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Beautiful and heart-warmingReview Date: 2007-02-27
Very enjoyable reading.Review Date: 2005-08-07
It has an excellent plot and the characters are lovely!!
A Wonderful Christian RomanceReview Date: 2003-01-02
Great Christian romanceReview Date: 2000-06-14
Rosie is a character to fall in love withReview Date: 2001-12-18
Catherine Palmer has created a cast of characters that will live on in the reader's mind long after the pleasure of reading Prairie Rose and its successors are over.

Making Sense of the Troubles : The Story of the Conflict in Northern IrelandReview Date: 2006-02-14
A great account, but some are let off lightlyReview Date: 2005-09-07
The issue I believe is that the situation is very fluid in that part of the world, and events often come to light that change perceptions of various characters. The famous 'They haven't gone away' remark from Mr Adams isn't mentioned for example, and this casts him in a rather different light than is presented in the book.
I do applaud the authors however for not glossing over the lowpoints of Northern Ireland's recent history. Whilst sometimes painful to read, it does help dispel the fairytale fancy of those who have been led to regard murderers as 'freedom fighters'. I just wish that the authors hadn't given their apologists such a light hand.
All in all, if you are new to the area I'd highly recommend this one. This book is a great startpoint but shouldn't be your last read on the matter.
A little dry, but good perspectivesReview Date: 2003-05-14
Best Historical Overview On The Northern Irish "Troubles"?Review Date: 2003-01-10
Excellent, balanced overviewReview Date: 2004-12-29

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Magnificent StoryReview Date: 2004-07-12
Do Yourself a Favor and Buy This Book!!Review Date: 2005-03-10
A sweeping yet wistful romantic novelReview Date: 2005-01-07
Magnificent StoryReview Date: 2004-07-12
A Remarkable Saga Of A Woman's Life In The Old West!Review Date: 2005-05-31
Shea Hawkshadow, a half-breed Cheyenne warrior, finds a young woman, near frozen to death during a freak early autumn blizzard. Seventeen year-old Emma Jordan had just finished burying her parents near the family's sod house, and was on a twenty mile walk to the nearest trading post, when she was overtaken by the snow and freezing temperatures. When Emma regains consciousness, she is at the Cheyenne Agency, Shea's home, in the capable care off Red Leaf Woman, a widow. Emma is treated well, and though she makes a few unsuccessful attempts to escape the reservation, she finally acquiesces to spend the winter there. She begins to learn the language and customs of these Native Americans, and in turn teaches some of the men to read and write English. Because of Hawkshadow's mixed-blood heritage, he is rejected as a potential husband by the tribe's women, although he has a proven record as a brave Cheyenne Dog Soldier and hunter. He and Emma have much in common, and their mutual attraction is more than just her neediness as a new found orphan, and his as a lone brave with little hope of marriage. The two fall in love and marry despite the strong prejudices which exist at this time about "mixed-race couples," especially when one member of the pair is a white woman. They dream of living a "normal" life amongst the Cheyenne.
When the tribe is threatened with yet another relocation, tribal leaders decide to ask Red Cloud's Sioux for help, and to flee north, back to their lands along the Yellowstone and Missouri Rivers. The fall of 1978 marks the Cheyenne Outbreak.Two hundred and eighty-four men, women and children undertake a clandestine and brutal 1500 mile march, which lasts for more than five months. During the trek, Emma is captured by bounty hunters and taken to Fort Robinson where she is imprisoned and almost murdered. The Hawkshadow's struggle to make a place for themselves is a difficult and poignant one. It is also a remarkably well researched story of the American West.
There are actually two interrelated novels here, with an unofficial demarcation line between them. The book's second part is about life in Washington Territory, eventually Washington State. Emma and Shea move to this region looking, still, to make a home for themselves where they will either be accepted or left in peace. The hatred and persecution they endure is terrible. Emma, Shea, and their complex relationship are beautifully brought to life by the author. In fact, I would say that one of Ms. Gibbs' strengths is character development. All of hers are remarkably three dimensional. This section of the novel also deals with the emotional manifestation of the many problems Emma has experienced over the years. She has a nervous breakdown, and the process of her healing reveals many interesting details from her past.
