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Strength and WeaknessReview Date: 2003-04-16
Interesting book.Review Date: 2004-04-28

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NOT a picture bookReview Date: 2006-04-22
Wildflowers of Alabma and Adjoining SatesReview Date: 2000-05-03

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Decent tactical discussion ruined by omissions and Celtic warfare theoryReview Date: 2007-05-12
As a tactical discussion this is probably preferable to Paddy Griffith's work favoring vigorous frontal assault and discounting the new firepower. However, Attack and Die has some glaring omissions that hurt it, and it also makes some assertions that don't help. There are too many technological phases and differing terrain, strategic, and logistical situations in the American Civil War to support the simple tactical absolutes that authors too often apply.
The authors' thesis is two fold: Southern armies were too aggressive; and that this was the result of Celtic heritage. On the first point it is true that the improvements in the rifle and percussion firing systems greatly improved the odds for the force on the tactical defensive. As the war progressed, earthworks further increased lethality of rifles while shielding the defender and concealing his numbers. However, this completely misses the strategic fact that it's rather hard for two opposing armies to simultaneously and indefinitely remain on the defensive since it results in stalemate. Unfortunately, as Joe Johnston proved both at Vicksburg (by failing to support Pemberton) and before Atlanta, if one cannot find an opportunity to repel the invader, the enemy can pin one's force and subdue it through siege operations. So remaining on the defensive can result in an even more demoralizing defeat without ever yielding an opportunity for victory. Preserving one's force is irrelevant if it cannot be fed or equipped because of destruction of one's territory, industry and logistical hubs. Lee, Davis, and even Bragg understood that. "Use it or lose it" applies.
As for blaming the tactical offensive of Southern armies on Celtic roots, it fails on several levels. First, one wonders what that means for Grant's armies who lost far more men in offensives...and in the end captured three separate CSA field armies for their trouble, and broke the siege of Chattanooga. Second the ethnic theory illustrates a huge flaw in the authors' (and many others') approach to comparing North and South, a simplistic New England vs. Old South view. Both North and South were heterogeneous, the North far more so. New England was far different than the Old Northwest, or the western states of the time. The differences can be seen clearly in census data for churches.
The discussion of ancient Celts, the *strategic* reasons for their defeats, the quality of their weapons and battles is very flawed and Telamon in particularly was erroneously interpreted.
Ignoring the speculative ethnic theory, what is missing in the discussion is the recognition of initiative and that when defending one's territory one must either compel the invading army to attack so that it can be defeated, or find a way to gain sufficient advantage to attack and defeat it. This was the impetus behind Lee's actions to repeatedly repel Union armies in Virginia. While the cost was high, it was probably necessary to prevent the immobilization and eventual defeat of his army. When Lee could no longer do this in 1864 he was forced to settle into a prolonged but eventually fatal siege defense.
Another important factor the authors neglected is that armies on the strategic offensive in hostile territory are at a considerable disadvantage in terms of intelligence, communications, and supply. Most of the decisive defeats North and South occurred as much for these strategic considerations as for tactical ones. Often forcing one major battle was sufficient to deplete the enemy's supplies or manpower sufficiently to end the offensive campaign even if victorious tactically.
The authors are careful to point out the general adoption of major entrenchments as a standard practice by 1864, and how this greatly changed Civil War fighting. They also illustrate how these (along with further entrenchments in the rear) became nearly impregnable to assault. Upton and other commanders had partial successes of using heavy assault columns to overwhelm sections, but the inherent resulting disorganization prevented capture of parallels to the rear. Local successes had become too difficult to exploit with large armies.
The best aspect of the book is the continual referencing of Mexican War actions and how these shaped the tactical thinking of the ACW commanders. Also useful is the lengthy discussions of period tactical manuals for the various arms.
The artillery discussion is generally correct, but the authors conspicuously fail to note the *wartime* transition from inaccurate and short ranged 6 pounder smoothbores and 12 pounder howitzers to the more accurate and longer ranged Napoleons and rifled pieces.
