Kentucky Books

Rice lists Rose Anna McCoy's Aunt Betty as "Betty Blankenship McCoy" on page 21. Without being able to contact him as to how he determined this, I have to contest it.

My great-great-grandmother was Aunt Betty-- Elizabeth Rutherford McCoy. She was married to Uriah McCoy, not Allen McCoy, as Rice writes. She is buried with Uriah in our family cemetery, just above her house, which is on the Hatfield-McCoy Trail tour as the house where Rose Anna stayed and had her baby.

Other than that, I assume his information is correct, though I will be thoroughly researching what he reports.

Recd the book in a timely fashion and the book was in great shape. Very pleased with the service.

we are decendents of the hat fields and my dad has been doing research on them. I gave him this for Christmas and from what I hear he loves it and cant hardly put it down.

I was looking for a book to give me a factual narrative of the Hatfield-McCoy feud. I took a chance ont his book and was nicely rewarded. Heavily footnoted and scrupulously dispassionate, the book gives a clear and concise rundown of the events leading up to, during, and as the feud wound down. In the course of doing so, this book also debunks many of the myths and some of the commonly held beliefs of what took place during this feud. Indeed, the book also gives details on other feuds that occurred during the years that the Hatfield-McCoy feud ravaged the Tug River valley. It is a good, easy to read book. The only failing of the book is that the pictures section is heavily tilted towards the Hatfields. I don't know if this is because the McCoys did have as many pictures or what. But a better balanced photo section would be helpful.

Much has been written of the feud yet in this book I found a "good read" along with a very historical study. Also inside the front and back covers you will find a family tree graphic to help you trace possible relations.

This short and interesting account of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force examines the campaign in Sinai and Palestine in the First World War largely from the perspective of the soldiers themselves. This is a charming and interesting read that tells of life in the desert and the hardscabble and sweaty existence of the troops forced to march across Sinai, watching the exceedingly slow progress of the railroad tracks being built, assault Gaza in a series of disastrous thrusts at the Turkis right flank and finally march on Jerusalem, up the Jordan valley and fight at Megiddo. It was a fascinating campaign, one the Germans described as 'pure' because it was fought in the desert. This is a good histor from the point of view of the soldier but it is not a thorough history of the campaign and certainly neglects the larger picture. Nevertheless it is an important contrbution to work on the First World War in the Middle East, a very interesing topic.

Seth J. Frantzman

Although the title sounds as if the book will be about the entire campaign in the Middle East it concentrates primarily on the Sinai-Palestine campaigns as told mostly in first person accounts.

While extremely interesting in that it discusses details of life and campaigning as experienced by the typical soldier it loses the "big picture" fairly quickly (despite discussions of foibles and weaknesses of the British generals in command) and never really explains to the reader what Austrians and Germans are doing in Palestine. Still, not a bad book and definitely something you would want if studying the WWI campaigns in the region as a whole. I highly recommend it.

Most histories of World War I tend to ignore the British army's Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) and its battle against the Turks in Palestine. While this theater of war was treated by the powers-that-be as a "sideshow", to the men fighting and dying in the Middle East it was a real war. Conditions there were different from those in France. Trench warfare was not the norm and the soldiers had to combat, not only the enemy, but broiling sun during the day, chilly temeratures at night, shifting sand, dangerous insects, and the incessant attack of flies. This book retells a story of courage and effort in a climate that was really foreign to most of the EEF. We follow them from Egypt, across the Sinai, through Gaza, up to Jerusalem and then farther North as Turkey's resistance collapsed, and the war began to come to an end. Anyone interested in the "complete" history of World War I, in all of its varied aspects, should read this book.

The full title of this book is "Hell in the Holy Land: World War I in the Middle East". While the first part is appropriate, this book is not a history of World War I in the Middle East. Rather, as stated near the end of the "Megiddo" chapter, it is a "personal account of British operations in Egypt and Palestine". The author takes personal accounts of British soldiers and exerpts them in the book. Through these exerpts we really get to see what the actual thoughts and concerns of these soldiers were. However, the story is told from only the British point of view. The only mention of the Turks is as they were seen by the British. There is nothing about the Turkish soldier's point of view, Turkish strategy, plans, etc. There is no mention of any other theater in the Middle East other than Egypt/Palestine. We hear nothing about the Mesopotamian campaing or events in Arabia. If you are looking for personal accounts of British soldiers in Egypt/Palestine, than this is the book for you. If you are looking for a comprehensive discussion of World War I in the Middle East then look elsewhere.

The Preface observes "Not only has the campaign in Egypt and Palestine been neglected in the historiography of the war, the ordinary British soldier has not been given his due." Author, David Woodward, corrects these omissions by narrating World War I warfare in the Turkish theater using the diaries and letters of the British soldiers to describe combat in this area. Woodward writes "The British soldiers in Egypt and Palestine, whose words constitute a large part of this book, fought in a theatre very different from France and Flanders." They were member of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF).

The British faced the problem of "....how could the War Office field the necessary forces to maintain its position in France and also defend the empire against the global threat posed by the Turko-German alignment." They chose to fight Turkey with Territorials augmented by imperial troops from Australia, New Zealand and India. The text notes "Among the participants, the Territorials have been especially overlooked ....and the Territorial Divisions were called upon to do most of the fighting in the battles of Gaza and the conquest of Jerusalem." The Territorials were roughly the equivalent of American Reserve units.

The narration begins in Egypt stating "The defense of Egypt....was not a `side show.' Its loss would be a disaster....Not only would the Suez Canal be lost, the Turko-German menace would now extend to Africa." To protect the Suez Canal a campaign to clear the Sinai was initiated. The text gives an excellent account of this operation where the environment was extremely hot and adverse. Camels were an effective means of transportation but were difficult to manage. "Drivers were required as well a camels." Ultimately, tens of thousands of men were employed in the EEF camel force. The difficulties of Sinai operations are illustrated by the work, begun in 1916, to build a standard-gauge railway across the Sinai. Progress averaged only 1/2 a mile a day. Fifty years earlier, the United States had built the Union Pacific Railroad westward at a rate of 1 or 2 miles a day with progress occasionally reaching 3 or 4 miles a day.

The EEF praised the pluck and endurance of the Turks. The text's accounts of two failed efforts to conquer the city of Gaza are interesting. Unfortunately, British troops were poorly lead. On the first attempt, elements had reached the center of Gaza but where withdrawn. The appointment of Sir Edmund Allenby as commander of the EEF "brought a new style and needed energy to GHQ." The text gives an excellent narrative of Allenby's performance. An interesting item was that on 13 November 1917 two British cavalry regiments attacked Junction Station in what was probably the last major cavalry charge in the British Army. Faced with morale problems at home, Prime Minister Lloyd George gave Allenby a mandate to capture "Jerusalem before Christmas." Interestingly, the idea of a crusade to free Jerusalem resonated with many of the men. By 7 a.m. on 9 December 1917 no organized body of the enemy remained in Jerusalem. The comments in diaries and letters covering Allenby's Jerusalem campaign are most interesting.

