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Arabic Mystical ModernismReview Date: 2004-12-17
verbal gymnastics and though-provoking imagesReview Date: 2004-09-16
The second influence was the Koranic school which instilled in Matar a deep respect for the religious injunctions of orthodox Islam and inspired in him a lifelong wonder and appreciation of the elegant language and form of Koranic verse. And finally, there is the influence of his study of philosophy and what it entailed of exposure to western literature, the Classics and Arab, possibly Sufi, philosophers. It is impossible to separate him from these ever-converging circles of influence, as his consciousness, like that of his nation, is the product of massive interpenetrating cultures.
In his quartets, Matar lashes out against the `sleeping insomnia' of the Arab nation, which he believes is the result of the hegemonic impact of authoritarian politics on the written text that places opaque mediators that block the vision of potentialities. To pervade the mental cloudiness imposed on the reader by external forces, Matar plays on his remaining capacity for wonder and proceeds to perform precise verbal gymnastics, juxtaposing myriads of provocative images to command the alertness required for the paradigm-transformation he urges the readers to make in reclaiming their senses so that they can write their own texts. He alienates them from the text so that they can watch him as he dismantles and reconstructs reality, an activity that is at the core of poetic knowledge and the point of creation of philosophy and poetry
Instead of building philosophies on the basis of texts propagated to serve temporary political agendas, the reader must learn that what is important is not the 'Answer' but the quest for the correct and most vital question.
Hence Matar's discourse with the reader takes on a two-stage strategy: First he stuns his reader, causing him to lose his bearings amidst the verbal vertigo that Matar creates, putting him in the position of one who is ready to relearn the meaning of the words as he discards the traditional questions pertaining to the meaning of the poem. In the second stage, the still-dazed reader begins to ask the truly vital questions that the poet intends concerning the worldview that Matar is trying to communicate.
The most rewarding way to read this is with an open mind, allowing the language and images to wash over you, it is recommended reading if you are interested in:
Sufism, Arabic Poetry, Eastern Philosophy, the Arab consciousness etc..