I was shocked at the lack of attention paid to Nathan Bedford Forrest's superb tactical skills. In fact the authors go so far as to suggest he added nothing! Perhaps they should have studied Brice's Cross Roads---a very relevant action that they entirely neglected to mention. Forrest understood initiative, momentum and concentration. Initiative and momentum are not things the authors seem to appreciate. With regard to weaponry, Forrest, like Mosby preferred two pistols for his men. This was an acknowledgement of the melee style of combat that frequently occurred in the thicketed country he operated in. He also at times effectively advanced his cannon in a more Napoleonic support because rifle range was not a factor in the dense growth. But perhaps Forrest's effective closer fighting style is in fact why they ignored his contributions.
Another irritating oversight was ignoring the decisive battle of the Vicksburg campaign, Champion Hill, and instead focusing on assaults vs. the entrenchments around the city. Champion Hill was an example of fixing an army in position and then hammering at a wing until it broke. The whole Vicksburg campaign up until the siege is one of continuous motion (initiative and momentum) never allowing the defenders to face the attacker with parity. Furthermore, after Champion Hill, at the Big Black River Grant's forces easily overran the entrenchments and forced Pemberton's army back into the city's works. Other lesser-known examples are Piedmont, Droop Mountain, Cloyd's Mountain.
Where Johnston failed is in giving up all the ground before Atlanta without once finding a point to effectively turn the Federal position or destroy a section of the army when it was most vulnerable. This is something the authors overlooked: the vulnerability of armies on the move to momentum based attacks. The defensive tactical advantage existed when positions were fixed and the defenders forces could support one another. When an army was moving it could be struck without such advantages as interior lines and defensive entrenchments. It also had less sense of where the enemy was and how strong while moving. Some famous examples of striking armies on the move include Brice's Crossroads, Mansfield, New Market, and Olustee. Each of these were Confederate victories seizing the tactical offensive from the enemy and effectively halting a Federal campaign.
Grant and Lee understood the initiative at both strategic and tactical levels. The authors (as well as McClellan and Joe Johnston) apparently do/did not. The tactical offensive could be extremely costly and against entrenched defenders it was nearly suicidal unless there were special considerations. However, it could also achieve the strategic objective and produce outsized results in various other situations. I can't recommend this work to most readers as I think it will lead them to an erroneous view of offensive operations because its conclusions are too broad and absolute.
The South was TOO agressive.Review Date: 2005-05-19
Rifles changed all that. It changed everything but American generals, mostly those of the South, refused to change their ways. But then why didn't the people say something to make them change their ways? The authors suggest that this also had to do with the culture of the South - that they were Celtic in their ways and thoughts. So the people approved of the tactics, even when it meant defeat!
While that part of the book seems weak, most of it I can agree with. This book DOES list a ton of facts and I suggest it only for those who already know a lot about the American Civil War.
ýIt was not war, it was murderýReview Date: 2003-05-29
Another interesting, and controversial, aspect of the book is the authors' conclusion that the tendency for offensive warfare was deeply rooted in Southern culture, and Celtic heritage. While the authors lacked sufficient evidence to be convincing on this point, they were far more convincing about how the advent of the rifle made bayonet attacks obsolete, the offensive use of cavalry ineffective, and entrenchments and fieldworks highly prized by Northern commanders.
Although, as the authors point out that there were good reasons for the South to adopt a defensive strategy, they elected to pursue the offensive to the detriment of their cause. Certainly, it is difficult to argue with the fact that the South lost 175,000 men during the first 27 months of the war due to their propensity for offensive action, or how they lost 97,000 men vs. 77,000 men for the North during the first twelve major battles of the war, or how Pickett's famous charge resulted in the loss of 62% of his command at Gettysburg.
It's no wonder that these tactics prompted D.H. Hill to respond with, "it was not war, it was murder," in reference to the losses the Confederates took after repeated attacks against heavily entrenched Union troops on Malvern Hill on July 1, 1862.
This book is an insightful and worthy addition to the study of Civil War strategy and tactics.
