wanted you running the place. in addition, lisa is the sweet naive innocent woman, she is practically a pregnant vigin for goodness sakes. then there is cy - he is a hard man with way too many hangups. first it is that she is just widowed (which is a legit hangup) then it is that she is pregnant by another man, then it is that she is too young.

another issue i have is the inconsistencies in the story. for example, cy didn't have a problem with his first wife having a child from a different man, and she cheated on him! but, now that it is this woman he 'loves' he all the sudden is so mad that she is pregnant by her first husband. that sounds odd to me. especially since he claims he loves children so much.

then there is lisa - for goodness sakes, you live on a ranch, grew up on one, yet you can't shoot a gun? so maybe i will buy that, but to be as skitish as she was around them, i find that very hard to buy.

then the baby - ok, this is a spoiler, so if you don't want to know, skip this part - she is supposedly two weeks pregnant when she and cy meet. and she has alreayd found out that she is pregnant. that just seems odd to me - first how many women go to the doctor that quickly? but i could buy that. then the mixed up blood samples, come on, i am sure it happens, but it is a just a bit too coincidental in this story. and then she is doing things that are dangerous to the pregnancy she claims to want - such as pulling cows and such. that just doens't mesh with the character that palmer painted. i would believe she was dumb enough not to know, but her doctor had to have told her to be careful of certain things.

then there are the other characters - we get a glimpse at a future book dealing with micah and his step sister. and that kind of turned my stomach. i know there is no blood relation, but to mess around with your step sister when you grew up with her just sounds wrong to me - too much like incest. and from the looks of things, it looks like that story will be as bad as this one - huge misunderstandings between the naive twit of a heroine and the overbearing bull headed hero.

i hope you pick a different book, but whichever book you do pick i hope you enjoy it. i think i may have to give up on palmer, which is a shame, b/c she has such potential if she could just come out of the 80's and write a plot that wasn't the same as every other book she is written...

I have read so far all of D. PALMERS books,
I can say this was an excellent book. The hereo character was what you will expect from a male hero. Cy Parks was dangers but gentle, understanding, and loving.

so if you do not own this book, you will be missing out on a great thing.

The back of the book reads, "Most everyone in Jacobsville, Texas, steered clear of taciturn Cy Parks. However, spirited Lisa Monroe wasn't exactly quaking in her boots, and electrified the formidable loner with her sweetly tantalizing kisses. Their fiery passion escalated when the winter soldier returned to the line of duty-and claimed the lovely Lisa as his bride, to shield her from a revenge-seeking desperado. Clearly, Cy was ghetting mighty possessive of this enchanting woman who needed the type of safeguarding only he could provide. But who would protect the beguiling bride from him...?"
My personal review, as an avid Diana Palmer reader, is that this is one of her more exciting, action-packed books. As it is one of her Soldiers of Fortune series, that is expected, but in addition, it was captivating with many sexual inferences. I would recommend this book to any person, whether or not they have had the pleasure of reading Diana's books.

Heroine in this book is widowed,in danger and "pregnant".
Hero stubborn , sexy and strong.
Married to protect her, but the story gets hanged up on the
fact that she so native and not pregnant by her
bad late husband but the good new guy as if the child would be bad because of his parent. Good at times.

WHAT A DISSAPPOINTMENT. WITH THE EXPERIENCE HE HAD, I HOPED BREHMS BOOK WOULD BE DECENT. IT WAS ANYTHING BUT. A TEDIOUS SLOW READ I POSED THE QUESTION TO MYSELF, "WHY AM I READING THIS?"

An easy-flowing book to read from start to finish; however, I wish there was more on the pipeline training. For those who expected more on the PJ's lifestyle, I recommend the video, "Pararescuemen - That Others May Live".

I thought this was a good book. Obviously that guy Frank who rated it has some serious issues about pararescue jumpers, maybe he washed out of the course and is a little bitter? Don't be mad frank, it's an 80% wash out rate. The book focuses on Jack Brehm, because he is the author, and can only tell the stories from his perspectives. Granted it's kind of slow, but this isn't a Science Fiction book, it's a Military History book, so it's not going to read like a Star Wars book. I work around and with these guys, and they are heroes and I think frank might change his mind if he ever had to be rescued by one.

I bought this book in tandem with Michael Hirsh's None Braver. In truth, I preferred the latter, however that opinion lies mostly in differing expectations. I had anticipated a more in-depth account of PJ training and missions. While this book contains a fair amount of that, Brehm and his co-author use it mostly to lace together what is more aptly described as an auto-biography. You are looking at mostly the personal aspect of the job: family life, stress, emotions, tough decisions, etc. Not nearly as gripping or action-packed, if you will. The disappointment notwithstanding, I found it enjoyable and a decent read, with just enough "adventure" to pull me in. If you are more interested in the technical aspects or more detail about combat missions and life during a war (Brehm served mostly in the U.S.), I advise Hirsh's book. However, Brehm's heart-felt stories are still worth a look. It's just another side of the coin - the rest of the story, so to speak.