However, the text notes that a steep price was paid for British success in the Middle East: 28,000 casualties were experienced in November and December 1917. Nevertheless, believing that offensives on the western front were doomed to failure, Allenby's success made Prime Minister Lloyd George even more determined that Britain's main military effort in 1918 would be in the Middle East. In March 1918, the War Cabinet authorized Allenby to advance "to the maximum extent possible, consistent with the safety of the force under his orders." All was not a military success as the British force on 2 April had to withdrawal back across the Jordan River. Unfortunately, losses on the western front forced the War Office to draw upon the EEF for reinforcements. Relying on concentration, surprise and speed, Allenby planned his 1918 breakthrough along the coast. Continuing to use diaries and letters to support the narration, the author gives a brief but excellent account of Allenby's operations from the capture of Jerusalem to the Turks surrender. Large numbers of prisoners (approaching 40,000) plus shortages of food, medicine and medical staff brought to the EEF death from disease; in the EEF 2,158 died from disease while only 453 battle deaths were suffered in October and November 1918.

In the CONCLUSION, the author states "....you were more likely to survive the war if you served in the EEF rather than in the BEF." "A lower casualty rate, however, did not make Egypt and Palestine, where physical discomfort overshadowed death, a `picnic'." The author further states the Tommies, most of whom were Territorials, were angered by comments that they were lucky to have served in the Middle East. They had passed with flying colors a long campaign against a worthy foe in a test of endurance and stamina. Furthermore, their combat was of critical diplomatic importance. As Allenby succinctly
stated "....if you lose Egypt, you lose the Empire which hinges thereon...."

One can only speculate on the probable tragic results if the Allies had won on the western front but the British had lost Egypt and the Suez Cannel. This is a well researched and well written work. The reader will gain valuable insights regarding war in the Middle East.

Tim Maga has done it again. The nation's premier scholar of US-East Asian relations has joined John Dower and Herbert Bix in considering postwar Japan. This book rises immediately to the top rank of studies of its specific subject and of the post-World War II period in general. The book is admittedly not an encylopedic review of the trials, although those who are searching for descriptions of the grotesque actions of Japanese war criminals will not be disappointed here. Rather the book's strength is in its ability to show how the trials played a crucial role in other important developments of the time. Dr. Maga's approach thus sheds new light on MacArthur's occupation government and its relationship with the State Department, the bifurcated view of war criminals in Japan itself as both villains and heros, and the developing Cold War in general and the Korean War in particular. The final chapter adds provocative insights into the legacy of the Japanese war crimes trials in light of the ongoing debate of how to deal with war crimes in the present day. Dr. Maga's research is impeccable and includes several heretofore unused sources. Out of this he has fashioned a book which must be considered by anyone plowing this field in the future. Expect to see this book receiving major awards later this year.

Tim Maga utterly fails to develop a coherant argument for his thesis (that, although critics abound, the Tokyo Trials were carried forth in the spirit of justice and fairness). Since I started the book as a skeptic of his argument, I was interested in what primary materials would be cited as well as how thorough of a job Maga would do.

The book follows no organization and the text itself is filled with tangental tid-bits of irrellevant information that serves no purpose except just to break any flow that a chapter might had. He focuses too heavily on the transcripts of the courtroom itself, instead of looking at how the trials proceeded according to a script written from outside sources. He concludes every chapter by returning to his thesis, while the reader is left wondering how such a claim can be made after what they have just read.

In all fairness, the task that Maga set out to do (to answer the critics of the trial) is a massive one. There are extremely well written histories of the Trial that take in-depth looks into how SCAP, MacArthur, even the Imperial House meddled in the affairs of the trial.....or reviewing the dissenting arguments of a few of the judges who saw the Trial first hand. These are all glossed over in a few paragraphs so that Maga can return to repeating his thesis that the allies and prosecutors were inspired only by justice/fairness.

To read a very small amount of material on the Trial, I suggest reading Dower's Embracing Defeat. Although not without folley of its own, his chapters on the trial give a better and in-depth glimpse into the Tokyo Trial.

Tim Maga has done it again. The nation's premier scholar of US-East Asian relations has joined John Dower and Herbert Bix in considering postwar Japan. This book rises immediately to the top rank of studies of its specific subject and of the post-World War II period in general. The book is admittedly not an encylopedic review of the trials, although those who are searching for descriptions of the grotesque actions of Japanese war criminals will not be disappointed here. Rather the book's strength is in its ability to show how the trials played a crucial role in other important developments of the time. Dr. Maga's approach thus sheds new light on MacArthur's occupation government and its relationship with the State Department, the bifurcated view of war criminals in Japan itself as both villains and heros, and the developing Cold War in general and the Korean War in particular. The final chapter adds provocative insights into the legacy of the Japanese war crimes trials in light of the ongoing debate of how to deal with war crimes in the present day. Dr. Maga's research is impeccable and includes several heretofore unused sources. Out of this he has fashioned a book which must be considered by anyone plowing this field in the future. Expect to see this book receiving major awards later this year.

Maga does an excellent job of weeding through post-war propaganda and revisionist history to reveal a trial which was much more fair and effective than most scholars have argued. Maga carefully documents the Japanese attempts to turn world opinion against the trials and, through various machinations, detract from the criminal acts of those on trial. He also reveals the degree to which American politics, now focused on the Soviet threat and anxious to shore up Japanese support against Communism,, influenced the trial and brought about lenient sentences for war criminals, and in some cases (Emperor Hirohito, especially), no trial or punishment at all. An excellent read!

I read the other reviewers...I usually do that with historical books because of the importance of those who may have a different perspective than someone like me who is coming into this particular arena of history with no background. I have read a lot about the Nuremberg Trials, much about German aggression, and very little about Japan. Growing up in the San Francisco Bay Area, with my grandfather a commander in the Navy, I grew up with a sense of pride, and also wanting to know more about the time in which he served, and shortly after when my father also served (Korea). But I also got snippets of information from other readings concerning the very unfair treatment of the Japanese in the U.S. when their homes were raided and they were placed in concentration camps. So of course, I was curious when I came across this small book.

For historians and social study teachers, this might be a good book to read for background. Some people write and make history come alive again. Others write history, and most people would put this book back down because it is so dry, and is written with an evident bias that is not always backed up with support. I guess I would have to read the actual transcripts of the trial because this particular one apparently did not gain the attention of the world. Those who came in close contact with Japanese atrocities such as China, Australia, and most importantly, the Phillipines definitely had a different viewpoint then most of the Americans involved in the Trials. MacArthur and the main judge, Keenan, evidently controlled quite a bit of the trials...who came to trial, who did not, who was punished, what the punishments were. I had a problem in that mentions were made of the atrocities, but unlike the very well-known Final Solution, Japanese atrocities were not as much fodder for the newspapers. Heaven only knows why.

All countries have time periods in their histories for which they should feel shame, including the U.S. Wisdom is when those countries recognize and address those problems, and many of the Japanese did incredible things such as one sobbing man turning in his own son for almost certain capital punishment for killing an entire Burmese town. If only more of us would show the courage that older man did in doing this, our world would be a better place.

I am going to read more on this area/trials, because Maga whetted my appetite, but didn't satisfy it. Whether our side was fair in their judgements, whether the Emperor should have paid a higher price (I think MacARthur handled this one right)...is probably up to those who read these books to make that judgement. It is a part of our world history, and Japan has certainly come a long way from their militarism of that time. Nationalism and militarism is scary in any form, no matter which country is involved. We've seen way too many nationalistic-caused atrocities in AFrica, Serbia, Germany, etc. I can't help think but of some words that said "Judge not, lest ye be judge..."

