Troops Books

First off, let me say I admire Bob Black for what he did for his country. He served in Korea and Vietnam and fought the good fight. I will disagree with him on wheather the war was winnable or not in both places. If we had to go to the Yalu and beyond, we could have triggered WWIII. If we had invaded North Vietnam, we would have faced guerrilla war in the mountains of NVA. Black believes the military was held back and prevented from winning. All of these are disputable areas.

That being said, Black related his time in service in both wars. This battle book is no different than many others out there. I enjoyed the war stories. This was an OK read about the U.S. military.

As a child born during the Vietnam war, I was embarrassed that I knew little about it. I could not have picked a better teacher. Learning about this time in history was decorated with the amazing story of one extraordinary man. I could not have picked a better character to guide me through the US military and Asian conflicts of my childhood. As the words of Robert Black carried me into worlds of the misunderstood, I came out of the the autobiography with an educated understanding of a troubled time in our history. Robert Black is the "Dr Phil" or our US Armed Forces. He tells it like it is, whether you are ready or not. In A Ranger Born, he writes for all those who care to learn and laugh on a journey that explores an unsafe time in history escorted by a Ranger that will protect and entertain you through the entire tour.
I hope Col. Black is deciding who will play him in the movie. I have a few suggestions...does anyone else? Read the book and you will see unforgetable characters come to life. Col. Black is the man everyone wants in their foxhole!!! Reading his book is as close as you will get!

This is the best book yet in Robert Black's series about the U. S. Rangers. It is the remarkable story of a young boy who knew exactly what he wanted to be when he grew up and who worked toward that goal from then on. Black has revealed in his series that he is a true soldier/scholar. This book traces his story through triumph and sadness. His love for his fellow Rangers shines from the story as does his love for his country. He writes with compassion and wit. The man who is the soldier and the soldier who is the man will live with you for a long time.

Unlike the technical, detailed Ranger books written by Col. Black, this one is from a personal standpoint and draws you into the story from page one until the last word is read. The book starts with Col. Black as a child and the desire to be a Ranger is obvious; to what it takes to qualify for Ranger training; what it takes to endure the training and what drives a Ranger to stay a Ranger. A story about being an American in the war ravaged country of Korea and Viet Nam. You read about betrayal, unrequited love, the guts and glory of war; the survival of war, and at times with a sense of humor. You laugh, you cry. It grips your heart; it grips your soul, but most of all it makes you proud to be an American; proud to have men of his calibar fighting for your freedom and that of our Country.

On page 207 of the paperback edition, Black writes about "sappers believed to have been drawn from a North Vietnamese parachute regiment." After I inquired to well over 100 Vietnam (in-country) veterans about a North Vietnamese parachute regiment, I was met with blank stares. A high percentage of these individuals served in combat units (i.e. Special Forces, 173rd, 101st, 1st Aviation Brigade). NO ONE EVER HEARD of a North Vietnamese parachute regiment. I was curious, so I contacted the author (Black) via telephone on Saturday (30 May, 2004). Black stated that he obtained the information from the military archives at Carlisle Barracks. When I checked the archives, no hits were obtained on this subject from their site, however they are now closed for the summer due to an ongoing physical location move. As a former combat Special Forces soldier and a retired homicide detective, I smell embellishment on this subject!

Whether you are currently a Ranger or aspiring to become one at some point in the future; whether you served in the military or are a military enthusiast, "To Fight With Intrepidity" is a great read. You will find it has detailed information on the formation and evolution of the Rangers in a way that keeps you interested without any extra marketing fluff. It is the story alone - one that will let you come face to face with men who lived and died, some even before the birth of the United States. But you will make a connection with these men, and come to understand and appreciate their valor and sacrifices, and realize their validity in our day and age.

LTC Lock has done in a compact form a BDU pocket-sized complete history of the U.S. Army Rangers, this quantification is usually what we praise, but we forget the quality of his writing when he does this. We need to realize what is it that we want to learn from Army Ranger history other than the predictable HOOAH! stuff?

LTC Lock in his book reveals an aspect of light infantry operations we simply do not understand today with our men turned into pack mules with "100 pounds of lightweight equipment". Read his accounts of Roger's Rangers and you will see a light infantry that could "fly" on its feet through the woods and outfight the Indians. The recent film, "Last of the Mohicans" best captures this capability. This was a Ranger infantry that was willing to use unusual mobility means, also---boats, ice skates, snow shoes, living off the land--all to get that mobility edge over the enemy. In WWII, Darby used speed-marches and carts to carry mortars/ammo to close on enemies rapidly to gain surprise/violence of action. Merrill's Marauders used mules to carry 75mm pack howitzers and supplies to penetrate deep into the jungles of Burma and take Myitkyina airfield from the jungle-seasoned Japanese. In Five major (WALAWBUM, SHADUZUP, INKANGAHTAWNG, NHPUM GA, & MYITKYINA) and thirty minor engagements, they defeated the veteran soldiers of the Japanese 18th Division (Conquerors of Singapore and Malaya) who vastly outnumbered the Marauders. Always moving to the rear of the main forces of the Japanese, the Marauders completely disrupted the enemy supply and communication lines, and climaxed their behind the lines operations with the capture of Myitkyina Airfield, the only all-weather airfield in Northern Burma.

Theese lessons need to be applied to today's light infantry that is still over-looking the capability modern mountain bikes and carts with oversized tires could give an Airborne Ranger-type force to close on an enemy after insertion out of detection range by parachute/airlanding aircraft.

My only fault with the book is that it doesn't clearly lay-out the roles/missions dilemma current Ranger infantry is in---it really has 2 types of missions:

1.) on one hand its America's shock troops storming defended high-value targets alone or as a spearhead for other troops (WWII Commando mindset),

2.)on the other, it has to be able to "Range" across the land as light infantry for days at a time to raid/recon (traditional Ranger missions).

These two missions are different and require different mindsets and equipment---and this is why TF Ranger in Somalia did not have armored fighting vehicles--because it was not seen as appropriate for "Rangers to do mech" if one was defining the unit by traditional roles/missions. However, shock troops need shock action and that means Armored Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) and shielded men, which Rangers lead the U.S. military by employing for the first time rifle-caliber resstant body armor and having the physical conditioning and willingness to take Soldier's load risks to go into battle with it. AFVs are not popular in the minds of some Rangers, but its necessary to successfully perform shock action missions in urbanized terrain. Other elite units in the world can ride AFVs without their image suffering. Walking is not always the best way to "range" across the battlefield, as Ranger gun-jeeps, RSOVs (Land Rovers) and HMMWVs attest from combat in Iran (Desert 1), Grenada (airlanded from C-130s), Panama (parachute air-dropped) and Iraq (Desert Storm). But these are unarmored vehicles not up to the task of advancing in the face of concentrated enemies and their fire. LTC Lock in his superb chapter on the Mogadishu raid expertly outlines why Rangers should have had armored vehicles and that they would have prevented 1-18 men dying that day. His Somalia chapter is as good as Bowden's entire book, "Blackhawk Down!" and in some ways better---because it doesn't mince words and gets to the point that AFVs were needed in the force structure.

