Indiana Books

Anyone who has ever enjoyed a novel by Thomas Keneally and wondered about his "inner man" will be richly rewarded by this perceptive, unpretentious, and often light-hearted memoir of life during his 17th year. The year 1952, was, he says, a "reckless, sweet, divinely hectic and subtly hormonal year...the most succulent and the most dangerous [year]," one which "lightly embarked on, [has] not to this day ceased to tease, govern and turn on me."

Capturing the confusion of adolescence, along with the trying on of roles, the dreams of the future, and his own willing surrender to aesthetic and otherworldly influences, he introduces the reader to his family, his school, his neighborhood, his church, and his psyche, as he "hungers for grandeur" and makes decisions which will ultimately affect the course of his life. Vividly depicting his friends, the Celestials, with whom he shares his last year at St. Pat's, a boys' day school about 15 miles outside of Sydney, he reveals himself, at seventeen, as an adequate athlete, an excellent writer, a devoted friend (especially to a blind student, the first ever to sit for the Leaving Certificate from a regular school), a dreamer of literary glory, a devout communicant, and a naïve worshipper-from-afar of the equally naïve Bernadette Curran.

With his characteristically astute eye for imagery and an acute sensitivity (born, in this case, of hindsight) to the pressures pushing him to become a priest, Keneally reconstructs this tumultuous year and the decisions he and his friends ultimately make about their futures. As the reader empathizes with the seventeen-year-old Keneally and appreciates both the atmosphere of Homebush in 1952 and the power of outside forces to affect his life, s/he also appreciates more fully the nature of the true creative urge and the urgency of its release. Less then ten years later, when Keneally's voice finally (and brilliantly) bursts forth, literary history begins a glorious new chapter. Though out-of-print, this book is readily available on Used sites, and Keneally lovers will find it unforgettable. Mary Whipple

In "Angola: The Anatomy of an Oil State," Anthony Hodges, describes, with exquisite detail, the rough transition to a Petro-Diamond economy in the worn-torn nation of Angola since the initiation of several peace agreements spanning the last decade. The book is a new edition of Hodges' 2001 text under a different title, "Angola: From Afro-Stalinism to Petro-Diamond Capitalism." The newer title is much more suitable as the previous title gave the impression that the history of the Marxist state of Augustino Neto is broadly covered, which it is not. The background history of Angola, for the most part, is summarized as Hodges focuses mainly on the last two decades of economic development. There are numerous tables and graphs, the text is well annotated, and it includes an excellent bibliography on the nation of Angola.

The book reads like a non-governmental organization policy paper at times, but I personally adore a dry style that dispenses with any distracting nuances. Several recent developments make this book a must-read for any students of economics and development in Africa. 1) Offshore petroleum and natural gas drilling, especially Ultra-Deep technologies, have rapidly increased off the Atlantic coast. Angola has pressed the corporations involved for a greater share in the development of its welfare infrastructure. Many of these corporations, notably Exxon-Mobile and BP, have agreed to develop the physical infrastructure, but have hesitated providing the manpower (doctors, nurses, teachers, etc.) necessary to staff these enterprises. 2) De Beers, the massive diamond corporation, has recently agreed to form a new diamond mining venture with the Angolan firm Endiama after having been forced out in 2001. Hodges' work in Angola: The Antomy of an Oil State, gives the proper history and context to understand these events.

Anthony Hodges was educated in economics at Oxford. As an associate at the Oxford Policy Management, Hodges specializes in the the post-colonial economies of Lusophonic Africa. He is currently at work advising the Department of Planning and Finance in the Republic of Mozambique.

Again, the pictures in the book are easy enough to use for my 3 year old. The information contained in the book is useful. We enjoy using this book and look forward to the spring and summer when we can travel further than our backyard.

This book is essential for any animation fan or scholar. It contains cross-referenced information which cannot be found anywhere else. In the week that I have owned it, I have used it at least ten times to find information I need. Now if only I had the budget to buy all of the animated films listed in the book! If you have any interest in animation at all, buy this book and become an expert!

The late, great, Maurice Natanson, himself a student and friend of Alfred Schutz, was told by Schutz, "Maybe you will discover that anonymity and death are the same." This profound thought underlies the entire text, as Natanson explores the causes and effects of anonymity (also called abstraction, typification, alienation, or as Dr. Martin Luther King has called it, "the darkness of nobody-ness").. Natanson reminds us that anonymity is not always a bad thing, but when it is instituted as a system upon unwilling participants, then it becomes problematic.