I thoroughly enjoyed "The Bend In The River," although I would have definitely preferred the tale to be told in two separate novels. The narrative peaks so many times over the course of 444 pages, that much of the drama's power and emotional impact is diminished. However, for those who are fascinated by life in the early West, and who appreciate well written historical fiction, this is not to be missed!
JANA
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InspiringReview Date: 2004-01-13
An Inside LookReview Date: 2001-12-01
The best basketball book everReview Date: 2001-01-27
AN AWESOME BOOK!Review Date: 2000-01-30
Full of heart - full of typosReview Date: 1999-06-13
Warning: Missouri fans will not be pleased; they might be downright ashamed after reading about some of the Tiger antics described in this book!

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A new interpretation of an old dispute.Review Date: 2006-11-10
Extensively researched and thoroughly documented, as well as clearly and engagingly written, this book is a significant addition to the scholarly literature on the German armed forces in WWII, as well as a refreshing antidote to the tiresome rehashing of the Führer's blunders and the self-exculpatory memoirs of numerous German officers that appeared in the wake of Germany's defeat. Strongly recommended for those interested in the subject, and another fine work of military history from the University Press of Kansas.
5 STAR MILITARY HISTORYReview Date: 2006-10-15
Excellent Presentation, Worthy of Criticism & DiscussionReview Date: 2008-01-05
There is little new information (if any) here, but the author's description of the functioning of the General Staff, the OKH and OKW from pages 17 to 101 is particularly easy to understand, and I say this as someone who first read Goerlitz's "History of The German General Staff" at the age of fifteen in 1954. It is this part that makes the book worth the price of admission.
Chapters 10, 11 and 12, offer nothing new except for one-sided cherry-picked references tending to support the author's far-reaching conclusions. Nonetheless, such support is weak at best. From time to time the author seems to understand this, but then he goes ahead and states his questionable conclusions anyway. For example, even though the author is quick to point out (& accurately) that memoirs are often self-aggrandizing, he uses a sole, questionable source (Lossberg) to describe Jodl's attitudes at the end of 1941 and his agreement that Manstein, at the time a newly-baked army commander, and someone who had never been responsible for more than one panzer division in his earlier corps and now 11th Army, was the leading general to assume overall command of the eastern front. Very doubtful, and something that cannot be verified!
The author correctly points out that many higher-ranking officers like Beck believed that Germany's only hope lay in winning a short, decisive military conflict rather than an economic or diplomatic course of action. Yep! Like a bridge player who carefully studies his cards and sees that there is only one course of action that might win the contract, he takes the sole option open to him. When it doesn't succeed, one should not criticism the player for not having used another strategy UNLESS IT CAN BE SHOWN THAT THE STRATEGY COULD (not would) HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL. Unfortunately, this is exactly what the author does without showing any realistic basis for alternatives. The player can be criticized for making the contract in the first place, but that was never the function of either the OKW or the OKH. I was also amused to see that the author took a similar position to the German defeat in World War I -- the high command again attempted to apply an operational solution to a strategic problem. Once more for the West Coast, what would the author have recommended they do? That he doesn't state.
