Services Books
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A must for parents!Review Date: 2008-09-29
How well does your IEP measure upReview Date: 2008-02-13
Very Informative for New -to-IEP process parentsReview Date: 2007-04-10
The best!!Review Date: 2003-06-22
Outstanding ResourceReview Date: 2004-05-05
Here is a sampling of some of the areas covered in the book: A detailed, insightful discussion of each of the components of an IEP and the relationship of the components to each other; the elements necessary to prepare an effective Present Levels of Performance (PLP), which forms the basis for generating annual goals and represents a baseline against which to judge progress; why specifying underlying conditions clearly is so important; the relationship between clearly written objectives and appropriate methodology; knowledge of ASD and the way in which it affects the student who manifests it as the most basic building block of appropriate IEP development; why IEPs should specify prompt levels in the objectives as well as a system for fading them back; discussion of a "prompt hierarchy"; the need to build generalization strategies right into the objectives so the child learns a skill across a variety of settings, people, activities, etc., right from the start; breaking down multi-dimensional behavior such as "crossing the street" into its basic components so that behavior progress can be measured; how not to confuse a process with a product outcome (e.g. developing understanding vs. demonstrating understanding); the difference between accommodations and modifications (the latter reduce the standard and result in lowered educational outcomes); guidelines for prioritizing needs and sample IEPs covering such content areas as concept development, critical thinking, making inferences, etc. The above list is only a sampling of the issues covered. This book is written from a highly-informed, sensible and practical perspective. Having read this book, I feel like I'm in control of the IEP process and not vice-versa. Highly recommended.

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ExcellentReview Date: 2008-07-20
Great Anatamy & Physio BookReview Date: 2006-07-14
The Human Body in Health and Illness, Second Edition Review Date: 2006-03-20
Fabulous!Review Date: 2002-09-03
Good Book but Lacks DetailsReview Date: 2005-04-20

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What a sad state of affairsReview Date: 2008-10-14
A Must ReadReview Date: 2008-10-01
An insider's view of the problems plaguing the CIA at the "sharp end"Review Date: 2008-09-18
Well Written Description of an Incompetent Agency from the TrenchesReview Date: 2008-08-31
Please allow me to make a few comments that might contribute to Robert Steele's excellent review.
Although the term "spy" is bandied about to sell books, for example, Valerie Plame's book, "Fair Game: My Life as a Spy...", case officers are not spies -- they handle, administer, and manage spies. As such Plame was not a spy, yet her career is typical: four years of training in the US, two years in an embassy overseas under diplomatic cover gathering tidbits at cocktail parties, four more years of training in the US, possibly a couple of months as a NOC (Non-Official Cover) case officer where she was not involved in any positive intelligence operations, (it takes years to become truly productive, if at all), and then ten more years in the US doing bureaucratic functions. I leave it to the reader to decide whether the taxpayer got his money's worth.
I do not mean to pick on Plame, but her story is typical. Very, very few case officers are effective, and when they are, it is in violation of policies and procedures from headquarters and only after taking extreme risks, both with regard to their physical safety and their career. Ishmael was willing to do this, and over time had to be eliminated in spite of his production because he; 1) made others look bad, 2) forced lazy bureaucrats to do even a modicum of work, and 3) was viewed as a loose cannon that someday would cause an intelligence flap. Another norm was "Suspenders", always looking good and making others feel good, but in reality contributing nothing.
The reader should be shaken to the core over the activities and bloated bureaucracy of the Agency within the US. The brief of the Agency is to provide intelligence ONLY on Foreign countries and agencies. The FBI is charged with providing domestic intelligence. So why are 90% of Agency personnel living it up in the US? Because it's comfortable, and that's what bureaucracies do.
The author's presentation of the approval process is not only accurate, but incomprehensible to a case officer. In my day operations could and were mounted within weeks (& that was without computers). If anyone watching a Hollywood movie where things happen with the velocity of light, please consider that approximately 80% of a case officer's time is taken up with paperwork (now computerized), 15% in support activities (travel, etc.) and maybe 5% in operations (if he is active, willing to by-pass procedures, and is willing to take risks.) Gathering human intelligence is not an easy job, and literally everyone above the case officer is against him, one way or the other.
In short we have "paralysis by analysis," and in the Agency this is furthered by bureaucratic "paralysis by approvals."