Also, I would recommend the work of Lewis R. Gordon, who adapts Schutz's and Natanson's theories of anonymity to discuss issues of antiblack racism and Africana thought. Gordon's "Existentia Africana," "Her Majesty's Other Children," and "Fanon and the Crisis of European Man" are suggested.

A real find for any student of Comparative literature or an interest in Turkish / Ottoman literature and culture. Probably the only complete anthology of it's type and definitely complied with love.

We are very fortunate indeed to have this book in print, in paperback. Sensitive and articulate, poet and Professor Annis Pratt explores the classic literary genre, the Bildungsroman, the young man's journey into the world and hence into himself, from the perspective of women characters in women's literature.

In doing so, she unveils the fact that women's challenges and tasks in poetry and life are different from men's and yield different fruit, necessary fruit. Her conclusion that one contemporary endpoint for women's individuation process can entail an encounter with an inner "green-world lover," describes a hopeful and erotic alternative to a stereotypical constricted adaptation.

Pratt's observation of the emergence of the "green-world lover archetype" in women's poetry goes beyond deconstructionist fantasies into the realm of finding meaning and purpose while planted right in the middle of life our lives on earth. Her observations also predict the possibility of a living reality that bridges the gap between the Knower and the Known, invites the emergence of the Self in relationship, and describes the concept of Intersubjectivity, now current in contemporary psychology.

The longstanding debate in the study of Middle East politics Area Studies and Social Science has divided schorlas in two general camps. Thos upporting the political economy approach (and its variations, i.e. State focused studies) such as James Waterbury, Roger Owens or Nazih Ayubi to mention some and those preferring a more cultural approach based on modernization theory typified by Bernard Lewis. This book edited by Mark Tessler aims to draw from the various approaches to establish a balanced view which combines the more scientific 'methods' of describing the Middle East through social science with the historical and local specificity of area studies. Tessler's aim is to sgow that neother approach works well in isolation and that, indeed, a combination of these two provides the most effective framework to the study of the Middle East. The one discipline adding the necessary context to the other's discipline.
The book features a collection of essays by noted scholars such as Lisa Anderson, Clement Henry and August Richard Norton (among others) which are invaluable to the specialist as well as those who have had less exposure to the debate. I especially enjoyed Lisa Anderson's essay in which she acknowledges some of the shortcomings of area studies and the need to combine more social science perspectives in the discipline. Nervetheless, the other essays are just as important and valuable.

This is an old and now out of print edition of John Harington's 1581 translation of "Orlando Furioso" the bizarre and wonderful epic-romance written earlier in the 16th century by Italian poet Ludovico Ariosto.

Harington's translation captures the wit and fantasy of Ariosto's strange poem in an easy to read and engaging verse format. Harington's poetry is usually at least functional, and often quite good, although he has his lapses into dull, plodding rhythms. Still, he is funny, ribald, yet with that false air of propriety the Elizabethans found necessary to mask their work.

Alas, no complete edition of Harington's translation exists that I know of. This edition contains the majority of the story of Orlando, as well as the story of Bradamante and Rogero. However, it is really just more than 1/3 of the total poem, with only 10 of the original 46 cantos, with excerpts from 7 more. That means that 29 cantos are completely absent from this text. Oh well. I guess there just isn't much demand for this work, which is a shame, because I feel like its fractured and absurdist narrative would appeal to modern sensibilities.

I read this book for a graduate seminar on Aristotle.
Topic of Metaphysics is Ousia=substance and being. What is the meaning of being? With respect to matter and form, it is primarily about form. Analytically both can be separate and distinct, but not in reality. One can analyze matter by potentiality and actuality. Matter can't answer the question of being without form. Some natural things are always a composite of matter and form, it is the answer to the question of what is ousia or being in nature. Matter by itself can't give us the answer to what a thing is.

Ousia=substance and being. Ousia= Being is the "this" spoken of in primary ousia. This is contrary to Plato. Categories vs. Metaphysics. We can talk of the "being" as quality as "not white." Being spoken of in many ways but only of one thing, i.e., "the focal being." Word being has flexibility. Other flexible words is essence. (the what it is to be). In Greek for Aristotle, a bed is not an Ousia because it is from techne=craft it can have an essence. Ousia is reserved for material things self manufactured in nature. All things are derived from a primary ousia.
This has to do with focal being, health is such a word. When we talk about different aspects of health, it is not a universal definition like Socrates looks for. Aristotle says you can't find it. Thus, the word "being" is just a word in a sense a focal point like the word health, i.e. healthy skin, healthy food, then there is health, for Socrates what is health. Aristotle says no, health is unity by analogy. Aristotle is OK with using examples. Math is not independent knowledge, it is dependent on things math is not a primary existence. Being is neither a universal nor a genus, (genus is animal in hierarchy). It is as though Aristotle wants to say that the primary meaning of being is the "this" the subject, i.e. Socrates not human all by itself, not animal all by itself.