If America's light infantry forces would look back via LTC Lock's fine book into its methodology of Roger's Rangers; it will find the mindset needed to make it the most mobile and hardest-hitting infantry on earth that can range across the terrain quick enough to defeat the stalemate sensors and optics will create against a slower moving force. If these forces will understand that as Col Daniel Bolger states in Death Ground: America's Infantry in battle: "Ranger tabs don't stop bullets", and accept a modest number of air-droppable and helicopter transportable light tracked AFVs into its force structure for its own organic shielded mobility and heavy firepower, it will have learned well from its Somalian ordeals and be ready to lead the way! into the 21st century.

It used to be that the U.S. military turned out officers who could write decently. Apparently this is either no longer the case -- or the Rangers tend to draw their officers from that portion of the corps which consists largely of people who can't even write a decent field manual. Major Lock is one of these officers, and TO FIGHT WITH INTREPIDITY suffers badly because the publisher of this book didn't assign someone to edit Major Lock's manuscript as thoroughly as it needed to be. This notwithstanding, Major Lock's book is an uniquely well-researched and enormously valuable source of information on the history of the Rangers in America and the Ranger units of the U.S. Army in the wars and other armed conflicts of the 20th Century. I find this book a valuable addition to my library despite the fact that it reads like a badly translated copy of a textbook from the Frunze Academy, and I would not hesitate to recommend it to anyone interested in the history of the U.S. Army's development and employment of light infantry forces.

Ranger units have always put tremendous emphasis on history and tradition as an aspect of pride in duty, and that's where this work has real value. Academic critique from recreational readers won't reflect this --it's just another book; however; Rangers and men in the Special Ops business out there will see much deeper meaning in it. If you want to take pride in wearing the beret a step further (whether today or years ago), read Lock's book. There are nearly four centuries of tradition behind the Ranger Creed and Roger's Standing Orders: Learn the history.

This book cover the hundreds of years that the Army Rangers or similar units have been fighting with tremendous bravery. Lock begins in the French and Indian War with Rogers' Rangers and continues all the way to the Rangers exploits in Somalia in 1993. Overall, it is a very fascinating book involving many fascinating - but unknown - heroes. Just to be a Ranger is to be a hero, and Lock shows that very well. The only complaint is he goes on for far too long on the French and Indian War. This is not all bad, though. Although that war is considered boring, he shows the incredible bravery of Rogers and his men. Despite the outdated war, bravery of men is still very modern. I would read this book again if I had the patience to read 400 pages of the same material again.

Mr Puryear's "American Generalship" is overall a good book. It has resently been added to the CSAF Reading List. The author has taken many of his interviews and discussions with past military leaders and summized what they believe the keys are to effective leadership within the military. It is a fairly easy read, though some thoughts seem to be repeated in several locations.

Puryear has done a superb job summarizing years of intensive research on the subject of leadership. The finished product is applicable not just to military leaders, but to anyone who takes on the awesome responsibility of managing other people. He systematically breaks down the essential components of character and cites examples that drive the point home. Time after time I found myself thinking that this book should be required reading for civilian leaders of all kinds. His writing style is articulate and easy to read. I've read several books on this subject and this one is a winner.

I've been in leadership and management positions, military and civilian, for most of my adult life. I've read a lot of books on leadership - some good, some not. This one among the best I've ever read, if not THE best. It's oriented towards military leadership, but it is applicable to leadership in any organization. It's also a first rate history of military and senior Government leadership in World War II and later. I wish I had had this book 30 years ago.

This book provided insight into the minds of the senior leaders of the military. It provided me w/a framework to continually develop and improve my own leadership abilities. I highly recommend this book, not only to new and current officers,(I have given my copy to my Platoon Leader) but to ALL enlisted men and women serving as NCOs, in the U.S. military. The information provided in this text can be utilized by ANYONE desiring to improve their leadership abilities. This book by Puryear has me wanting more, and now I must read his previous book "19 Stars".

American Generalship does an incredible job of outlining the necessary components to character, and while it is aimed at American military leaders, its scope seems unnecessarily constrained. I have been told that I cannot criticize the author for not writing a book he didn't write; however, it seems that the subject was deserving of a broader scope than merely American military leaders. The book includes eleven chapters, each covering some component of this elusive leadership character: (1) Selflessness; (2) Decision: The Essence of Leadership; (3) "Feel" or "Sixth Sense" in Decision Making; (4) Aversion to "Yes Men": Having the Character to Challenge; (5) Books: The Importance of Reading; (6) Mentorship: Guidance, Counseling, Advice, Teaching, and Door Opening; (7)Consideration; (8) Delegation; (9) Fix the Problem, Not the Blame; (10) Reflective Descriptions of Character; and, (11) The Pattern. Unfortunately, because of missing and misused quotation marks within the text, it is difficult to understand whether Puryear is himself speaking, or whether he is quoting a military leader. There are some remarkable stories contained in the book however, most especially in the fifth chapter concerning reading. I had purchased the hard- back version of the text (I am unsure of whether there is any other in print), which was published by Presidio Press, and the binding has already cracked. Thus, the reason I have given it three stars is because I believe the structure Puryear used in defining the nature of leadership character is excellent, and the text is generally reflective of a well-considered approach. Yet, the book's durability, and more importantly, its readability remain wanting.

The Battle Between the Farm Lanes: Hancock Saves the Union Center, Gettysburg July 2nd 1863, David Schultz and David Wieck, Forward by Jeffery Wert
301 pages, paperbound, endnotes, bibliography, index, Ironclad Press, 2006.

Paying close attention to the physical terrain of the battlefield, Schultz and Wieck offer an important re-visitation to familar material regarding the 'close run thing' of the Union center between 5:00 and 7:00pm on July 2nd 1863. A great amount of detail is offered and succesfully puts into context the charge of the 1st Minnesota, which in popular treatments of the battle, is second only to the 20th Maine's heroics on Little Round Top.