Karen Sadler,
Science Education,
University of Pittsburgh

Well, what I have recently purchased is a very interesting book. It unveils a rather dark and unknown world that for centuries has been with us. The pictures are fine but scarce, and the prose has wit and many secrets of the trade are rather amusing. In fact a very fine book

For centuries, millions of people have enjoyed looking at commercial exhibits of the odd and curious. Joe Nickell is one of those people. Growing up in Kentucky, he never missed the carnivals and circuses that had human and animal oddities on display as sideshows. Nickell is well known for investigating frauds and hoaxes for the Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal, but it doesn't matter to him that many sideshow acts were bogus or at least grossly exaggerated on the banners outside the shows. He obviously loves the now-disappearing shows, and in _Secrets of the Sideshows_ (University Press of Kentucky), that affection is made plain. To be sure, he gives plenty of secrets away here, most of them open secrets, but the book works best as a tribute to the imagination of the performers and organizers of the exhibits which were meant to provoke and satisfy that admirable old human characteristic, curiosity. The book provokes and satisfies in the same way.

Nickell notes that "sideshow" means an adjunct to the main show. The "midway" where these shows were located was midway between the entrance and the main attraction. He briefly recounts early history, and then goes into their heyday starting in the early 1900s. Sideshows featured magic performances, often with one big trick like sawing the woman in half or the escape from a chained box. The way these sorts of tricks are done is explained here, but the explanations would not ruin the fun of a good performance. Fire-eating and sword-swallowing are explained, as is how to eat glass or walk barefoot on it, or how to walk barefoot up a ladder of swords. The explanations are enough to show how the tricks are done, but few readers are going to be tempted to try them. There were performers who didn't perform, but just showed themselves. Dwarves, giants, fatties are all here, all respectively taller, shorter, or lighter than their publicity banners proclaimed. Giants of such acts, for instance, sometimes had a contract that specified that they would not be measured. A bearded lady ("The Monkey Girl") and a man with the skin disease ichthyosis ("The Alligator Man") eloped in 1938, and were a sideshow feature as "The World's Strangest Married Couple"; they were happy together for over sixty years. Not all the displays were real, but as one carny said, "Oh, it's _all_ real. Some of it's really real, some of it's really fake, but it's all really good.") Hilariously, these exhibits which used to go under names like "Mother Nature's Mistakes" are sometimes now displayed in a "Horrors of Drug Abuse!" scare show.

Nickell closes with analysis of why the sideshows are fading into the past; it isn't because of any attempt to become politically correct, or any triumph of good taste; it comes down to simple economics, as fairs can make more money with, for instance, rides that take up the same space a midway does. Because it tells secrets of the sideshows, Nickell's book is a miscellany that is full of good humor and bizarre stories, like that of the bank robber who was killed by a sheriff's posse in 1916, and his mummified body passed from carnival to carnival. Somehow it became part of the "Laff-in-the-Dark" funhouse in Long Beach about forty years later, but everyone thought it was just a spray-painted mannequin until it broke and showed bones inside. He finally got laid to rest after a long postmortem career. There is a description of how to enlist fleas into a flea circus, and how to harness them to their particular tricks. There is an even more interesting description of the comic flea circus ("The Most Minuscule Show on Earth!") that has no fleas, only the colorful banter of the proprietor over the tiny apparatus ("She's blindfolded herself!... She's walking backward!"). If you want the lowdown on sideshows, step right up, ladies and gentlemen, Joe Nickell presents the best show on the midway.

Joe Nickell's latest is quite different to other books published by him during the last few years. It's not really an investigative book and it doesn't discuss anything paranormal or unexplainable, and also, the entire books feels more like a pursuit of a personal hobby than the critical examination usually delivered by Nickell's sharp pen. However, in no way does this mean it's not worth reading, just because it happens to be more personal and relaxed than his other works. Quite the opposite, actually. Secrets of the Sideshows is an exciting experience of the mostly American phenomenon of carnys, sideshows, freaks, and carnivals.

It's not easy to find fitting translations to the above terms, and no American-style sideshows have ever made it big in Sweden. But it's still very possible to enjoy the book, even though one happens to be Swedish.

History is filled with numerous examples of strange people having displayed strange abilities, exotic animals from far-away countries have always fascinated the audience, and the grotesque, different, and sometimes flat out revolting have always been sure to make people curious. During the latter half of the 19th century traveling sideshows and carnivals started gaining more and more popularity, and the circuses of today can be considered to be the descendants of these productions. Nickell - who himself used to be a carny - paints a fascinating portrait of these pioneers of an odd business concept, and he makes it very clear to the reader that people throughout all of history, including contemporary man of course, have been exploited by shrewd entrepreneurs who have been quick to realize how to make big money from letting people witness what they have a problem comprehending.

However, the main focus of the book is on the people, animals, or objects that were exhibited. Giants, midgets, fat people, snake women, Guerilla Girl, "human skeletons", Frog Boy, fire eaters, bearded ladies, normal-looking people with not-so normal abilities, and many, many more are discussed, often accompanied by photographs from Nickell's personal collection. Cows with five legs, infants with two heads, alleged mermaids, Bigfoot and other weird are mentioned also. Nickell isn't afraid to expose how many of the magical acts were done, and he's also not afraid to expose how many of the faked oddities were manufactured (for instance, it was possible to make a "mermaid" using the upper body of an ape and the lower half of a fish). But still Nickell is keen not to neither romanticize nor ridicule anything. It's a fascinating study - or rather exploration - of both human behavior and strange individuals, and these days when the days of glory for the sideshows are all but gone the book becomes an important documentation of the strangest of all creatures: the human being.

(But on page 201, Nickell makes a major blunder when he refers to Anton LaVey, the founder of the first openly satanic movement, Church of Satan, as a "Satanist" in quotation marks. I've never encountered this spelling before, and I honestly would never have thought a learned man such as Joe Nickell would make such a strange mistake.)

Joe Nickell's Secrets of the Sideshows (2005) presents its audience with an adequate but lackluster overview of its subject. The volume suffers from two problems. The first, and more significant, is that most of the material included has long been available elsewhere, as Nickell's numerous references to a variety of other works makes clear. The second is that, despite the author's long employment history as a carnival hand in an apparent variety of capacities, his writing style is so perfunctory that he manages to make what should be a fascinating subject seem quite dull. Therefore, the best audience for the book will be readers with a budding interest in the subject; those already conversant on the topic are unlikely to learn anything new.

Nickell, who is also a "senior research fellow" of the Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal (CSICOP), is honest, upfront, and unapologetic about the tone and moral tenor of most sideshow and midway personnel, who routinely, though not exclusively, defraud their thrill-seeking public in any number of ways. The author quotes a "carnival owner" as saying, "You have all the ingredients necessary to rise in your profession-a deceptively honest face, a genius for legitimate fraud, no conscience, a golden tongue, and a feeling that a quarter in somebody else's pocket is a personal rebuke." Interestingly, Nickell seems to find this sociopathic approach to life, commerce, and human relationships fully acceptable, and perhaps even inevitable. As a result, readers may come away with the impression that all or most people associated with carnival work are con men and passive aggressive bottom-feeders who would rather attempt to trick another man out of his money than work honestly to earn their own. Nickell quotes another showman, whom he believes he has caught "in a particularly cynical moment": "On my tombstone, you know what they're going to write? 'Screw you. I got your dollar.'"

Needless to say, few of the 'secrets of the sideshow,' outside of the authentic 'human oddities' and performers with a genuine skill are very fascinating: the rubber aliens, faked two-headed geese, 'giant rats,' 'jackelopes,' false 'psychics,' 'headless girls,' and enormous 'spiders' with human heads are as absurd, tawdry, and patently obvious as one would expect.

