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A great addition to the history of our presidentsReview Date: 2008-10-07
With No Favors From BlaineReview Date: 2003-12-05
The University Press of Kansas began its presidency series with a treatment of George Washington's tenure in 1974, and as of this writing has brought the series as far along as the presidency of George Bush, Senior. A survey of the series indicates that coincidentally or not, all the volumes to date are remarkably similar in length, just under three hundred pages in most cases. Critics may argue that presidencies such as Lincoln's or FDR's might merit more ink than, say, Franklin Pierce or our subject at hand, Benjamin Harrison. Having read several volumes, I would say that the success of the series to date has been bringing the achievements of the lesser known presidents to more public prominence. Presidents such as Hayes and the second Harrison have done better by this series than have Nixon or Kennedy, whose volumes naturally have had to compete with the products of the likes of Sorensen, Manchester, Caro, Dallek, etc.
The University Press has attempted to stay focused upon the presidencies themselves, which has had the effect of dulling some of our more charismatic leaders and their colorful pasts. [One wonders how the editors will come to grips with Monica Lewinski, when that day inevitably arrives.] Diminishment of charisma is not a problem when treating of Harrison. He was Robert Taft before there was Robert Taft, a tweedy Midwest lawyer who successfully put the excitement of war behind him and nurtured a competent, unflappable, and predictable personality. He won and lost a senate seat prior to the Republican convention of 1888, and became an eighth ballot nominee when it became clear that his party's reigning Hamlet, James G. Blaine, would not run, apparently for reasons of health.
Harrison's pragmatism led him to undertake the formation of his cabinet as an exercise in party unity. One can probably argue that Harrison's presidency never really survived the selection process, for Harrison, in a gesture of perhaps insecurity and stubbornness, refused to allow state party bosses their traditional say in cabinet appointments. Harrison chose a cabinet of men like himself: Midwesterners, brevet generals, Presbyterians. And, until the very last moment, no Blaine. Maine's favorite son assumed himself a shoo-in as Secretary of State. Blaine, a master of denial whose illnesses compromised his effectiveness in Harrison's cabinet, and Mrs. Blaine, put out by her perception of Harrison's lack of reverence for her husband, were simply two of many disgruntled forces in the Republican Party. That the Democrats would storm back in the 1890 congressional elections--aided by a distinct lack of Republican enthusiasm--was predictable early in the Harrison presidency.
Harrison's domestic policy prior to 1890 focused upon issues which, to one degree or another, had been problematic since the Civil War. Tariff restraints, currency debates, civil service reform, civil rights, management of western territories, Indian affairs [including the battle at Wounded Knee], immigration, labor issues and safety were regular staples of government debate. With the House and Senate nearly evenly matched till the 1890 elections, there were no spectacular federal breakthroughs for which Harrison could claim victory. The authors do note that the president deserves more credit for his efforts to establish federal land reserves in the teeth of opposition from the lumber industry. It is also worth noting that more states were formed under Harrison's administration than under any other president; the northwestern alignment of states, as we know them today, took shape with apparently minimal controversy.
Harrison's alienation from party leaders, an unremarkable first two years, his administrative inexperience, and a rather cold demeanor did not augur well for a long tenure in the White House. The disastrous [for Republicans] returns of 1890 assured that Harrison in all likelihood would not lead the ticket in 1892. [His wife's illness and death in that year would make such considerations irrelevant when the time came at any rate.]
Harrison turned his attention to foreign affairs in the last half of his presidency. By 1890 it was beginning to dawn upon politicians of both parties that affairs in Central and South America were taking on an added importance in this country's commerce and defense. For most of the century America's chief concern had been the designs of foreign powers from across the sea. Now the necessity of an ocean-to-ocean canal involved this country more deeply into the relations of South American countries themselves. Harrison was not the first, and certainly not the last, president to assert American hegemony on the South American continent, and his warlike gestures toward Chile were of a cloth with McKinley and certainly Roosevelt, who admired Harrison's belligerence. Harrison also saw the importance of American military and fueling bases in the Pacific in the face of growing German interest in the region. It is not clear that Harrison fully appreciated the unfolding of the new international military order in the way that an Alfred Thayer Mahan or Theodore Roosevelt would, but he can be commended for fidelity to a policy that made the American position in South America and the Pacific much more tenable. And, it should be noted, Harrison conducted his foreign policy without the help of Blaine, who was too ill to assist and too proud to step aside.
Harrison was re-nominated by the anti-Blaine forces of his own party but without wholesale Republican support. The death of his wife during the campaign presaged the elector outcome and Cleveland's re-emergence.