The authors make clear that the glory the 1st Minnesota gained during the charge was with the aid of the 111th New York infantry, commanded by Colonel Clinton MacDougall and the 4th U.S. Artillery, Battery C, commanded by Lt. Evan Thomas. The flanks of the 1st Minnesota were aided by artillery on the right, and on the left by a infantry charge immediately before the Minnesotans effort. The 111th New York was one of the three regiments that was unfairly lableled as the 'Harper's Ferry Cowards' stemming from an unfortunate command decision during the Sharpsburg Campaign of 1862.

The personality and presence of Winfield S. Hancock is a recurring theme in every chapter. He is the single most decisive element in the preservation of the Federal center along Cemetery Ridge. Lacking from the discussion is a description of Hancock's staff, which in this micro-history, would have been enlightening and enjoyable. This reader finished the the book thinking that Hancock was unaccompanied by couriers, advisors, and aides as he rode between the farmslanes during the afternoon of July 2nd.

Yet, there are some difficulties with this book. The size of the type font must be 18 point or larger. Initially I thought the publisher had sent me the Large Print edition for the visually impaired. There was a period of adjustment for my eyes to accommodate such large text. Also, some printer/publisher proofreading needed to be done before setting this book between its covers. The pages listed for the maps in the table of contents does not match with the actual page locations of the maps in the book. Also, the maps do not have the farmsteads labled which is a curious thing for a book that has the word 'farmlanes' in its title. Only one map, Tour Stop # 5, has a farm building labled. The maps have on them only the modern park roads and not the 1863 farmlanes. Furthermore, it would have been convienent for the reader if the publisher put a few maps in the first section of the book that describes the 1863 fighting. All the maps are in the second section of the book that describes the modern driving and walking tour.

In addition, the portaits of officers do not have their units in the captions. Lacking is a picture of Colonel William J. Colville (1st Minnesota) though it is located in the Library of Congress. At times the writing style doesn't carry the narrative consistenly forward. A favorite expression of the authors is 'by the time . . .' but there is very few statements of time in the book. Of course, given the fact that the book covers about two hours of fighting, the reader does not expect a minute by minute account, but an estimation of the range time, such as the phrase '. . .about 3:30pm . . .' or ' . . . probably sometime between 4:00pm and 4:30pm . . .' would have helped.

From the bibliography is missing Richard Moe's highly regarded 'The Last Full Measure: The Life and Death of the First Minnesota Volunteers.' Missing from the book are appendices at the end of the book; especially helpful would have been an Union and Confederate order of battle of those units on the field at the Union center. There is an appendix which offers an essay on measuring the ground on which the fight occurred; the appendix is located in the middle of the book, between the narrative and the tour.

Though mechanically the book has its flaws, overall the discussion it offers is enlightening and clearly presented.

The author does an excellent job of describing the activities of Hancock as they relate to the Union defenses on Day 2 at Gettysburg. He was willing to give credit to units other than the 1st Minnesota in the stopping of Barksdale's Brigade,e.g., the 111th New York. Most of the credit seems to go to the 1st Minnesota. They suffered the highest percentage of casualties but not the highest number. Had Hancock not been all over the battlefield the outcome could have been different or there could have been more Union casualties. I highly recommend the book for those interested in accounts of specific parts of the battlefield.

Most books now published relative to the Battle of Gettysburg are "microhistories", focusing in on small segments of the whole, exploring those segments in great detail. "The Battle between the Farm Lanes" is such a microhistory, examining a crucial moment during the second day of fighting at Gettysburg. The Confederate successes at the Peach Orchard and the Wheatfield and their failure at Little Round Top during the grand assault on the Union left on July 2, 1863, are well-known and well-documented in many works. Less familiar is the story of how the Union Army of the Potomac brought the Confederate onslaught to a halt and preserved the integrity of their main position along Cemetary Ridge. "The Battle between the Farm Lanes" is the story of how the Army of the Potomac brought the Confederate advance to a halt and turned it back. The authors carefully examine the role of Winfield Scott Hancock (commander of the Federal Second Corps) in directing that Union effort, and they give him high marks for saving the Army of the Potomac from grievous defeat. But they do not neglect Hancock's subordinate commanders in how they carried out his orders and performed heroically on the battlefield. "The Battle between the Farm Lanes" is a volume that belongs on the shelves of anyone seriously interested in Gettysburg, and it provides a a vivid look at Civil War combat on the infantry regiment and artillery battery level.

Ironclad Publishing continues to bring affordable high quality Civil War histories to the public as part of The Discovering Civil War America Series. This is the fourth excellent book in the series the others are:
Protecting the Flank: The Battles for Brinkerhoff's Ridge and East Cavalry Field
A Little Short of Boats: The Fights at Ball's Bluff and Edwards Ferry
"No Such Army since the Days of Julius Caesar" Sherman's Carolinas Campaign: from Fayetteville to Averasboro
Each is a paperback book of 200 to 300 pages, with illustrations, maps, index, bibliography and notes. Each book is a very good introductory to intermediate account of the subject and is about the best buy available in Civil War history.
July 2, 1863 at Gettysburg is my candidate for most written about event in the Civil War. The Pickett's Charge is the other event that could be considered for this status. Do we need/want another book about this well covered event? Considering the work of Coddington and Pfranz this is a very valid question. Some of you may not consider buying this book as you have the mentioned volumes in your library.
While this is a valid consideration, I feel that you will lose a unique view of this action. Most accounts focus on the Confederate side of Longstreet's' attack. The Union response while not slighted has not gotten equal coverage. Unintentionally, this promotes the idea that Longstreet's attack ran out of gas as darkness ends this very long day.
Shultz and Wieck focus on Hancock's responses on July 2nd. Starting with the arrival of his Corps and deployment thru the end of the day, with the attack broken and the Union line intact. Sickles unauthorized advance that weakens the Union left complicate Hancock's task. Sickles being out of position and trying to defend to long a line forces Hancock to reinforce to him. As the battle moves into Hancock's area, he no longer has a full Corps and must cover Sickles area too.
This book is a detailed history of how Hancock held. Riding from crisis to crisis, meeting threat after threat, we come to understand the wrenching decisions he makes. The 19th Main, the 1st Minnesota, the Harpers Ferry Cowards and Turnbull's Battery march and fight across the pages. Each of these actions is detailed and placed within the larger action, allowing us to understand the unique dangers and contributions these units made.
This is a well written easy to read account of the Union response. One of the nicer items is a detailed tour of the area. This allows the reader to visit and understand the why to much of the actions. This book is a valuable addition to your Gettysburg library and highly recommended.

