War and Politics Books

Before a democracy engages in war, government leaders must convince the citizenry that the cause is just - spread freedom, enhance national security, right wrongs, overcome evil. The virtues of the country and its cause must be extolled and the enemy demonized. Citizens must be aroused to support the war effort with their votes, their financial resources, and their lives.

In this book Professor Schmidt takes a critical look at American wars from the 1898 Spanish American War to the 2003 Iraq War and the continuing War on Terror in terms of how they were sold to the American people and what their costs were to the nation - human, financial, national security, foreign relations, and others. It is presently obvious to all but extreme partisans that the Bush administration used deceit and misrepresentations to sell the Iraq War to the American people. It may come as a bit of surprise to many that the selling of this war is not unique in American history. Schmidt thoroughly documents the lies, distortions, misrepresentations and hidden motives that were involved in the selling of all American wars during this period of time.

Schmidt sees the American people's motives for going to war, in general, as good. They want to make the world a better place - more economically secure, more democratic, more moral, more peaceful, more like America. American presidents have the same good motives for going to war as the people. In addition, however, they are subject to enormous pressures from economic and foreign interests. They have the temptation that comes from commanding the world's greatest military machine. Also, they have great interest in their place in history. War presidents get more attention from historians. Whatever the threshhold-crossing reason for going to war, the citizenry must be convinced the war is necessary and that it will be fought for a good cause.

Professor Schmidt is a dispassionate historian. War by war he examines the influences that led to the war; how, by whom, and why the war was promoted; the opponent's perspective on the war; how the war was conducted; and the costs and consequence of the war to all combatants - especially to America. In each case, including World War II, his carefully reasoned analysis leads to the conclusion that the war accomplished few of its stated goals, did not serve the nation's long-term interests, was a vast waste of human and material resources, and set the stage for future national problems.

The reader will learn a lot of 20th century history by reading The Folly of War. It is not light reading, but it is one of the most interesting, well-documented, well-reasoned, thought-provoking, and informative books I have read. I highly recommend it to anyone who values a critical and honest examination of America's 20th century wars.

I have always thought that we Americans believe that we are a peace loving country slow to anger and only going to war rarely and with the very best of reasons. We always take the high ground, lending assistance to the weak, beating up on the bullies.

Then I look around the world. Sweden, I don't believe, has been at war since the Great Northern War in the 1770's. Switzerland's last war was the Wars of Kappel, an internal religious war in about 1530. Both Sweden and Switzerland maintain standing armies, in Switzerland virtually every male spends time in the Army. And their armies are quite advanced in terms of weapons and electronics. These tend to keep people from attacking them, and they don't go out to attack others.

Why then does the US seem to go to war frequently? In this book Schmidt argues that U.S. foreign policy has been driven by the public's desire to 'do good.' As in we had to destroy Hue in order to save it. Schmidt analyzes the wars the US has fought in the 20th century. The biggest war was World War II. In his discussion of WW II he leans pretty hard on Roosevelt, he seems to take the theory that FDR maneuvered Japan into the attack at Pearl Harbor. He quotes John Toland's book 'Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath,' where Toland claims that Roosevelt knew the attack was coming. This is, however, something that we will never know for sure. Yes, there was a lot of intelligence pointing to the attack. But most people believe that these various bits of information were submerged in a sea of data points and not put together until afterward. Monday Morning Quarterbacking is a lot easier than putting it together before hand.

This is a very interesting view of the wars the US has fought. My one real complaint is that the type is too tiny for my old eyes. More, bigger pages and larger type would have suited me better.

I would recommend this book to anybody who seeks a deeper understanding of American foreign policy. The open minded reader will find the book quite refreshing, as it diverges from the standard vanilla treatment of history, however, some readers will find the book disturbing because it challenges deeply held beliefs that America is always right. Each chapter is logically developed with facts to substantiate claims. I strongly agree with Schmidt's assertion that American foreign policy went awry with devastating effects when our "leaders" decided to abandon the neutrality policies of the founding fathers and instead decided to institute a policy of interference and favoritism.

