War and Politics Books

Dave Palmer makes clear that the Second Amendment was aboutmilitary organization. It was not concerned with the civil rights ofprivate individuals ...

This little gem of a book is one of the most interesting I have ever read. It covers the disbanding of the Continental Army, the fear of a standing army by some of the Founding Fathers, the anti-military stance of the anti-Federalists, the Constitutional Convention and how Washington was 'elected' as the first President, and how the US quelled both the Indian problems in the Old Northwest and the Whiskey Rebellion.

The narrative is crisp, accurate, and the tale told is fascinating. The cast of characters, from Washington and Frankling, through Hamilton and Gerry, and finally to Anthony Wayne is impressive, spellbinding, and completely fascinating.

It is a great read and gives insight into the troubles, nearly fatal troubles, that the young United States faced in its irst decade and a half as an independent nation.

This book also answers many questions: Why some of the Founders objected to a strong military establishment (Patrick Henry and Thomas Jefferson were two that did-neither listened to Washington and settled on the dubious security of the militia which Washington considered 'a broken reed.'); why the Indians had to be fought in the Old Northwest; why the Constitution came into being, and finally how the United States finally survived and evolved.

This is a character study of a young nation trying to come to grips with its own nationhood, and how it would fulfill the promise of the Declaration of Independence. It is a fascinating tale told with wit, verve, and accuracy.

You won't find many of the usual right wing nut jobs reviewing this book, because it is very hard to libel documentary evidence. In law, we say "res ipsa loquitor," or "the thing speaks for itself." And this book has delivered the goods: documentary evidence in spades. If you don't come away from this book convinced that at the very least there is a prima facie case for indicting the US military high command, up to and including the shrub and Darth Cheney, on charges of aggravated war crimes and crimes against humanity, then you just haven't paid attention, or, worse, you are part of that portion of humanity--Hitler, Stalin, Mao, Pinochet, Pol Pot, etc.--that thinks there is nothing wrong with torture and that, in fact, we should use it more. If that is the case, you will find plenty to warm your heart here.

This book is a great collection of the records of the Bush administration's torture policy. Seeing as it is a collection of documents obtained through FOIA some of it is redacted. This redaction lends the book that air of "what are they trying to cover up." This book would be great for research.

The introduction sets it all out in a nice brief synopsis. Thus, this book has little author influence as to opinion. It allows you to see for yourself.

reuters is a great source for worldwide media coverage. this book contains fabulous photos taken of afghanistan as well as small reports from a variety of reporters between the groups of photos. nothing is better than being able to see what is being mentioned or what you have heard or read about afghanistan so far. large and gripping images of all kinds of people, and differnt areas of land, the book is a great compilation of images and words to give you a nice idea of what things are like in afghanistan.

"Afghanistan: Lifting the Veil" is well-titled, as it helps educate what and why the people, the Taliban, bin Laden, al Qaeda could be what they are in Afghanistan.

Reuters is one of the best positions possible to see what is going on. As the top int'l news agency, they know the lay of the land, and the issues surrounding things.

It is not overly academic, and is accessible by the intelligent reader. It brings more to the table than simple American anger, or sadness for the loss of the WTC. Instead, Reuters shows the whole of the matter, demonstrating the grays and well as the black and whites of the circumstance.

I fully recommend "Afghanistan: Lifting the Veil" by Reuters.

Anthony Trendl

The book was well-researched with 176 endnotes and 14 pages of bibliography, but you will not want to put this book down! My only complaint is the outrageous price, $60 for a paperback. Damn Cyr, give those graduate students a break. Don't be a bunghole.

Arthur Cyr, who is the former President of the World Trade Center in Chicago, puts his years of experience and perspective to good use in this book. Dr. Cyr's views on the influence and impact of Ronald Reagan in shaping the post cold war world is a topic that is often overlooked by political writers. Although I do not fully agree with Dr. Cyr's views on the utility of multinational organizations and NATO expansion, he is correct on these type of organizations playing an important role in the future. My only real critisism of the book is that the book is somewhat dry. This is a good book to assign to a graduate level academic class but it is above much of the general population.

A thorough and demanding book which reveals to the world many facts and issues needing attention from those seeking intallectual stiumlation.

A thorough and demanding book which reveals to the world many facts and issues needing attention from those seeking intallectual stiumlation.