This book addresses an important part of the Battle of Gettysburg. Unfortunately, the maps are woefully deficient, which detracts from the book's effectiveness.

I think this may be my favorite of the books so far. It brought back some of the mystery that was missing from the last one.

A great story for the young and the young at heart. Our story now includes Jack and his probable girl friend, both of whom have dragons hitching a ride on their skins. Jack finds out a lot more about his parents, what their probable fate was, and that they were probably as opposite Uncle Virge as two people could possibly get. In the process he has lots of adventures, takes plenty of opportunity to mete out justice and grow one more step in to that Responsible Man that seems to be Zahn's ideal. If you don't expect to be wowed by depth and complexity then you will not be disappointed by this story. It's well worth the read, but do not expect greatness.

In this the fifth book of the series, Zahn does something that he's very good at. He separates his characters and has his two stories running parallel. While Jack and Draycos are finding out what really happened to Jack's late parents, Alison and her symbiant find themselves back on the slave planet of Dragon and Slave: The Third Dragonback Adventure (Dragonback). Alison has been captured by The Malison Ring in order to help them obtain the information of where Draycos's people will arrive. Once again, the relationship between Draycos and Jack takes a new and unexpected turn. A must read.

I've been reading Timothy Zahn's "Dragonback Adventures" series with a fair amount of enjoyment through the five books so far. It's a YA series. The hero is Jack Morgan, who has acquired a symbiotic companion, Draycos, a dragonlike being of an alien species, the K'Da. The K'Da can turn two-dimensional on the skin of an appropriate host. Indeed, they need to do so at least every six hours or so. Draycos was one of a vanguard group of K'Da as well as their hosts, the Shontine, who were fleeing an evil enemy in another galaxy. They had arranged for a colony in our Galaxy, but were ambushed on arrival. Draycos was the only survivor, and luckily for him Jack turned up -- luckier still, humans are acceptable hosts.

Over several books Jack and Draycos have been trying to track the humans who seem to be helping the bad aliens arrange to destroy the rest of the K'Da. They have by the by acquired an ally of sorts, Alison Kayna, a girl Jack's age (14 or 15) with a similar skillset to Jack's -- thief, hacker, safecracker, etc. And in the previous book they discovered a planet inhabited by a species much like the K'Da, but doomed to mindlessness by the lack of suitably intelligent hosts. Alison is now host to a female named Taneem. (So it would seem -- possibly -- that love interests are in place for both Jack and Draycos, though no real moves in that direction have been taken.)

In this book the quartet head to a planet where Jack's Uncle Virge had stashed something mysterious in a safe-deposit box. No sooner does Jack arrive, however, that he is shanghaied by a group of aliens and taken to their rural home to act as "Jupa", or Judge-Paladin -- to adjudicate tribal disputes, basically. It turns out he smells like their previous Jupas -- who turn out to have been Jack's long-dead parents. Jack cooperates, while he and Draycos sense a mystery concerning an abandoned mine -- and possibly concerning Jack's parents' death.

Meanwhile Alison retrieves the contents of the safe-deposit box, and is immediately kidnapped by bad guys who have been expecting someone to take an interest in that box. Rather implausibly, what they really want is a super-skilled safecracker, to open a safe from Draycos's ship -- that may contain information about the arrival of the rest of the K'Da. In other words, these are the bad guys. Why a 14 year old girl is the best safecracker available to them is a mystery never revealed. It turns out the safe is back on the planet from a couple of books before where Jack freed some slaves -- and Alison finds herself, against her will, guilted into trying to free more slaves.

The book (as with all in the series) has great gulps of implausibility and downright silliness. But it is also fast-moving, fun, with engaging main characters. I find the whole series pretty enjoyable fluff.

Zahn is a wonderful writer who has immersed his characters into a new sci-fi setting. This story is a great whodunit and and is well written. The story keeps your attention and skillfully has the characters grow before your eyes.

I would compare this book to ones as written by J.K. Rowling. Zahn has a way of making even adults love the characters. In the world of Jack and Draycos, you will be thoroughly entertained throughout the experiences of these two key characters.

The author, Thomas J. Rowland, develops his thesis that General George McClellan has been unfairly characterized by both contemporaries and historians. The first half of the book discusses the common criticisms of McClellan. In Chapter 2 the so called psychological profile on McClellan is reviewed stating that "Of all the reasons why McClellan may have been a gravely flawed commander, the exploitation of the psychological model is the most flawed itself...." He notes that both Grant and Sherman "....trailed a significant baggage of personality deficiencies into the Civil War" observing that "If anyone came close to experiencing a psychic episode during the Civil War it was Sherman in Kentucky."

In the chapter discussing McClellan's lesser faults, the author notes that both Grant and Sherman had similar faults, but they weren't judged by these faults nor should McClellan's strategic abilities be evaluated by his peccadilloes. Acknowledging that McClellan played a major role in his poor working relations with Lincoln, the author notes that "....the president was not frank about how military goals were to be shaped by the political dimensions of the rebellion." In addition, Stanton's dislike of McClellan did not help in the commander's poor relationship with the president. However, the author does not imply that McClellan was faultless noting "....his failure to delegate authority and his obstinate secrecy" Another fault was his unwillingness to take risks. The greatest question is whether he made the best use of the Army of the Potomac. Rowland concludes that "In any comparison with other Civil War commanders, particularly those to whom he is unfavorably compared, McClellan's personal shortcomings were not that remarkable."

Chapter 4's discussion of the early months of war provides valuable insight into the ultimate conduct of the war. The widely held Northern belief that most Southerners were not committed secessionists initially led to a limited war strategy. After the First Manassas McClellan recommended that to restore the Union in the shortest time, the North had to "crust the rebellion at one blow...." Rowland notes "McClellan's was....a well reasoned strategic proposal. His conservative views.... reflected....widespread appeal throughout the North at that time...." In support of this strategy, he launched the Peninsula Campaign which was undermined by Washington politics and lack of support. The book states

"....the half defeat on the Peninsula.... spelled the end of the conciliatory" strategy. For this campaign to succeed, joint operations were mandatory; and the author observes that in the early stages of the war, the inability of Federal armies to cooperate in joint operations contrasted sharply with the military situation Grant inherited in 1864.