I think the chapter on World War I is the most important because it illustrates exactly why the founding fathers desired a neutral foreign policy. The Germans did not sink the Lusitania out of so-called naked aggression. They sank the ship because America was secretly supplying war material to Britain and they rightly or wrongly believed that the Lusitania was transporting such material. Had America remained truly neutral, innocent peoples lives would have been spared and History, quite possibly, would have pursued a different course-one without the harsh and punitive Versailles Treaty and one without Adolph Hitler.

Schmidt also emphasizes the pathetic lack of geopolitical knowledge of many of our leaders with President G.W Bush as the most prominent example. Bush never even had the desire to travel to Europe before becoming President. Note, Bush alone is not singled out for criticism nor is this a partisan treatment of foreign policy.

The chapter on the War on Terrorism is important because it illustrates the deception of the Bush Administration regarding the threat of Saddam Hussein. No clear unambiguous evidence has been produced linking Saddam with 911. International Law, in which United States is a signatory, forbids the invasion of any sovereign nation that is not an aggressor. It also should be noted that a declaration of war is required to invade a sovereign state.

There are many other important topics discussed in this chapter including the role of influential Zionists such as Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and others who years earlier argued for the overthrow of the Hussien regime.

The Folly of War provides a much-needed critique of American foreign policy as well as serving as an accurate and concise historical reference. It may very well be one of the most important books of our time as it serves as a much-needed wake-up call for all Americans who believe in the Republic. In Schmidt's view, the terrorist threat of today is directly related to foreign policy "follies" that are in direct opposition to the views and writings of the founding fathers. I for one, agree.

There are some fine reviews, so my primary purpose in posting this review is to flag it for the folks that keep an eye on what I read.

My one complaint is the tiny font size. I had to get special glasses from the supermarket to read this book, a $15 cost that should not have been necessary. The publisher made a serious mistake on the font size and I urge that all future printings be at least 11 font. This entire book is in a font normally used for obscure notes, and it takes dedication to get through this. Such valuable material should NOT be so parsimonesouly treated by a publisher, who should have known better.

I am among those that believe that war is a racket and that we live in an unconquerable world where the only possible positive outcome comes from combining the wealth of networks with the new craft of intelligence and free distance learning as well as on demand answers via cell phone, in order to empower the five billion at the base of the pyramid. Only they can create infinite wealth that stabilizes the entire planet in a sustainable fashion.

This author has ventured where few have had the imagination, persistence, or integrity to go. He has taken on the military-industrial establishment, the banks, the rule by secrecy and scarcity mandarins, and he has nailed it. This is a Nobel Prize level effort and I for one am deeply impressed.

His organization is superb, and even his fanciful conversation among all our Presidents is provocative. This is not "turgid text," this is the fabric of history restored and rewoven.

Shortly Medard Gabel will have a book come out entitled "Seven Billion Billionaries," and I urge one and all to buy that book along with this one. They are two sides of the coin. This book is focused on the folly of war (which today costs $900 billion a year across all nations, with the USA being the most spendthrift), while Medard's focuses on the inexpensiveness and achievability of peace and prosperity--in his carefully documented manuscript, every bit the equal of this author's, he shows how $230 billion a year--LESS than a third of what we spend on our varied militaries, could resolve every single one of the high level threats to mankind identified by LtGen Dr. Brent Scowcroft, USAF (Ret), and the other members of this United Nations panel.

I hope this book is put into the digital domain prompty, for the wealth of information it contains will be made all the more valuable as we move to an era of transparent budgets, digital democracy, and constant oversight from the people whose money has been wasted so cruelly all these years.

See my many lists for other recommended readings. Below are a handful of books that complement this one.
War Is a Racket: The Anti-War Classic by America's Most Decorated General, Two Other Anti=Interventionist Tracts, and Photographs from the Horror of It
The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People
The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political--Citizen's Action Handbook for Fighting Terrorism, Genocide, Disease, Toxic Bombs, & Corruption
Designing Web-Based Training: How to Teach Anyone Anything Anywhere Anytime
Blessed Unrest: How the Largest Movement in the World Came into Being and Why No One Saw It Coming
The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (The American Empire Project)
Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions
Wilson's Ghost: Reducing the Risk of Conflict, Killing, and Catastrophe in the 21st Century
Deliver Us from Evil: Peacekeepers, Warlords and a World of Endless Conflict
The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism

The author, an experienced teacher of diplomatic history, has given us a very useful survey of US foreign policy from 1898 to 2005. He shows how all America's wars, except World War Two, have been corrupt in origin, vicious in execution, and disastrous in effect.