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Good ministry help Review Date: 2008-01-14
Great Book for a Pastoral ReminderReview Date: 2007-05-15

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A definitive studyReview Date: 2007-06-30
Ely is not intimidated by the reigning thesis that railroads were "smoking devils" run by ruthless capitalists who bent legislatures to their greed or the notion that judges fell over themselves to protect railroads from tort liability in the name of economic progress. Ely argues instead that far from "allowing carriers a free hand, lawmakers enacted a host of preventive measures and insisted that railroads must bear the cost of regulations to protect the public." (134) Refreshing and right on target is his description of the Mann-Elkins Act (1910) as a "regulatory straitjacket" that helped destroy the railroads.
The potential reader of this book should be warned that though clearly written, it is encyclopedic. Teachers of economic history, legal history, and transportation history will here discover a wealth of illustrations for their classes; a general reader with no absorbing interest in railroads will probably find the presentation overly academic.
Railroads and American LawReview Date: 2002-10-12
Ely challenges popular myth that railroads literally carried the courts and the lawmakers in their back pockets. The image of 19th century railroads taking land from people and getting all the laws and court decisions in their favor is simply not true. Ely demonstrates how some railroads won court cases while others lost. At times labor or the travelling public won cases while in others railroad interests prevailed. There is no set pattern of cases where one side prevailed over the other. Rates for freight are but one of Ely's examples. Another was railroad mergers and the application of antitrust laws.
This book is not for the casual reader. It is in-depth and at times kind of boring. But legal historians will enjoy the large number of Supreme Court cases referenced and how the author analyses each. I chose this book because I enjoy reading about both topics, railroads and law. Others in this same boat will likely find much offered here.

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A Compelling ReadReview Date: 2001-04-12
Fascinating case study. . .Review Date: 2001-04-29

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Ted V. McAllister's account of Machiavelli and Plato.Review Date: 1998-05-10
Good StuffReview Date: 2000-01-12

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An Overview from the InsideReview Date: 2000-06-03
The true rodeo bookReview Date: 2001-02-04

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Good SaleReview Date: 2008-08-10
Arrogant BrillanceReview Date: 2008-07-22
Herspring also argues that Rumsfeld had an irrational dislike of the U.S. Army and its officer corps. He supports this allegation with antidotal evidence, but the reader is left to wonder if this charge is accurate or not. For example, Herspring states that Rumsfeld choose Marine General Jim Jones as the senior U.S. Military Representative at NATO as a deliberate snub aimed at army and, to a lesser extent, air force general officers. While this may very well have been Rumsfeld's motivation, the fact is that General Jones was highly qualified for the NATO position. He is fluent in French (English and French are the official NATO languages), experienced in dealing with high level foreign civilian and military officials, widely respected both in the U.S. and Europe, and equally capable of unambiguous command and diplomatic maneuverings. Perhaps Rumsfeld knew nothing of these qualities, but there is really no way to tell.
Rumsfeld by any standard is a complicated and not always agreeable person. This book is a serious attempt to examine his second tenure as SecDef. It is a good start, but far from the definitive work on the topic.
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Mighty Men!Review Date: 2002-09-24
under recognizedReview Date: 2000-05-30

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Once you start it, you won't want to put it down til done!Review Date: 1999-02-28
another great entry in the seriesReview Date: 2000-08-07