Yes, intelligence concerning the Soviets was almost nil, but military intelligence world-wide has been notorious for being poor except in combat conditions. The US was and is no exception to this rule, and Ultra (not mentioned by the author) was indispensable to the Allies (most notably in North Africa.) In a limited time frame like that for Barbarossa, one does the best one can. As far as logistics are concerned, the German economy was not put on a total war footing until Speer did it in 1944 with the resulting improvements in production. Of course, by then it was too late, and at any rate, that was not within the purview of either the OKW or OKH. And the US also used the term "supply" just like the Germans. With regards to personnel, the Germans only had one chance against the Soviet Union and that was denied them by Hitler's racial policies. The Germans needed to fight a "War of Liberation" against the Communists, setting up puppet governments in the non-Russian states and utilizing their manpower. In spite of everything, the number of Hiwis was enormous and Russian units like Cossacks and the Vaslov Army still opted to fight alongside the Germans. But again, this was not an option open to the OKW or OKH. So given the situation, what was the high command to do? The author is silent on this point, but condemns the General Staff anyway. One feels compelled to point out that Beck paid the ultimate price, Fritsch sought death before Warsaw, and Halder narrowly escaped execution before the war's end.
Yes, there was a culture in the General Staff that viewed the Versailles Diktat (it was not a negotiated treaty) as unbearable and to be torn up as soon as possible. Yes, they wanted to regain lost territories. That is hardly new or difficult to understand in the light of history. To the extent that Hitler's aims coincided with theirs, the German senior commanders supported him. To their regret, they found themselves riding on the back of the tiger. Even at the end, von Bock's last words were to Manstein, "Manstein, save Germany!"
For a much fuller treatment on the German officer mindset that the author only alludes to, see Robert Citino, "The German Way of War."
Military personnel are normally conservative (as the author points out), and the General Staff operated much like they did in 1870. Insofar as their opponents were incompetent like the Polish, French, and British, they won easily through aggressiveness and vastly superior training. The US Army adopted much if not all of the German leadership doctrine and training methods after World War II, recognizing that US performance in Europe was spotty at best. War gamers traditionally equate three American soldiers to two Germans, and Marshall's contention that over 40% of American infantrymen refused to fire their rifles in combat brings "the greatest generation" into question. Live-fire training has never been possible to any degree in the American Army, mostly due to objections by civilians for the casualties it causes. Of course, another reason the Germans fought so well is that they executed over 30,000 of their own military personnel in the course of the war for a wide range of offenses.
That the Officer Corps was not prepared to conduct a modern war with the necessary personnel, logistics, intelligence, and economic basis is correct. But neither were the French, Polish, British, Japanese or Russians. The Axis were defeated through a combination of British and American code-breaking, Russian manpower, and American logistics and economic power. The US struggled to put 90 divisions on the ground in Europe, but changed the Red Army into a mechanized force while the Wehrmacht became increasingly dependent on horses. Yes, the German machines were good, but German engineers tinkered their way to oblivion and prevented mass production.
The author sums up with the following statement: "The myth persists of a supremely talented, if politically naive and ambitious, German officer corps being led unwillingly into war and defeat by a ruthless dictator, a megalomaniac with no understanding of the military art." If one removes the word "unwillingly" and tones down "supremely", that "myth" would seem to be true. Nor do I know any serious scholar that believes in the myth as stated. Maybe some portion of the readership does, but only if they are not well-read on the subject. The author then states an untruth: "They (the officer corps) made strategic decisions, independently and in support of Hitler's, that started a war...." I know of no strategic decisions made independently by the German officer corps or high command that started World War II. Maybe the author can enlighten me. They didn't even make strategic decisions in support of Hitler that started the war unless you count their support of Hitler himself during the crises of 1933 and 1934. For that focus on Hammerstein-Equord, Blomberg, and those that refused to back Fritsch.
The author also castigates the Officer Corps for continuing the war after its futility should have been obvious. Gee, that was why Halder resigned. One is also tempted to castigate Robert E. Lee and Confederate commanders for continuing the Civil War after the fall of Atlanta. But like German officers, (& the German opposition had already been told in no uncertain terms that the Allies would not help them), they could not rise in rebellion -- they could only play their cards as they were dealt and hope for the best. Maybe a miracle would take place -- it has before. Only in hindsight is everything so clear.
Like I said -- this book is an excellent starting point for discussion. But I deplore the current trend by the author, Wolfram Wette, and others -- they represent the pendulum swinging too far in the opposite direction from the memoir literature of the 50s and earlier studies.