He has great knowledge of the various ploys that have been used to embroil states in wars and to persuade the gullible that the wars were just.

For example, in 1915, the British Admiralty gave the Cunard passenger liner Lusitania no destroyer escort. British government agents had illegally loaded her with explosives and other munitions. The week before she sailed, Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, wrote to the President of the Board of Trade that it was `most important to attract neutral shipping to our shores, in the hope especially of embroiling the United States with Germany'. When a German U-boat sank the Lusitania, it was a big step towards the US entry into the war.

Schmidt denounces the US state's wars, against Korea, Vietnam and Iraq as colonial and genocidal. He shows how the US state has used its assets to start wars, as in 1980 when US Secretary of State Brzezinski used Saddam Hussein, telling him that the US government would not object to `an Iraq move against Iran'. Saddam attacked, starting an eight-year war that killed 1.5 million people.

At the end of the 1990 war against Iraq, the US government assured Iraq that its "withdrawing troops would not be attacked." Then, after the ceasefire, USAF and RAF planes carried out the massacre at Mutla Ridge, the infamous `turkey-shoot' on the `Highway of Death', killing thousands of soldiers who had already surrendered, a major war crime.

Quiz questions: who described the First World War as this `glorious delicious war'? Kaiser Bill? Lenin? Or Churchill? Who first used poison gas on Iraqi people? Saddam Hussein? Ayatollah Khomeini? Or Churchill? Clue - the answer to both questions is the same.

This is an important introduction to the topic of the Third World and the Cold War which has been gaining more study recently and deservedly so. For too long the history of the Cold War focused on foreign policy and Europe, but this book examines the doctrine of intervention, beggining mostly with Eisenhower in the U.S and increasing greatly with Khruschev and Brezhnev in the U.S.S.R. The book examines unique examples such as Cuba, Vietnam, Southern Africa, and Afghanistan. But it is also a sweeping account of this phenomenon, whereby many countries went from being colonized to being politiszed between the West and the Soviet Union. A very interesting study that seeks to show how the modern state of affairs in the world is tied up with the affects of the Cold War.

Seth J. Frantzman

Westad presents a disturbing but comprehensive and balanced evaluation of U.S. and Soviet policies towards Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia in the 1946-1991. His research is exhaustive, and his conclusions are cautionary for American interventionists in the post-Cold War era.

This fine book is devoted to a hugely important topic typically neglected in most discussions of the Cold War; the course and impact of the Cold War in the Third World. Most overview monographs on the Cold War concentrate on US-Soviet relations and/or the impact of the Cold War in Europe and Japan. Westad successfully attempts an overview and structural analysis of the Cold War in the Third World. Westad opens with a pair of summary chapters on the USA and Soviet Union leading up to the beginning of the Cold War. He then covers the early decades of the Cold War in the Third World concisely, and devotes much of the book to the last 2 decades of the Cold War, including detailed analyses of the events in Afghanistan, Africa, and Central America. Based on a wealth of secondary sources and analysis of primary literature from both US and Soviet archives, the narrative is comprehensive, clear, and punctuated with thoughtful analysis.

There is a lot of surprising information. While many readers will be aware of US interventions in places like Guatemala and Iran, Westad's descriptions of the depth of US interventions in places like Indonesia and Brazil will come as a surprise. Similarly, his description of how the Soviet involvement in the Third World came to be seen as a crucial element of the legitimacy of the Soviet state goes a long way towards explaining why the events in Afghanistan had such importance. With respect to the battleground states of the various Third World countries where US and Soviet interventions took place, this is generally a series of tragic stories, usually involving considerable bloodshed and impoverishment.