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an informative look at a struggle behind the big struggleReview Date: 2000-05-01
Secret Messages Makes Existing Works on Subject ObsoleteReview Date: 2002-12-03
Secret Messages provides much fascinating detail on the United States's cryptanalytic attack against the diplomatic communications of foreign countries from 1930 to 1945, an effort that after Pearl Harbor became very wide-ranging indeed, and eventually seems to have included almost every country in the world in its list of targets. While the United States's main cryptanalytic effort before the end of the Second World War was directed against Japanese systems, a fact that was made known to the public shortly after the end of the war, and American collaboration with the British attack against German Enigma systems was revealed in the 1970s, details of the work on breaking into many other countries' diplomatic communications during the Second World War was regarded by the United States government as too important to United States national security (or too embarrassing) to be released until recently. Although few eyebrows would be raised at the account in Secret Messages of United States cryptanalytic efforts against the diplomatic communications of pro-Axis neutrals such as Argentina, Spain, and Sweden, more surprising is the story of the vigorous attempts to break into the official communications of more conscientious neutrals such as Switzerland and the Vatican. Most troubling of all is the material on the cryptanalytic assaults against the communications of staunch Allied governments, such as the governments-in-exile of the Free French, Dutch, and Poles. What strikes this reviewer as ironic is that this tremendous and unscrupulous effort, undertaken mostly by cryptanalysts in the army's Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) (but which also included the collaboration of FBI agents who burgled foreign embassies in search of cryptographic materials), was made with the full approval and support of Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, the statesman who in 1929 as secretary of state in the Hoover administration had shut down an earlier United States cryptanalytic unit, Herbert Yardley's Cipher Bureau, on the grounds that it was unethical for the United States to read other countries' private diplomatic communications. Stimson's abrupt change of attitude is one example of the tremendous rapidity that marked the United States's transformation from isolationism to global superpower.
What effect did the intelligence produced by this ultimately massive cryptanalytic effort have on United States foreign policy and national security policy during the Second World War? Despite its great success in providing invaluable insights into the thinking and actions of foreign governments, enemy, neutral, and Allied alike, Professor Alvarez believes that cryptanalytic intelligence had little impact on policymaking. In part this was because the central figure in United States foreign policymaking at this time, President Roosevelt, had little apparent regard for cryptanalytic intelligence - Professor Alvarez recounts the president's usual practice of having decrypts read to him while he was shaving - and did not appear to distinguish between it and other less reliable forms of intelligence such as his casual conversations with old friends who had recently visited war zones. But this may have been an act on the president's part. Throughout his presidency Roosevelt was notorious for concealing his thinking and motives regarding decisionmaking from those around him and this may also have applied to his attitude towards intelligence, he may not have wished to reveal to people around him which kinds of intelligence he found more valuable and useful than others in case by so doing his thinking on policy matters might be deduced. Professor Alvarez's findings in Secret Messages strongly suggest to this reviewer that every major decision of the president's regarding foreign policy and national security policy during the Second World War needs to be carefully re-examined in light of the newly-released evidence on United States cryptanalytic work during the war. Even when it turns out that cryptanalytic intelligence did not contribute directly to a decision being made, it is still critical to take it into account when considering the president's underlying motives. For example the president's knowledge of the devastating impact of Operation Barbarossa on the Soviet Union in summer 1941, which was communicated to him primarily through the intercepted messages of the Japanese ambassador to Germany, Oshima Hiroshi, and that foretold the probable collapse of the Soviet state, tends to undermine the claims of historians who have argued that President Roosevelt believed right up to Pearl Harbor that the United States could contain or defeat the Axis powers merely by supplying anti-Axis countries with lend-lease aid. Cryptanalytic intelligence supports the view that President Roosevelt knew that without full United States intervention in the European War it was very likely that Nazi Germany would defeat all its enemies one by one. The thoroughness of Professor Alvarez's work on the United States's cryptanalytic attack on the diplomatic communications of foreign governments from 1930 to 1945 casts doubt on his conclusion that this kind of intelligence had limited influence on policymaking. Secret Messages is a significant contribution to the laying of the groundwork for a thorough revision of the history of United States foreign policy and national security policy during a most critical period.
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