And lastly, I must register my objection to the author's dissertation advisor writing the Foreword and even being referenced on the title page. It should have been enough for the author to acknowledge Murray in his Preface. Moreover, Murray clearly shills for the author, using adjectives like "outstanding" and "extraordinary." Obviously the standards of objectivity and propriety in the academic world (or Ohio State at least) have changed, and not for the better.
High Command? What high command?Review Date: 2002-06-04
The problem was only partially Hitler's. The Germans never really created a staff to manage a global conflict. Hadler resented Hitler's inferference, but because it was usually stupid, not because Hitler should have been managing the war, not the battles. The Germans were superb at what they considered the "operational" level of command--the control of armies on a single battlefield. But they never looked at the "big picture."
The book also proves that the German army high command, such as it was, had serious failings. They simply did not understand the logistics of a campaign as vast as the Eastern Front. Nor did they have the intelligence gathering capacity to estimate what they were getting into when they attacked the Soviet Union. Worse, they did not even realize their problems.
This book can teach a lot about why people frequently fail to understand and act upon hard facts. Learning this can help avoid future disasters of any sort.
Shatters some old mythsReview Date: 2002-04-30
Megargee argues convincingly that the German Generals had a political agenda similar to the Nazis. That is they supported the abrogation of the Treaty of Versailles, they wanted an end to democracy and they wanted Germany to rearm and to become a great power again. A large number of Generals such as Rommel, Guderian, Zeitzler and Reichenau were if not committed Nazis, enthusiastic barrackers yelling support from the sidelines.
One interesting point is Megaree?s estimation of the ability of the German Generals. After the war a large number wrote memoirs in which they modestly estimated themselves as pretty good. Megaree concedes that from an operational point of view the German army did well. However it was vulnerable in a number of respects. The key mistake made by Germany in the war was the attack on the Soviet Union. It would seem clear that the planning for operation Barbarossa was deeply flawed. For instance the Germans knew nothing of the actual strength of the forces against them. (The Soviets had 5 million men, 20,000 tanks and 20,000 aircraft to the German?s 3million 3,200 and 3000 respectively) In addition the Germans had no clear plan of defeating the Soviets. Barbarossa was based on the hope that the bulk of Soviet forces could be destroyed near the Polish border. It was then hoped that the Soviets might give in or the government would collapse. However if this did not eventuate the Germans had massive supply problems. They had limited fuel, and they could not use the Soviet railway system until they changed the gauge. In fact when the Soviets failed to collapse the Germans suffered massive supply problems, not being able to supply their troops with winter clothing and struggling to maintain ammunition levels and fuel and spares for their vehicles and planes.
Thus throughout the war the German Army acted as if intelligence was not really worth worrying about and that supply was a problem which could be overcome by an act of will. This deficiency was not a problem in initial war in the west, as the distances were so small and the French and British acted incompetently when faced by the German advance. However against the Soviets it was fatal.
Megargee summarises the weakness of the German generals as one of a strategic weakness. It was one that they shared with Hitler and in fact it is clear that they had little insight into the reason for their defeat even after the finish of the war.
Another issue dealt with by the book is the question of the role of Hitler?s leadership in bringing about the loss of the war for Germany. Megargee clearly shows that it was only in the later part of the war (1944) that tensions arose between Hitler and the Generals. By this time the war was lost. Over the big decisions there was not a lot of disagreement.
This book although expensive is short and easy to read. It is interesting not just for those interested in the war, but it illustrates how history can be distorted by over reliance on self serving material.

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Useful travel bookReview Date: 2007-05-14
What to do in Kansas City ...Review Date: 2007-03-20
Great BookReview Date: 2005-06-23
My personal guideReview Date: 2003-09-14
A KC Household MustReview Date: 2002-12-19
Katie has sparked the "adventurous" in me and now I am ready to hit the road. This is a book meant for every local's library not to mention all visitors to the city. Most of us are unaware of the myrid options that Kansas City offers. This guide gives us the opportunity to explore and enjoy everything that is available. We are also prepared when, when they come, to enlighten visitors as to everything that Kansas City is about.