The author's accurate depiction of the problems in husband/wife teams in the bureaucracy should be taken to heart. They are essentially ALWAYS dysfunctional. The veteran reader should consider the situation where a husband and wife are officers together in the same infantry company and the problem is readily visible. But not to the Agency.
Another startling statistic is that the Agency is now 1/2 female. I wonder how many, if any, are successful case officers. I can't imagine any of my agents allowing themselves to report to a female. (Sorry, folks, but there is a lot of agent/case office bonding required.)
I was also startled to discover that case officers are paid $100,000 or more per year, plus all sorts of allowances and expenses. Ishmael's estimate that a case officer cost hundreds of thousands of dollars per year was incredible, particularly considering that most produce nothing. So what does run-of-the-mill human intelligence cost? $100,000 per page? And that doesn't count the bloated bureaucracy. This is truly a broken organization.
BUY AND READ THIS BOOK!
p.s. I can't believe Ishmael fronted the Agency up to $300,000 out of his own pocket. In my day such debts never went over a thousand dollars or two.
Is Anbody Listening?Review Date: 2008-08-21
The pseudonymous author of this book, Ishmael (Call me, Ishmael), has provided an excellent account of just how a NOC goes about the business of recruiting and exploiting foreign agents often under extremely difficult circumstances. To his great credit, Ishmael managed to produce an informative and fascinating memoir that still protects sensitive CIA names, locations and operations. Ishmael is a former Marine Infantry Officer who, despite his contempt for CIA as an institution, still is a patriot first who wants the U.S. intelligence system to really work.
This brings us to what for many is the most important revelation of this book: the fact that CIA is and apparently always has been a dysfunctional institution virtually incapable, as an institution, of either effectively collecting human intelligence (HUMINT) or doing its core mission of producing strategic intelligence. Ishmael suggests that CIA has been able to attract a host of dedicated, capable people who should have made CIA the premier intelligence agency of the world. Unfortunately, Ishmael also describes a culture of amateurism and bureaucratic gamesmanship that has more often than not hampered if not prevented the agency from doing it job of producing good intelligence. CIA managers as described in this book come off as risk adverse, ill-informed bureaucrats incapable of supervising even mundane administrative activities. Ishmael also implies that CIA managers are excellent at protecting themselves, their `turf' and, of course, hoodwinking their nominal overseers in congress.
All this is pretty harsh on CIA, but seems to square with what Robert Baer, another competent and patriotic CIA intelligence officer, has noted in his own `intelligence memoir', "See No Evil" about his adventures as a case officer. Reading both books is an interesting exercise. Although there is no evidence in either book that the men knew each other both have arrived at remarkably similar conclusions on the sad state of CIA.


High Quality Effective Hypnosis CDReview Date: 2008-05-21
YOU LIVE IN ANGER, YOU LIVE IN MISERY Review Date: 2007-01-16
Hypnosis for Overcoming AngerReview Date: 2007-04-03
Two Thumbs Up!!Review Date: 2003-08-09
A Reader In Palm Desert
Satisfaction guaranteed!Review Date: 2004-03-12

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Great bookReview Date: 2008-05-08
servant leadershipReview Date: 2001-01-05
Chuck Swindoll is a great story teller. Probably would have been a great television personality like Cronkite, but chose to follow the real call on his life.
If you want to be challenged to face your pride/ego, pick up this book and read it cover-to-cover. Ouch!
An Excellent Challenge to Get Outside Ourselves!Review Date: 2004-05-11
Among the important points covered in the book include:
1. Two tests of true humility.
2. A great proof of true servanthood is giving anonymously.
3. Servants
who refuse to be bogged down in the past are seldom petty people.
4. Humility, a character trait greatly cherished by
God, is sadly lacking in today's world.
5. The dangers of being a servant.
6. Jesus described Himself as a servant
and 3 aspects of obedient service.
7. God's servants will be attacked and abused - nothing we experience has not first
gone through God.
8. An eternal perspective of the servant's rewards.
Unfortunately, the church all too often copies the world - lording it over others instead of serving others, expecting to be served instead of serving, and not wishing to serve unless we receive recognition.
Swindoll's book is an excellent challenge to serve in Jesus' name. Read and be encouraged and challenged!