This book maintains that the primary purpose of the FBI, from its inception and at least through to the late 1980s when Agents of Repression was first published, was to repress political groups and individuals who posed a threat to the status quo. The text is accompanied by heavy documentation and I was often reminded of the writing style of Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman. The focus here, however, is on the domestic crimes of the government. Churchell and Vander Wall show that the FBI was willing to use massive illegal force (including assasination) to repress political enemies and serve the interests of those in power. This is an excellent eye-opener to the true nature of the Bureau and the harsh crimes visited upon the American Indian Movement, the Black Panther Party and others such as the Puerto Rican Independence Movement. One is left wondering what activities the FBI has engaged in since the '80s and especially since 9/11. The best book I've read in some time.

The reissue of Agents of Repression is not only based on the historical significance of the book, but also the concerns expressed by co-author Ward Churchill in his lectures and writings about the direction of this nation with the advent of the Department of Homeland Security and legislative measures that have trampled over the Bill of Rights.

The book was published in 1988 based on the then ongoing litigation by some government officials against an author and publisher who had a work published concerning the illegal repression of AIM.

Agents of Repression is basically split into four sections; a history of the FBI, the government's war against the Black Panther Party, a lengthy exploration of AIM and the steps taken by a variety of government departments to destroy the grass-roots movement and how nothing has changed in the 1980s.

For readers who have explored these issues through other forums, it is an outstanding history. Readers who may be researching this era for the first time, I highly recommend the book since it takes larger topics and breaks them down into succinct chapters.

Churchill became the punching bag for the lightweight talking-heads on cable "news" shows more than a year ago due to comments he made in an academic setting concerning 9/11.

I urge a potential book-buyer to disregard that rhetoric and disinformation campaign waged against the co-author Churchill and consider that perhaps the payback for truly believing in civil rights means the attempt to silence him.

This book is an excellent addition to the literature on the Vietnam war, providing us with a new perspective. It is full of novel information but still easy to read, which is quite an achievement. It is particularly interesting -- given the current political situation -- to learn how eager the British government was to support Kennedy's Vietnam policy. This is a real revelation.
The book's approach is truly international, and the research is more than impressive. Among the archives the author used are the national archive of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the US, and of course Britain.

In this brilliantly-researched study, Peter Busch examines the Conservative government's policy towards the US war against Vietnam for the years 1961 to 1963. The author, who formerly worked at the Public Record Office at Kew, has thoroughly mined newly available records from Britain, the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Germany. He also shows how British policy towards Vietnam related to wider policy towards South-East Asia, especially towards Indonesia. In both cases, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan ruled out negotiated settlements and preferred to use force.

Busch shows how Macmillan fully backed President Kennedy's aggressive military build-up in Vietnam, `a clear breach' of the Geneva agreements, while advising him to conceal it. Macmillan pretended to be a peacemaker, while actually supporting the US war. He aimed to keep Britain's `great power' status and prove its value as a US ally.

As co-chairman of the International Control Commission set up by the 1954 Geneva Conference, the British state abused its role in order to support the illegal, dictatorial Diem regime in the south. It backed up Diem's unwarranted claims that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was responsible, `whether there was evidence or not', for starting the civil war in the south. It used these claims to rule out the DRV's call for reconvening the Conference to negotiate the peaceful reunification of Vietnam.

Macmillan helped the US counter-insurgency effort, setting up the British Advisory Mission in 1961. British forces also trained Diem's troops in Malaysia. In 1962, the British Ambassador to Saigon urged the USA to `crush and eradicate the Viet Cong'.

The British government only dropped Diem when it discovered that his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, was willing to discuss peace with the DRV. It then backed the US coup against Diem that sabotaged the chances of peacefully reunifying Vietnam.

Busch concludes that the British government did not pursue peace. "Britain supported the American policy in Vietnam wholeheartedly. The British only wanted to `sell' this policy in a different, less confrontational way." Plus ca change! This superb book vindicates all those who opposed the US aggression against Vietnam.

Mark C. Yerger's work is classic. It's a 100% true. I have understood it as soon as has taken this remarkable book in my hands. I don't even speak about the cover and paper quality - because it's brilliant!