It's worth speculating whether Nickell, who has become a ubiquitous debunking presence on the National Geographic Channel and the History Channel, believes all "claims of the paranormal" are either honest mistakes of perception or outright hoaxes, however subtly accomplished, because he himself has been, via his carnival work, so experienced in promoting, selling, and by default, perpetrating hoaxes himself.

Joe Nickell's latest book, Secrets of the Sideshow is a thoroughly researched tome that is worth the cover price for the pictures alone.
The cover effectively uses a 'banner art' style with 'Frog Boy' charmingly gracing the spine. The title is a little misleading, it is not a revelatory guide or 'masked magician' type of book at all. More of a scholarly attempt to document a lost part of American theatre. Mr. Nickell's previous works were largely concerned with his role as editor of the Skeptical Enquirer. So deal with the Shroud of Turin, Bigfoot etc. Not having read any of those I cannot comment, but suffice to say that this history of bringing a scientific mind to apparent miracles may have impacted the choice of title. What is apparent is that he has a real love of this subject. He has worked the midway at various fairs as a magician and obviously the carnival world got into his blood. Relying heavily on interviews with carnival legends Ward Hall, Chris Christ and Bobby Reynolds the author details the history of this unique piece of Americana. Bobby Reynold's contributions are fairly ascerbic with a certain bitterness when compared to Ward Hall's more agreeable approach. No attempt appears to have been made to edit any of these contributions. There are copious references to other works, Ricky Jay, Daniel Mannix and Al Stencell are quoted liberally and these authors works would make excellent companion reads.
As one goes through the book the reader does learn how effects are achieved, the use of gaffs, fakery and general deception are discussed. However, this remains a secondary facet of this work. It is much more of a historical encyclopedia and includes a thorough list of references and detailed index. Overshadowing the mechanical 'How To' aspects of the book are the wonderful characters that one meets within its pages. Poobah the fire eating dwarf, Percilla the monkey girl, Doug Higley phantom of the midway and purveyor of Area 51 artifacts. [Of course they are real]. And numerous other fascinating people who often show more grace and dignity than the so called 'normal' specimens of the human family.
The writing style is a mixture of academic investigation and whimsical fan. Despite his natural instincts for scientific rigor the author's joy in the subject and obvious sadness at the demise of the sideshow shine through.
It ends on a positive and up to date note with a piece on the sideshow school at Coney Island, one of the last bastions of the traditional arts.
I reccomend this book to anyone whoever thought about running away to the circus and I enjoyed reading it tremendously.
PS. One small piece of pedantry. On page 214, Joe Nickell decribes the turn of the century magician Chung Ling Soo as an 'Englishman pretending to be a Chinaman'. In his excellent biography of Chung Ling Soo, The Glorious Deception, Jim Steinmeyer details Soo's life as an American who often pretended to be an Englishman, or more commonly a Scotsman pretending to be a Chinaman. Which goes to show that even a skeptical investigator can be confounded by a fellow conjurer, from beyond the grave to boot! My sense is that Mr. Nickell would be delighted.

This is a fine book about the legendary Sergeant Alvin York, recounting his whole life from the early childhood in rural Tenessee to the extraordinary exploits in the Argonne Forest and the turbulent years that followed the moment of glory. The author presents a fine portrait of York, with all its virtues and weaknesses and he does not forget to include also the German account of what happened on that fateful day of October 1918 at the Argonne Forest. I think that the most fanciful part of the book was the explanation of the reasons which catapulted York to fame, the life that York led after his return home and his opinions on current political affairs during the next decades. There are some good black and white photographs in the book and also a few maps.

A valuable look at York the man, the times he lived in, and the process of creating a national legend. Distinguishes the myths of York's life from the simple facts of his famous exploits. I especially enjoyed the look back at York's rural background and how those values shaped him as a man as well as an American heroic ideal. WEll-researched and documented, but also simply a good read!

If you like to grab a book and take a nap shortly after opening it, this is the book for you. It starts out keeping your interest, but will quickly loose it. If you are looking for a book that really lets you meet York (which was what I was looking for), this is not the right book. This book is a wealth of information, but you will get easily dis-interested, lost, and confused as the author goes into great depths to introduce the men that were involved in York's struggles after the war. I was hoping for a book about York and his family, but was disappointed in this one. He gives very little information about York's family life.

After reading the biography on Eddie Rickenbacker, I figured this book would be a good follow-up on the other "hero" of WW-I. However, the book spends little time on Mr. York's military achievements and contains minimal information on battle tactics and strategy of that time. While the book is interesting and quick to read, it does not rate as a 5-star biography. For those armchair generals who is interested in learning about US history, there are no doubt better sources than this book. But for the cost, its well worth the addition to your library.

Lee views the life of World War I hero Alvin York through the lens of a changing society. York represented, according to Lee, the values of 19th century rural American-simplicity, honesty, hard work, Protestantism, and Anglo-American heritage-in an industrializing society. His defeat of German machine gunners came to symbolize "man over machine" as well. York moved from a pacifist, noninterventionist position to accept America's role as a major world power. This acceptance was based on a religious vision of the US as a defender against evil in the world. Lee's book is well written, moves fast, and well argued. He succeeds in demonstrating that an indivdual life can be used to understand American history in the early 20th century.

I was very surprised when the material in the book did not live up to the title. In sum, the book presents the general history leading up to specific urban battles like the battle for Warsaw in 1944 and the battle for Budapest in 1956. However, each chapter barely scratches the surface of the subject matter. For example, the chapter on the war in Northern Ireland hardly does that complex conflict justice. There is no discussion of the informant war, the assassination methodologies employed, the importance of forensics science, or even basic IRA tactics employed.

Where is the in-depth analysis of modern urban guerrilla warfare techniques like urban sniping (used so extensively in Chechnya), or the use of IEDs (which made leaps and bounds in Northern Ireland), or the employment of car bombs (used to such great effect in Iraq), or the effects of kidnapping/hostage takings (that once made Colombia the most dangerous country in the world)?

The author failed to address the fundamentals of modern urban guerrilla warfare, the reader gets a superficial understanding of the subject at best (in a book that is only 165 pages long and only has 21 pages that actually address the title), and some of the most important, relevant urban guerrilla wars are not even mentioned (like the war in Iraq and the PLO's war against Israel).

The most painful part of the book is the final chapter where the author summarizes the previous chapters which are themselves summaries of the battles. Incredibly, the author makes the final conclusion that his best advice to the U.S. military is to avoid urban guerrilla battles altogether. Clearly, the author is an academic with no personal experience in urban guerrilla warfare and has rushed this work into print as opposed really diving into this fascinating subject.

The problem with this book is that it is not what it says it is. there is very, very little warfare described here--with the exception of the chapter on Grozny, Joes almost completely ignores urban combat as far as tactics, techniques, 1st person accounts of the combat, etc. It is all big picture stuff, and lots and lots of background about events leading up to the situations he describes--but again, not much on warfare itself.

This is an excellent treatment of the subject, dispelling myths and misconceptions. A fine addition to my library; and I am now procuring more of his works. Accurate histories, much research in original sources and well documented. Highly recommended.

I have read a number of books on guerrilla warfare, everything from the US Army's Field Manual on Guerrilla Warfare (FM 3-24) to Bard O'Neil's Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare to David Galula's Counter-Insurgency Warfare:Theory and Practice to John Nagl's Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Dr. Anthony James Joes' Urban Guerrilla Warfare is a necessary read for the student of guerrilla warfare. In this book Joes covers eight different urban settings...from Warsaw in WWII to Grozny in the 1990's. As with his other books, Urban Guerrilla Warfare manages to execute that difficult dance of providing an enormous number of facts and figures yet is eminently readable. It is hard to imagine that the 164 pages of text actually contain the hundreds of notes that they do, as it is written in a manner that the facts and figures presented don't disrupt the flow of the reading.