On the whole, I thought this was an excellent view into the lives and mindset of PJs, as well as their families--and let's face it, family is important. Stress destroys relationships, and there's enough stress in this job for a dozen ordinary people.
Some of the more gut-wrenching moments include descriptions of rescues where the weather won't allow an air pickup, so a PJ jumps into the sea with the hope of being able to keep himself and the victims alive until the weather breaks. Not a job for cowards.
Some parts are a tad slow, but then, this is one of those jobs that consists of months of boredom punctuated by moments of sheer terror. It's an essential element, and I didn't find it to detract from the read.
My only complaint is that it seemed rushed into production and some technical errors slipped in. An F-15 rarely seats two people, never side by side, and doesn't have an "escape pod." That sounds somewhat like an F-111, and if the rescue was off the coast of Britain in the 1980s, a likely actuality. Obviously, Jack Brehm didn't make that mistake in print; it was probably an editor shuffling things around. Likewise, some of the parachuting technicals mentioned don't match my jump experience.
But then, this isn't a textbook for students, it's a view into the mind and lives of the men who risk death to save others, amidst the families, organizations and rivalry and the occasional mockery of wannabes. Well worth the read.
As to "The Perfect Storm" reference, there has to be some way to relate the content to a casual reader who would otherwise think of "Pajamas" when hearing "PJ."
It's "Pararescue Jumper," and they and the pilots and the Coasties are all on the same team.

How much do we really know about the US Marine Corps? Like many, I knew the basics in that the Corps spearheaded nearly every major battle in the Pacific during WW2. I also was familiar with their victory at Inchon and their yes, victorious retreat from the Chosin Reservoir in Korea. As to their combat history during VietNam, Khe Shan is their most well known battle. Who could not know about the Marines during Gulf War 1 and 2. The embedded media during Gulf War 2 help many know about their exploits in the rapid taking of Iraq.

What most do not know and which Warren brings forth in this book is the deep character that exists within Marine Corps veterans, retirees, and those serving today. It is the character that is taught in their basic training of enlisted and officer personnel that sticks with each and every one who has earned the title of United States Marine.

Warren also highlights the many innovations of the Marine Corps as it literally had to fight tooth and nail for its existence. That's right, in times leading up to WW2, after WW2 and up until the end of the Korean War there were those who sought to disband what is today American's mobile 911 response force.

As to those innovations mostly in the area of warfighting; it was the Marine Corps that developed the amphibious warfare doctrine used from WW2 until today, it was the Marine Corps that first used heliocopters on the battlefield during Korea; and it was the forward thinking of Marine leaders that adapted their organization to changes in the geopolitical world so that America can project its might over 600 miles inland from the coast of any hostile nation.

While at times a bit overly detailed, Warren has drawn on the best sources to compile a solid must read for those who consider themselves military history fans. At the end, one can not help but recognize the leadership buidling that goes on within the Corps and that application of leadership that has made the US Marine Corps an elite organization that we should be proud of.

This book came in excellent condition and as promised. I can't say enough about the book resources on Amazon. Especially for used books. I know it must help a lot of well read people for a source to recycle their books too.

begins with wwii works forward. has many of the standard historical errrors of the tet and misses most of the final victories in the late sixties.

I found this book in my local library while searching for information on the activities of the modern United States Marine Corps. While it goes pretty far in meeting this interest, its got some really annoying baggage.

The basic premise of Mr. Warren's story seems to be the United States Marine Corps is the only organization capable of defending the interests of the nation. The other services are failed organizations lacking in the martial skill, charisma and intelligence to do much more than thwart Marines in their activities and to occasionally produce a leader who will praise their greatness. To apparently reinforce this, the author almost always uses lower case terminology when referring to members of the supposedly inferior branches. I really don't see the point of all this. The Marines have an illustrious history which does not need the belittling of other services to help it along.

If Mr. Warren could have proved his premise, I would not be so harsh. But the man just does not seem to have much of a clue when it comes to the background of the "lesser" services and their histories. This can best be seen in his take on activities in Somalia in the early 1990s. From the author's vantage, the Marines pretty much had Somalia stabilized when the Army took over and screwed up everything by not using Marine techniques. This is a massive oversimplification given that the Marine and Army missions in Somalia were so different comparisons just do not make sense. Perhaps if he delved into a little Army specific research he might have realized this. Sadly, it appears the author just relied on official Marine sources such as one would get from Public Affairs Officers. How does one otherwise explain the author's bizarre comment that Marines pioneered the use if helicopters in warfare (yeah, Marines were first to actually use them but most of the innovations came from the Army during the Vietnam War).

The only part I liked was Warren's recounting of recent Marine combat activities. While a bit dry at times, he does managage to pull together the big picture and a foxhole view pretty well. But even then, youve got to put up with lots of propaganda.

If you're interested in the history of the Marines and how they have maintained their independence and their relevance, this is a great book for you. I enjoyed learning more about how the Marines train their recruits to instill Marine values. Some elements of the military think this sort of thing is outdated; this book makes a good case that it's not.

The book makes an interesting point that in some ways the Marines are diverging more today than they used to from the mainstream civilian American lifestyle. America today has fallen for the idea that happiness lies in buying more stuff. The Marines reject this in favor of loyalty, duty to country, hard work, etc. Materialism is not part of the ethics they teach. I had not thought of the Marines as a force for good in this area before. In a way it gives me hope. As an ecological economist I put a lot of effort into trying to get people to understand that the present American way of life centered around driving to the mall is not making us happier. That lifestyle has no future in any case; the passing of the oil peak and the end of the cheap oil era will see to that. It's great to know that there are some unexpected allies out there. For more on this, see "The Long Emergency" by Kunstler.