The every aspect of the Allgemeine-SS is covered (except the uniform, insignia etc.): SS-Oberabschnitte, SS-Abschnitte, SS-Fuss-Standarten, SS-Reiter-Standarten and Specialist Units such as Nachrichten-Sturmbanne, Pionier-Sturmbanne, Kraftfahr-Sturme etc. Commanders and details on their career is also given. The posts of the HSSPF and SSPF are carefully examined. I was struck with beautiful photos in this work, some of them I didn't see before! It's completely a "majestic" book. The Mark Yerger is a prolific researcher and deservers to be called a "El Nino". My best by of the month. Now I hunt for "Riding East".

This book represents an in depth and comprehensive analysis of all SS main commands as well as the men responsible for leading them. It includes a section on the sub districts as well as a portion which focuses on the SS Main Offices which reported directly to the Reichsfuhrer SS. I would highly recommend this book for any serious researcher on the subject of the Allgemeine SS and its leadership figures or organizational hierarchy.

Iraq, well informed and eminently fair; it concludes with excellent advice, particularly regarding the need for Washington to continue supporting European integration and a collective European defense effort. What the authors make clear, without shrillness or grandstanding, is that "the European complaint that the American decision-making process and diplomacy about Iraq violated reasonable alliance norms and expectations is valid." They prove this point with careful analysis of what happened in 2002 and 2003 and with a short, sharp reminder of previous alliance crises and how they were overcome. This is not to say that the authors side with France and Germany; their criticism of those countries' diplomacy is often quite stinging. But the fact that the United States is the "indispensable power" does not mean that its allies must support it in every case. As Gordon and Shapiro write, "when taken too far, assertive leadership can quickly turn into arrogant unilateralism, to the point where resentful others become less likely to follow the lead of the United States." "Even a country as powerful as the United States," they explain, "needs a certain level of legitimacy and consent." And indeed, it is clear that U.S. rashness and roughness in its handling of Iraq has weakened its legitimacy and, as a result, badly damaged its interests.

The importance of persistent conflict in Iraq throughout the 2004 presidential campaign makes this volume an essential contribution to the on-going public debate about the Bush Administration's foreign policy, particularly its global war on terrorism. Gordon and Shapiro carefully analyze the motivations and perceptions of the political elites on each continent as well as the opinions of their publics as the Iraq crisis unfolded. The initial chapters set the historical context for an analysis of the deepening discord within the Atlantic Alliance, which came to a head after September 11. The second part analyzes the sources of disagreement regarding Iraq and the reasons for divergence among the members in the transatlantic relationship. The final chapter makes several constructive recommendations to restore the Atlantic Alliance.

These recommendations are particularly significant in light of findings reported after the book's publication. Recent confirmations question intelligence regarding Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability, notably the aluminum tubes cited as evidence that Saddam Hussein was rebuilding Iraq's nuclear weapons program. The fact that these aluminum tubes were likely intended for small artillery rockets, not nuclear use, necessitates a more comprehensive and critical public inquiry. There is an ethical imperative for the American public and the world to receive the information that allows citizens to question intelligently why military action was taken in Iraq. In light of the mounting casualties on all sides, this is a civic responsibility that speaks to America's founding as a republican government, not a reluctant empire. In question are the Bush Administration's doctrine of preventive war and its insistence on the need for regime change, not containment, in the Middle East. This volume underscores the Bush Administration's reliance on military action to rid the region of terrorists. The fact that this reliance occurs without a steadfast pursuit of Middle East peace through a US commitment to the Road Map defies a basic premise of The 9/11 Commission Report's findings. The Report emphasizes that a global strategy to protect the nation should be a balanced one that uses all elements of national power, including diplomacy, intelligence and education to reach out to the larger Muslim world.

Perhaps the most relevant aspect of this case study analysis is the explanation of allied differences. The American faith in precision technology and military prowess is contrasted with the European willingness to accept, contain and try to deter the threat Iraq represented under the dictatorial leadership of Saddam Hussein. More fundamentally, Europe's, and particularly Germany's, awareness of historical mistakes in the rush to militarism is opposed by an increasing American proclivity to accept military force as just another tool in its global strategy against terrorism. This difference brings to mind the influence of the Bush Administration's distinction between a September 10th and a September 12th mentality. For a government that initially shied away from nation building, the undaunted belief in the creation of democracy with bombs in the Middle East flies in the face of French and British experiences with colonialism there. Moreover, this book's analysis is helpful as we evaluate whether success in Iraq is indeed possible, and if so, whether it can decisively define a new stage for Middle East peace as an alternative to negotiations with Arafat.