Westad goes considerably beyond good narrative. Several well articulated themes run through the narrative. A basic concept is that the Cold War was driven by two competing ideologies about what should be the basis of modern society - American liberal capitalism and Soviet communism. Westad is very good on how ideological considerations consistently drove US and Soviet policy decisions, including the many cases where ideology led to gross misunderstandings of reality. Another important theme is the independent role of local elites in Third World countries. Over and over again, these elites or portions of them sought superpower support to pursue their own ends, often quite different from those of the superpowers. This led, for example, to the depressingly frequent US support of brutal dictatorships and the Soviet support of regimes who suppressed local communist parties. Westad is very good as well at showing how the Cold War involvement of the superpowers was entangled with decolonialization, another important theme. Both the US and Soviet Union presented themselves as, and made serious efforts to act as, modernizers. In a series of particularly ironic developments, both US and Soviet policies often mimicked the development policies of the imperial states they displaced.

My only substantial criticisms of Westad are his treatment of the origins of the Cold War. Westad presents US policies as rooted in a long history of US expansionism and capitalist ideology. There is considerable truth in this position but it ignores some of the specific circumstances of the 1940s. The failure of the post-WWI settlement seemed to demand a dominant international US role after WWII. Similarly, as Westad's own narrative shows, US fears of the Soviet Union were driven in good part by Stalin's aggressive and paranoid behavior.

Westad concludes by highlighting the frequently tragic consequences of US and Soviet intervention in Third World states, often transforming local conflicts into major disasters. The results of US and Soviet interventions in the Third World are among the most important results of the Cold War, and these results have been largely negative.

Westad's book offers a new interpretation of the second half of the twentieth century, one that focuses on how the conflict between the US and the USSR-- and the division of the world into two halves-- played out in the Third World, and shaped and was shaped by the politics of those regions. The first two chapters are fairly heavy going, as Westad lays out sweeping statements about first the US, then the USSR, arguing that both countries developed around ideas that committed them to an almost evangelical form of statehood, of exporting their way of life. As he moves into the middle of the book, however, the story really takes off; he offers well-informed, fascinating case studies ranging from Angola and Ethiopia to Iran and Afghanistan. In every case, he illuminates the way in which the US and USSR offered only two sides on the playing field, and how people in these Third World countries responded by playing the superpowers off one another. One of the central processes that he brings to light is the way in which this situation eventually encouraged the rise of sectarian movements in many of those countries, including fundamentalist Islam, which appears here as a natural development from a generation who had watched their predecessors cast in with one of the two superpowers, and end up pawns in a global chess game. After finishing this book, I felt that I had an entirely new perspective on American history in the 20th century and better understood current-day issues from the rise of Islam to American support for Israel to the politics of central Africa. Certainly NOT a light read, but an invaluable one.

This is by far the best book available about the Cold War in the Third World. I have been waiting for a good book on this subject for quite some time, and I was not disappointed.
Westad starts out with a broad overview of American and Soviet history with particular emphasis on the importance of ideology and expansionism. He shows that the Cold War was primarily an ideological struggle between two powers that occurred at a time when when many new nations were coming into being due to European decolonialization. The two forces contributed to the radicalization and violence of the Third World in the Cold War.
Westad does an excellent job of providing both wide scope and in-depth analysis of a number of conflicts. He covers Cuba, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Somalia, Angola, Iran, Afghanistan and Central America. Unless you are an expert in all these conflicts, you are sure to learn something from this book. I am somewhat familiar with a few of them and found no major inaccuracies. And Westad does a great job of integrating them together into a tight narrative and argument.
My only complaint is that the book ends with an argument against "intervention." After 400 pages of explaining why past interventions were so important to the direction of modern history, it seems a bit of a contradiction to the rest of the book. But this is just a tiny criticism of an otherwise great book.

The letters reveal Donn who was a lively, exciting, fun-loving person with great love for his mother(the names he gives her in every letter never ceases to bring a smile)his sisters and all his other family members. His sense of humor is contagious as it springs from each of his letters. All the characters with their special quirks become familiar to the reader as he paints them so well in his letters. This is a great book that could be made into a movie and any actor who plays the role of Donn will be paying a rich tribute to this wonderful young man who teaches that life is full of promise and hope to be enjoyed every single day. The author did a great job of taking a painful memory and leaving a lasting impact on the readers who will close the book with a great big smile for having known this wonderful person. Great job Evie!!!!!!