One thing the book left me wishing is that the Marines would play more of a role in asking questions about when, where, and why America should fight wars. The Marines have lost a great many good men fighting in utterly pointless wars like Vietnam. The war in Iraq, sadly, looks to be going down the same tragic pathway. Our nation simply cannot afford this sort of war. The Marines clearly love their country. Why aren't they doing more to see that America spends its money and men where they will do some good, instead of pouring them down rat holes?

Have to concur that the book abounds in factual errors and this is a shame because the overall approach and observations about Grant's genius are sound. Mosier dispels the myth that Grant was a dullard at West Point (not challenged enough) or a chronic alcoholic-- more likely an "episodic alcohol abuser" who had it under control by war. Other points: Casualties were as great, and often greater, in the Napoleonic Wars but armies were made up of the dregs of society and most of the dead weren't missed--harsh but probably some truth in that. So Grant wasn't a "butcher" but all strata of society was now represented even in the lower ranks and, coupled with a literate society and a lively press, deaths shook the nation, especially starting with Shiloh. Halleck comes off even worse than in most works: he set Grant up for Shiloh. Anyway, the novice really needs to get his facts elsewhere--and some decent maps--elsewhere but should eventually read this book.

I wish that I read these reviews before purchasing this book and hope that a few will save their dough by reading this. Not only is the book filled with basic factual errors it paints such a saintly figure of General Grant that one would suspect Mosier is related. From the author's perspective, Grant is not only a genius but his alchoholism and depression were actually assets! U.S. Grant was an excellent commander, far better on the offense than on the defense but Mosier's treatment would lead one to believe that he won the war single handedly. Again, I urge you to save your time and money, and find a good copy of Grant's Memoirs.

In my humble opinion, while Mosier has written a book with interesting insights and conclusions about Grant's ability as a general, I feel that he got too much into analysis of his personality and why he did what he did. I say this because at the beginning of the book, Mosier admits that he does not have much information on Grant the man. So why draw all of these conclusions if you do not know much of the man's personality? Why not just instead analyze his successes and failures?

Another point of contention I have are the lack of good maps. While Mosier does have some good descriptions of Grant's campaigns, there are not nearly enough maps to detail his Civil War movements.

Granted, while I am a lifelong Civil War buff, I am by no means and expert on the period. However, I do believe readers will get more out of reading other titles on Grant, specficially: "Grant" by Jean Smith, "Grant and Lee" by JFC Fuller, or the titles by Bruce Catton (Grant Moves South, Grant Takes Command).

Complaints aside, I do believe that Mosier has written a book that will challenge the reader to further assess Grant's ability as a general and president.

I admire Washington, Lincoln and Grant. While the former two have garnered numerous accolades, Grant has been unjustifiably denigrated personally (alcoholic, fool, depressed) and professionally (butcher). His presidency has been unappreciated. Mosier makes a persuasive case that General Grant was probably a genius. In the final chapter, he briefly discusses Grant's undervalued presidency. I would highly recommend two other brief succinct biographies one by Korda and another by Bunting both of which explore Grant's presidency.

Mosier dispels many Grant myths. He was not an alcoholic in a medical sense. He was self-taught in algebra. He entered West Point which was one of the best educational institutions in the world. West Point entrance examination had a 50% failure rate. He graduated 21st in a class of 39 but 40 of them failed to graduate so he was in the top 25%. He was a good artist with a great 3-D vision which was essential for a commander during battle. He was a great horseman.
In the Mexican war, Grant was a quartermaster who demonstrated tremendous skill in logistics. This experience was vital when he commanded the Union armies and he made sure his men got enough ammunition, food etc. He displayed tremendous personal courage during the Mexican war (riding away to get ammunition) and ingenuity (dragging cannon to a church steeple).

Mosier compares U.S. Grant favorably with other great generals, namely Wellington, Napoleon and Foch. He finds Grant to be superior all of them. Without him, the North would have lost the war. Grant never lost a battle. Mosier defends Grant against charges of butchery by comparing Civil War casualties with those suffered by the British and French in World War I. Robert E. Lee said, "I have carefully searched the military records of ancient and modern history, and have never found Grant's superior as a general". Grant's magnanimity in victory is still an American tradition.

The book contains some historical errors which other reviewers have pointed out and I will not belabor here. This prevents me from awarding 5 stars. I am happy to find a book that appreciates this good, decent, honest everyman, great general and undervalued president.

In GRANT by John Mosier, the accomplished military historian and author of The Myth of the Great War: A New Military History of World War I, the author posits that Ulysses S. Grant (1822-1885) is "one of history's greatest captains" (xi). This volume of Palgrave Macmillan's Great Generals Series, effectively validates this claim. The limber prose is illuminating, succinct, and decisive; plus, the presentation of facts is exact and thorough. Being a historian, ROTC cadet, and espoused Grant admirer; I must note that this is the best study of Grant since Flood's Grant and Sherman: The Friendship That Won the Civil War, and one of the most hagiographical on Grant (a positive since the rise of Revisionist History). I was surprised and delighted by the level of intellectual thought, study, and research that was compiled in only 199 pages.