Ousia= Being is the "this" spoken of in primary ousia. This is contrary to Plato. Categories vs. Metaphysics. "This" is ontologically primary. Ontological= the most general branch of metaphysics, concerned with the nature of being.

In the categories discussion, he doesn't talk about the distinction between matter and form, it comes later on in the Physics and then the Metaphysics. The "this" is ontologically primary in terms of what the "being" something, what something is. Why would it be wrong to say that primary ousia can't be primary from the standpoint of knowledge, it can't be the distinction between ontological and epistemological? Why would it be wrong to say that the "this" the perceptible encounter wouldn't be primary from the standpoint of knowledge? Because, whatever the categories are whatever the notions of say "horse" the "this" is a horse, the "this" is ontologically primary, but it can't be epistemologically primary because a "this" by itself is just a "this" the question "What is this" called a horse is to involve the categories of knowledge. Therefore, from a knowledge standpoint, secondary ousia, which is things like categories and context, they have primacy in knowledge. However, from the standpoint of "being" the perceptible "this" has primacy. This is just a technical way of distancing him from Plato. In the Metaphysics, the question of form is primary Ousia. Ousia =form in Metaphysics. In Metaphysics, the "this" is simply matter. Aristotle did not give up on Ousia as form. This matter and form is never separated for Aristotle, thus a composite of matter and form is in the Metaphysics. In realm of nature, form and matter can't be separated for Aristotle. If you only talk about matter, you have nothing definable. You never come across things without their form. God is only exception to form and matter together.

Ousia as form and essence. The essence of a thing is "what" it is, it gives us knowledge. Definition= essence. Bronze can't be essence of circle, the form is important, not the matter.
Can't use abstract math to explain a human. When it comes to knowledge, we must emphasize the ousia as form. It isn't that first you have material things, and then the mind adds form to it, whatever the particular thing is, it always was that form. Then when we learn about it, we actually just discover what the thing is. Therefore, it is a process of coming to understand the universal, the essence, but that was always there in the thing, it just needed to be done. So what he is emphasizing in the Metaphysics is the idea of ousia as form, as some kind of essence, but never separated from matter!

Ousia --1. Grammatically basic. 2. Ousia As Ontologically basic, something that exists in its own right. The 1st example is how humans speak, the 2nd example is how things really are, both are both side of the same coin.

Principle of Noncontradiction
Arche= principle, beginning and rule. Aristotle thought that this was the firmest of all principles. It is impossible for the same thing to both belong and not to belong to the same thing at the same time to the same thing in the same respect. An important governing thought in Western philosophy. A thing is what it is, it can't be equal to its opposite. Aristotle thought reality was organized this way. It has to do with both knowledge and being. Aristotle states that if this principle is true then it is the firmest of all principles both for knowledge and reality. In the same respect, what does it mean? It shifts depending on circumstances. From standpoint of knowledge and reality principle of noncontradiction is stable. The three factors of the principle are: the same thing, in the same time, in the same respect, is what Aristotle is calling the principle of noncontradiction. In order for knowledge to be reliable, these factors are in play. Can't be going up and down a hill at the same time. 1 of 3 factors has changed, time. A "hill" is both up and down but meaningless unless you think in relation of motion. Aristotle believes when it comes to knowledge and reality the principle of noncontradiction is most basic and most fundamental and evident principle, because without it we can't communicate or think about things. Aristotle explains well how we lead our life by the principle a very pragmatic explanation. This is a principle we live by as humans thus, no one can deny it!
If you talk about change as a potentiality, you have a way of solving the puzzle. This actually serves as a slap at Renee Descartes in the future wondering if he is conscious or in a dream state. All philosophy stems from wonder and puzzlement. Aristotle makes distinction between worthy puzzles or useless ones.

Emphasis between primary and secondary being, Ousia.
For Aristotle Ousia or being is not just a thing, many ways being can be understood. Primary Ousia is things perceptible in nature. Secondary Ousia or being is sometimes being is how we understand things, i.e., big or small, etc, this is how we talk about things. He stretches the way Ousia in many ways. Matter can't be primary being like atomists, nor form alone like Platonists. However, when we analyze beings, we can use secondary being. Idea of "is" or "being" will shift depending on what you are talking about. The term "being" has plurality to it, depending on how we regard it (like using a hammer as a paperweight). Even though Metaphysics emphasizes form, it is "this form." Primary thing is the "this."