Too often books about war deal more with the officers and civilian leaders, the ones who direct the military actions without looking at those most involved. The young men and women on the front lines who must live with life and death and whose minds are concentrated both on the action at hand and their loved ones back home. It is most likely the latter that keeps them going in the face of enemy fire, the memories of happier days in their home towns or cities.

His Name Was Donn: My Brother's Letters from Vietnam is a particularly moving book, a collection of letters written by Donn Sweet during his service in Vietnam up to his tragic death. An honored soldier, his letters are a combination of describing what is taking place over there and his memories of home. These letters were put together by his younger sister, Evelyn Sweet-Hurd whose grief over his death kept her from re-reading them for decades. Now this book has helped bring her closure and is a moving tribute to a brave young man with a sense of humor who truly loved his country. It gives us an insight into the heart and soul of a true American hero and patriot.

The reader also learns a great deal about the Sweet family and Evelyn's own thoughts and feelings then and now. It is the sort of book every reader can relate to whether Donn is writing about comrades dying or his memories of home. Home is very important and Donn takes the time to write thankyous for gifts and letters even when under enemy fire. There is a strong connection between Donn's two worlds and his relationship with his younger sister Evelyn who idolized him. The book is a testimony to the importance of family in the growth and maturity for young people.

Ms. Sweet-Hurd writes in a style that is both vivid and concise. Once finished this is a book you will want to re-read as you will feel connected with the family. This would make an excellent film and we want to see more works by this author.

"His Name Was Donn" is powerful and poignant, a book that will stay in your head and your heart long after you have raced to finish it--even though you know the tragic conclusion from the first page. What an amazing accomplishment of Donn's sister to open the box and share his letters with all of us! Evelyn Sweet-Hurd's technique of alternating letters and commentary keeps us involved and challenges us to think about the individuals who are sent to war on our behalf.

A young soldier dies heroically in battle. His maimed body is returned to his grieving family. Medals and citations are awarded posthumously.

At once the circumstances of his death eclipse all other aspects of his life. He becomes forever a fallen soldier. The military citations extol the "ultimate sacrifice." Nowhere in the formal wording is there mention of "the life that might have been."

But the two are one and the same.

This is the message of Evelyn Sweet-Hurd's remembrance of her brother, Lieutenant Donn Sweet, a native of Roanoke VA, who was killed in Vietnam in 1968 at age 26.

In, "His Name Was Donn," Sweet-Hurd attempts to rescue the memory of her brother. From a box of letters shuffled from attic to attic over forty years, she has fashioned a soldier's journal that speaks to our day as poignantly as if written from Iraq yesterday.

From the first line of Letter #1 ("It's a warm Saturday afternoon") to the final signoff two days before his death ("Well, it's beginning to rain"), Donn Sweet reports on his Vietnam experience very much as an observer, more war correspondent than soldier at times, fascinated with events, people, places and how the weather was. Absent, always, is any acknowledgment of personal danger.

To his mother, he writes: "Yesterday we left Dong Ha in a driving rainstorm and
took a boat up the river to the coast and a Marine camp called Qua Viet. The day before, Qua Viet had been shelled and a dentist and three others were killed."

We are reminded of the young Martin Sheen journeying up the river in Apocalypse
Now, without, in Donn Sweet's telling, the sense of foreboding.

Forty years later, his sister wonders if her beloved big brother had indeed
taken a first step into the "Heart of Darkness." It bothers her when he writes,
"I took pictures of one of the dead VC. He was 28 and was from Gio Linh -- or so
his papers said."

The reader has difficulty sharing the author's concern. Donn Sweet seems always to have a sure hold on reality. His lifeline is a mischievous sense of humor and a relentless focus on his civilian life to come.