This book is a valuable addition to the study of such an illusive and grossly misunderstood man. Mosier captures the inalienable quality of Grant that many biographers have missed: true genius. I do not understand why men like McFeely in Grant: A Biography, who won an undeserved Pulitzer for his bilge about Grant, and many other biographers have interpreted Grant as an inebriate, ignoramus, depressed fool and butcher. The proof against these fallacies are within Mosier's text. Mosier convinces the reader, and supports my long held hypothesis, that Grant was not an alcoholic in the medical sense of the term and that he possessed inherent genius. I have always admired Grant and considered him my foremost hero but this text radically altered my opinion to the highest degree. I have nothing but the utmost esteem and veneration for this great captain.

Mosier says of Grant that he was "a world class strategist whose achievements left a lasting imprint on the American military, and his unbroken string of victories make him unique" (1). In supporting this claim Mosier refrains from "conjecture and inference" and instead finds support from fact (10). One such poignant quote from the text was, "The most important part of Grant's significance as a military leader...is his attitude, his calm steadiness, together with his unwavering confidence in his men...has become what we might call the signature of the American commander" (166). Indeed, one might infer that this is also an American quality: the everyman quietly and diligently working for himself and posterity. It is the legacy of Grant that Robert E. Lee summed up best, "I have carefully searched the military records of ancient and modern history, and have never found Grant's superior as a general" (164). Grant the man is an enigma, for he is often described as "taciturn and imperturbable" but I feel Mosier reveals more details on this illusive subject (10).

Overall I would give this book 5 stars for high quality prose, superior insight, hagiography, and excellent readability. The general reader will also delight in this study of Grant for Mosier provides essential information for any laymen not familiar with the military world about campaigns, theory and Grant's peers. While nothing will compare to Grant's own Ulysses S. Grant : Memoirs and Selected Letters : Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant / Selected Letters, 1839-1865 (Library of America), a masterpiece of American prose, Mosier's book provides rich detail to the spectacular life of the man. A companion piece would be Josiah Bunting's Ulysses S. Grant (The American Presidents), another equally readable and great addition to Grant knowledge. Let me be brief: I recommend this book for anyone interested in Grant, military history, and the American Civil War.

The U.S Department of Defense has put out the handbook for U.S. Army Rangers, and this is the book to get on the subject. You can find out information Troop Leading Procedures, Waterborne Operations, Combat Patrols, pretty much anything you would ever want to know about army procedures, is in this book.

Just recently purchased this book and have gone through it a few times already. The print is kinda small and it is definitely not something you would want to take out on the field, but overall I consider it to be a great supplement to FM 7-8. This may be a harder book to read if you are not familiar with basic U.S. military terms.

I have read the reviews above and I have read this book, in many formats and many times, this book is a stellar reference when it comes to the principles of Patrolling, TLP, MDMP, various other things that not only Rangers but every Soldier should know.

This is NOT the version that the army issues. It is identical in every way except it is in a bigger version. The Army Version is in fact pocket sized, this is not. This is still a great desktop version/version for dudes that want to learn about military matters.

One warning, this book is dry, and only exciting if you are familiar with military terms, and graphics. Like I said, this one is identicle to the Army issued one except for its size.

This is definitely one of those books that is a must read for every Soldier, and anyone curious to learn about how Soldiers operate.

I ordered this product to help me brush up on my Army knowledge after I was called back to active duty. It is comprable to the Ranger handbooks that you get on an Army post, except this book is significantly larger and seems to be an older version than what I was used to carrying. Not a bad thing to purchase, but much too large to carry in your cargo pocket.

Sorry man, your wrong this is not the the Army Ranger Handbook. I just received the latest Army Ranger Manual from the cadre at 4th RTB, Fort Benning. The manual I received from this seller is NOT the latest version / not any version the army would give to a Ranger.

The book was well written and easy to read. Excellent maps accompany the chapters allowing the reader to follow the action. The book focuses on the Civil War's Eastern Theater in 1862-63. The author believes that the Eastern Theater was critical to the South and allowed the only opportunity for Victory. The author compares the war fighting styles of Robert E. Lee and Thomas Jackson. His thesis was that Lee's attacking style used up the manpower resources of the South. If the South had followed Jackson's way of war, it would have invaded the northeast, threatening northern cities, used maneuver to dislodge Union Forces, forcing them to attack the Southern Army in a favorable defensive position. Union forces would be broken by losses suffered in attacking a strong defensive position and then shattered by counterattacks. With the North beaten on Northern soil, the North would sue for peace, granting southern independence. (Maybe)
The author does some choosing of facts to paint the picture he wants to show. He believes the landed aristocracy of the South was wedded to an aristocratic view of war and established commanders were not replaced by more qualified subordinates of a lower class. True enough, Davis appointed friends for his old military days and did not replace them when they proved inadequate. The author believes that Stonewall Jackson was the best Southern Commander and probably could have won the war by carrying the campaign to the North and pursuing a policy of destruction against the Northern People similar to Sherman's March to the Sea in 1864. Jackson shared this thoughts with no one so the author needs to construct his strategy from collected comments. The author gives credit to Sherman for his campaign of maneuver in the Atlanta campaign and afterwards, but cannot figure out when Sherman decided to pursue this strategy. See Sherman's Mississippi Campaign He does not credit Grant as the Union general who first saw that his forces could live off the southern countryside early in the Vicksburg campaigns and determined to use this strategy.
I enjoyed the book. The South probably wouldn't have won the war pursuing a strategy of strategic raids but it certainly would have been a different war. How well would Jackson have fared if he lived and had to face better and better Union generals. Lincoln lost most of his aversion to removing generals who failed him by 1863 and favored those who fought and won. I would recommend this book to those who are interested in how the Confederacy could have won the Civil War

Bevin Alexander's new book, HOW THE SOUTH COULD HAVE WON THE CIVIL WAR, is an analysis of the errors and missed opportunities that led to Union victory. There were plenty of mistakes in the Civil War on both sides, as you might expect from a war in which the majority of the generals were appointed for political reasons. The entire catalogue of the early history of the Army of the Potomac is chock-full of serious and costly errors that led, time and again, to battlefield disaster. But Alexander's focus is on the Confederate mistakes --- how Robert E. Lee, Jefferson Davis and Stonewall Jackson erred, and how those missteps cost the South its independence.