The review of civilian leaders alarm regarding Washington's safety is noteworthy. Extraordinary concerns for the capital's safety contrasted with months of endless nagging McClellan to assume the offensive. However the troops needed for an offensive had to come from those providing the capital's defense. Both McClellan and Grant faced the problem of Washington's safety with McClellan trying to comply and Grant often giving only limited support. The book concludes "McClellan's Peninsula campaign, the first major Federal offensive in East, experienced problems uniquely its own, not the least....was the administration's failure to sustain plans they had.... agreed to support." During the first two war years, many Northerners believed the Confederates would be quickly defeated perhaps in one major campaign. When McClellan assumed command in 1861, he inherited an untrained and disorganized army. The author notes that McClellan implemented schools of instruction and all volunteers were given basic training directed by an experienced officer. In addition, he recognized the deficit in trained officers (several were political hacks) and arranged effective training. The book frequently notes, that the training and organizing of the army was a major contribution. Considering, the sheer folly of his predecessor's taking an unprepared army to defeat at the First Bull Run, McClellan's unwillingness to assume the offensive in 1861 with an untrained army was prudent and not excessive caution. Unfortunately, in 1862, politics and lack of support doomed his Peninsula campaign.

Rowland writes "....little attention is paid to the context in which McClellan dealt with the difficulties that faced the Federal army in the first fifteen months of the war. ....his early tenure deprived him of the advantage of leading mature and seasoned civilian soldiers, adapted to the demands of a new age of warfare...." As one historian noted, McClellan "suffered the frictions and frustrations of being first." The text notes that Sherman observed that Napoleon took three years to build an army and "....here it is expected in ninety days..." The author notes the irony that McClellan was relieved of command when "He had effectively divided Lee's army into widely separated halves, intending to drive between them. The celerity of those moves alarmed Lee...." This could have been a critical blow.

The text continues that McClellan might have been forgiven a multiple of failures had he kept his eye on the military objective, the destruction of the Army of Northern Virginia. However, McClellan's strategy to capture Richmond was not without merit as Richmond was a critical manufacturing, transportation and financial center. The Tredegar Iron Works alone justified the capture of Richmond. Richmond's fall during the first two war years would have been devastating to the Confederacy. Regarding Antietam, Rowland correctly notes that regardless of McClellan's shortcomings, Antietam was a Union victory. McClellan had stopped Lee from delivering a demoralizing blow on northern soil.

The book concludes, "McClellan's strategy, though reflective of the unrealistic war aims of the years 1861-62,was cogent, reasoned, and consistent with conventional military wisdom.... McClellan can scarcely be elevated to the ranks of the great captains of war, but he was hardly the worst that the conflict dragged into the center stage."

The book is somewhat repetitious and devotes too much space to comparing McClellan's faults with similar faults of Grant and Sherman. However, the book is worth reading for its discussion of Union military and political strategy during the first two years of the Civil War.

As an Amazon.com reviewer, I can see that I am going to be in the decided minority in my opinion on this book. Hopefully I can adequately point out my perceived problems with Mr. Rowland's work, and yet maintain the positives other reviewers have posted.

I have long been fascinated with George B. McClellan as not only a Civil War general, but as a Civil War personality as well. Here we have a man who should have been the one, single, Union military success - a man who had it all: brains, looks, youth, education, and family. And yet, there is no single Union general who managed to accomplish so little in over a year's time, with so much.

I hoped that Thomas J. Rowland's "George B. McClellan & Civil War History: In the Shadow of Grant and Sherman" would provide some insight into McClellan's flawed character that did not come forth from modern biographers such as Stephen Sears. Yet within Rowland's work, I was sorely disappointed.

Rowland sets forth to disprove Little Mac's critics by doing the one thing in Civil War writing that I abhor - rather than building up his subject, and letting McClellan's story stand on its own - he sets out to drag everyone else down. For some strange reason, there appears to be more and more of this going on in Civil War historiography of late, much to the detriment of our understanding of history.

Rowland sets out to outline the perceived problems with McClellan's personality and generalship, and rather than refute the contentions directly, often sets out to discredit others such as Grant, Sherman, and Edwin Stanton. If Rowland's guy cannot stand tall, then no one else will, as well. For example, we have on page 67 a typical statement of Rowland's: "The notion that McClellan was the butt of more embarrassing incidents than anyone else is greatly diminished by any extended review of the war's comical and tragic mistakes." And from there, rather than review Little Mac, Rowland sets out to review other participants on history's stage.

Rowland attempts to minimize McClellan's flaws by qualifying his admittance of such flaws throughout the book. Thus, we see Rowland admit, cautiously, that McClellan could be petty, vain, and vindictive "on occasion." In other places, his review of other historian's work is tinged with statements like "Unfortunately, that is not entirely true." The reader is left to try to ponder which portions are partially true, and partially not.

This book is not a comprehensive analysis of the life and times of General George B. McClellan, but a selected bibliography of truth and half-truth that uses only what the author wants the public to see about McClellan - and more importantly, anyone else held in higher esteem than the Young Napoleon that can be drawn down to the perceived level that history holds McClellan.

All in all, this was a very disappointing work. If you want to come to grips with the enigma that was McClellan, this book will leave you very short of your expectations.

I am in two minds about this book. On the one hand: history has not been kind to "Little Mac", and it was about time somebody stood up for McClellan. Mr. Rowland has picked up the gauntlet. Lately, it seems to me, one can detect a bit of a trend towards that end. Mr. Rowland and other authors have reexamined and reassessed the General's personality and actions. Mr. Ethan S. Rafuse's book on McClellan ("McClellan's War") is another example of a fresh look at McClellan.
To do so and fly in the face of the "communis opinio" (the widely held view) of McClellan is in itself commendable.

On the other hand: I don't think that there is much purpose to this excercise. As I see it, and I'm pretty sure in that many other ACW scholars, buffs and aficionados, share this point of view, no matter how fresh or objective one tries to look at George Brinton McClellan, one reaches the same conclusions again and again: that the General was a deeply flawed man, to say the least, vain and boastful, and yet (or perhaps even because of this) also extremely cautious, highly insecure and frankly, paranoid. I've read of people, in his own time already, not just smart-mouth Amazon book-reviewers like yours truly, referring to him as a crackpot. I even think it was Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton. Well, we know that Secretary Stanton was no great friend of McClellan and that he was quite stern in his opinions about the Generals he had to deal with, but in this case his ususally hot-headed judgement is not necessarily a wrong one.