Thank you Katie for making all of us who have the book "insiders." The book is a must.

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Wonderful bookReview Date: 2007-09-01
really goodReview Date: 2007-01-30
Excellent : ) Review Date: 2005-09-25
A must read book!Review Date: 2006-11-07
This Novella reads like one big story! Wonderful book.Review Date: 2006-03-08
Sara's trying to escape an abusive stepfather, and her groom marries to please his father?
Jane wonders if the marriage proposal she's received is Luke's reaction to the love he just lost - Jane's own sister?
Mara collects suitors like some women collect teacups - though not the one man she really wants?
Emily says "I do" with the dream of having children but finds her husband has no such desire?
Will these marriages ripen to a full harvest of love or will they produce chaff scattered on the wind? Can these women trust God to orchestrate their lives and loves?
The thing that I really enjoyed about this collection of stories is that it really read like one BIG story. The storyline from the previous story carries over to the next. It makes it a very satisfying read. You really feel like you are in Cedar Springs, Kansas and walk away feeling these people are your friends.

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The Democratic Party's recent history and near futureReview Date: 2003-01-11
Clinton was elected on a New Democrat (i.e. DLC) platform, but he commenced to govern, or was perceived to govern, with a liberal agenda. This led to his plummeting popularity and the mid-term disaster of 1994, and at the time it appeared he would be retired after one term. Since a good scare is always more valuable than good advice, he embraced a New Democratic agenda in his second two years and, with a little help from the Republicans, he won a handy victory in 1996, vindicating the DLC in the process. In all likelihood the New Democratic philosophy (embodied in Al Gore) would have achieved further electoral vindication in 2000 but for unfortunate lapses in the Oval Office and mis-steps thereafter -- the 2000 election was close; Clinton-exhaustion seems to have been a factor.
This book narrates events in a Democratic evolution that is still taking place, and the success of which is not guaranteed. If you care about public policy and the future of the Democratic Party, or just like to look inside the political process, this book is worth a read.
A Political Page Turner!Review Date: 2000-03-02
The Answer Key for Elected OfficialsReview Date: 2000-02-16
Comprehensive, provacativeReview Date: 2000-08-31
Can't be missed!Review Date: 2000-08-31

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Grasping Mental Illness and DepressionReview Date: 2006-12-28
Refreshingly Sensitive and RealReview Date: 2007-01-02
Blessed EncouragementReview Date: 2006-12-23
The prayers offer assurance that we are not alone in this journey. Suggestions and experiences offer help and guidance. The list of support groups and resource materials are also quite beneficial.
A blessed treasure to return to often.... and a wonderful gift to share.
Long Overdue! Addresses Issues not Addressed by Other Books.Review Date: 2006-12-18
This book and all the books in this series are extremely insightful and will help those who care for someone with depression or mental illness. If your loved one also suffers from Alzheimer's or Addiction we highly recommend Cecil Murphey's other books dealing with these topics.
Encouragment For the JourneyReview Date: 2006-12-18
I used the one-sentence prayers at the end of each reading as a prompt for my own prayers. The prayers helped me to focus on God rather than the mire our family was often in.
"When Someone You Love Suffers from Depression or Mental Illness" is one of those books that the reader wants to return to. It will become dogged-eared as you come back for encouragment.

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An excellent book and resourceReview Date: 2008-07-28
glantz shows genius as usualReview Date: 2008-04-24
Dry and long - but hey, isn't that why we buy it?Review Date: 2007-06-18
OK, nothing's perfect (5 stars means it's as perfect as it could be in our imperfect world), I can tell you one complaint. At one point he claims that command turbulance wasn't that bad even during Barbarossa. He cites statistics. But what I would've needed is some comparison. It's fine to know that less than X% of certain types of commanders were relieved of command, but it would've been nice to read some comparison: how was it with other armies... Without those, the data just hang in the air... (There were a few similar points - it's not much in a book well over 600 pages. So I still give it the 5 stars.)
