Indiana Books

I actually haven't read this book yet but it is written by my Greek and Roman Mythology professeur. He's an amazing man. He knows so much about the subject that I'm sure this is a great book.

Dr. Hall was one of my professors as well, and he definitely knows what he's talking about. This book was extremely helpful in all of my classics courses, especially Roman History and translating Livy's Ab Urbe Condita. I'd recommend it to anyone.

This is an excellent book! I used it in one of my classes in college. It really gives insight into daily details of the lives of the Etruscans, which also helps you to understand the Romans better. Very well written, by good scholars.

The book reads like a diary, but it's a fictionalized story of the real Civil War surgeon Zabdiel Boylston, and it would make anyone grateful for modern medicine. Amputation was pretty much the treatment for everything, and that he was burned in love a couple of times during his period as a combat surgeon puts a very human face on this story.

I got it at my local library; it was part of a display in advance of the 200th anniversary of Lincoln's birth.

I enjoyed this book tremendously. The research and realism was amazing. I was fortunate to see the author lecture on the subject in Indiana. Dressed in the full civil war soldier uniform I thought the author to be an enthusiastic Civil War Buff. I was amazed to find out that the author was a modern day trauma surgeon whose interest in the civil war goes beyond the superficial, dry information one reads in text. His interest draws on real life experiences with bullet wounds and infections that he has treated in modern times.

An excellent novel of a surgeon who signs up to serve in the Union army during the Civil War. Written by a modern surgeon, Kernek obviously had researched his predecessors well. It might be a bit detailed for the squeamish, but for those who want a good "feel" for what a surgeon went through during the Civil War, I highly recommend it. It is a relatively short read, and the story line carries one right on through. This book belongs in every Civil War buff's collection, because it tells about an often overlooked part of the war and tells it very well. At this price, one can't afford not to buy it!

Fortress Besieged is one of the set books in the morden Chinese literature course I take. Though I like English literature more than Chinese one, this book gave me a refresh. Chien Chung Shu was so called Scholar writer, his works are full of both Chinese and western idioms. Therefore reading Fortess Besiged you can learn a lot of about Chinese and western world. Though it was written in the 30s, you will not feel it is old fashioned.

One of the greatest modern Chinese novels. Disguised as a "modern Rulin Waishi (Scholars)," Fortress Besieged is much more than an ingenious satire of the haute intellectual class in 1930's China. Its depictions of Chinese society in a time of great adversity (the Sino-Japanese War rumbles in the background much as the Napoleonic Wars do in the works of Jane Austen) is thorough and penetrating. The sheer wit of Qian Zhongshu, who possesses a stunning erudition in both the Chinese and Western literary traditions, makes the book one of few "random access novels": novels the reader can flip to any page and start reading with equal relish. The central characters, Su Wenwan, Tang Xiaofu, Zhao Xinmei and Sun Roujia are all unforgettable. Above all, it is the portrayal of the hero Fang Hongjian that elevates the novel to the realm of the highest tragicomedy.

I am astonished to find that this book has not been reviewed by anyone at amozon.com. Fortress Besieged is the immortal work by one of the most talented Chinese modern novelists, Chung-Shu Chien (Qian, Zhong-shu). This book has been translated into all major languages and enjoyed by readers all over the world. It has also been made into a very popular TV series in early 90's in China. Almost every educated Chinese is familiar with the story of this book, while the truth of life told by this book appeals universally to all mankind.

This book is about the life of a young Chinese intellectual in the 30's. His travel, his career, and most importantly, his relation with women. Through the simple, everyday happenings of this young man, the author shrewdly seeks for the motivation that drives us to receiving education, building a career, falling in love, and forming a family. The conclusion is that everything of life, including career, marriage, etc., is like a besieged fortress; the people ouside of it want break into it and the people inside of it want to break out of it.

The language used in this book is very humorous, sarcastic, and intellectual. Preferrably read in Chinese to get the most enjoyment out of it.