Is it time for some revisionist history concerning McClellan? Is this necessary? Are the commonly held views of McClellan subject to debate, are these views thought to be untrue, unjust, unfair or even unhistorical by a growing number of ACW scholars, students and buffs? No, of course they are not. Because the general view of McClellan is born out of something "Little Mac" himself so conspicuously lacked: common sense.

Major General George Brinton McClellan had it all when he was called to Washington in 1861. He had a towering reputation (which was undeserved, after his successfull but minor campaign in Western Virginia, but the Union was elated to have a military success at last), he was hailed as the savior of the Union and he was given command of the Union's most important field army. The President and the cabinet trusted him, deferred to his judgement and put themselves at his disposition in stead of the other way round. He soon succeeded in ousting Winfield Scott, the venerable US Army Chief, and became General in Chief of all Union armies. McClellan, catapulted into this position of enormous power, then started to believe the adulation and the flattery of the people, the press and the politicians himself. He seemed to need it more and more, because as his influence and power increased, so did his insecurities, his doubts, his paranoia and his unbalance.
Well, we don't need to make to much of McClellan's flaws, after all, who of is isn't flawed in some, or even many, ways. Mr. Rowland correctly makes that point. McClellan wasn't more or less flawed than Grant and or Sherman. The thing is, however, that Grant and Sherman overcame their flaws, faced their demons and learned to function adequately if not superbly in command.
McClellan did not succeed in ridding himself of his fears or in learning to control them, nor in curbing his insecurities and his paranoid tendencies, and as such he was definitely not the right man to command the Army of the Potomac in the field.

Also there is cause to question his moral and indeed even his physical courage: McClellan stayed well away from the field of fight during any action. And there are more instances of behavior which justify this question mark against "Little Mac"'s honor of than the often cited episode of McClellan sailing away on a gunboat just after the beginning of the battle of Malvern Hill. An "unforgivable act of pusillanimity", as was said by some at the time, for which McClellan never offered an adequate explanation. Well, surely he was not prepared to get down to the level of his accusers and react to such slander, mr Rowland says. Yeah, right. That is the way in which people like McClellan usually respond to such considerations. I think, as do many others, that there remains a reasonable doubt as to McClellan's courage, based on his actions.

As to his judgment, well, let's name an aspect of this that puts a different light on the General's fitness for command. I'm talking of course of McClellan's tendency to systematically overestimate the number of enemy troops opposing him. He did this from day one in command and kept it up to right after Antietam, when he was finally relieved, in october 1862.

Why oh why did he do this? How did he come by those incredibly fantastic figures of hundreds of thousands of rebels opposing him and his poor little army? Was it all Pinkerton's fault? The great detective, after all, supplied the figures to McClellan. Pinkerton later said that he and his operatives had always given McClellan true numbers to the best of their knowledge. He also stated that they had not supplied McClellan with data which would support the exaggerated numbers of troops McClellan claimed Johnston and after him Lee had arrayed against him. In other words: McClellan took what Pinkerton gave him and then did some calculating of his own. He tailored the facts to fit his opinions and impressions, a professional hazard for a General, made all the more probable by McClellan's psychological make-up.
Whatever the psychological reasons; his inability to admit mistakes is one of the least attractive traits of McClellan's character.
After the war, indeed even during it, it became clear that Johnston and Lee had never commanded anything near the numbers of men that McClellan had claimed in his frantic cries for reinforcements and on which he had based his overcautious strategies.
After doing some maths it must have dawned on the people of the North that the war, which had gone on for four bloody years, could have ended in 1862. It could have ended with McClellan taking Richmond in june 1862 or with McClellan crushing Lee's badly outnumbered army at Antietam. In those days McClellan had acted too cautiously because he had convinced himself he was outnumbered. Even McClellan must have known, pretty soon after the war, that he had been tricked, by the rebels and by his own mind. But he never made any comment on the question!
He never apologized (well, that would have been impossible for a man like him) but neither did he ever explain his behavior. He never said on what he had he had based his now manifestly wrong actions in the Peninsula and Antietam campaigns!

What I even less understand, why weren't the people of the Union states furious with him for failing to win the war in 1862? He dawdled, faltered and failed and in doing so wasted the opportunities to end the war out of weakness, lack of resolve, moral cowardice and pig-headedness! He had Lee's battleplans in his possession just prior to Antietam, for Pete's sakes!! Why wasn't there more of an outcry against him? The war lasted two more years thanks to him! Why was he not dragged before congress or before a court-martial? In my view there was every reason to do so.

Now to the plus side. McClellan made the Army of the Potomac. He built it from the masses of raw volunteers that came to Washington in 1861. He trained these men, and selected their commanders, and he made some inspired choices in this regard (men like Gibbon, Hancock, and Hunt, for instance). He drilled the army, organized it and fed, clothed and housed it. He kept the army in good health an kept it supplied.
The fine performance of the men of the Army of the Potomac, especially that of the infantry and the gunners, owed a very great deal to the rigourous training programme to which McClellan subjected them. The General turned out to possess an enormous talent for organization and training. He honed the skills of the army and prepared it to an excellent degree for it's task. The credit for this is largely due to McClellan. Maybe this was part of the problem: McClellan built the army and knew it's strengths and it's weaknesses. After having made this huge army he was reluctant to commit it to action. They were all so green! There were so few regulars! He could not do what the French had done in 1793 when they fused the professional Royal Army with the new volunteer army, made up of inexperienced national guardsmen. They amalgamated the two types of soldiers in a new army: they put one regular army batallion in a demi-brigade with two batallions of volunteers. In this way the old sweats showed the rookies the ropes of soldiering and infused old-fashioned discipline while in turn the volunteers were an example and an inspiration of revolutionary elan to the old soldiers.
McClellan could not do this: there were only some 17.000 regular soldiers in the US Army in 1861. He felt he had to use his army very very carefully and cautiously, if he lost it, he would lose the war, and the Union with it. This realization, of which he convinced himself, eventually paralyzed him.

This is book that makes you think, and think again, on McClellan. Four stars for that!!!
I do not share Mr. Rowland's conclusions, though. In 1862 McClellan was not the best man for the job to command the Army of the Potomac.
It would have been for him and for his reputation had he continued in an organizing/facilitating capacity. Lincoln should have made him Chief of Staff in Washington, in fact, should have given "Little Mac" the job Henry Halleck got in 1862, or should have made him Quartermaster-General or even Secretary of War.
It would in all probability have meant that McClellan would have become the Lazare Carnot of the Union: "The Organizer of Victory" The man who supplied the tools that won the war for the Union. He could then have supervised the productions of arms and ammunition, the supplying of the army, it's transportation, the training of it's new recruits, and he would more than probably have done a great job. He was the born military organizer. He was not, alas, a great field commander. McClellan would have lived to great respect and glory and would not have died at 58, of a heart condition which probably stemmed from the stress of supreme command, and which after the war was aggravated by the constant stress of battling to keep his reputation intact. McClellan died a controversial figure, respected and yet partly tragic, partly ridiculous. But he had only himself to blame for this.