Red Army at a GlantzReview Date: 2006-06-26
Nearly PerfectReview Date: 2007-06-23
Glantz' book is divided into three parts to tell this story. The first is a chronological discussion of the first 30 months of war, subdivided into the initial period, which covers the war up to the Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad and then the second period, which covers the remaining 12 months. This first part of the book not only discusses the conventional view of the war but also clearly exposes the many Soviet operations that have lay hidden in virtual obscurity since war's end. Glantz also does a fine job showing how the Soviet-German war affected the course of WWII in general. Perhaps out of necessity this part of the book is rather concise. In any case it is still eye opening to have the vast number of counterstrokes, counteroffensives and strategic offensives laid out as they are here. As he himself points out, prior histories of the war have led to an almost constant and simplistic portrayal of operations as smooth periods of Wehrmacht offensives in the summer and Soviet offensives in the winter. He also clearly dispels the myth that the Red Army was simply along for the ride after the surprise attack and shows how Stalin and the Stavka repeatedly during the initial period of war attempted to organize counterstrokes as well as full counteroffensives.
Part two of the book is a very thorough look into the force structure of the Soviet army. This section is as comprehensive as one could possible ask for and retain a modicum of readability. Even as such, it is certainly the most difficult section to work through as it is basically a detailed look into how every aspect of the Soviet forces were reorganized from Front down to battalions in some instances. As such is feels at times to be comprised of endless tables of organization. This should not be overstated however, as this type of attention to detail is what most readers of Glantz have come to expect. Furthermore, it is this level of detail that sets him apart from most other widely published WWII historians. He does not simply explain to the reader that a particular type of unit was employed in a particular defensive or offensive action. He thoroughly explains how that type of unit came to be and gives the prior organization of similar units and why they failed to work.
Part three is a thorough analysis of the leaders of the Red Army and those that they led. The first subsection is broken up primarily into mini biographies of every major general, commanding every Front, Army, and Corps and all of their variants. It does so and gives a very interesting breakdown and percentages by year of the surviving and thriving general staff as well as command failures and traitors. Glantz then gives a very enlightening look into the soviet soldiers; who they were (ethnicity and gender are investigated here) how they survived, why they fought and what methods were used to keep them toeing the line, particularly after the hideous and demoralizing losses of the first six months. This section is probably the most readable of the three and is a very well written look into the human aspects of the war.
Finally, Glantz has once again written a history of the Soviet-German war that is groundbreaking, to say the least. Using sources that only he seems to be able to gain access to, he has delved more comprehensively into the factors that allowed the Red Army to first survive and eventually defeat Hitler's Wehrmacht, than anyone else before him. Yes, this volume reads quite dryly at times and the tables of organization can seem daunting but it must clearly be understood from the beginning that this is not a book for the casual history reader by any stretch. This book is meant for the dedicated historian of the Soviet-German war-those who need more than a basic overview of the military operations and geopolitical ramifications of the war. With all that said the only weakness that this book has are some instances of sloppy writing and subsequent poor editing. At times-particularly in Part I-this poor editing is truly frustrating and frequent. For the most part though, this is never more than a minor irritation. As a whole Glantz can, once again, be said to be the undisputed master of Soviet-German war history.
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I must applaud the author in a splendid job well done. You have to choose carefully when reading books by Catherine Palmer. Some of her stories are forced, badly written and ridiculously cliched (like Affectionate Adversary or Love's Haven) while others are absolute gems (like Bachelor's Bargain or Victorian Rose). This book shines along side the great ones. I have yet to read Palmer's "Treasures of the Heart" series, but I look forward to it, and only hope that she keeps these fine traits and writing skills with her in the books to come.