These 1929/30 lectures represent a stunning use of phenomenology as it probes into the nature of the philosophical bindingness to nature (as self-arising into presence "ousia"). Philosophy is understood to be the ongoing response to homesickness (as denominated by the poet Novalis). As such a response it is unique in its form of questioning and in the way it receives "answers" from the giving/receding orders of nature and their elusive ground. Philosophy is also infused with an attunement that compels it to return again and again to the questions concerning worldhood, finitude, and solitude; questions that goad it forward and backward simultaneously. The act of philosophy drives us out of our everydayness, "For in it there becomes manifest something essential about all philosophical comprehension, namely that in the philosophical concept, man, and indeed man as a whole is in the grip of an attack--driven out of everydayness and driven back into the ground of things" [Wesentliches alles philosophischen Begreifens, dass der philosophische Begriff ein Angriff ist auf den Menschen und gar auf den Menschen im Ganzen--aufgejagt aus der Alltaglichkeit und zuruckgejagt in den Grund der Dinge]. Boredom, rather than anxiety, is now seen to be the fundamental mood that governs our Dasein (human being in the world). Heidegger unfolds the complex interplay of the modes of boredom and their special ways of illuminating worldhood. Boredom is seen as one of the ways of time's withdrawal into a kind of tarrying that is nowhere and everywhere, but bereft of full worldhood. Animals, while open to their environment [umwelt] do not have a world [welt]. Yet animals live in their own way within a disinhibiting ring that opens them to their release into their species-specific environment. Here Heidegger's descriptions of the animal forms of not-worldness represent a major achievement in helping beings-with-selves become aware of the unique forms of openness of other living beings. As humans we are called to project ourselves into the difference between the various things in being, on the one hand, and the Being of all beings on the other (his reiteration of the ontological difference). This is certainly one of the most important series of lectures in Heidegger's career and the translation is a fair and compelling one. For those who only know "Being and Time" or some of the late essays, this text will come as a surprise because of its masterful and careful phenomenological descriptions of nature and the forms of openness that it contains.

I always see talk of the successor book to Being and Time. Some say the Kantbook, some say Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), etc. Let me propose The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. Because it was originally a lecture course, it is much more accesible than Being and Time, but it really continues the preoccupations of that book. In B&T, anxiety was the mood through which Heidegger discovers revelations of the Being of beings. Here Heidegger pushes on to a new "attunement": boredom. We think of boredom as something about which there is almost nothing to say, and it would be easy to joke about someone going for hundreds of pages on boredom fulfilling his own prophecy, but Heidegger's reflections on boredome as revealing aspects of Being and Time is about as profound as you can get. This is a great book. Maybe because it didn't even appear in German until 1983, it hasn't had as much attention as other works, but anyone interested in Heidegger (which ought to be equivalent to saying anyone interested in philosophy at all) should get to know this work.

The beginning is like an introduction to beat all introductions. This book has no index, but there is very little in these lectures that an index could pick out as an adequate description of any of the topics covered in the book. Pages 375-376 have a glossary, with some complicated words and phrases like "time as it drags," but with no attempt to locate where to find such topics in the text of these lectures from 1929/30. The Glossary is a guide to the translation, and people who have a favorite German word can check for the English word that is a most likely translation. You are more likely to think there are some totally unlikely translations, if you only speak English, like "resolute disclosedness: Entschlossenheit."

Martin Heidegger is great, and you can't understand how he is great unless you comprehend the major problem in this book: boredom. Page 112 is devoted to smoking a cigar, and it is not just any cigar. Smoking is studied as a social activity in which he watches himself taking part in a ritual that eventually leaves him empty because his entire life depends on what he thinks, and certainly "not of viewing it in terms of isolated incidents, but of understanding it in the context of the whole situation of the evening, of sitting together, of making conversation." (p. 111). The social casualness is in sharp contrast with his desire for some enthusiasm for himself.

"It--one's own self that has been left standing, the self that everyone himself or herself is, and each with this particular history, of this particular standing and age, with this name and vocation and fate; the self, one's own beloved ego of which we say that I myself, you yourself, we ourselves are bored." (p. 134).

People who find Heidegger thrilling might find it interesting that there is very little information about other philosophers in THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF METAPHYSICS: WORLD, FINITUDE, SOLITUDE, Translated by William McNeill and Nicholas Walker. At the beginning, "In Memory of Eugen Fink" by Martin Heidegger, 26 July 1975, pictures Fink at this course listening "with thoughtful reticence" and later "repeatedly expressed the wish that this lecture should be published before all others." (p. v). Philosophers mentioned in the text only get a few lines. Novalis has his name in the title of section 2 on page 4, but he only gets quoted for eleven words: "Philosophy is really homesickness, an urge to be at home everywhere." (p. 5) Then Aristotle gets quoted with three Greek words that seem to mean "Poets tell many a lie?" (p. 5).