Attack and DieReview Date: 2006-03-09
I thought the book established effectively that the defender had the advantage in the Civil War and discussed cogently the role of current tactical thought and Mexican War experience in encouraging offensive tactics despite the changes wrought by the rifled musket.
The authors claim that when Confederate soldiers attacked they suffered more casualties than Federals did when they attacked, but do not seem to give an explanation. If this is true, and the problematic nature of exact numbers and losses in the Civil War should be acknowledged, I suspect it has to do with artillery fuses.
A major claim, that Confederate troops attacked more often than Federals did, is never, in my view, substantiated. The evidence offered, which includes accounts of Grant's attacks in 1864, actually supports the idea that neither side really learned the dangers of the tactical offensive.
I am, in particular, not convinced by any aspect of the "Celtic" theory. The evidence of a Southern preference for the offensive seems shaky, and the evidence for Southern cultural aggressiveness comes mostly from anecdotal and/or unfriendly sources. A newspaper editor ranting about war to the knife, or similar sources, shouldn't be taken as representing a culture as a whole.
Nor am I convinced that the South was "Celtic", and the argument put forward by the authors is circular -- the South fought aggressively and that proves they were Celtic because Celts are aggressive. Actually, a quick look at the surnames of Northern and Southern generals and politicians doesn't give me any sense that the North, with its Sheridan and Grant, was any less Celtic in ancestry than the South with its Davis and Stuart. Irish immigrants were more common in Northern than Southern armies, though both sides had their Irish Brigades.
The idea that the Celts were aggressive convinces me least of all. To support this claim, the authors mix primary sources and literary references, often from unfriendly and not necessarily expert authors (Caesar) and skip wildly from one cultural and historical setting to the next, giving a deep analysis of none and appearing to choose evidence tendentiously. Bannockburn, for example, appears, but Scots defensive schiltron formations do not.
The authors use overgeneralized and stereotypical "racial" arguments -- Romans, Englishmen and Yankees were "practical, materialistic, tenacious, machine-like", and Celts and Confederates were "emotional, foolhardy, romantic, undisciplined". Substitute "white" and "black" for those ethnicities and it becomes clear that this argument is oversimplified at best. The idea that the American Civil War represented "a continuation of the centuries-old conflict between Celts and Englishmen..." not only strikes me as specious, but underemphasizes slavery as a cause to a degree with which I am uncomfortable.
The idea that there's some meaningful tactical or cultural link between Pickett's Charge, say, and Vercingetorix, or for that matter Bonnie Prince Charlie, beggars my belief -- the popularity of Scott's novels notwithstanding. The book descends to its silliest level when it attempts to draw a serious parallel between a Union soldier's quite possibly wild claim of having found Union skulls in a Confederate camp and the beheading activities of the medieval Irish literary/mythological hero Cu Chulainn.
I can't recommend this as serious scholarship.
Not credibleReview Date: 2003-10-09
Also, as other reviewers have pointed out, the book ignores many "big picture" issues that played into the outcome of the war. Better alternative reading would be "Two Great Rebel Armies" by McMurry or "Why the South Lost" by Hattaway and company.

Run from this tidal wave....Review Date: 2007-03-08
I've heard nice things about Ms. King's writing. This was my first exposure to her work and will try another of her books. Maybe I just started with the wrong one?
Excellent Book! A great family saga read! Review Date: 2006-07-25
Donette Sullivan, the main character in the book is just starting her business as a hairdresser in a home she and her husband inherited from her aunt. The book begins with Auntie Maudie's death. She was the town's schoolteacher, and everyone was grieving terribly over her death. Donnette was asked to do her hair and make-up for the funeral, and very reluctantly after Mary Frances Clark talks her into it, she does thinking it will help her business grow.