Alexander makes the distinction between strategic and tactical mistakes, and how the shortcomings of Southern strategy led to the tactical errors. Faced with a Union strategy that turned out to be very effective --- cutting off Southern supply lines while trying to capture Richmond and evict the Confederate government --- the Confederacy had limited strategic options. Davis's initial strategy (much derided by Alexander) was to try to protect all Southern territory from invasion and play on the defensive. Lee's strategy was to try to destroy the Army of the Potomac with relentless head-on assaults, taking advantage of his men's fighting spirit and drive.

But there was a third option, advocated by Jackson and supported by Alexander. Jackson's plan was to invade the Northern heartland, evading the main body of the Union army, and strike against the fat civilian targets of Baltimore, New York and Philadelphia. Jackson reasoned that attacking the North's cities and industrial base would cause Abraham Lincoln to sue for peace --- all the more so if the South was able to isolate Lincoln in Washington by cutting off the rail lines that supplied the city. (This is exactly the strategy, as Alexander points out, that William Sherman used in capturing Atlanta and Savannah, and thereby bringing the war home to the Southern heartland.)

Alexander takes pains to describe the tactical consequences of these strategic errors. For example, the author analyzes the impact of Jackson's hugely effective campaign in the Shenandoah Valley, not only in terms of his tactical genius, but in how his campaign kept Union forces out of the hands of General McClellan when he was driving up the Peninsula towards Richmond. Alexander argues that if Jackson had been given free rein to threaten Washington, he would have caused Lincoln to order McClellan back to the defense of the capital, thereby ending the Peninsular Campaign and giving the Confederacy the initiative. However, Lee instead ordered Jackson back to aid in the defense of Richmond, targeting McClellan's army instead of the potentially richer prize of the Union capital.

Alexander's talent as a historian is lifting the "fog of war" and explaining the tactical issues of the Civil War in a way that is comprehensible for the armchair general and the military amateur alike. However, as his focus is limited to only certain battles and engagements, the reader may feel that he gives some topics short shrift --- Shiloh, for example, rates only a paragraph, and General Grant not much more than that. Furthermore, it is at least debatable as to whether or not all the mistakes that Alexander identifies were avoidable. The author asserts that a Southern invasion of Maryland, following up on the disaster of First Bull Run, could have brought the war to a quick end. While such a strike was at least technically feasible, it is not at all clear if the still-raw Southern troops could have pulled off such a thing, especially given the quality of Southern generalship at that point in time.

Nevertheless, HOW THE SOUTH COULD HAVE WON THE CIVIL WAR is a formidable piece of scholarship, showing a mastery of small-scale tactical details and an eye for the missed opportunities that led to Confederate defeat.

--- Reviewed by Curtis Edmonds, who writes the "Northbound" blog at http://www.txreviews.com/blog.

In about 1978 I began reading seriously about the Civil War. The library in St Paul MN had a vast literature on the subject, including numbered/signed 1st editions and obscure local works. The MN Historical Society had a lot of material including letters home from the front. I have gamed the ACW many many times, tactically at the battle-scale and strategically the war as a whole. At Ft Snelling I was inducted into the 1st MINN Vols, a re-enactment group, although as a non-uniformed member. On the wall of my gaming room hang framed reproductions of the paintings of the seven Minnesota regiments found in the capitol building and governor's office.

In all my studies I have found exactly one large unit that surrendered -- Pemberton at Vicksburg. This occurred after a campaign lasting about a year. I mention this because Mr Alexander has units surrendering left and right, had the Confederacy only done the right thing. Page 28 -- 1st Manassas -- "...a brisk move with only a few troops up to Centerville would have...forced them to surrender." Page 41 -- Stonewall Jackson -- "Jackson's aim...was to...force the opposing army against some terrain feature such as a mountain or river, where it would be compelled to surrender." Page 79 -- Seven Days -- "Lee felt he had a good chance of defeating McClellan and forcing his army to retreat in panic or surrender." Page 81 -- Seven Days -- "If this had been done, McClellan would have been forced to surrender his entire army."

We're only in 1862 and AoP has already surrendered three or four times! This sounds good if you know little or nothing of the war.

Alexander's thesis is a good one. He advocates Fuller's indirect approach. That is, make war not on the enemy's main force but on its ability to supply itself and against the state of mind of the High Command. This was Jackson's method. He criticizes Lee on this point, as have others. "The enemy is there and I intend to attack him there." That is Lee in a nutshell, alright. (No one else could have maintained the ANV in the field as long as he did, so you have to say Lee was a positive overall.) Yet, note Hood's references to the "Lee-Jackson School" in his memoirs, "Advance and Retreat." Hood sought to apply in the western theater the lessons he absorbed while serving under Lee in the east, and we know the result. There was nothing indirect in his methods.