When Heidegger gets to God on page 19, it just seems to be trouble. "Then philosophy too would have become utterly superfluous, and especially our discussion about it. For God does not philosophize, if indeed (as the name already says) philosophy, this love of . . . as homesickness for . . ., must maintain itself in nothingness, in finitude. Philosophy is the opposite of all comfort and assurance." Heidegger opposes Descartes and theology since "It, and with it all philosophizing of the modern era since Descartes, puts nothing at all at stake." (p. 20). Heraclitus is praised as a sign that "The philosophers of antiquity already knew this and had to know it in their first decisive commencements." (p. 22). Plato gets credit for the distinction "between being awake and sleeping. The non-philosophizing human being, including the scientific human being, does indeed exist, but he or she is asleep." (p. 23). "Hegel (to name a philosopher of the modern era)" is mentioned without a quotation or even a footnote, "but merely as an indication that I am not inventing a concept of philosophy here, nor arbitrarily presenting you with some private opinion." (p. 23).

Chapter Three of the Preliminary Appraisal, justifying the inclusion "of Comprehensive Questioning Concerning World, Finitude, Individuation as Metaphysics" (p. 24) is back to the basic views about philosophy of the Greeks. Heraclitus and Aristotle are considered "by way of an elementary interpretation of the concept of truth in antiquity." (p. 30). Books were not published by big printing firms, like they are now, especially after "Aristotle died around 322-21 B.C." (p. 35). The Aristotelian treatises were not collected for study until the first century B.C., long after Plato and Xenocrates established the main topics as disciplines: logic, physics, ethics. (p. 36). Many of Aristotle's treatises did not belong within those topics, and Heidegger calls them "Aristotle's philosophy proper." (p. 37). But there have been many approaches since then.

"Through Christian dogma, ancient philosophy was forced into a quite specific conception which maintained itself throughout the Renaissance, Humanism and German Idealism, and whose untruth we are slowly beginning to comprehend today. The first to do so was perhaps Nietzsche." (p. 42).

With so few philosophers being mentioned, I was surprised to find in section 14 "The concept of metaphysics in Franz Suarez and the fundamental character of modern metaphysics." (pp. 51-55). Considering Kant and Aquinas not as important as the questions raised by this Spanish Jesuit in the 16th century, "who must be placed even above Aquinas in terms of his acumen and independence of questioning." (p. 51). While "Suarez sides very positively with Thomas Aquinas" (p. 53), "it was precisely Kant who placed the possibility of metaphysics in doubt." (p. 54). Bouncing back to reality, "We see most clearly at the place where modern philosophy explicitly begins, in Descartes, but especially in Fichte." (p. 55). The Preliminary Appraisal ends with section 15, in which the possibility of "being gripped by a metaphysical question" (pp. 56-57) sustains the book. The shift to Part One is called "Awakening a Fundamental Attunement in Our Philosophizing." (p. 59). The contemporary situation with the opposition of life (soul) and spirit in four philosophers leads to "All four interpretations are only possible given a particular reception of Nietzsche's philosophy." (p. 71).

Outstanding Book! Well written! Very insightful history of an amazing person and a fine institution.

God, Country, Notre Dame is a book that once again proves what an amazing man Father Hesburgh is. This book is inspiring. If you've never read or heard about Father Hesburgh, this is a must. He has got to be one of the top 10 most influntial people of the 21st century.

I "read" this book for the first time on audio cassette and quickly ran out and bought it" Years later, I still think of it and am still amazed at what a tremendous person Father Hesburgh is. If I did not know its true, I would not believe that a person could accomplish so much in a lifetime. Knowing that this country and faith produces such great men, makes me proud to be Catholic and an American. This book would make a great, great gift!

Equality of all races was not a widely embraced idea in the United States until the past few decades. "Going Over All The Hurdles: A Life of Oatess Archey" is a story of a remarkable man. Marion, Indiana, known by many for notorious lynchings, was not open to a black intellectual and law man. Oatess Archey overcame that anyway, working up from a lowly janitor to teacher to coach to FBI agent to sheriff. His overcoming of the odds makes for a good read, making "Going Over All the Hurles" highly recommended to those who want to read of a man beating racism, and an invaluable contribution to community and academic library Black Studies and 20th Century American History reference collections and supplemental reading lists.