Donette's husband Tim, is crippled from a serious accident caused by Taylor. He was formerly an artist and football player until this happened. When they have Aunt Maudie's funeral, Taylor is coming into Alabama-and since the whole town hates his guts-no one wants him there. But he is coming for his Aunt Della, who is becoming much older and decrepit, and needs her nephew there. She raised the boy, as Charlotte, his mother was only a whore who wanted nothing to do with her own son. Taylor wants only to help his aunt, as the Clark family wants only to put her in a nursing hime so that Sonny, (Taylor's brother), and snobby wife Ellis can take over and have Aunt Della's house for themselves, and Ellis wants Glenda her sister to take over there as well.
There is a great big family fight over this matter and as Aunt Della seems to grow weaker, the problems try to work themselves out which isn't easy-and may not. Especially when no one is willing to forgive Taylor for the past and what has happened to Tim because of it.
Making Waves is a fun read!Review Date: 2006-07-14
Making WavesReview Date: 2006-07-05
Unlike the author's book Sunday Wife - it seemed to fail in it's delivery.
typical small town stuff!Review Date: 2006-06-20

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BOBBY'S STORYReview Date: 2007-12-06
Still Waiting for the Last Word from Bobby HimselfReview Date: 2007-09-07
Some errors, but entertainingReview Date: 2007-02-18
However, I can look past those errors, because the last third of this book is simply engrossing. The Allisons, and the so-called "Alabama Gang," endured so much tragedy, and it has probably never been more fully chronicled in one book. Also, I found Bobby's crustiness, and his deep-seated enmity toward Waltrip, revealing.
This book is short on primary sources. It's a lot like other Golenbock books, which can at times read like long Q and A sessions where the source just talks on and on in unedited form. This book mainly relies on interviews with Bobby and his brothers, Donnie and Eddie. Eddie is extremely opinionated, and you take what he has to say with a grain of salt. Some of the best interviews come from folks outside the family circle - Humpy Wheeler and Larry McReynolds offer some amusing anecdotes.
Bobby Allison may not get the credit he feels he deserves as one of the best race car drivers in history. After reading this book, one gets a good idea why.
This one's worth a read - errors and all.
Great Story Riddled by ErrorsReview Date: 2008-03-03
Page 30:
Gil Hearn
Correct spelling is Hearne
Page 34:
He started thirty-ninth, and he finished thirty-ninth, still running at the end of the race.
He started thirty-first and finished thirty-sixth.
Page 40:
Deal Ford
Correct spelling is Deel Ford.
Page 66:
(James Hylton) led the 300-lap Islip race from lap 147 to lap 282.
Hylon led from 147 through 292.
Page 68:
a lap after Bobby passed Buddy Baker to take the lead in the race it blew up.
Allison never led a lap in the race--and neither did Buddy Baker.
Page 100:
Donnie entered two superspeedway races, finishing twenty-seventh at Rockingham and ninth, twenty-two laps behind winner Fred Lorenzen, at Charlotte.
Exactly the opposite, Donnie was ninth at Rockingham, twenty-seventh at Charlotte.
Page 102:
What made winning the World 600 even more remarkable was that he also entered the Indianapolis 500 the same weekend. (Donnie was the only driver ever to do that until 1993, when Jeff Gordon did it.)
Jeff Gordon has never raced in the Indianapolis 500.
Page 105:
What made the June 20 1971 Riverside race notable was that Bobby had arranged with Motorola to put a two-way radio in the car so that during the race he could talk directly with Eddie. It was the first time a driver didn't have to rely on a chalkboard, and it wasn't long before all the drivers were doing it.
Though Allison popularized the two-way radio, it was first used in 1952 by Al Stevens in a Modified/Sportsman race on the famed beach/road course.
Page 129:
Describing a test session in an Indy car at Ontario Speedway, one sentence begins "When he arrived at the Ontario track," followed by Allison saying "I arrived at Indy."
Page 130:
Later in the test at the Ontario track, "Bobby went out on the famed Indianapolis track."
Page 133:
Driver Art Pollard had gotten killed on the first day of practice at the Brickyard
Pollard was killed during the first day of qualifying on May 12, after more than a week of practice.
