Kentucky Books
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Alternative perspective on human interaction with the earthReview Date: 2000-06-19
Good Principles, Little InformationReview Date: 2006-12-14

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Chandler and Hollywood: Poisonous Marriage w/ Beautiful KidsReview Date: 2001-11-13
An Admirable MessReview Date: 2001-01-06

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Incomplete CritiqueReview Date: 2008-07-16
The doctrine of mutual deterrence was in part a response to the terrible destructiveness of nuclear weapons. The doctrine was predicated on the premise that faced with destructive power of nuclear weapons no rational leader would opt for war. As this book makes abundantly clear there is no empirical basis for this premise. Human behavior is enormously complex and Payne argues that unless both sides have the same definition of rational behavior, mutual deterrence simply will not work. He notes that U.S. strategists assumed that the behavior and thinking of Communist leaders would mirror the U.S. approaches to nuclear war. This Payne notes was wrong. The availability of information since the collapse of the Soviet Union demonstrates that the Communist Leadership had a very different understanding of acceptable damage and rational responses than the U.S. did. He points out that as the Cold War developed the U.S. crated a doctrine of mutual deterrence based on developing accurate counts of the number and type of nuclear weapons possessed by each side. This method reached its logical absurdity, of course, under Robert McNamara and the ultimate deterrence doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). MAD was based entirely on weapon counting and evaluation without any reference to human (leadership) factors and so was in effect irrelevant.
The thesis of this book is that deterrence is effective if, and only if, it is based on a through knowledge of culture, ideologies and personalities of the leadership aggregate that is to be deterred. Payne correctly argues that military decision making is often based on non-empirical factors and is seldom entirely governed by a rational review of military strengths and weaknesses.
Payne is not ready to give up on the concept of deterrence however; he rather wants to build deterrent strategies that reflect actual knowledge of the subjects to be deterred. He does not believe that analysis of arsenals alone can be the basis for a real deterrent strategy. As far as he goes he is right. But one has to ask what about other factors that might affect a nation's strategic choices? Specifically what of the growing 21st Century phenomenon of international economic interdependence and the telecommunications revolution of the Global Network? Both have to be factors in national decision making processes, whether rational or irrational.
Superb analysis, lacks alternativesReview Date: 2005-04-12
The title itself might have been a sign. The cold war deterrence system, as Payne describes it, followed mainly from Schelling's first analyses of two-party prisoners' dilemmas. Deterrence was an issue of determining the proper quantity of nuclear material to bring to bear on any given issue. Rational actors will realize the costs of any certain action and thus will or will not take action based on simple calculations. We can be assure ourselves of safety simply by dint of our arsenal.
Payne quickly and deftly undermines this simple understanding. He does this by introducing a simple but compelling concept - the gap between rationality and reasonability. Most traditional deterrence theorists viewed states as black boxes. They operated through mirroring - using our own calculations as a means to test enemy calculations. Payne argues that this is a dangerous assumption. Our own calculations are not transferable. Most states are narrowly rational; that is, they choose from a hierarchically ordered set of policy options based on cost-benefit analysis. Even rogue states can be rational. The problem is that many nations do not seem reasonable to us. Reasonability is the measure of how similar their conclusions are to our own. Payne presents a series of examples where states rationally chose policies that deemphasized national survival for other things - national pride, ideology, or religious fervor. A simple understanding of deterrence theory would not be able to deal with such a state.
Payne also makes use of the rich literature on psychological factors involved in crisis decision making. He attacks the viability of the rationality assumption quite convincingly, in my estimation. Decision makers often ignore information that goes against a course already chosen in order to limit the stresses involved with reappraisal. A whole series of motivated and unmotivated biases influence the clarity of decisions during essential (and highly tense) times. Hoping that messages will be received clearly might be too much to hope for.
In a following section, Payne presents a detailed case study of a hypothetical conflict with China over Taiwan. He uses a deep study of Chinese operational codes and psychological characters to propose a deterrence strategy that could work. Involved and hard to criticize.
After this, the book falters somewhat. After such a convincing and detailed destruction of deterrence theory, what can a state do to prevent nuclear attack? Payne is coy on this point, but reading between the lines one senses that he is a proponent of some form of missile defense. It's a logical step, but it's still not articulated in much depth. The only possible fault I can give the book stems from this lack of consideration for an alternative. It's not a very big problem with the book, but it still leaves one slightly unsatisfied.
That said, this is a superb book. The scholarship is impeccable and the prose is urgent, clear, and compelling. Anyone vaguely interested in strategy or nuclear policy must read it at once.

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Who Guided the first US Cold War Strategy ?Review Date: 2007-11-12
A strong spin on still evolving respect for Truman, but one that left this writer not toally convinced.
Excellent book on TrumanReview Date: 2006-05-17

No house arrangements in here!Review Date: 2002-07-26
If you're looking for a book of songs for the camp-fire, this may not be it. If you're looking for the real songs of Appalachia, look no further.
UncommonReview Date: 2000-06-06

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Tin Pan Alley Goes to WarReview Date: 2007-03-28
Putting a Boot in Hitler's AssReview Date: 2004-09-12
Smith is an okay writer but her book is somewhat padded, and Kentucky should hire a proofreader, it is trying indeed that Melvyn Douglas and Ralph Bunche both have their names misspelled.