The idea of assuming the tactical defensive in a civil war battle, is a good one. Longstreet had it and applied it whenever he could. It was not Jackson's alone. Yet it was never enough to win the war.

To find out if the south could have won the war, play SPI's "War Between the States." This vast game uses weekly turns and offers the players the complete range of options. Combat is attritional, but that is unimportant if your idea is to test the indirect approach which of course seeks to avoid combat. You will find there was no way for the south to win. Large-scale maneuvers against the enemy's sensitive rear areas are mostly impossible because of the supply problem, and small-scale maneuvers are easily dealt with. The last time I played it, I tried out the specific idea of preventing the capture of New Orleans and maintaining control of the river and Gulf coast ports. I couldn't do it.

So my beef with the book is that is assumes so much! We have to remember, this is the 19th century. Applying 20th-century methods, learned the hard way and shown to be effective, is not possible with 19th-century armies. Mechanization was answer to the problem of mobility. We have to wait for the IC-engine before we can break out in deep penetrations into the enemy's rear and attack them where they aren't. ("Hit 'em where they ain't." Wee Willie Keeler)

Nonetheless I enjoyed Alexander's narrative. It was a good summary of the eastern theater. It was always true that the north could lose the war in the east but could only win it in the west, so concentrating on the east was a good idea for the author.

On the frontispiece are photos of Lee, Jackson and Davis. Davis makes only a few short appearances in the book. For my money, Davis is the one man most responsible for the defeat of the south. Alexander ought to write a book about Davis' screwups. It would be a big seller!

Alexander, Bevin. How the South Could Have Won the Civil War: The Fatal Errors That Led to Confederate Defeat. New York: Crown Publishers, 2007.

This books supposed subject in contained in its title, but it does not really achieve that. The subtitles is slightly more accurate. It is 337-pages including notes, bibliography and index with eighteen maps and very readable type.

The introduction is entitled "No Victory is Inevitable" which is true but analysis of why and how victory could have shifted to the historically defeated is a difficult task. Such analysis moves into the realm of counterfactual (or alternate) history, a field more usually the playground of fiction writers rather than historians.

In Chapter 2 "A New Kind of War" (p 33-43) Alexander lays out the three strategies that the Confederates had to choose from:

* Passive defense, championed by President Jefferson Davis and, as such, the de facto strategy of the CSA.

* Engaging and destroying the enemy, championed by Robert E. Lee and later pursued by him.

* Invasion of the North to destroy its ability to make war, by destroying economic and transportation assets, according to Alexander, this was the strategy that `Stonewall' Jackson wanted to see followed by the CSA.

Alexander believes that the war against the infrastructure of the North would have been a winning strategy. By Jackson was not able to find support for such a course of action, nor does it seem that he tried very hard to do so, and it did not happen. There Alexander leaves the matter, Jackson was right and if the Confederates had just listened they could have won. No discussion is made of how the Confederacy could have effectively pursued this.

Would cavalry raiders, such as Nathan Bedford Forrest commanded, have been sufficient? Or would it have required the actual Confederate armies to have pushed into the North, laying waste to all around them. Could J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry done it alone? Perhaps partisan rangers, such as John Singleton Mosby commanded, could have been employed to assist in these tasks. None of these questions are properly addressed nor is any likely Union response. How would the Federal army have deal with such raids? Would Lincoln's government have fallen? Would the depredations light the fires of resolve and revenge among the people of the Northern states? None of this is even considered by Alexander, he just agrees with a single letter of Jackson's, the only place he seem to have presented these views, and moves on.

The rest of the book is looking at the battles of the army of Northern Virginia. Alexander is a strong supporter of `Stonewall' Jackson and his strategic and tactical insights, especially his ability to act on the strategic offensive and the tactical defensive using the weapons of the era to their best advantage. The rundowns of battles are familiar with occasional comments on how they could have gone better for the Confederacy if different actions had been taken but nothing new or even very interesting here.

The book neglects the western theater of operations, relegating it to another loss for the Confederacy. Alexander fully overlooks the potential of Shiloh to have been a turning point in the war, in the Western theater at the very least, and is content to criticize the incompetence and overly defensive mind set of the western Confederate commanders. Alexander recognized that the defense had primary on the battlefields of the Civil War and deals harshly with those commanders, on both sides, that threw their man away on fruitless frontal assaults. However, he complains about General Joe Johnson trying to force Sherman to attack him behind field fortifications (p. 252-3) which ultimately came to naught as Sherman flanked him repeatedly but at least Johnson was not throwing his men away.

Alexander uses Sherman's success in his March to the Sea as proof that Jackson strategy of attacking the North economically would have caused its collapse. While there are similarities in strategic design, by the time Sherman moves through Georgia, the South was hollowed out by four years of war and blockade. However the North never suffered the same level of hardship and, one suspects, would have been more resilient to such damages and more able to resist such attacks into its heartland.

While an interesting read, the writing is solid if unexceptional, this book adds little new to the debate on the American Civil War.

This is a quite good operational and grand tactical history of the Eastern Theatre of the American Civil War from 1st Bull Run to Gettysburg, complete with a plethora of very useful maps, told from viewpoint of the Confederate high command.