Page 140:
His Champ car team has won a hundred races with driver Gils deFerran
Penske Racing has won more than a hundred Indy-car races, but Gil deFerran won just seven of them for the team.
Page 148:
After Donnie finished fifth in the Firecracker 500
There has never been a Firecracker 500, it is the Firecracker 400
Page 160:
When Smokey Yunick had a fallout with the France family in 1976, Smokey decided to quit NASCAR and run at Indianapolis.
The fallout was in 1970. Yunick's cars raced at Indianapolis from 1958 to 1975, and one driven by Jim Rathmann won in 1960.
Page 164: Eddie Allison was watching the race on television.
Page 166: I was watching TV and Dave Despain was interviewing Ryan Newman
It's doubtful Dave Despain was interviewing Ryan Newman on race day. Newman was not yet two years old at the time.
Page 191:
Bobby and Gary Nelson put the Monte Carlo on the wind tunnel skid, and after they cranked the fan up, the wind started to blow the car off the skid pad. It was clear to everyone that the Buick was not going to be able to perform.
Of course Monte Carlo is a Chevrolet model.
Page 193:
On May 17 at Dover
The race was May 15
Page 194:
At Richmond, Waltrip was second, Bobby third.
It was at Long Pond. Tim Richmond won the race.
At Richmond, Bobby won his second race in a row. Ricky Rudd was second,
Waltrip fourth.
Waltrip was third.
Page 202:
Terry Labonte didn't win a single race but became the new racing champion.
That season Labonte won on June 3, 1984 at Riverside and August 25, 1984 at Bristol.
Page 204:
After two top ten finishers at Pocono and Michigan, the team went to Daytona for the Firecracker 500.
There has never been a Firecracker 500, it is the Firecracker 400
Page 205:
A couple of other things happened in the Firecracker 500
There has never been a Firecracker 500, it is the Firecracker 400
Page 206:
Bobby finished twenty-first.
He finished twenty-seventh.
Page 223:
Neil Bonnett had raced in 1972 but it took another three years for him to take a crack at Grand National racing.
Bonnett's first season was 1974, when he appeared in two races.
Page 230:
Hillin himself had begun his driving career in 1982 at age sixteen
Bobby Hillin holds the NASCAR record as young competitor at 17, just 48 days shy of his eighteenth birthday.
Page 257:
"Because of Butch Lynley."
Correct spelling is Lindley
Page 280:
Ken Squire
Correct spelling is Ken Squier
Page 282:
"I passed him clean on the outfield"
Since they weren't racing in a baseball stadium, I'm pretty sure he was on the outside
Page 304:
Robert Yates's and McReynolds s scenario, which had the blessing of NASCAR...
(next paragraph) Yates and McReynolds objected.
It was Yates' and McReynolds' scenario--but they objected?
Page 313:
He kicked a record 89 PATs in a row, a Memphis State record.
Joe Allison kicked a then-record 81 PATs in a row
Page 328:
Red, whose whole life revolved around arcing, had traveled to Hueytown to race against Bobby and Donnie thirty years earlier and had become family.
As has been well-documented in the preceding 328 pages, the Allisons knew Farmer from their days in South Florida where he had mentored both Donnie and Bobby.
Page 333:
Just after seven o'clock on the morning of July 12, 1993, Davy was pronounced dead.
Allison died on July 13, the day after the accident.
Page 355:
Bonnett first announced his return to racing at a press conference at Talladega the morning of July 13, 1993. Later that afternoon, Davey Allison crashed his jet helicopter at the track and died.
Allison crashed on July 12.
Page 360:
On Monday, February 13, 1994
Monday was February 14, 1994
Page 369:
When the team arrived for the inaugural NASCAR Indianapolis 500
The NASCAR race at Indianapolis is the Brickyard 400
In addition, there is a great deal of careless editing--if indeed there is ANY editing.
Massively inaccurateReview Date: 2007-08-13
Greg Sacks won the Firecracker 500. There has never been a Firecracker 500; it's the Firecracker 400.
Gary Bettenhausen injured in a "spring car" race. Should be Sprint Car.