Thomas J. Rowland set out to prove that, although George McClellan was not a great general, neither was he as bad as so many Civil War historians and writers have depicted him. I believe that he has succeeded. Having read Stephen Sears' classic biography on "Mac", I was certain that the definitive McClellan verdict was a fait accompli. How wrong I was! Historians T. Harry Williams, Kenneth P. Williams, and Bruce Catton were also cited for a less than even-handed assessment of McClellan. Still, one must add that Rowland did not maliciously criticize the intent of these historians. He merely pointed out that they needlessly made Lincoln, Grant, and Sherman--men who remain giants without anyone's help--larger than they should be, at McClellan's expense. After examining their records during the first two years of the war, each of these men showed less than a superlative level of performance, contrary to popular assumption. I think that Rowland's book is one of best buys I have ever made. A more superbly-written, well-argued, and illuminating book on George McClellan and his impact on the Civil War and its interpretation would be hard to find. It's great. Buy it!

Thomas J. Rowland set out to prove that, although George McClellan was not a great general, neither was he as bad as so many Civil War historians and writers have depicted him. I believe that he has succeeded. Having read Stephen Sears' classic biography on "Mac", I was certain that the definitive McClellan verdict was a fait accompli. How wrong I was! Historians T. Harry Williams, Kenneth P. Williams, and Bruce Catton were also cited for a less than even-handed assessment of McClellan. Still, one must add that Rowland did not maliciously criticize the intent of these historians. He merely pointed out that they needlessly made Lincoln, Grant, and Sherman--men who remain giants without anyone's help--larger than they should be, at McClellan's expense. After examining their records during the first two years of the war, each of these men showed less than a superlative level of performance, contrary to popular assumption. I think that Rowland's book is one of best buys I have ever made. A more superbly-written, well-argued, and illuminating book on George McClellan and his impact on the Civil War and its interpretation would be hard to find. It's great. Buy it!

This is truly an amazing book. It is very helpful and it really gives you hope that people are starting to take note and take action to help these families.

I felt as if I was reading a "report" from the internet and not an informative book on PTSD. Too much political bias for me, could have done w/out that, very slick job. There were a few interesting and valid view points and facts, but the meat and potatoes of this book could have been written in 20 pages in bullet format. I don't care much for reading books that are a compilation of information from other books. I have read many of her sources books and found them far more helpful and valuable.

I am a strong supporter of our military and understand PTSD and it's affects all too well. I have lost two Soldiers to suicide upon return from Iraq. If I weren't already in the mix I am not so sure this book would "move" me to care, I was hopeful by the title and reviews that it would inspire others to do just that "care" more and get involved. At some points I felt like I was reading anti-war, anti-American rhetoric and not about PTSD. The bias in the media and our own politicians wanting this war to be failure has hurt our Troops more than anything. I do agree Rumsfeld was an idiot and screw up in her political expressions.

I found no inspiration in this book, other than to agree the DOD needs to start tracking suicides of our Veterans post deployment, some are hard to call like high speed car accidents late at night, intentional or accident? I do agree more of us need to put pressure on the VA and politicians to force the VA to function properly now and not later, but again nothing in this writing stirred any fire from within. Maybe if PTSD and war is new to you it might, I can only hope.

Enough already w/understanding and research of PTSD, we have enough information and it's time to start progressive, productive treatment and support. As the author points out PTSD has been around since the dawn of war. The VA has always been poorly managed and needs to be cleaned up, this is nothing new, we can't blame all of it on Iraq and the Stan influx or present administration, though they do need to step up. During peace time no one cared what the VA was doing and now our country is paying the price in more ways than one. I did agree that the miitary and gov have created some nice catch 22's for our guys returning so they don't have to spend the money to take care of our Soldiers and Marines.

So I painfully give this book one star, just was hoping for more.

PTSD: Pathways Through the Secret Door A must read. Although it is a bit analytical at times. I found that it expanded my references greatly

Those of us who diagnose PTSD are faced with daunting challenges in its treatment of many facets: therapy, support groups, community based resources, and medication management. Post Traumatic Stress becomes a disorder when that person is no longer able to function adequately. Friendships drift apart, marriages dissolve and increasing stress can overwhelm anyone whether it is the result of rape, natural or manmade disaster, or the horror of war. Knowing what PTSD is is half the battle in getting treatment.

Mental health professionals may hear from patients, "You weren't in combat; how would you know what PTSD is like?" Ilona Meagher has written an illuminating resource, gleaned from many hours of research and interviews with our military and veterans to bring Moving a Nation to Care: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and America's Returning Troops to our attention. You will discover through the words of our warriors what PTSD is.

A 19th century poem by Will Allen Dromgoole called the "The Bridge Builder" describes an older man who had a journey to make on foot, through a river over a deep canyon. After crossing it, he stayed and built a bridge across the stream.

"Old man," said a fellow pilgrim, near,
"You are wasting strength with building here;
Your journey will end with the ending day;
You never again must pass this way;
You have crossed the chasm, deep and wide-
Why build you a bridge at the eventide?"
The builder lifted his old gray head:
"Good friend, in the path I have come," he said,
"There followeth after me today,
A youth, whose feet must pass this way.
This chasm, that has been naught to me,
To that fair-haired youth may a pitfall be.
He, too, must cross in the twilight dim;
Good friend, I am building the bridge for him."

Let us build it through knowledge and support.

Soldiers and their families love Moving a Nation to Care. They look at this easy to read, easy to understand book as a WORKBOOK, a RESOURSE GUIDE, and, in some cases, a MIRROR to their own on-going experiences.

In early May of this year I gave two copies of Ilona Meagher's book to the top Sergeants of two locally-based military units which had recently returned from Iraq. I hoped that they would read the book, but knew they might not. Each of them read it. Their wives read it. It took them weeks to get through it. The material was helpful, the resources excellent, and the information relevent to their own problems and the problems the members of their unit were having. One wife was afaid that her marraige was skidding out of control. The book opened the door to conversations with her husband she never believed possible.