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An Excellent Work!Review Date: 2004-02-08
Fought on the Red River throughout Central and Northwestern Louisiana, this campaign is a study in how partisan politics, economic need and personal profit determined military policy and operations in Louisiana and Arkansas during the spring of 1864. It is also a study in conducting military operations in a tactically useless theater of operations, an operation in which the Union Army was almost totally annihilated and one in which the Union River Navy was almost captured intact. Blunder does not begin to connote the foolishness of this campaign. It was a short operation, lasting from only March 12 to May 20, but wound up being one of the most destructive of the entire war.
Ludwell H. Johnson does a masterful job with his topic. The writing is clear and concise and the tale told is really quite amazing.
Still the best look at this Campaign after nearly 50 years...Review Date: 2006-07-14
As the title suggests, Johnson's study takes a look at the reasons why the Red River Campaign was launched in the first place, and these reasons had little to nothing to do with what made sense as far as strictly military objectives go. He repeatedly stresses this point throughout the book. Although this is also a fine campaign study, Johnson's coverage of "politics & cotton" adds an extra dimension to this book. His first few chapters deal with the reasons behind the campaign. One of the two main reasons behind this advance was to obtain a foothold in Texas so that free staters could flood the state in a move similar to what was done in Kansas in the 1850's. Northern abolitionists and other groups hoped to create "five or six" free states out of the current massive slave state. A corollary effect would have been to prevent any attempted European land grabs in the southern portions of the former United States. France had installed Maximilian as a puppet emperor of Mexico, and many Northern politicians feared that France would not stop there. The second reason involved cotton, the massive need for the crop in Massachusetts and other Northern mills, and the immense profits to be gain by speculators who were allowed to accompany the army.
Nathaniel Banks, a politician turned general, had designs on the 1864 presidency, and he hoped to use the campaign as a springboard to election. As a Massachusetts man, he also hoped to capture thousands of bales of cotton to ship back to his home state, making himself a hero in the process. In addition, he was hamstrung by a need to keep cotton speculators with important political connections happy, although Johnson repeatedly stresses that Banks mostly managed to keep his head above the murky speculation waters. Even President Lincoln could be duped on occasion, in one case signing a note that instructed Banks to do everything in his power to help Samuel Casey, a former congressman and now a cotton speculator. What Casey hoped to do was far from legal, and Banks had no choice but to give him free reign. In any case, the commanding general had many reasons of his own to both go on this campaign and to make sure cotton got back to Northern mills, however legal the means.
The campaign got underway on March 10, 1864, as William Franklin's portion of Banks' Army of the Gulf started marching north along the Red River from southern Louisiana. A. J. Smith and half of the XVI Corps joined the expedition by river, joining up at Simmesport, Louisiana. After an early move by smith to capture poorly guarded Fort De Russy on March 17, Banks and his army of over 32,000 effectives (I'll have a note on this term later) faced Richard Taylor, who initially had 7,000 or so men of his own. Admiral David Porter's Union fleet accompanied Banks on the expedition, but the low water levels in the Red River had the navy concerned about their ability to navigate the waterway. Taylor could only delay this host, and by March 31 Banks was in Natchitcohes. At this point Banks made a fateful mistake. Instead of continuing to drive northwest along the Red, Banks instead chose an inland road that ran through Pleasant Hill and Mansfield before swinging north again to Shreveport.
Richard Taylor had a surprise waiting in this area for Banks and his men. Taylor attacked the advance portions of Banks' army near Mansfield, Louisiana on April 8, 1864 with around 8,800 men, driving the Yankees back with heavy casualties and capturing many supply wagons before stopping due to the darkness. He had faced a grand total of around 12,000 Federal troops in the fight. Many others were miles behind. Johnson faults Banks and William Franklin for the troop positions chosen in the march. Incredibly, the train of the cavalry force covering the main body was placed in front of any infantry, and these were the supply wagons captured when the Union troops were forced to beat a hasty retreat. Taylor again attacked Banks at Pleasant Hill, nearly winning another major victory if not for the solid stand of A. J. Smith's "gorillas" of the XVI Corps. After this fight, Banks retreated to Grand Ecore, just to the north of the Natchitoches. At this point Kirby Smith, commander of the Confederate Department of the Trans-Mississippi, took most of Taylor's troops away in an effort to stop Frederick Steele's movement towards Shreveport from Arkansas. Taylor was furious, believing that Banks' troops were demoralized and possibly ripe for capture. The disagreement festered and led to Taylor's transfer shortly after the end of the campaign.
Banks had retired to Alexandria with his army, but he could go no farther. The Red River's water levels remained very low, and Porter's naval vessels were all but trapped until the river rose or some other method could get them south of the falls at Alexandria and to safety. So Banks was stuck twiddling his thumbs while waiting for the water to rise. Eventually, through the construction of several damns by the army, Porter was able to get his ships over the falls. The Federals left a path of destruction in their wake, burning houses all the way south from Grand Ecore and even leveling Alexandria by firing the town. Johnson singles out the men of A. J. Smith's Corps as the main culprits, though I suspect it was a bit more complicated than that. Taylor, deprived of all but 5,000 men, could only harass the Federals as they made good their escape.
Johnson argues that this unnecessary campaign delayed the end of the war by at least a short period of time, say two or so months. Banks' mistakes on the Red River tied up as many as 20,000 men who could have been used to reinforce Sherman's army operating against Atlanta or who might have started a campaign against Mobile, Alabama, according to the author. Instead, these men were stuck west of the Mississippi, allowing General Polk and the 20,000 odd men of his Corps who were detailed to guard Mobile to move north to help Joe Johnston defend Atlanta. In non-military terms, the campaign was also a failure. Most of the cotton Banks had hoped to glean was burned on the approach of the Federals or lost in the hasty retreat from Grand Ecore. Banks' Presidential hopes were also crushed by his humiliating failures during the campaign. In the end, a campaign conceived for purely non-military reasons ended up hurting other campaigns which were very important to the quick prosecution of the war.
I enjoyed Ludwell Johnson's writing style. He presents the various aspects of the campaign in an entertaining and informative way. One term I found a little odd was Johnson's use of "effectives" rather than Present for Duty (PFD) strengths, though the fact that the book was written in 1958 may have something to do with that. Johnson seems very high on Richard Taylor, and for good reason. The son of a President was an excellent general, and it seems that his ideas for pursuing Banks made more sense than Kirby Smith's "less risk, less reward" decision to stop Steele inn Arkansas. The author finds Banks to be a very poor leader, fairly criticizing many of his decisions. He also seems to have a decidedly low opinion of David D. Porter, painting him in a very unflattering light when it came to his handling of cotton. Johnson believes that Porter was extremely greedy and little better than a thief when it came to possession of the valuable crop. He also finds Porter's attempts to get his boats south of the falls at Alexandria to be less than satisfactory. A. J. Smith's XVI Corps takes quite a few jabs from the author's pen. Johnson seems to hold the XVI Corps entirely at fault for the destruction of property in Louisiana during the march, entirely absolving the Eastern troops making up the majority of Banks' army.
The maps are surprisingly good for a book written in 1958. The advance up the Red River is covered in stages with several area maps. The Battles of Mansfield and Pleasant Hill are decently depicted, even going down to regimental level in a few key places. However, there is only one map for each of these battles, and things such as terrain and elevation are not even attempted. The book has more of a focus on the overall campaign than the actual battles, so the deficiencies in the battle maps do not detract from the story. The book does lack any Order of Battle though, which to me is a serious shortcoming in any campaign study.
Writing in 1958, Johnson did not have access to as many sources as the authors of today, but his book apparently remains the best of a rather uneven bunch, at least according to the reviews I have read online and elsewhere. For this reason, I chose to read Politics & Cotton first, and I hope to have reviews of some of the other Red River Campaign studies available very soon. As I write this, I have two other books and an issue of Savas Publishing's Civil War Regiments focusing on these events. Johnson repeatedly drives home the point that this campaign more so than others was based on no sound military strategy. Instead, cotton was wanted to fill Northern mills and land was needed in Texas to provide cotton growing areas for free and loyal laborers. I recommend this above average campaign study to anyone interested in the war in the Trans-Mississippi, the Red River Campaign specifically, and the politics involved in the running of the war.