Gil de Ferran winning 100 Indy Car wins for Penske and Rusty Wallace winning 55 stock car races for him. Poor sentence structure; A number of drivers got Penske to 100 Indy Car wins, and Rusty won 55 races in all, but not all of them with Penske.
The list goes on. Amateur mistakes.

UndecidedReview Date: 2007-05-31
Classical Economies Did Not Exhibit Modern Economic BehaviorReview Date: 2001-10-27
Good Foreword and Pointers to Other AuthorsReview Date: 2000-03-13
However, Finlay's as author is not as satisfying.
The foreword to Finlay's book is good. It puts Finlay's contribution into a larger context and, in particular, pointing out Max Weber's influence on Finlay.
Max Weber noticed that most people are mainly interested in social prestige, not the means thereto, and, more specifically, that the modern means to prestige is not the traditional (ie., ancient) means thereto.
As a result of the foreward, I immediately ordered Weber's ostensible masterwork "Die Protestantische Ethik und der 'Geist des Kapitalismus'" (written 1904 with revision 1920).
Finlay himself does not explicity appear to recognise his debt to Weber. He refers to Weber's contemporaries (Rostovtzeff & co.).
As the author points out, very little was probably ever written in ancient times - and much less has been delivered down to us through the passage of time - regarding "economic" matters, the writing and reading public being consituted essentially by well-born persons with private incomes, who were generally interested in the (for them) more appropriate topics of poetry, rhetoric, religion, philosophy and heroic military exploits.
Hence research on this subject is difficult.
Also, the book is rather tedious and the amount of repitition and ampflication on essentially obvious points gets a bit monotonous.
Having said that, the whole subject matter was interesting, and the pointers to other authors useful.
The economic model which is developed is typical social sciences stuff: simplest ideas expressed cryptically as pseudo-mathematical charts. One can overlook this.
At the end of the day, the most worthwhile knowledge which I gained from Finlay's work was the knowledge that there was a Roman writer called Vitruvius who wrote a work on Architecture at around the time of Christ which remained the standard work on that subject for at least 1,500 years.
In the meantime I have read Vitruvius and found him to be both useful and entertaining.
Now I'll read Max Weber.
Not much of an economistReview Date: 2006-02-07
Roman EconomicsReview Date: 2002-03-15
Finley first examines status and statistics. What constituted status in the ancient world? For one thing, class and status were independent. A person could be of low class, but very high status. Pallas and Narcissus, the freedmen that served the emperor Claudius, come to mind here. Both were extremely high placed in society. They were rich beyond the dreams of avarice, but their class was lower than that of a senator. Finley's examination of statistics in ancient Rome is telling. In our world, it is inconceivable that the economy could be discussed without using stats. In Rome, this was not the case. Certainly, there were receipts of expenditures and interest rates on loans, but numbers just didn't hold the allure in Rome that they do today. The absence of guilds and interdependent markets, according to Finley, certainly has something to do with this. Most merchandise was locally made and consumed locally, or shipped directly to Rome. There was no need for corporations or massive transportation of goods (except grain shipments to Rome) between regions.
Finley's discussions on slavery are certainly enlightening. Finley believes slavery was necessary to the Roman world because it reinforced status. The highest strata of society disdained work, so having a dependent class of workers was essential to watch over estates and manage businesses. One of the surprising insights Finley provides is in exploding the myth that slavery is inefficient. Finley shows that the large landowners had money to burn due to the labor of slaves, as did the plantation owners in the American South. I'm not so sure I agree with this argument. To the extent that slaves were profitable in Rome, it would seem that this had much to do with the Roman system of slavery. The Romans had a process called "Peculium" in which slaves were given seed money by their masters to start businesses. Slaves could keep some of the profits from this system and eventually buy their freedom, as well as learn a trade. This is an excellent incentive to work hard, thereby increasing profits to their owners. I don't think slaves in the Americas had the same incentives.