For the author, Jackson is a transcendent military genius, Lee is myopic at best, and Davis becomes pretty quickly becomes immaterial. Ordinary soldiers enter the narrative mainly as numbers engaged, and casualties.

The author posits that the Army of Northern Virginia could have wandered around eastern Pennsylvania for months in the summer living off the land. On the other hand, he suggests that any Union army would have surrendered almost immediately if cut off from supply. Similarly, he suggests the Union itself would have surrendered upon the capture or cutting off of either Washington, Baltimore, or Philadelphia. The possiblilty that any of these events would have merely riled up the Union against an invader is not even mentioned, much less discussed.

So, while I found the book an enjoyable read, I also find it possible to doubt many of the author's opinions and spectulative theses. For me, these things balance out to a four star rating.

I found lawyer Eric Wittenberg's book on General Sheridan entitled "Little Phil" just appalling and frightening, that this book was even published and author is considered a noteworthy Civil War historian. Once again we have a non-military historian or professional trying to view the profession of arms through some ridiculous method or process, this time applying law as in a legal case. As a three-decade veteran of the military, I was shocked by the lack of general military knowledge, which is such a current fade of historians who are not in the same class as "SLAM" Marshall, John S. D. Eisenhower, Trevor DuPuy or even Stephen Ambrose, who got things wrong and crossed the integrity line, but most of his books are doctrinally accurate. Wittenberg's understanding of combat, war, the dynamics of changing tactical application, the levels of war and so much more, is dreadful. Saying that according to Dennis Hart Mahan that cavalry operations should be conducted by some military tactical manual and not change and adapt with the real-world fact of combat is so ignoramus that it would haunt any combat veteran. To say that cavalry was not to "fight battles" is so absurd, because, guess what? It was happening! They were fighting cavalry against cavalry battles as nations had since the Crusades and Ghenus Kahn and Napoleon. Mahan, according to Wittenberg, should run out at Haw's Shop and announce, "Stop! This is not in my book, you are not following my manual."
The author needs to stick with law, because he is no historian and lacks the training. To measure Sheridan like he was a race horse with a tally sheet is pathetic. What Wittenberg fails to see, that through Sheridan's aggressive operations, win or lose, he ripped the initiative from the Confederate cavalry and they had to fight him on his terms. There has never been a military leader who has not exaggerated or misused his reports to a degree, made tactical or operational mistakes, including Washington and Frederick the Great, and though winning the battle as Sheridan did at 3rd Winchester, the execution was flawed. Mr. Wittenberg's concept of war is to be a clean, gentleman's contest with no hurt feelings, fair rules and clear winners. Who cares if Sheridan fires a couple of officers in the heat of battle. He is the commander and lives are at stake. War is not a popularity context.
There are so many errors, flaws and ignorant comments, one-sided bias and just immature criticisms of Sheridan in this book that I could not finish it; the first time in my reading career. One example, in Wittenberg's assessment of the Overland Campaign he faults Sheridan for failing to link up with General David Hunter at Charlottesville and escort Hunter's army to join General Meade. This did not happen of course, but in Wittenberg's litany of Sheridan's failures he fails to address the fact that Hunter was defeated at Lynchburg and retreated west back into the Shenandoah Valley. Even if Sheridan would have gained Charlottesville, Hunter never made it. This is extremely prejudicial history for even a lawyer.
The scholarship is so bad, that Mr. Roy Morris and other biographers should share in the royalties of the dozen of so books sold. Where does one go to claim a refund?

As another reviewer said, this book makes some good points, but ultimately is too one-sided. Phil Sheridan's image may be more untarnished than it should be, but if the author wanted to bring it into proper perspective, he could've accomplished that simply by giving us an honest, reasonable portrait, pointing out the shortcomings that others have tended to gloss over. Instead he has given us a diatribe. The author is an attorney, and I happen to be a judge. When a lawyer refuses to admit that his opponent has ANY evidence or legal authority in his favor, when it is obvious that he does have some, I tend to look more askance at that lawyer's entire argument. I had the same reaction reading this book. Instead of being content to bring Sheridan's lofty reputation back down to earth where it belongs, he "trashes" him, and thereby weakens the force of his argument. Had Wittenberg simply argued that Sheridan was not as good - even not nearly as good - a general as he is commonly thought to have been, one might be readily inclined to agree. But he essentially argues that Sheridan was a bad general, and the evidence does not support that argument. Those who like so-called "advocacy history" may enjoy this book; those who believe that historians should simply attempt to present what they believe to be the truth, without having an axe to grind, will likely not.