My personal favorite chapter (besides the conclusion) is the one on the battle for Saigon (Ho Chi Minh City) during the Tet Offensive. It is impossible that, after reading the chapter on Saigon, you could still think that the US and South Vietnam lost the Tet Offensive, and that it was not a total disaster for the Viet Cong. In fact, you will walk away with the realization that the US did win the counterinsurgency battle in Vietnam...and that it was North Vietnamese regulars that defeated South Vietnam in 1975.

The conclusion chapter provides a number of critical ideas for both the insurgents and counterinsurgents in fighting in an urban environment. Ideas that would assist the US and her allies today in the insurgencies she is involved in.

In summary, this is more than a book to buy and have on your shelf. This is one to read - and to reference back to.

This work has a refreshing depth and understanding. It purview includes the insurgencies in Warsaw, Budapest, Latin American countries, etc. Owing to the comprehensiveness of the book, I limit my review to its first part.

Joes quotes Fuller, Tukhachevsky, Lord D'Abernon, and Carr as to the decisive nature of Poland's victory over the Bolsheviks in 1920 (pp. 11-12).

Joes unmasks the nature and extent of the Soviet-Nazi pact: "Stalin punctiliously sent great trainloads of food and materiel to Hitler so the latter could evade the consequences of the British blockade...Apologists for Stalin often maintain that Stalin saved Russia, and indeed all of Europe, by his pact with Hitler because it gave Russia time to prepare for war. True, he did get an extra year and a half of peace, but during this time he was helping feed the Nazi war machine...The `second front' for which Stalin incessantly clamored in 1942-1944 had already been there in 1939...What saved the USSR was not Stalin's cunning but Hitler's errors..." (p. 33)

As for the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising (1943), Joes focuses on the very limited ability of Poles to render significant aid (p. 24). The Polish Underground was not yet deployed, and it possessed a meager stock of arms at the time.

Joes provides considerable detail about the Warsaw Uprising (1944) and the 63-day agony and defeat, all thanks to Soviet perfidy. There has been a tendency for writers to be wishy-washy about Stalin's conduct. Joes will have none of it. He quotes Air Marshall Sir John Slessor, RAF commander, who called it `the blackest-hearted, coldest-blooded treachery on the part of the Russians.'" (p. 35)

In conclusion, "The Germans were responsible for the deaths of a quarter of a million civilians in Warsaw, by mass execution and deliberate starvation, but no one was arraigned for these crimes (nor for Katyn) at Nuremberg." (p. 37). "For decades after Germany's surrender, punishment continued to be meted out to Nazi war criminals. Nobody has been punished for the countless thousands of deaths resulting from Stalin's deportations of Polish civilians in 1939-1941. No one has been punished for the murders of thousands of Polish officers at Katyn." (p. 21). Well said!

the book went by fast, it was that great! those submariners in world war two were extraordinary.

The previous reviewers have sufficiently pointed out all the positive (and negative) elements of the book USS Flier: Death and Survival on a World War II Submarine by Michael Sturma, so to add any more general critiques would be superfluous. Alas, there are two glaring points I must make, for they propelled me to write this truncated quasi-review.

First, why no mention of the USS Flier as a Gato-class submarine? The actual submarine designated USS Gato (SS-212) is mentioned twice. So, why is there no mention of the class of submarine? The repetition of this question is symptomatic of how puzzled I was. Also, a more detailed discussion about the R-class (which were WWI coastal defense boats) and the S - Class boats would have been welcomed.

Second, a more in-depth discussion should have been made about the total failure of the US Navy's Mark 14 torpedoes at the start of the Pacific campaign. It was a huge SNAFU on the part of the Navy and not a subject of debate today for history has shown the facts. The Navy even presented the problem to Albert Einstein! (They found his solutions a bit complicated!)
Here is a synopsis from the October 1996 issue of THE SUBMARINE REVIEW:
(Take a look at:http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/1592/ustorp2.htm)

THE GREAT TORPEDO SCANDAL

"The Great Torpedo Scandal emerged and peaked between December 1941 and August 1943, but some of its roots went back twenty five years. It involved primarily the Mk.14 and three distinct problems, depth control, the magnetic influence exploder and the contact exploder, whose effects collectively eroded the performance of the torpedoes. The scandal was not that there were problems in what was then a relatively new weapon, but rather the refusal by the ordnance establishment to verify the problems quickly and make appropriate alterations. The fact that after twenty five years of service the Mk.10 had newly discovered depth control problems adds weight to the characterization of the collection of problems and responses as a scandal. These comments should, however, be mitigated a little by the fact that each of the Mk.14 problems obscured the next. Although BuOrd did not identify the final problem, contact exploder malfunction when a torpedo running at high speed struck the target at ninety degrees, their response, once the difficulty had been identified, was notably prompt. In spite of the promptness of BuOrd's response, by the time it reached Pearl Harbor a number of relatively simple solutions to the problem had been proposed, and modifications had already been designed and implemented. This was, however, almost two years after the United States entered WW II."

One final point, a full list of submarines and their actions during WWII in a glossary format would have been an excellent addition. Thus, every follower of the Silent Service could look up their favorite boat.

These points should otherwise not detract from a decent book about the Silent Service and the men that sacrificed so much.

Fifty-two American submarines were lost in action during World War II. USS Flier (SS-250) was one of those 52, being lost on 13 August 1944. Flier was running on the surface at the time, 14 crewmen including skipper John Crowley surviving the sinking. Eight made it to land. The combat career of Flier is detailed in this well-written book by Australian professor Michael Struma.

SS-250 had a short, checkered career. In January 1944, enroute to the war zone, she ran aground off Midway Island and one crewman was lost overboard. Refitted, in May she headed out on her first patrol, eventually being credited with sinking 10,000+ tons of Japanese shipping. Her second patrol was abruptly terminated on 13 August when she hit a Japanese mine in the Sulu Sea. Eventually meeting up with coastwatchers/guerrillas, the eight survivors were later rescued by USS Redfin.

USS FLIER is a good read. Sturma has an engaging writing style and does a fine job relating the short life of Flier. The subsequent inquiry held on Flier's loss and its effects on various Naval officers' careers makes for interesting reading.

Recommended for all 'Silent Service' enthusiasts.

I bought this book with the expectation of an interesting tale of survival during war. What I got was a story of US Navy bureaucracy. The Flier story is an interesting adventure saga of men who survived the sinking of their submarine by a Japanese mine and eventually contact Phillipino Guerillas who arrange for their extraction to Australia. That part of the book is excellent. But the author proceeds to pad the book with the politics of deck bound navy brass. Those men in the subs are the heroes. They should have gotten more print time than some paper pushers in Honolulu and Australia.

Submariners assert their's was the most dangerous duty posting in World War II. Unlike the thousands of Airmen shot down over Europe who had a chance to bail out, if submariners were forced to abandon ship, there was little chance of survival. "The USS Flier: Death and Survival on a World War II Submarine" retells the story of eight survivors who not only survived the sinking of their ship, but made their way back to allied lines to fight again.