When I talked with one of those Sergeants and offered to get more copies for his unit if he wanted them, he lept at the chance. Through our local Elks Lodge we are furnishing 20 copies of the book to his unit.

Is this book any good? Ask a soldier who has read it. "Yep. It sure is."

I REALLY ENJOYED THIS BOOK. IF YOU ARE INTERESTED IN FRENCH FORIEGN LEGION HISTORY,ESPECIALLY THE 2E REP, THIS BOOK IS FOR YOU.

I enjoyed reading Mr. Simpson's book. It's a survey of 2REP with a bit of history of the disgraced and disbanded 1REP. To tell the story of FFL's parachutists, he included some history from the disastrous drop into Dien Bien Phu in the border region between Laos and Viet Nam. 2REP is not a typical FFL regiment and Mr. Simpson does a great job explaining what they do and how they do it (with emphasis on Low Intensity Conflicts).

If you want a novel built around legionnaires or an "I was there" account, this is not the book for you. Mr. Simpson doesn't say it is.

The book gets five stars from me because it covers what it says it's covering with elegance and a sense of insight without sensationalism that is lacking in many similar military accounts.

The only thing left to do is to get Mr. Simpson to go through the jungle training school in Guiana and write about it.

I was not at all entertained by this book. I have read several books on the French Foreign Legion and this one was probably the most boring; in fact, it was text-book-boring. I tried reading it and just could not endure it beyond the first 100 pages. It may have historical detail as mentioned in other reviews, but it is certainly very dry and has no exciting moments or narrative. Sort of like telling war stories while on elephant tranquilizers.

This is a good book. I think it's best for those who are more interested in military history in general. I expected something else but that's my fault for not reading the description. This book gives and accurate account of history as well as interviews with legionaires AND personal thoughts. I recommend this book for those intersted in history. Not for those interested in joining.

This book, having bought and read it about 18 months ago, finds me now - 31 March 1999 in Metz, France - about to follow in the path of those men written about by the author. Its descriptive narrative combined with historic facts and personal stories of the various men, convinced me after many years of self doubt that this, The French Foreign Legion, is the lifestyle and destiny I seek for myself! It makes for easy reading, that is hard to put down till the end.

in this turn pager muki betser reveals the secretive world of isrel's elite special operation units. told with great credability and a cocky attitude muki guides the reader through israel's wars , terrorist attacks and fight for survival. revealing not only succeses but also failures and tragedy.

As good as Marciko's Rough Warrior. True account no holds barred combat stories. Get it!

Muki Betser tells an intense account of his experiences as one of Israel's greatest commandos. Awesome book highly recommended. I read it in one day - couldn't put it down. Covers his experience in Shaked, Tsanchanim, and Sayeret Matkal - bascially starting from 1967. Despite the fact that his political views are outdated, (i wonder if he still thinks the same) this is a man who gave his entire life for the state of Israel.

I read this one a while ago, but recent events brought it back into the forefront of the mind. I remember that this was a really good book and gave me a perspective of the Israeli military that I never saw before. I knew they were very good, but I had no idea.
I just hope that we don't have to resort to the level of security that they have in Israel or Northern Ireland. Also, this book makes me want to read other books about the Israeli military.

I have never read a book that was more addicting than the SECRET SOLDIER. I have read it 4 times and I am still amazed at what the IDF can do. The missions that are described within this book will blow your mind from Entebbe to Prime Minister Ehud Barak running through the streets if Beirut in a dress and firing an Uzi. THIS BOOK IS FAR AND WAY THE BEST BOOK I HAVE EVER READ!

Please send my purchase or credit my account. Thank you.

David G. Bauer

The creator of this tome puts you squarely behind the devastating 90mm flat-trajectory weapon on his Patton Series M-46A1 tank; plus, many more direct fire adventures and the inevitable side trips to tedium and despair that is synonomous with the eternal, war-weary combat Marine tankers. This was all accomplished through his letters sent home and preserved by his loving and sagacious mother. In his depiction of the War in Korea, punctuated by death and misery all around is clearly expressed. Conversely, it also demonstrates the exlixir of daily triumphs against a resolute and formidable enemy locked in mortal combat. This is not only a superior read, but also a treat to the eye with a myriad of on the scene photos and the author's brillant penchant at illustrations and sketches well done. It also explores the brutal and intensive training of all Marines who volunteered for a combat tour to Korea. Only the finest specimen of a Marine entered Korea for service in the Fleet Marine Force. This literary work personalized and covered a polygot of details of what Marine tankers were all about: their virulent mindset and their military accomplishments in the field, which unfolded day-in and night-out. ..THE ENEMY ALWAYS FOUGHT AT NITE!! [close combat]...Roger Baker's natural style unmasks the unvarnished truth of how Marines survived under severe combat conditions and the trials and tribulations of misconduct in the Reserve Area. He even puts a stamp on his own veracity for expressing his love/lust for life. His writings of such, symbolizes the courageous youth of America; regardless, to his own country's pathetic apathy on what is taking place in Korea [1950-1953]. By your leave, take for instance his 'Bon Voyage' out of Korea in the final chapter. With all the death and destruction during his combat tour of duty, a rip-roaring climax takes place on the loading docks at Inchon...it mirrors, there was never a safe haven in Korea. It was a full blown WAR despite President Harry Truman's smoke/screen, "It's only a 'Police Action' and nothing to fear"...yeah, sure Mr. President...It was WAR in Korea...who am I??...just another Marine tank gunner, who also squeezed the 90mm trigger just like our humble and eloquent author...this is one hellava read...Semper Fidelis....SSGT CHRIS SARNO-USMC FMF

I found myself many times feeling as though I was there with Roger. There were times I laughed and had tears. I especially like the idea of his personal account of what it was like being a young man so far from home, building new relationships and dealing with losing those close to him. I'm thankful Roger wrote home consistenly and his family saved all his letters and drawings, more than that I am thankful Roger has shared his experience with us, taking many of us to a place we have never been, but walked away feeling what it was like to have been there.

Roger Baker shares with all readers his personal account of his year in Korea. His letters home were extraordinary in their level of feelings and honesty and yet allowing his parents to be part of this very difficult time in his life. I found the book warm, funny, sad and yet very tender. Tankers are a special group of men for sure, and living in these machines in the heat of summer and cold of winter must have been unbearable. Roger lets us experience his trip to adulthood in a very personal way. He is a true American Hero.

This book took me to a place I knew nothing about, and did it with language vivid as the photos that stud the text. Perfect? No. Moving? Yes. This is war. Read and learn.