I'm not talking about playing tennisReview Date: 2000-04-25
Has been improvedReview Date: 2001-09-26
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A book that stimulates the mind and the heart !Review Date: 2000-05-24
StupendousReview Date: 2000-03-30
A very good bookReview Date: 2000-03-30
A moving tribute to a great manReview Date: 2000-03-30
A courageous man!Review Date: 1999-05-15

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Strap in, and get ready for a rideReview Date: 2003-06-23
The stand alone stories have ended. It's time for Ms Isard to claim the Imperial throne, time for Rogue Squadron to show their flying skills, time for the performance to really kick in. Unlike other issues, this one has a genuine feel to it, where power and politics have some major characters decide the day.
The art is similar to Battleground:Tatooine, which I didn't think much of in that issue's review. Here, where you don't have Tatooine and Ryloth deserts to inhibit your artistry, the lush vista of Brentaal saves the day. Character faces just aren't rendered in enough detail, and at times the features in the frames just look a bit small in size.
That notwithstanding, Fel makes up in dialogue what his rendered art misses. A brilliant but loyal pilot straddled with a fool for a superior that's too-often semi-attired and looks quite like a roman emperor, you feel for him. The Rogue pilots don't miss out on their lines too, and a range of emotions are showed which help to convey the seriousness and delicacy of the mission.
Action is hot and intense, and even though Imperial politics is what allows the Alliance to take more and more of Brentaal, you can bet Fel's going to make them fight for it. This is war, and it reflects well in how the captions were chosen. A level in the N64 Rogue Squadron game was based on the last mission here, so it's fun to view it differently. The Telsij lady you briefly meet---and gasp at---from her sight in Mandatory Retirement is explained here.
Dendo is back, armed with his flashy cape and quick-finger trigger. New Rogues are featured to make up for attrition, and you'll like Koyi Komad's interaction with them. Her character, short as her appearances are, just shines out from the page.
Overall, the sketchy feel of the art had me rating this a star less, but In the Empire's Service is just too good to give any less. It has it all, what you could want, and certainly worthy lightening your purse a few Imperial credits less indeed.
Indeed a good bookReview Date: 1999-12-21
The Classic Rogue Squadron ComicReview Date: 2001-02-10
In this story, Sate Pestage has basically assumed Palpatine's role at the head of the Empire, and is struggling to hold it while an alliance of various other high ranking Imperials (the "Cabal") is also seeking to gain control of the Empire. Enter Ysanne "Iceheart" Isard, who, while presumably advising both sides as to the best way to defeat the Rebels is actually expertly playing them off against each other. Taking her advice, Pestage vows to hold a wealthy Imperial world, which the rebels promptly start planning to liberate. Thus begins the power struggle between Pestage, the Cabal, and the Rebel Alliance on Brentaal.
As I've said, this comic has an awesome number of dogfights, and it introduces several new Rogues to make up for attrition in the last comic. In addition, it introduces Salm and his wing of Y-wings, as well as Imperial fighter legend Baron Fel and his feared 181st Fighter Group, which is basically the Imperial equivalent of Rogue Squadron. Also, Kapp Dendo and his SpecOps squad show up again. The art is nice and easy to follow, and the pilot chatter is good as always. Unfortunately, Baron Fel is somewhat stiff, starting as just a perfect superpilot, but he does evolve into a more human character by the end of the series. Also, why is Plourr still with the Rogues? Wasn't her return at the end of the previous comic just a very temporary reprieve from her duties on Eiattu?
Just as a note of interest, you'll notice that the main battle in this comic was adapted as one of the levels in the Rogue Squadron 3D game for PC and N64.
Overall, this is an excellent comic, one of the best Rogue Squadron stories out there. Definitely and highly recommended.
The Best of Star WarsReview Date: 2001-08-12
This arc is unique in that it gives both the Rebels and Imperials almost equal time. The faces of the Empire are many, and this arc shows a depth to it not acheived in anything else thus far. The scheming by Ysanne Isard is great, while you also see the varying faces of the Empire on Brentaal itself. Admiral Lon Isoto and Baron Soontir Fel are both Imperials, yet completely opposite characters. Isoto is an incompetant, vain, corrupt, lazy, and perhaps even slightly insane man, while Fel is a very smart, strong, moral, yet somewhat flawed figure. He is the greatest pilot in the Empire, and serves that Empire not because of who leads it, but because of simple loyalty to its people. As time goes on, it becomes more and more apparent to him that perhaps his view on things was flawed, and perhaps he need to rectify it. Along with Grand Admiral Thrawn, he is perhaps the best Imperial character to come out of the comics and novels.