OK, to believe this "reassessment" of Phil Sheridan, we must believe that the general fooled Union leaders Lincoln, Grant, Sherman, and Halleck, and Civil War writers from Bruce Catton and Fletcher Pratt to James McPherson and Shelby Foote (as well as British military authors such as Jackson's biograper, G.F.R. Henderson). Not to mention scores of non-coms who fought under Sheridan."It might be worth making a fight if Grant were their commander. But not against this man". So was the report of Napoleon III's troops after Sheridan led a movement after the war along the Rio Grande to block French forces occupying Mexico. Bismarck also praised Sheridan upon the latter's counsel in the Franco-Prussian war.You do not need to dislike an unadmiring book to be shocked how author Eric Wittenberg relies selectively and heavily on prejudiced and "hurt" sources, as well as taking exclusively critical but minor remarks from favorable Sheridan biographers.For example, sources for Wittenberg's "reassessment" include rebel General Jubal Early and guerilla Colonel Mosby, and Union General George Crook (whose claim to credit for the decisive move at Fishers Hill on his own came AFTER a falling-out with Sheridan over American Indian policies AND after Crook was heavily criticized for the Union near-loss at Cedar Creek.) Wittenberg fails also to remember that commanders base their decision partly on the input of lieutenants. Whatever Crook's contribution to victory was at Fisher's Hill, it was Sheridan's decision after meeting with his division leaders. Wittenberg even tries to deny Sheridan his widely-received credit for his amazing victory at Missionary Ridge by favoring another Brigadier's claim of capturing the enemy's cannons. Yet Sheridan was seen celebrating his charge by straddling one of the cannons in victory before continuing on as the only commander to pursue the retreating enemy. Wittenberg does not note that Sheridan was in this pursuit when he said the guns were "recaptured". And although most historians credit Sheridan for this win (including those mentioned above), Wittenberg is only able to footnote one magazine article.But in many matters like these, Wittenberg outrageously resorts to calling Sheridan a liar even when he does no better than show them to be one man's word vs. another.But it is obvious from the number of pages on Sheridan's supposed insubordination and harshness that these are Wittenberg's biggest criteria for generalship. Insubordination? Harshness? Hmmm... sounds like another general. His name was PATTON. One must wonder than how Blood-n-Guts would fare in a Wittenberg "reassessment."Regarding Wittenberg's biggest Sheridan victim, Governeur Warren, the latter General had let down both Grant and Meade and was previously considered for dismissal. Mainly, he was Sheridan's opposite in personal leadership and drive and played second-guesser at critical moments. He was not seen by Sheridan on the field at crucial moments ("By God, THAT's what I want to see! General officers at the front!" he cried, seeing Joshua Chamberlin.). As Bruce Catton observed, the real mistake was that other men lacking Sheridan's leadership were not cashiered earlier. In comparison to the ink spent on these subjects, Wittenberg greatly understates Sheridan's victories early in the war, mentioning Booneville without obererving that Sheridan clinched victory over the rebels forces with a 90-man rear charge. And though Sheridan outnumbered the rebels in the Shenandoah Valley, he bested the military maxim that attacks on an entrenched foe should be with a 3:1 advantage. His masterly use of combined arms is cited by the US Chief Military History office.INCREDIBLY, Wittenberg faults Sheridan's use of cavalry as a separate fighting arm, yet many consider it to have been the precedent for freewheeling armored strikes. Again Sheridan was like Patton, who wrote: "Good tactics can save even the worst strategy."

Little Phil: A Reassessment Of The Civil War Leadership Of Gen. Philip H. Sheridan by civil war historian Eric J. Wittenberg is a 272 page examination of the legendary Union Army general. This controversial study challenges the existing literature on Sheridan arguing that his war record has been commonly overrated. Informed and informative reading which is confidently recommended to Civil War buffs and academia alike, Little Phil is a provocative, iconoclastic, well written study that will enrich and enhance our understanding of one of the Union Army's most famous yet fallible officers.

Wittenburg writes a very compact critical book on the military skills and ethics of Phil Sheridan. The author writes in a concise fashion presenting factual detail centering on the most important moments of Sheridan's career. After a review of Sheridan's early career including the near bayoneting of a senior classman at West Point, the author spends virtually the remainder of the book on Sheridan Civil War career offering rather severe critiques of Sheridan's military ability as a cavalry leader and tactician, as an unfair supervisor of subordinates, his inability to follow orders, his inability to tell the truth abut early forays and his failure to recognize the contributions of subordinates. Although this does appear to be pretty harsh treatment of Sheridan, Wittenburg presents the information in a flowing economic narrative that sets up the final chapter's evaluation as a virtual summary of points categorically describing Sheridan's weaknesses. The author virtually starts with Sheridan's failure not to bring on an engagement at the battle of Perryville, to his inability to follows Meade's directions to open the road to Spotsylvania to his possible bypass of Grant's original orders for him to join Sherman. The author notes thst Sheridan's typical veteran post Civil war memoir glories in abundant hyperbole that speaks of frequent victories over southern horsemen. Sheridan's most interesting conflicts are personal with Crook, Averell and of course the cataclysmic collision with General Warren at Five Forks. However, in spite of the numerous criticisms, Wittenburg acknowledges that in the final theater during and after Five Forks, Sheridan was relentless in pursuit of Lee's retreating army earning accolades. And perhaps this last phase balances the book in that although Sheridan had his faults and ego, he had a certain ruthless drive that could truly make war hell for his his opposition in the valley or Indians and he could apply total war when the end was near. Grant's respect for Sheridan at the end seems to be at its zenith when he tells Sheridan that he may sack Warren with total authority and discretion. Of course Sheridan sacks Warren most likely without facts or reason but more so for perception and past negatives that Meade did not hold Warren accountable. Sheridan and Warren are perhaps the most interesting pair in conflict during the Civil War other than Jefferson C. Davis and William Nelson where the former assassinated the latter. Wittenburg's critiques may be controversial but they are well presented and many are well proven. But the debate is still on in the end because Grant has full confidence in Sheridan and with Sheridan brimming with confidence and his well-supported cavalry force, he literally pulls the plug on Lee's valiant and hopeless attempts at escape. A well-written book with controversy but the best part is that the book challenges your thought professionally leaving room for argument.