This is a terrific read for those who grew up in the late '30s, and beyond. Blacks may identify with the injustices; Whites may be shocked at the hurdles one Black man faced - and overcame. All races will find his life story very inspiring.
This is a must-read for those who were born in the '60s and later.
Jim HarmonGoing Over All the Hurdles: A Life of Oatess Archey

Going Over All The Hurdles: A Life of Oatess Archey is the proper title for this book because it is about a man who developed tremendous courage within himself. That courage helped Oatess Archey to always be prepared to deal with any task and clear any hurdle he had to face. Vince Lombardi once said to his team, "Gentlemen,today's game will be decided by four plays. Now," he said, "I don't know which plays those will be, so play every play like it's one of those four." This is what Oatess Archey did throughout his exemplary life of courage, leadership and setting an example for all those with whom he came in contact. Norman Jones-author of Growing Up in Indiana: The Culture & Hoosier Hysteria Revisited

I read The Golden Ass for a Classic art course I took while at university I loved it! It is fun, entertaining and comical- not your typical dry Roman read. It is a great story and a great look into history.I highly recommend this tale to anyone who not wants to laugh but is interested in an important text from antiquity.

I really loved this book and have recommended it to many (unfortunately none have taken me up on it). I had to read this for my History of Western Civilization class in college. I thought it was going to be boring and dry, but soon found myself consumed by it. It's hilarious, fast-paced, romantic and thought provoking. What impressed me most was that a person of today can easily relate to the way Apuleius thinks and acts. I had always imagined Greeks walking around in togas endlessly philosiphizing in white marble temples, but here we are presented with the how similar our thoughts and daily activities are to how theirs were. It allowed me to see historical figures in a new way. I think that being able to laugh (heartily) at the same jokes is indicative of how alike our minds are to theirs. Again I recommend this to everyone.

I too had to read this as a course requirement in college. Surprisingly, it was not as dry as I had expected a required text to be. It is very entertaining and a pretty quick read. I would recommend it as a travel companion for a weekender.

Here is the true story of a wild river, a man who loves it, and an unusual goose who decides upon a new home. Jerry is on a mission to rescue a fading river from ecological disaster: caught in the middle of disaster is a goose whom he rescues - and who becomes a loyal friend. A Goose Named Gilligan reads like fiction with all the drama - and the realism backed by a true event.

After hearing this story from the Riverlorian himself, I was looking forward to seeing and reading it in print. It brought back the memories of this amazing sojourn I heard almost a year ago on the Delta Queen.
I've ordered 3 for Christmas gifts but probably can't wait that long to share them with my neices and nephews! It will be fun to tell them I know the author. The illustrations are perfect compliment to this ongoing saga.
Animals instincts are uncanny; when least expected and most deserved, they reciprocate and surprise in most unique ways as Gilligan did!

I had the pleasure of riding on the Delta Queen Steamboat last year where the author, Mr. Hay is a Riverlorian. He told the story about Gilligan Goose. I have not read the book yet but the heartwarming story was wonderful. Jerry Hay is a great storyteller so I'm sure the book will be great, as well. The incredible thing about the story is that Gilligan is a real goose and the story he told is true. I am ordering copies for myself and each of my grandchildren.

Reiner Schürmann's anarchic reading of Heidegger provides a formidable response to the hermeneutical dilemma of how to read Heidegger. In reading Heidegger backward, from "topology of being" back to "history of being" back to the "Existential Analytic," Schürmann gives us a Heidegger that, admittedly, the man Martin Heidegger would not have approved of. The humble title of the English translation (altered from the original French, "La princile d'anarchie: Heidegger et la question d'agir") does not really mark the originality of Schürmann in setting to work an epochal theory that announces the withering of normative-legislative-predicative holds of metaphysics. What is in fact more important about this book is that Schürmann provides us an "actable" theory, not in the sense of ideological prescriptions or revolutionary cookbooks, but in a way that resuscitates within us a sensibility toward the irreducible plurality of manifestations of being and prepares us to respond to such irreducibly varied manifestations in an anarchic way, in the spirit of freedom that denounces hegemonic principles.

The delicate complexity of the arguments made in this book does not allow for profound reflections on its merits in such a limited space. Let it just be said that the book provides an excellent opportunity for thinking beyond the tedium of "what is," the matter-of-factness of the actual. It allows us to think and act based on the clearing of the possible. Schürmann calls us to prepare for modes of thinking and acting that have not founding First--and as such remain forever an-archic (without a First).