Although the book is much more complex than the poor description I've given above, this review should provide ample initiative to read Finley. Even a beginner to Roman history could get much out of this book. Finley, despite some early hiccups, has a smooth writing style that is sympathetic to the newbie. Many a professional scholar has received inspiration from Finley. Highly Recommended.

Some good content, but style/organization is appalling!Review Date: 2001-08-17
Still, if one is willing to put up with all the dross, there are some genuine insights to be had from "Mythography". Foremost among these, I think, is Doty's attempt at a comprehensive definition of myth. For too long, professional mythologists have been adopting definitions of myth that are either so broad as to include conceivably anything (a criticism that can be made of Barthes, certainly) or so timorous, qualified, and limited as to be almost useless. Doty seeks to provide a "polyphasic" definition of myth (the "polyphasic" is just a meaningless but trendy-sounding buzzword that links together 17 basic qualities of myths in a (more or less) unitary definition. He then goes on to explain each of those 17 basic qualities. The glossary he provides at the end includes short but useful sound bite definitions of some of the jaw-cracking neologisms used by professional mythologiests-- words like "mythos", "mythologem", etc. (Neither of these items is perfect, mind you, nor unquestionable but they are at least somewhat useful). Many of Doty's observations about how we should conceive of myth, in general, are also useful.
All in all, this is a book that probably ought to be read by anyone seriously interested in keeping abreast in thought about mythology. However, it may not be a book that you get a lot out of of unless you've got the stamina to wade through all of the cutesy pop culture refs and pseudo-postmodern phrasings and the ability to separate the few kernels of wheat from the a whole lot of chaff...
Studying myth: the starting pointReview Date: 2003-12-20
Writing style eclipses contentReview Date: 2000-05-22
mythographyReview Date: 2004-02-05
Scholarly substance and extensive reference value.Review Date: 2002-10-01

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terrible 2Review Date: 2006-04-19
Classic initial Sanskrit grammarReview Date: 2000-08-03
Very useful - but not for self-studyReview Date: 2006-05-11
TerribleReview Date: 2003-01-27
Now, the bad points: All the rest of the book. Instead of clear explanations and tabular presentation of noun declensions and verb conjugations, that I somehow expected to get, all there are are pages after pages of obscure paragraphs more meant to confuse than to explain.
Let us look at Page 43, Conjugation, § 57. Preliminary remarks, II, which is supposed to explain Sanskrit moods and tenses:
"The moods are: indicative, optative, imperative; only the present has three moods, the remaining tenses only the indicative; the infrequent precative is, however, a kind of aorist optative. The tenses are: present and imperfect, which form the present system with opt. and pres.imp., future, the rare conditional, aorist, perfect."
Precative? aorist optative? pres.imp.? And it gets worse and worse.
I really cannot recommend this book. I wasted my money and time on it. Instead I recommend "Introduction to Sanskrit" by Thomas Egenes. It is a very user-friendly book that can actually teach you something about Sanskrit.
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Best Poli Sci Teacher Ever!Review Date: 2004-02-21
Looking for a cookieReview Date: 2002-12-30
Any group of American Citizens that uses a national prefix before stating they are American are by trial Anti-American. As far as one can determine there is no demographic knowledge as to the percentage of American Black persons that actually have roots back 157 years into a slave family.
There is a strong probably that ninety percent of the black population would be unable to make such a link.
Looking for a cookieReview Date: 2002-12-29
Any group of American Citizens that uses a national prefix before stating they are American are by trial Anti-American. As far as one can determine there is no demographic knowledge as to the percentage of American Black persons that actually have roots back 157 years into a slave family.
There is a strong probably that ninety percent of the black population would be unable to make such a link.
Definitive book on status of racial vs class politicsReview Date: 2003-01-10

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Great referenceReview Date: 2005-07-13
What Beardsley does so well is to present every important view in historical context so that the reader gets a good idea of not only what the different views on art are, but why they were developed.
While it may not be a great text, it is a great resource.
A Useful IntroductionReview Date: 2001-09-01
Painfully clutteredReview Date: 2000-02-19
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