The Rebels are interesting as well, and the Rogues are for the only time in the series at full strength. Balancing the stories of 12 pilots is not easy, but as events transpire some paths are split and some interconnect. Some, like Wedge, Tycho, Janson, Ibtisam, and Nrin, get more time, wheras ones like Dar Keyis and Standro are forced into the backdrop. But that's alright, for reason I won't get into lest I spoil things.
The art by Nadeau perfectly fits the whole 'war movie'-type feel of 'In the Empire's Service.' His technology and cityscapes are, as always, superb, and although his faces may be a little choppy at times, each person has his or her own face, which is very important with such a large cast. And David Nestelle's coloring prowess is once again demonstrated. Never slips, always consistent, always fitting the scene perfectly.
And who can forget the cliff-hanger last line of the series?
Bravo to the creators of 'In the Empire's Service'. They've produced one of the most insightful, well-written examples of 'Star Wars' ever published, and the series' lack of sales is truly shameful. Highly, highly reccomended work.
One of the Best SW Comics EverReview Date: 2000-01-16
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One of the finest primers on intelligenceReview Date: 2008-03-23
Written before 9/11, Informing Statecraft makes hay from Cold War intelligence experiences. Consequently, the book does not address the complex issues and consequences of pre-9/11 intelligence matters or those matters associated with weapons of mass destruction intelligence Iraq. Those issues Codevilla deals with in other writings.
To begin, Codevilla does a fine job of organizing the disciplines of intelligence. Guiding the reader through the thicket of terms and arcana, Codevilla structures his discussion of collection, analysis and production, counterintelligence, and covert action to provide the reader the foundation for the critique of these disciplines, which follows.
With respect to the collection disciplines, Codevilla argues that nearly any fact can be of great importance - or of no importance - depending on the use to which an decision maker might put it. It is possible for a political leader or military commander to choose the right course of action with little (or in spite of) information. Whether a fact turns out to be useful or harmful depends on timeliness, volume, intelligibility and inherent relevance. The consequences of poor collection capability are profound: not having a spy in the enemy camp means never knowing for sure about what is being prepared for the future. Not having a spy means relying on observation, with all its invitations to self-deception.
Once in a while a fact - a picture, a message, an event - is so clearly important that its value is self-evident. In such cases, an intelligence service may transmit the fact to policymakers without analysis, and the policymakers will see its meaning clearly. But even in such clearly obvious cases the key is knowing the difference between facts that can be treated that way and those that cannot. Consequently, the act of screening information for relevance itself becomes an act of analysis. Codevilla observes that two nemeses lurk behind every analytical process. First, there is rarely enough data to draw an unchallengeable conclusion. Second, since the data concern human struggles, it is likely to have been biased precisely in order to deceive the analyst. Moreover, the analyst, being human, comes fully equipped with bias.
Codevilla argues persuasively that serious interest and serious mind are the real prerequisites for quality analysis, and these characteristics distinguish professionals from amateurs. The author quotes Plato in saying that only an expert thief can understand thievery. Knowledge of perverse practices, argues Plato, is necessary but not sufficient to understand perversion. Vulnerability to such perversities is most acute during periods of urgency and stress. This is because, with regard to dynamic events, the analyst is at his greatest disadvantage: The data is sketchiest, the opportunities for deception and self-deception are greatest, and the time is shortest. The analyst must rely solely on his knowledge of the character of the people he is observing under such circumstances.
With respect to the contemporary question of intelligence failure in the nature of surprise, Codevilla's thesis is simple and clear: intelligence has done all it can when it delivers the best possible report that the facts allow to the right person at the right time. Distinguishing such intelligence failures from failures standing from other sources, he notes that the real intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor was not one of intelligence at all. The collectors instantly analyzed, and even managed to deliver. But the high officials who received the product did not order action.
Two factors intervene to complicate the proper delivery of intelligence. First, the providers of intelligence are jealous of their sources and methods. Second, the various users of intelligence all realize that the power to state officially what foreign conditions are like is at the same time the power to determine military budgets and foreign policy.