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Complete guide to Kentucky's hiking trailsReview Date: 2001-06-21
Comprehensive guide to Kentucky hiking (updated review)Review Date: 2001-06-21
Each hike contains a trail map, detailed directions to the trailhead, a black-and-white picture, and a brief description of the hike. Hikes range from 1 to 12 miles in length, with the average at around 4-5. This guide is exclusively devoted to day hikes, but longer hikes are referenced in an appendix. The trail maps are hand-drawn, but since I have personally hiked many of the trails in this guide, I can tell you that most of them are rather accurate. However, they still lack details such as elevation changes, so you probably won't want to venture into one of the more remote areas described here without a better map such as a USGS topo map. Also, the authors have not measured some of the distances very carefully, as I have found some of the distances given in this guide to be somewhat over-stated.
In addition to the above, the major drawbacks with this book are the scant amount of information given about each area's geological or cultural history and the lack of detail in the trail descriptions. The author suffices with only 1 paragraph in introducing each hike, and many of the trails receive only 1 or 2 sentences in a description. Also, there is no trail summary at the beginning of the book, so it is not easy to choose a trail to hike.
In summary, if I were to own only one guide describing the "greatest" hikes in Kentucky, this would probably NOT be the one. For that purpose, I would recommend "50 Hikes in Kentucky" by Hiram Rogers (a book I have personally read) instead of this book because of its superior trail descriptions, maps, and ease of use. However, if you are looking for a more comprehensive guide to add to your library, this is a well-written, informative guide that deserves serious consideration.

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An Easy ReadReview Date: 2001-03-08
Good outline of the life of a great and troubled manReview Date: 2000-06-27
A sad tale of greatness thwarted by principle. Warren composed this essay in honor of his fellow Kentuckian, whose U.S. citizenship had been restored that year - 1979 - by an act of Congress. Warren writes with verve, wit, humor, and insight.

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This little book covers a lot of ground!Review Date: 2001-03-06
Fast Read............Review Date: 2002-04-05

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Mammoth ReviewReview Date: 2004-11-14
FL Booklover
Come follow follow follow follow follow follow meReview Date: 2005-06-03
Stephen Bishop was born a slave in the state of Kentucky in 1821. His owner Frank Gorin, owned the Mammoth Caves and needed a tour guide to schlep tourists in the busy summer months. Enter Stephen. Fascinated with the caves, Stephen proceeded to explore beyond the usual paths. As he did so, he would find more and more beautiful areas and hidden passages. He discovered blind cave fish (never before seen), huge gypsum caverns, and miles and miles of caves stretching under the land of Kentucky. He even created maps of the areas he had found that helped others explore as well. Though he died a short time after he was freed (at the young age of thirty-six), Bishop is remembered as being the first and most important guide of the impressive Mammoth Caves today.
The story is, as Elizabeth Mitchell rightly says, captivating. Cleverly, she has included Stephen's maps on the front and endpapers of the book. Mitchell also tells the reader, right off the bat, that she has reproduced his life with as much accuracy as possible and that the dialogue, "is not reproduced from any source". I commend Mitchell for her choice of subject. Stephen Bishop, rightly, deserves to be remembered for his great life and magnificent accomplishments. I personally believe, however, that an entirely factual book of this fellow would not have been out of place. Consider similar books about other people who lived in the 1800s. There is the book, "Phineas Gage", by John Fleischman. Here we have a beautiful non-fiction text with color photographs and engravings that is the perfect way to tell the story of a 19th century life. Think how wonderful, "Journey to the Bottomless Pit" would have been, had it been done in a similar format. When you read this book, you hear about eyeless fish and beautiful stalactites. Wouldn't it be great to see beautiful color photographs of them as well? Instead, you must rely on illustrator Kelynn Alder's black and white drawings. These pictures are nice, no question, but you can't help but wish that you could see the caves for yourself in a far more lively format.
You might argue that good non-fiction subjects have been given a similar fictional treatment to Stephen Bishop and that those books have been good. This is true, of course. There's just one small problem. Mitchell, for all that she is great at choosing the best details to highlight in her story, is not a good writer. Her language is stilted and cloying. Though the book is ostensibly written for kids between the ages of 9-12, the tone of voice taken here would be better for a seven-year-old reader. Stephen constantly is describes as being grateful to his master, proud that he has been chosen, and hoping that he'll do a good job. The wry sense of humor that Stephen had is mentioned here, but Mitchell's not adept enough to give us a taste of it. Worse, there are some truly unbelievable moments that are written solely to spell things out to child readers. Take this for example: "When he first heard the name `Underground Railroad,' Stephen wondered what kind of train could run for so many miles below ground". Mitchell doesn't seem to give Stephen much credit, and his abject gratitude and innocence makes him seem a very different person from the intelligent guide described by his contemporaries. Had Mitchell been a talented enough writer to pull off the additional passages in this text, the book might have worked brilliantly. As it stands, I yearn for the beautiful glossy-paged non-fiction text this could have been.
Will kids read this book? Not without some prodding. It's a fine story and a good adventure tale at times, but children will only ask for this if urged to do so. There is great potential in this material. I can only hope that a future author sees it and capitalizes on it themselves. A great story in a mediocre package.
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Wes Jackson describes a growing perspective that we need to interact symbiotically with the earth rather than considering the earth a "resource" at our disposal. He mixes philosophy with actual personal experiences to further illustrate the story.
The fact that he began the Land Use Institute in Kansas and is still and active participant lends credibility to his dialog.