Sturma researched War Patrol Reports and the 1944 transcripts of the ship's skipper, Commander John Crowley, along with numerous other applicable publications available from US Navy Archives. After reading the book, you may jump to the conclusion either Commander John Crowley was a hard luck skipper, or the USS Flier was a hard-luck ship. In January 1944, on its first outing in the Pacific, Commander Crowley brought the sub into Midway harbor for refueling. Sturma provides a detailed look into the circumstances that led to the stranding of the submarine and subsequent sinking of its rescue vessel, the USS Macaw.

The book briefly describes the board of inquiry into the accident which held Crowley accountable, but permitted him to retain command. After major repairs in California, Commander Crowley led the USS Flier on its second patrol where it came to an abrupt end in the Balabac Strait on August 13, 1944.

Sturma begins with survivor accounts ("there was a big explosion") and analyzes the possible causes for the explosion. Although never proven conclusively, Sturma establishes a credible argument for a Japanese naval mine as the probable cause of the explosion. The story continues with the incredible fourteen-hour swim to a nearby island. Two days later the survivors make contact with coast watchers in the Phillipines, who radioed US Seventh Fleet to coordinate a rescue during the night of August 29, 1944.

The balance of the book describes the subsequent inquiry into the loss of the USS Flier, and the careers of Crowley, the other survivors, and Admiral Christie, the commander of the submarine fleet based out of Freemantle, Australia.

Whether it's a description of the evolution of Midway Harbor; mine warfare tactics; or the personal rivalries between the American commanders of Australia-based submarines, Sturma provides detailed segues into many facets of Naval and submarine warfare during World War II. The book has numerous charts that enhance the reader's ability to understand the operations areas.

This enjoyable and readable book honoring the USS Flier would be a welcome addition to any maritime library.

These types of books are only as good as their editors make them, and unfortunately these editors didn't do a great job. With these types of books it is necessary for the editors to really give the work structure, organization and guidance and all three were lacking in this book. Because of this the contributions are isolated and do not work towards a common goal.

German, French and Great Britain's performance in WWII was covered by three separate chapters, and each contributor's essay dealt with its subject in isolation from the other contributions which gives the reader three disjointed conclusions for failure and success of each. The problem is that all three are interconnected. One cannot really discuss French failure without discussing German success because, while France's failures were profound and debilitating, German success was a major factor as well. France had failed to conceptualize and then implement a strategy that would maximize their air power in WWII which was a major factor in the total failure of its air forces, but this might not have lead to the unmitigated disaster that followed had it not been for the German success at developing a successful strategy against France. The problem with this book is that it treats each subject in isolation, so that all the reader gets is France's own failures as the reason for its poor performance in WWII, and this is not an accurate or a whole picture.

Also Great Britain's eventual success was a product of lessons learned from French failure and German miscalculation and arrogance (along with the Soviet's successful strategy of giving up land for time). Had GB not learned those lessons, and had Germany not decided on terror bombing and the disastrous Russian campaign (or had they simply focused production from the beginning on a long conflict) the story for GB might have been very different. Had the editors given their contributors a little guidance I think each could have contributed their own piece to create a whole picture, but instead they contributed pieces that created isolated pictures unto themselves leaving nothing but a disjointed work that feels anything but complete.

Next, much of the material isn't really new or innovative. If you are someone who has studied WWII or WWI at any depth then much of this material will be rehash you have read before. The French suffered a weak government and an old military leadership stuck in the era of trench warfare which are two major factors (although certainly not the only factors) that doomed the French. This isn't new information. This is basic stuff. While there were tidbits of information that were a little more in depth and more focused on air power than one might normally get from other histories, these tidbits were not worth the amount of pages one had to read to get them.

Lastly, the authors do not tackle some of the areas I was really hoping would be discussed. Like why air power has never been able to win a major conflict against a determined and motivated opponent. In WWII Germany had lost the air war and was being pounded daily by Allied bombing, but yet it wasn't until almost all of Germany was overrun that Nazi Germany fell. Why was Allied bombing a failure in that sense? Next the authors suggest that Japan was an instance were air power brought a war to a successful conclusion, but I think that point could be argued as well given the fact that when Tito learned of the scale of destruction from the two atomic bombs he was more than prepared to continue the fighting, and even suggested that the fire bombings were more destructive. These attacks certainly helped to drive home the hopeless situation facing the emperor which helped him end the war, but to say air power alone did this is a point that could certainly be argued.

There is also the case of the "shock and awe" strategy employed by the US. This has failed numerous times against determined foes in Iraq were the US enjoyed total air superiority and control (also it failed for Israel in Lebanon as well, but I wont fault the authors for not being able to write about the future). This seems to me to be a glaring omission. Why do we find that even with total air superiority it still requires land forces to actually take physical control of territory? In the early days of flight it was thought to be the weapon that would end all wars. It would be so terrible and the destruction so great that nations would fall in days due to intense bombing. The terribleness of the destruction has come to pass, but why has air power failed to bring about a conclusion to any engagement on its own? Why has air power been a strategic failure on its own without support of land based forces? These are the kind of questions I hoped would be tackled, but yet I was wholly disappointed.

This book would be great for someone just getting into air power and looking for a quick easy starter, but if you have been studying these conflicts and air power for any real length of time and in any real depth then I think you can skip this work.

This is a well organized, well written and extremely relevant book, especially at a time when the Israeli Air Force is pounding Lebanon with high-precision munitions in an attempt to wipe out a terrorist organization on its northern borders.

In "Why Air Forces Fail" editors Robin Higham and Stephen J. Harris have compiled a series of historical case studies that look at the failures of various air forces in World War I, World War II (Europe, the Eastern Front and the Pacific), the Arab-Israeli Wars, and the Falklands War. It is a wide net that examines air power in Poland, France, German, Italy, the United States, Great Britain, Japan, the Soviet Union, Israel, Argentina, and the Arab nations. Each chapter is written by a specialist in the field and contains a wealth of information on the various air forces and their performance in war.

The editors divide the air forces into three groups: (1) those that never had a chance (the "dead ducks"), (2) those that had initial success, but eventually failed (the "hares" that ultimately lost the race), and (3) those that suffered initial disasters but were victorious in the end (the "phoenixes").

Higham and Harris show that by studying the defeat of air forces at war a number of patterns are discernable. The "dead ducks" were doomed because they lack the infrastructure and resources to withstand their attackers. The "phoenixes", on the other hand, had the necessities, including the resources, political environment, personalities, and strategic space, to rise again.

The editors conclude that, historically, the practitioners of airpower have only rarely achieved anything like the ideal of a quick and lasting decisiveness. Nonetheless the pernicious myth of independent air action capable of winning wars by itself persists. One has only to look at the promises made by the proponents of airpower in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and, more recently, Israel, and the aftermath of air strikes, even over the long-term, to see that even a small nation or military organization cannot be defeated by airpower alone.

"Service doctrine that is not in harmony with government policy is likely to produce circumstances in which air forces will fail," write Higham and Harris. "Government policy made in isolation of service capabilities tends to do the same. Avoiding such dissonance is not easy, even where think tanks abound."

Of course, the main lesson of the book is that the ends must match the mean in the short term and when national survival is at stake.