We have all heard it said that Heidegger had no great followers, only great apostates. The list of those influenced by him, and impressed by the quality of his thought, but nevertheless refusing to simply follow him includes Arendt, Derrida, Gadamer, Kojeve, Lowith, Marcuse, Merleau-Ponty, Rorty, Sartre and Leo Strauss. Schürmann is a rarity; a genuine follower of Heidegger who is also a thinker in his own right. Now, I do not maintain that Heidegger himself would agree with everything that Schürmann says of him and his 'radical phenomenology' but I do think that this is easily among the most serious and thoughtful accounts of what we might call the later Heidegger's final position. People only familiar with Heidegger's early work (such as 'Being and Time') tend to read him as a practical, existential or political philosopher actively interested in the 'human things'. Schürmann considers this a profound mistake.

Allow me to begin with a long quote:

"The 'intrinsically manifold state of affairs which is that of being and time' prohibits referring the epochs and their closure, let alone the 'event', to some figure of root, of the One, of man. It is because of this anti-humanism that Heidegger's concept of epoché has nothing to do with Husserl's. The phenomenology of the reversals in History follows the trail of the regimes to which unconcealment gave 'sudden birth,' but which have folded up their order to withdraw again into concealment. The genealogist seeks to understand this phenomenon of an encompassing, although precarious arrangement as it comes about and recedes. The birth of such an arrangement is 'epochal,' since in it presencing as such 'withholds' (epechein) itself. Thus what establishes us in our precarious dwellings is not some thing, it is nothing - a mere coming to pass. In the deconstruction of the texture or text of Western history, phenomenology remains transcendental in that it looks for the context which is the world; it is however dissociated from all a priori reference to the subject as text-maker. The principle of an epoch is a factual a priori, finite and of non-human facticity. It exhibits the paradox of an 'ontological fact.' What bequeaths the historical epochs and their principles, the 'event', is itself nothing, neither a human nor a divine subject, nor an available or analyzable object." (Schürmann, On Being and Acting, p.57.)

I follow Schürmann in this understanding of Heideggerean Being; the 'gift' of Being does not come from a subject nor is it a 'History of Reason'. It is fundamentally just whatever Happened to Happen. That is, it is pure contingency. Again: not only is there not a Subject but this pure contingency is absolutely not a history of Reason. It would seem that whatever 'reason' is in the world is itself only a temporary affair, waiting to be overthrown by the next epoché, or gift, of Being. But since what is unreasonably given is always (eventually) unreasonably taken away one ends up wondering precisely why Heidegger so often speaks of 'gift' here... In any case, by the curious phrase 'ontological fact' Schürmann is conceding that Heidegger's 'gifts of Being' are little more than Necessary Irrationalities. So you see that the 'Truth of Unconcealment' equals exactly the 'truth' of circumstances. While Concealment always remains precisely Nothing. Note that Man is in no sense, for either Heidegger or Schürmann, a 'maker' of the text of the World; no, Man is merely the reader of (or powerless Witness to) the succession of Epochs that make up the text of world history. Thus it is not, in my opinion, that Heidegger's philosophy in any way 'predestines' him to be a Nazi, rather, his philosophy provides no resources to oppose it. Or, more clearly, to oppose anything. The Epochs are given and withdrawn without any reference to human values or needs. But we must never forget that whatever happens to happen is always, I mean eventually, at least for historical Man, a catastrophe. Thus Heidegger's oft referring to these happenings as 'gifts' is but another example of will-to-power. One can say anything about these 'ontological facts' that one chooses, absolutely anything at all. Heidegger, at times, elects to say 'gifts'...

But it really has become impossible to discuss Heidegger without discussing the relation between the Nazi period and the later position. If you will allow me a few more words on this contentious topic there is a little vignette in Chamfort which I would like to share that might be apposite here:

"The Curé of Bray had moved three or four times from the Catholic to the Protestant faith, and his friends expressed surprise at his indifference. 'Indifferent?' said the Curé. 'Inconstant? Not at all. On the contrary, I don't change at all. I want to be the Curé of Bray.' (Chamfort, Products of the Perfected Civilization, p. 226)"

All the various ontological 'regimes' of History are 'gifts of Being'. In the end there is absolutely nothing we can do about this. One can only accept what is. When Heidegger thought that the Epoch he lived in was one of 'fascistic' authenticity he embraced it. Later, realizing his mistake, he supposed that the next 'unconcealment' to be revealed would be an ontological 'quietism' that many today read in an ecological 'new age' manner. But in reality Heidegger never changed his mind, he only wanted to see the World in its giveness, not as human needs and values would have it, but as it was. And he wanted to accept whatever his phenomenological method revealed to him. Thus there is from this perspective, for Heidegger, no truly fundamental difference between his early and late position; he always wanted to see the World phenomenologically - that is, exactly as it was.