Codevilla addresses the discipline of counterintelligence in a refreshingly mature and disciplined manner. He thinks of the discipline of counterintelligence primarily as a quality control function. While intelligence services must busy themselves with a host of things, a part of them must be constantly devoted to collecting and analyzing facts about other intelligence services - in short, doing counterintelligence. Counterintelligence is often confused with security, that is, merely with protecting secrets and protecting against subversion. Whereas the objective of security is to cut and prevent all contacts between hostiles and those who are to be protected the objective of counterintelligence is to engage hostile intelligence, control what it knows, and if possible control also what it does. As others have argued, Codevilla acknowledges counterintelligence is the queen on the intelligence chessboard: when one side loses the contest for quality control, its intelligence services become a net liability.
Codevilla urges a fresh understanding of covert action as a complement to contemporary statecraft. Secret relationships, he argues are a means of playing some members of a government against others, or of dealing with an entire body politic under false pretense. The commonplace view that covert action, which Codevilla calls "covered warfare," is the weapon par excellence of the weak states is true, he argues, but misleading. First, covert action works for the weak no insofar as they are weak, but insofar as they are smart. Second, it works even better for the strong than it does for the weak.
Having established a framework for his discussion, Codevilla turns to a critique of contemporary American intelligence.
As he was in previous publications, and has been in subsequent ones, the author is particularly hard on the CIA. Among all other nations, the United States struggles with the human intelligence discipline. This truth is born out in the historical facts of America's human intelligence institutions. The notion of the gentleman spy who steals into enemy territory to sow treachery and steal secrets has no basis at all in the history of the real Office of Strategic Services, the CIA's forerunner.
Today, he argues, real American spies, following the tradition of British intelligence, live by the rule that they themselves should neither masquerade as natives nor steal documents, but rather that they themselves should recruit and manage the people who do such things. Lacking technical, cultural, practical competence with respect to their targets, such spies will at best be ineffectual, at worst, liabilities. Writing before 9/11, Afghanistan, and Iraq, Codevilla offers a long and detailed critique focusing on pre-9/11 failures of US intelligence. He concludes that real intelligence reform will be extraordinarily difficult.
First, Congress is not well-positioned to shape intelligence. Congress lacks the required expertise, and the rule that members of the Senate Intelligence Committee may serve no more than eight years, and members of the House Intelligence Committee no more than six, helps to hold down expertise.
Second, it was before 9/11 and remains today extremely difficult to focus intelligence activities on the most important strategic challenges the country faces. True reform, Codevilla argues, does not consist of procedures, budgets, or of drawing bureaucratic "wiring diagrams" much less of bureaucratic vendettas. It consists of figuring out how the needs of the future differ from what the present bureaucracies deliver, and then acting dispassionately.
Third, Codevilla expresses concern over the quality of America's ability to attract and retain quality intelligence professionals. As with military for foreign service officers, intelligence professionals must be selected from among those intellectually qualified people who want to join the fray on their country's behalf. Commitment to the ends of one's country truly frees intelligence professionals to search for the most effective means. Moreover, intelligence is a people-intensive business. Good performance depends on an unusually wide variety of talents. Many of these talents are rare, and most are not of the sort that can be taught, especially by governments.
Reform is essential, concludes Codevilla. Even - or especially - in the post-9/11 world, this book is important. In the long run, he argues, governments get the intelligence they deserve. Whether in the post-9/11 world the American people are benefiting from their nation's recent and acute struggles with intelligence remains unclear - despite a dedicated and energetic effort at reform.
An impressive and meticulously researched account on intelligence...Review Date: 2005-07-12
And, yes the aphorisms are authentic, fascinating, and call for radical reformation e.g., "Sound knowledge of a disorderly world, rather than faith in a trouble free, post-end-of-history `new world order,' will best fit nations to thrive in the twenty-first century." P 72. "There is never enough intelligence to guarantee instant success at no cost and never enough to overcome entrenched prejudice." P 213. "It is more important to define what any particular job, e.g., espionage, is to accomplish, how it is to be accomplished, and to hire the right kinds of people to do it, than it is to decide for which bureaucracy these people will work." P 293.