Why Air Forces Fail consists of 11 scholarly essays by different authors that address the reasons for the defeat of air power in conflicts from 1914 up to the contemporary era. Unlike many essay anthologies, this book has real meat in it, not just opinions. The authors categorize three different types of defeated air forces: the `dead ducks' that never had a chance, the `hares' who won initially but lacked the ability to conduct protracted warfare and `the phoenixes' who suffered initial disasters but came back to win in the end. Why Air Forces Fail is geared for a military-academic audience, and each chapter includes notes on areas that still need more research and lengthy bibliographies. For the most part, the writing style and research that went into this volume is first-rate and Why Air Forces Fail represents an excellent series of case studies that deserve serious attention from all those who see air power as a panacea for international problems. The eleven essays are:

* "Poland's Military Aviation, 1939: It Never had a Chance," by Michael Peszke: A good essay in which the author looks at the dilemmas facing a small power air force that lacks the resources to successfully accomplish its missions. One point the author fails to mention: the Polish Air Force continued to fight and win after 1939 - it did not cease to exist.

* "L'Armee de l'Air, 1933-40: Drifting Toward Defeat," by Anthony Cain: This essay examines the doctrinal, organizational and technical reasons that led to French defeat in 1940. Disunity of command, vague doctrine and poor choice of aircraft were major factors in the debacle that followed.

* "The Arab Air Forces," by Robin Higham: This is the weakest essay in the volume, marred by misspellings, mistakes (e.g. Iranians are not Arabs), several dubious contentions and some glib assertions. The author contends that the Egyptian Air Force has reached parity with the Israelis by 2003, that the Royal Saudi Air Force is an elite, professional force (ha, ha - good joke) and that Arab air forces have consisted of "simple Koranized mechanics." Skip this essay.

* "Defeat of the German and Austro-Hungarian Air Forces in the Great War, 1909-1918" by John H Morrow Jr.: This author argues that the Germans wasted too many resources on Zeppelin construction (which he never proves in any statistical fashion) and had not developed a sufficiently robust aviation industry to sustain four years of attrition warfare. A bit contentious, but well written.

* "Downfall of the Regia Aeronautica, 1933-1943," by Brian Sullivan: An excellent essay that discusses how Italy's attempt to build a force in line with Douhet's theories of strategic bombing - but for which they lacked the resources - led to the development of a weak air force that was incapable of accomplishing virtually any mission. Poor technological and labor decisions also led to too few, too poor-quality aircraft. This is a great essay about how an air force can be totally disrupted by a few bad decisions.

* "The Imperial Japanese Air Forces," by Osamu Tagaya: Another great essay, that pins the blame for Japanese defeat on a divided force (army and navy aviation) that essentially fought their wars separately. After building a great fighter like the Zero, the Japanese failed to produce a successful replacement and their aircraft were undermined by lack of radios and radar. Failure to train enough replacement pilots also contributed greatly to defeat.

* "Defeat of the Luftwaffe, 1935-45," by James S Corum: A good essay that blames doctrine (failure to develop a naval air component to cripple England's economy), poor management of the aircraft industry and inadequate forward repair capabilities as the primary causes for German defeat.

* "The Argentine Air Force versus Britain in the Falkland Islands 1982," by Rene De la Pedraja: The author stresses that the Argentine Air Force did not prepare for this war but it had to carry the lion's share due to the pathetic performances of the army and navy. The author contends that the Argentine Air Force could have won with a more aggressive effort to repair the Port Stanley airfield.

* "From Disaster to Recovery: Russia's Air Forces in the Two World Wars," by David R Jones: This essay tries to cover too much ground and skims over WW1 a bit, through the Soviet build-up in the 1930s, then to disaster in June 1941. The Red Air Force was a `phoenix' because it harnessed the Soviet Union's industrial power to outbuild the Luftwaffe and come back to regain air superiority. This essay focuses a bit too much on the Soviet-superiority-through-numbers approach, which ignores other factors that helped the Red Air Force (like depth, that allowed them to pull back out of range of attacks, when necessary).

* "The United States in the Pacific," by Mark Parillo. A good essay that looks at the disasters at Pearl Harbor in the Philippines. The author makes good points that US leaders up to Roosevelt had false illusions about the military capability of small numbers of B-17s in the Pacific. There is also a point made here about military forces forward deployed for deterrent value, but which lack the logistic support to conduct actual military operations when the balloon goes up.

* "Defeats of the Royal Air Force: Norway, France, Greece and Malaya, 1940-42," by Robin Higham and Stephen J. Harris: The authors view the RAF's key weaknesses as a bomber-centric philosophy at the start of the war and poor operational intelligence about enemy capabilities. The succession of disasters in these early expeditions apparently didn't teach the RAF too much.

WHY AIR FORCES FAIL: THE ANATOMY OF DEFEAT examines the reasons for catastrophic failures of the air forces not just of this country, but other nations. Air forces are divided into three categories here: forces what never had a chance, forces that began with victory but ultimately were defeated, and those which were defeated early on but rose to win. In making WHY AIR FORCES FAIL a global examination, focusing on major wars, contributors provide a range of analysis on the causes of defeat of all kinds of strategies and differing air force scenarios in a sweeping set of insights essential to understanding air force approaches.

Diane C. Donovan
California Bookwatch

An extremely readable and informative work, with essays ranging from the First World War to the Falklands conflict. The essays are quite reasonable in length, if anything sometimes too short, and include sections on areas which need more research and recommended reading. I ask you my fellow history lovers- is there anything more helpful to the student of history than a good annotated bibliography?

A valuable corrective to sugar-coated triumphalist delusions. Shows that, even though Nazi Germany faced hopeless odds in early 1945, they continued to fight vigorously on both fronts until Hitler was cut off and killed in late April.
Mr. Fritz focused on a relatively small area of southern Germany (Franconia, home district of Julius Streicher), to examine war-fighting at the local level. While some senior Nazis like Albert Speer were beginning to obstruct some of Hitler's more irrational orders (eg to destroy Germany's infrastructure, so that a German people unworthy of his genius would be punished with starvation), local Nazi activists held on with undiminished ferocity. For example, townspeople attempting to surrender to the advancing Americans would be summarily tried and hanged in proceedings that looked a lot like lynchings.
(The following point is mine, not Mr. Fritz's: In this context, the notorious Allied bombing of Dresden 13-15 Feb, stained with the blood of 35,000 civilians, was not entirely irrational. The war was still on, and Dresden was making important contributions to it, eg as a rail hub.)

"Endkampf", by Stephen G. Fritz. S
ub-titled, "Soldiers, civilians And The Death Of the Third Reich", University press of Kentucky, 2004.
This is a well-documented record of the last months of the war in Europe, 1945, with an emphasis on the American drive through the south of Germany, into Austria. I say well-documented because, for example, Professor Fritz has devoted pages 276 through 332 on end notes on the subject matter. The author may have overdone it for some readers, because he has almost as many pages of notes as he does have text. This would, however, make my MA thesis advisor happy. Along the same scholarly theme, the book contains some 22 pages of primary sources (pp. 331-352) and some 23 pages of secondary sources (pp. 353-369).
Despite these scholarly overtones, Stephen G. Fritz has a written an excellent history of the final chapters of the war, the "end struggle".

Contemporary generals (e.g. Eisenhower and Bradley) were quite concerned with the so-called "Werwulf" -Werewolf- groups who were supposed to act as guerrilla units and continue hostilities even though the Wehrmacht had surrendered. Looking back over the past 60 years, we know that this guerilla army was an empty threat. The author, however, spends a lot of time on the this threat, that never materialized. He gives both the high command's ideas of what was happening in the south of Germany, but also presents the "grunt's" view of the end struggle. For example, he clearly shows that the American Army would not tolerate any last ditch defense. If the Hitler Youth or the SS chose to defend a town or village to the last civilian, the Americans would sit back, call in artillery and the USAAF and literally destroy the location. Mr. Fritz documents incidents where the German civilian population wanted to surrender, but the die-hard units (e.g. SS units) wanted to fight to the bitter end. This resulted in some cases of civilians being hanged for treason and in other cases, the SS units evacuating the town. Interestingly, the author has tracked down the men who did hanging and reported on the final judgement on these individuals, many years after the end of the war.