There is an apatheia at work here that at first glance reminds one of the ancients but is truly modern. Ancient apathy was aimed primarily at the emotions; but what one could (be perhaps forgiven to) call Heideggerean apathy is aimed at theory or belief. But what of the practical or 'political', that is, nature and technology? "... political thinking consists in weighing the advantages and drawbacks of one theory or another. Nothing of the kind occurs in Heidegger. The pertinent question is therefore not of knowing whether technology may be counteracted, mastered, surpassed, sublimated; whether nature, given over to the rule of reason for two millennia and summoned to surrender its energies to the reign of comfort for two centuries, may be 'restored', whether man can be 'reconciled' with it. About matters such as these the deconstruction has nothing to say." What askesis (training) will be necessary for us today to achieve such distance from older conceptions of theory and practice! The 'radical phenomenology' (or 'deconstruction', in Heidegger's sense, not Derrida's) of the later Heidegger, and also Schürmann, is this very training...

Radical Phenomenology, as here conceived, is the science of circumstances. Fundamentally, it neither predicts nor learns; it sees whatever happens to be. More clearly, its learning and predictions are based on what it sees, and not the other way around. This also means that every one of its results (i.e., 'discoveries') will be 'falsified' in time. Knowing circumstances doesn't tell you what to do, not ever. All evaluation is beyond the ability of any phenomenology. (On this also see Heidegger on Nietzsche, especially the fourth volume: Nihilism, for his denunciation of values.) Thus even the decision whether or not to write a book on phenomenology is made for extra-phenomenological reasons... Now, if we are past the regimes of Principles, as Schürmann here argues, - well, what exactly are we to understand that to mean? Those regimes, where action was based on 'metaphysical' principles, are the regimes that were initiated by philosophical interventions. After the regimes of Principles pass we will live in an 'anarchic' (i.e., no metaphysical Principles) world. This can be understood to mean that there will be no philosophical artifacts (that is, no post-Platonic monotheism, Christianity or Islam, and no modernity -Liberalism, socalism, etc., at all) once the latest 'unconcealment' (i.e., the anarchic unconcealment our author here defends) is fully apparent. Properly speaking, this is where the 'conservatism' of the later Heidegger is most obvious. It is tempting to say that what the later Heidegger is, in effect, prophesying (or making) is a world in which pre-philosophical 'traditional' societies rise again. Note that a 'pre-philosophical' world will likely be one that is, among other things, bereft of modern technology. One wonders if John Zerzan, perhaps even unbeknownst to him, is another one of the later Heidegger's acolytes?

Note that by 'Anarchy' Schürmann does not mean the political movement known as anarchy, rather he says anarchy because there is no longer an arche (ultimate underlying principle or substance). When the regimes of Metaphysics (the Principles) fall what will be left is a world without said principles; it is only on this sense that the world will be 'anarchic'. Now, Schurmann does not mean that everyone will do their 'own thing'. Far from it! Doing ones own thing is also a product of the history of Metaphysics... As Schürmann says "...'in principal' all men do the same thing." This is so whether they are all worshipping the One True God or 'hanging out' doing their own thing. But, I would argue, when we look at how men lived in pre-philosophical civilizations there too we find that 'all men do the same thing.'

Now, what is the relation of philosophy to this radical phenomenology? But let's start with another question: Why did phenomenology, the ability to see circumstances, have to arise? It turns out that this question rests on another question: Why is seeing the world, as it actually is, so difficult? One suspects that it is because the various artifacts of philosophical interventions (e.g., Christians, Moslems, liberals, socialists) have imposed their various 'myths' and these myths have become the habitual way we see the world. So philosophy, according to Heidegger, must first deconstruct what it has ultimately made in order to see what the world (i.e., 'unconcealment') actually offers. Radical Phenomenology allows us once again to see the unmade. After this deconstruction philosophy becomes phenomenology, the mirror of circumstances. No? I ask your indulgence of another long quote where our author calls for:

"...the removal of the principial obstacles as just so many conditions for compliance with the event of appropriation. 'Any conception and enunciation of the thing, which tend to place themselves between the thing and us, must first be removed.' Which are the conceptions and enunciations that most massively tend to place themselves between us and things emerging into their world? They are the conceptions and enunciations about essentially hubristic ('unjust' in Anaximander's words) representations - the epochal principles." (pg. 281)

The 'epochal principles' that Schürmann refers to are the succession of metaphysical world-views that dominate our understanding even today. According to our author, in Heidegger philosophy has turned on itself; destroying its own history is the first step towards seeing the world it inhabits...