But the roots of this work lie deep in lessons that humankind desperately needs to understand now at the beginning of the new millennium: the mystery of foreign lands and the mystery of the language, culture, and people integral to them.
o Despite superficial signs of a uniform world culture (cassette recorders, jeans, soda pop, burgers, rock groups), Africans are becoming more African, Asians more Asian, Russians more Russian, etc. The often astonishingly good English spoken by young people from Moscow to Mecca - never mind the Indian subcontinent, where it is the lingua franca - has led many U.S. analysts to the disastrous conclusion that foreigners can be understood in terms of what they say in English. On the contrary, their English words are our symbols, to which they do not necessarily attach the same meaning or convictions we attach. P 239.
o The characteristics of the person sent to gather information often make the difference between information that is useful and information that is worse than useless. P 301.
o The network is most important. Closed terrorist cells in the Middle East are part of the semiopen entourages of terrorist chieftains who are part of overt Palestinian politics in which Arab governments take major parts. P 311.
o Among the most effective forms of propaganda is the propaganda of the deed-the sight of a corpse, and the feeling that one may be next. Nothing so cements a movement for the long run as martyrs, nor changes a government so definitively as killing its members or supporters. P 375.
After my first reading of Informing Statecraft, I read it at random, and find that no matter where I pick up the thread, it produces a comprehensively researched and unrivaled account of the intelligence industry. As always, Codevilla navigates the shoals of this information with great skill and dexterity.
Six StarsReview Date: 2003-08-28
Codevilla, from years as a Senate intelligence staffer, knows otherwise, and he chronicles one blunder after another. The lesson: since few if any of Codevilla's proposals were implemented, when CIA says something does or doesn't exist, you should be very, very skeptical. CIA has secret intelligence right? They know things we don't, right? Wrong.
Informing Policy is more important than stealing secretsReview Date: 2000-04-08
For any intelligence hands, this is the First BookReview Date: 2000-05-12
It is interesting to note that Codevilla wrote two of the best introductions on "how to think" about two major subjects- about war in "War, Ends and Means" and "Statecraft". It is a crime that this book is out of print, and one should do everything in ones power to obtain a copy.
The only other book in the intelligence field that approaches this level of worth is "The New KGB, Engine of Societ Power", an older 1980's book by Robert Corson. All the other poor books on intelligence either take the character of "The Puzzle Palace" (which is stupid and an insider's pro-old boys network hack job) or one of Noam Chomsky's blithering semi-conspiracy theories. "Informing Statecraft" is the only type of really usefull intellectual companion to intelligence work in all existance.
This book is exactly what an intelligence book should be- an attack on the structural inadequacies of the United States intelligence community in the guise of a "how-to" book on how to run things correctly. Flipping through the book, one will wonder at the bales of common sensical yet brilliant realpolitik critiques involved in his analysis of what intelligence should be about.

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Mr. Bua's book puts an end to relying upon hearsay.Review Date: 1997-12-18
An invaluable resource!Review Date: 1999-06-19
Read it at CareScout.comReview Date: 2000-06-24
Only place I have ever seen Nursing Homes rated and ranked!Review Date: 1999-02-26
A valuable tool for making an extremely important decisionReview Date: 2000-08-14
Wayne D. Ford, Ph.D., author of "Nursing Home Leadership" docwifford@msn.com

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An Insiders View of Military IntelligenceReview Date: 2006-11-28
The author takes on the complex task of analyzing how military intelligence works, and why it sometimes fails. This is an interesting exposition of the culture of intelligence and the high-level decision makers who use it. Kivett provides a lot of insight into the sorts of issues that affect intelligence warning. Some of the issues he deals with are ambiguity of information, operational security, disinformation, organizational inertia, and political bias.
The author uses numerous intelligence case studies to make his case. Among these are the 1968 Tet Offensive, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, failure of General Douglas Mac Arthur to heed warning of Chinese intervention in the Korean War, and the emasculation of U.S. HUMINT capabilities. He provides a lot of material that I haven't seen elsewhere. Rather than telling you what conclusions to draw, he points you in the direction of original sources (many of which are now available on the Internet), and encourages you to do your own analysis. I found the material on North Vietnamese SIGINT operations particularly interesting. It sobering to think about how many Americans may have died in Vietnam as a result of poor communications security exploited by enemy SIGINT operators.
Highly recommended for military intelligence professionals and enthusiasts, and for military history buffs.
Not To Be MissedReview Date: 2006-09-25
Before reading P.G Kivett's book, I had some reason to think that I knew a lot about its subjet matter. Instead, I learned a lot from it that was completely new to me.
If you have ever wondered why the US loses military engagements despite overwhelming technical advantages, the answer is here. Don't miss it.
Most timely and thought-provokingReview Date: 2006-09-02
Eye-opening & Thought-provokingReview Date: 2006-08-23
Good choice for anyone with a mindReview Date: 2006-08-22
Related Subjects: Health Records Services
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