More fundamentally, this volume offers readers the opportunity to assess the impact of a consistency that has emerged in America's domestic and global policies since 9/11. Cornel West terms this "escalating authoritarianism" in his recent book, Democracy Matters. On the domestic front, the democratic public discourse so vital to the nation's capacity for renewal is at risk. The nature of the US popular debate about the war in Iraq, critical or passive, is a litmus test in this regard. It demonstrates the extent to which Americans are able to display a responsible consciousness about the nation's military involvement there. This public awareness is significant because, as Allies at War convincingly explains, the Atlantic Alliance is not doomed to disintegrate. The context in which the Alliance must evolve has changed, however, given the absence of the Cold War and current threats to world peace, including "out-of-area" ethnic conflicts as well as nationalism, which, in the case of the Beslan tragedy, is not always distinguished from global terrorism. This volume's timely conclusion should not be taken for granted amidst the factual confusion, media spin and political rhetoric of the 2004 presidential campaign. Gordon and Shapiro are right to assert that the post 9/11 context requires leaders and populations in Europe and the United States to understand the challenge they face: to adapt the Atlantic Alliance as a matter of choice as well as necessity.

There have been several prominent books and journal articles on Japan's postwar economic success (my personal favorite is The Misunderstood Miracle: Industrial Development and Political Change in Japan (Cornell Studies in Political Economy)). However, understanding the true nature of this flourishing is a somewhat different matter. While Friedman addresses the ECONOMIC aspects, Fosberg ably addresses the political and diplomatic aspects.

Prior to the War, Japan had been a major industrial power, and while a stupendous amount of plant and materiel had been physically destroyed by Allied bombing, it was clear that Japan possessed the trained personnel and deepened industrial institutions to recover. What was not clear, however, was if the US political establishment had the will or vision to help out.

Political establishments are heterogenous things, with complicated networks of competing and colluding interests; and while this is something so obvious it ought to be vapid, it's a point usually overlooked by ideologically zealous historians. For those interested in a serious, well-documented treatment of how the network of myriad US interests coalesced towards a strategy of helping Japan develop, and then integrate into the US economic sphere, this is a good beginning.

Students of economics will possibly be perturbed because Forsberg does not strictly adhere to neoliberal economic orthodoxy. This book tends towards neutrality on controversial issues in development economics, and rather, deals with what actors expected to happen as a result of the policies they pursued. So, for example, for much of the period covered the US Congress wavered between accommodating Japanese home markets protection (for the purpose of defeating Communism in the region) and demanding that the Japanese authorities open their market to US goods. An orthodox economist might object that protecting domestic markets was a stupid "payout" for either Japanese or US constituencies generally, but the point is that in 1950 very few political actors anywhere thought such things.

In general, the account tends to be fairly favorable to the US polity in terms of "generosity" (in this case, willingness to sacrifice short-term regional preferences for long-term success in the project of Japanese development), and emphasizes the success of Japanese industry interests in protecting specific markets. At the same time, the difficulty of getting the US polity to support Japanese economic recovery is not ignored. The terms of the bilateral agreements with Japan were sometimes one-sided, allowing the USA bases without commitments to actually defend Japan. Partly this was an ugly byproduct of the fact that Japan had become a US client by virtue of defeat in a war; but it also reflected internal divsions in the Japanese polity over the relationship with the USA.

In any respects, the book is an outstanding companion to the above-mentioned Friedman book on the economics of Japan's development. While Friedman emphasizes the overlooked entreprenuerial aspect, Forsberg explains the institutional and diplomatic aspect that actually prevailed. Readers of varing ideological or economic dogmas may draw their own conclusions based on what actually followed.

in my world history class i was doing a project on the japanese economic miracle after world war ii. this was the main source of information i used. i thought that this book was full of information involving the japanese and their sturggle to gain economic success. this book also taught me a lot about how the americans felt about the japanese. although in war they were enemies, after the war, since the US occupied Japan, due to their help, the japanese were able to get the success they wanted. if you are working on a project or just want to know about the japanese economic miracle, then i strongly suggest this book.