Radical Phenomenology is not an attempt to make the world conform to some arche; it is an attempt to see the world exactly as it is, that is, as it merely happens to be. But like the esotericism and dialectics that preceded it, Heideggerean phenomenology, from the viewpoint of philosophy, is only another philosophical method (i.e., tool). Unlike them, phenomenology only intends to see (or know), not make. Phenomenology cannot be converted into a metaphysics or an ethics. All attempts to do so are either mistakes, idiosyncrasies or lies. Thus the phenomenology here described is at war with the other philosophical tools of the philosophical tradition. In order for radical phenomenology to see the world it must wipe away the shadows (myths) that other philosophical methods have made. In order to survive philosophy must incorporate Heidegger's 'radical phenomenology' as another tool while denying that it is in any sense an 'uber-tool'. In other words, if philosophy, as we have known it, is to have a future it must see to it that no tool is privileged and that each is only used in the proper measure...

To put all this in another way, to Radical Phenomenology the rational constructs produced by philosophy have become idiosyncrasies; they are ciphers of a bygone time and place - that is, of an 'unconcealment' that has been withdrawn. Philosophy answers that the non-rational, non-foundational, nature of all unconcealments (Being is, after all, Time!) will one day make the radical phenomenology (and its 'anarchic' moment) that Schürmann here defends also passé. And that would be why Philosophy, and all its methods, must continue.

Even though Schürmann is also, broadly speaking, a 'postmodern', he sees clearly the abyss that post-Heideggerean philosophy represents. Compared to Derrida, Rorty, etc., there is a dreadful seriousness in these pages that is the outward mark of all deep thinking. Our author is to be congratulated on his clear eyed vision of what can and cannot be done; fundamentally, there isn't anything that Man can do - except radical acceptance of whatever happens to be insofar as it is and for as long as it happens to be. This is a profound book. I have barely considered the complex argument within it in order to concentrate on what might be called some 'extra-phenomenological' points. This is an extremely demanding book. Know your Heidegger, especially the later Heidegger, and be prepared to work.

Reiner Schürmann's anarchic reading of Heidegger provides a formidable response to the hermeneutical dilemma of how to read Heidegger. In reading Heidegger backward, from "topology of being" back to "history of being" back to the "Existential Analytic," Schürmann gives us a Heidegger that, admittedly, the man Martin Heidegger would not have approved of. The humble title of the English translation (altered from the original French, "La princile d'anarchie: Heidegger et la question d'agir") does not really mark the originality of Schürmann in setting to work an epochal theory that announces the withering of normative-legislative-predicative holds of metaphysics. What is in fact more important about this book is that Schürmann provides us an "actable" theory, not in the sense of ideological prescriptions or revolutionary cookbooks, but in a way that resuscitates within us a sensibility toward the irreducible plurality of manifestations of being and prepares us to respond to such irreducibly varied manifestations in an anarchic way, in the spirit of freedom that denounces hegemonic principles.

The delicate complexity of the arguments made in this book does not allow for profound reflections on its merits in such a limited space. Let it just be said that the book provides an excellent opportunity for thinking beyond the tedium of "what is," the matter-of-factness of the actual. It allows us to think and act based on the clearing of the possible. Schürmann calls us to prepare for modes of thinking and acting that have not founding First--and as such remain forever an-archic (without a First).

The experiance I had with the web site finding what I need was a good one. The time I spent waiting on the book to get mailed was very short and so I consider that Great. The Best part it got here early and in the best conidition you could have asked for.

The text is well written. The study guide is extremely helpful. The ADAM interactive CD set is a MUST. It is awsome at explaining visually what the book and study guide put in writing.

I love this book because it is extremely thourough. When I was in anatomy class I had to teach the course to myself because the professor never taught anatomy. So I studied from this book and I got an A in the course. It gets in depth about the macroscopic AND microscopic anatomy and describes the anatomy/physiology/functions/and detailed pictures.