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Really fine!Review Date: 1999-04-18
A wonderful readReview Date: 1997-09-28
Collectible price: $250.00

Thoroughly researched and carefully writtenReview Date: 2007-05-14
The book is extremely informative with great details about the human experience and industrial adventures during this period of the lumber industry in the Ouachitas. Highly recommend.
The Story Has Now Been ToldReview Date: 2007-02-03
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poems about everythingReview Date: 2003-11-18
30 years from John WoodReview Date: 2002-01-05

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an excellent collection of a suppressed poetReview Date: 2008-01-24
Very good but could be betterReview Date: 2008-01-02
The reason that I gave 4 stars, is due to some details in the poem translation. I read the Persian version as well and I could understand all in the English translation. But for most of the friends didn't know Persian, the translation was sometimes far from the original version; plus the semi harmonic intonation in the poetry hasn't been well respected in the translation.
Although I'm saying it could be better, I very much recommend this book, its very valuable and worth it to spend time and attention.
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I must have for forensic anthropologistReview Date: 2002-09-24
Definitely the "the standards" for skeletal analysisReview Date: 2003-08-24

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Trees, Shrubs & Vines of ArkansasReview Date: 2008-06-19
Very informativeReview Date: 2005-09-28
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AN INVALUABLE RESOURCE.Review Date: 2003-02-27
Not All Treasure Is In The SeaReview Date: 2001-08-13
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Great Study of the Life of Franz SigelReview Date: 2000-06-01
Good biography of a lesser know Civil War generalReview Date: 2008-01-26
The first chapter focuses on Sigel's background, from his birth in Baden to his retreat after the unsuccessful military venture into Switzerland. The crushing of the republican forces was an event that colored Sigel's later life. He was a "champion of idealism, liberalism, and democracy" (page 25), but failed to achieve those goals in Germany. These factors are part of the context for his declaring for the Union at the outset of the Civil War, after he arrived in the United States in 1852.
It is his performance in the Civil War that is central to people's views of Sigel. In early small-scale conflicts, he had some success in Missouri. Part of his importance was generating many German recruits flocking to the Union forces. His popularity among Germans and his ability to inspire new recruits into the Union Army helped him last as long as he did as a field commander. In his first major battles, Wilson's Creek, he convince the commanding general to try a Robert E. Lee-like division of forces to strike the larger Confederate Army from front and flank. At this stage of the war, this was essentially not very practical. The end result? A Union defeat and the death of General Nathaniel Lyon.
I won't be tedious, going over battle after battles in which Sigel fought. Two illustrate: At Pea Ridge (Or Elkhorn Tavern), he began slowly, but actually had one of his few really good days of the war on the second and final day of the battle. It may be that the commanding general, Samuel Curtis, was the kind of take-charge commander he needed to work under (he was never very good in independent command, as later events would show). At Second Manassas, his generalship (he served as a corps commander) was uninspired, as was normal. He was finally shelved.
However, historically, he was an interesting figure in that, despite his flaws as a commander, he did elevate "the status of Germans in an American society and by raising the national consciousness of Americans" (page 233). Overall, the book is pretty well written, although sometimes matters might be more clearly explicated. Nonetheless, to get a better understanding of an important Union general, this is a good volume.
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He is on the vant-garde of a select group of Arab poets who were able to break free of the strict rules of traditional Arabic poetry.
Matar, is a poet that, even in translation, has a universal appeal. He is a "modern" metaphysical Arab poet.