He wants to move away from Plato's idea that we can separate matter from form. A things essence is going to be the ultimate answer to the question of what is being. However, a things essence can't be separated from its statement of thing, it is almost as though that this essence is going to mean the definition of a thing, "what it is." Then in some respects, it has the characteristics of a secondary being. If you want to know what is the big deal about the perceptible "this," the primary ousia? Again, and again, the best way you can get a handle on that is he is critiquing Plato! He wants to move away from Plato's idea that it is possible to understand beings apart from the material world. Aristotle does make certain commitments; he makes certain commitments to the idea that the primary sense of being must be used in nature that are evident to us.

The Platonist in Aristotle says if the mind desires and is naturally inclined to pursue knowledge and he gives us a map how does it acquire knowledge. The Platonist in Aristotle says in the Metaphysics that if all there is, is matter and form then there is always an element of elusiveness in things because matter cannot fully deliver how we know things. When he gets to the question of the Divine, he does so because he believes that the natural desire of the mind can know that it will not have a final resting place with respect to just composite things. Especially since these composite things are always changing because nature is the realm of movement and change and the idea of form will at least give us access to how we can know changing things and actuality and potentiality. Changing things will always have this element of excess, beyond the minds capacity to grasp.

His talk of the Divine is the idea that there is something in reality that will satisfy the minds' desire for the ultimate stable resting point. If change were the last word, the mind could never come to rest. This is what Heraclitus argued for, Aristotle didn't like it. He wants to grasp the final. For him the Divine is satisfaction for the mind to grasp reality.
Uber Ousia. Aristotle here is talking about 2 senses of eternity.

1. Endless time.
2. Timelessness. 1st is never begins, never ends this is eternity or infinity. 2nd is in order to understand whole world there has to be something, the unmoved mover.

Ideas of potentiality and actuality criticizes Platonic idea. Potentiality has idea of negation in it. Thus, a thing in nature always has actuality; we are always on the move. Divine is pure form and actuality without matter and potentiality. Ontology now moves to theology. This is his theological science. (Theology in the Metaphysics is speaking about God for Aristotle). In reality, composite of form and matter is always in motion until it ends. Any actualization has potentiality it is prior. Actuality is prior to potentiality; this is his ultimate metaphysical statement. Two ways Aristotle proves this idea. 1st is human reproduction brings us into being. Our parents actually reproduced us. 2nd is God the ultimate sense of actuality prior to potentiality.

Talking about other philosopher's ideas. Hesiod question of the Gods in poetry, night comes before day, thus we don't have access in the "dark" symbolic of precedence of something unknowable, and Aristotle doesn't like it. Thus, for him he has the unmoved mover.
The pure actuality of the Divine is Aristotle's nominee for the principal that explains why there is this movement in the first place. Limitation in nature is matter which is unstable but all things in nature strive to their potential. Thus, you have pure actuality of Divine. God is Prime mover or final cause not efficient cause for Aristotle.

Rational and non-rational potentiality. This is how Aristotle recognizes the phenomenology of human thought. What rational means here is human drama of seeking what might or not work out. Now rational is stable when you heat water it boils no other potentiality. Thus, non-rational movement is very regular. Human reason is precarious we may not use potentiality to reach actuality. When we practice medicine, it might not work out.

Theoria=contemplation. There are three kinds of ousia, all are a study of secondary ousia in some way.

1. Physics-study of material and moveable.
2. Mathematical-study of ousia that is non-moving, (1+1=2 always), but is derived from matter.
3. Theology is study of ousia that is non-moving and non-material.

This is scheme of understanding the nature of understanding something. 3rd level is big for Aristotle. 1st two levels have limitations to them. We begin from wonder (ignorance) philosophy is to illuminate wonder with answers. He doesn't deny Greek deities but the way poets depict them is deficient.

Movement is a way of understanding change we see this in the Physics. Movement is actualization of potential. Psuche=soul which is the word he uses for life. Things in nature that are alive. Soma=body. Plato separates soul from body, Aristotle doesn't. Aristotle's text De Anima is on "The Soul" is a philosophical biological treatise. We have three-part soul, plant, animal and human all are part of this.

I recommend Aristotle's works to anyone interested in obtaining a classical education, and those interested in philosophy. Aristotle is one of the most important philosophers and the standard that all others must be judged by.