I found this book to be well written and to contain a wealth of references and sources on the final victory in the southern part of the Germany and some parts of Austria, as the Allies worked to prevent any post-war continuation of hostilities.

Stephen G. Fritz's "Endkampf" was an unexpected surprise. While I began reading the book with low expectations--the University Press of Kentucky has published a number of 2nd rate works of military history--I soon realized that there was much here that had not been previously explored in any detail.

What Fritz does, and what makes his book worthwhile, is that he concentrates on the triple relationships of U.S. Military versus German Military (and sometimes Nazi leadership), of U.S. Military versus German Civilians, and German Military/Nazi leadership versus German Civilians, all in the context of a rapidly changing military situation and a collapsing Reich. As the U.S. Army drove through Franconia like a tsunami (although sometimes sharply resisted by the remnants of the German Army and SS), German civilians found themselves freed--sometimes unwillingly--from the coccoon of the Reich. The decisions they would make might come back to haunt them, as the local military situation swept back and forth. To place a white flag from a building might save your life in one situation, or mean certain death in another.

By focusing sharply on one small region--Franconia--Fritz is able to go into great detail and to tease out some of the nuances, as well as supporting anecdotes, that makes this civil-military study special. While he occasionally goes on unwelcome detours--such as tracing the Niebelungen--in general, the book is a pleasure to read, full of information most readers--even military historians--are unlikely to have come across before. Also pleasing is the fact that his account does not stop on May 8, 1945, but continues for some time. His account of post-war German resistance reveals a Germany not nearly as pacified as the official U.S. Army volume on the occupation of Germany suggests.

In some cases, however, his sharp local focus leaves the reader awash in a sea of small towns, with no overall context. Although Fritz sets a context at the beginning of the book, discussing the mythical Alpine Redoubt in the minds of Allied military planners, that is the last time he looks at commanders. Even corps level and divisional level contexts are not typically provided--action is usually at the battalion level. This often provides confusion, especially as the situation was unusually fluid. The maps, alas, are almost useless in helping the reader sort this out.

Still, I could not help but be impressed by this study, which definitely is a worthy addition to our understanding of the late war campaigns in the west, as well as to our understanding of the last days of the Reich.

Is this a textbook?...because it reads like one, or better yet, a doctorial thesis. This book is boring, dry and dull. I was intrigued by the idea...Germany immediately after the fall of the Third Reich, but the first 200 pages of the book deal with the last days of the fighting, and the stories in these pages are very repetitive. Then the last 67 pages deal with the days following the defeat, these pages are a bit interesting, dealing with all the displaced persons. You may say "hey, that only adds up to 267 pages"....well yes it does, even though the info here says the book contains 382 pages, the last 115 pages are the afterword, notes bibliography and the index!...A third of the book! Now, I'm no scholarly reader, I am a avid reader of WW2 by the likes of Ambrose and Beevor, and this is nothing like those authors books. I really labored getting through this book, not enjoyable at all. If you can grasp a clinical story like this, you may like it, but if you, (like me) like your WW2 books with more warmth and feeling, then look elsewhere. I thought this review a bit more detailed then simply saying " I hated it"

Essence of Dubai, who was gunning for this year's 128th Derby for Sheikh Mohammed's Godolphin Stables, finished a disappointing 9th. Despite this expensive colt's subpar performance, the story that unfolds in "From The Desert To The Derby" is sure to entertain even the slightest horse racing enthusiast. Author Jason Levin digs deep into the inside scoop on how the billionaire crown prince of Dubai has bought the best American horse-flesh available in an all-out attempt to win America's premier races--which ultimately began with the Kentucky Derby, followed by the rest of the Triple Crown races and the Breeders' Cup in the fall. Some of the colorful interviews with American trainers who have publicly critcized the Sheikhs unorthodox training and preparation methods are worth the cost of the book alone. The book takes you on a wild ride from the breeding shed to the expensive yearling sales at Keeneland and Saratoga. A+

Jason Levin, From the Desert to the Derby (DRF Press, 2002)

In Steve Crist's autobiography, he talks about DRF Press, and how he wanted to get serious about publishing books with it after he took over at the Daily Racing Form. Well, he's certainly gotten serious; DRF Press has not only stepped up publishing books on handicapping and betting the horses (look for my sure-to-be-overenthusiastic review of Steve Klein's The Power of Early Speed early in 2006), but also taking chances on books aimed at a more general audience-- for example, From the Desert to the Derby.

As the title implies to any horseplayer, From the Desert to the Derby focuses on the Maktoum family, whose royal brothers Maktoum, Mohammed, and Hamdan have been making waves in the Thoroughbred industry since the early eighties. In the mid-nineties, the brothers got together and formed Godolphin Racing, and one of the prizes on which they've focused their eyes is the Kentucky Derby. As of Levin's writing, they had yet to win one. (For that matter, as of this review, the streak still holds.) One would expect, given these two thoughts and the title, that the focus would therefore be on the Maktoums' quest to win the Kentucky Derby.

That's one focus, but not the only one. In fact, the Derby quest takes, in the latter half of the book, second stage to the obvious focus any writer would have been looking to zero in on at the time this book was written-- Godolphin's all-out assault on the 2001 Breeders' Cup, held in Elmont, New York only six weeks after the bombing of the World Trade Center. (The two tie in thanks to a fortuitous late-nineties comment by Sheikh Mohammed that Godolphin would win the Kentucky Derby by 2002; Levin's focus on Godolphin's two-year-old 2001 string follows naturally.)

To say the least, this book was not written with the seasoned horseplayer in mind; Levin takes time to veer off into anecdotes well known to every horseplayer over the age of twelve, but that would be unknown to the general public. Thus, we can deduce that the book was, in fact, aimed at the general public, rather than the specialist horseplayer. Quite a radical title for DRF Press to publish in the old days, but an interesting statement by the new guard.

So, does it succeed? I think it does. Levin has crafted a book that, while it trips over its feet sometimes (some of those diversions mentioned in the last paragraph do tend to kill the pace instead of building suspense), would make a very good introduction to the world of racing for the non-horseplayer. Like Auerbach's Wild Ride or Barich's Laughing in the Hills, From the Desert to the Derby presents horse racing from a human, rather than an equine, angle, staying away from jargon and easing the reader into an understanding of the sport. Quite nicely done, this, and worth your time. *** ½

I purchased this book with the intention of learning the thoughts, procedures and techniques of the Godolphin Stables of Dubai while persuing a Derby win. The amount of information on these subjects could have been put on one page. Instead there was page after page of race results, the history of horse racing in general and famous race courses in particular, quotes and conversations with trainers, plus I picked up on a definite anit-Royal Family attitude. Also, the contents of the book has no continuity and seem to be just a collection of facts and records. I think think the title is very misleading and did not finish the book.

I enjoyed this book from start to finish. It was an excellent mix of horse racing, politics, and the story of how much the one Arab sheik really wants to win the Kentucky Derby. I like books that tell a story and also allow me to learn interesting things as i go and this one did that, a lot like Seabiscuit did. I definitely recommend this book to all sports fans, not just horse racing fans...