Three days after describing a fire fight in which "We lost nine men...", he pens
an appreciation of a package newly-received from an aunt, "[There was] a black
oblong soft smelly object. At first I thought it was a squashed eclair; the
Marine captain living with me thought it was a piece of liver. You know what it
was? A BANANA! What would make someone think a banana would make it to Vietnam?
... I will write a thank-you note."

After noting that the officer who relieved him in his last command has been killed, he instructs his mother: "I want you to please do the following and write me on what you do and the results. Please have the valves on my Porsche set for the proper setting and have my oil changed correctly. I want the filter screen cleaned. The manual explains how it should be done. I don't want them to simply drain the oil out the plug and put some new oil in. Check it out and have it done right... and let me know what the story is."

He mentions running into a mortar ambush, "...we had one KIA (killed in action)
and one WIA (wounded in action"...", then inquires about law schools: "Ask Ernie
[a lawyer friend] what he thinks about McGeorge College of Law and U. of Arizona,
OK?"

John Lennon famously said, "Life is what happens to you while you're making other plans." Donn Sweet was killed in Vietnam by a mortar shell. His Silver Star citation states that he had confronted and killed a North Vietnamese sniper in order to reach a hilltop from which he could direct artillery fire. There is nothing in the citation of his having other plans.

In her commentary, juxtaposed among the letters, Sweet-Hurd does not disguise
her anti-war sentiments. But they come across as neither insistent nor intrusive. They are a crying out for comprehension, and they are a needed perspective, a simple wondering at what Donn himself might have made of the Vietnam outcome and of his own "ultimate sacrifice."

In the book's "Post-Mortem", the author makes her point with quiet subtlety.
Without comment, she lists the official telegrams and citations received from
the Army. They commemorate a hero, the military laying claim to her brother's memory. To the reader, who has come to know Donn Sweet through his own words, his kid sister's appeal proves successful on at least one score: the citations seem to be placed where they properly belong -- in the appendix.

My review starts with a warning to readers. Once you pick up the book, you will find it hard to put down. Long after you do read it, you will find yourself still connected to the young lieutenant and his world.

The book is a combination of letters from Donn, who is stationed in Vietnam,to his mother and the reflections of his sister as she reads the letters again thirty years later. Like war itself, the book contains jarring juxtapositions. The abstract and the specific, the important and the trivial, the terrifying and the hilarious are side by side. Donn worried about the beloved car he had warily left in the care of his family, joked about his mother's weight, and relayed the brutality and dangers of war in a careful and powerful way.

Another dimension of the book is his sister's growing awareness of her brother and how he adapted to war. Her teenage vision of him was incomplete, and the matured vision she reveals as she reads his letters again is moving and truthful.

I know many will read the book and say they learned a lot about the realities of war, and you will, but the book is about more than war. The book is about love and the strong bonds of family.

Time has and will continue to prove Craig right on virtually all of his claims. Unfortunately, that means we as citizens are in big trouble, yet totally to blame for our predicament. Whether he's talking about civil liberties, corporatism, empire, international relations, the military, etc, Craig hits the nail on the head. I've heard some of his radio interviews, and he definately writes the way he talks. He writes some very long sentences which could benefit from a comma or two. Nonetheless, his research is amazingly indepth and the information presented is crucial. He dismisses popular conspiracy theories and picks apart his topics with logic and razor-sharp critical thinking. This book is great also because he quotes from so many other authors/researchers, and footnotes like you wouldn't believe. So the book serves as an index of many other fascintating books. You owe it to your Country to absorb this book.

There is no question this book will make you wonder why the media has not raised some of the issues this book does. Does it speak too much of the truth about what is taking place in this country? The author has done a lot of research and it comes accross. The book was thought out and well written. A lot of the projections about the political agenda of the Bush administration are becoming fact. How did the author know these things would happen? I would reccomend this book to anybody who cares about the future of our country. This book should not be so hard to get!

First, don't be put off by the title. It has a purpose to illustrate which you will understand once you finish this book. If you care to hear THE ONLY rational dissenting vioce about 9/11 and the events that took place leading up to it then you have to read this. It will dispell all the rumors and myths surrounding the attack as well as give you unique insight into what holds for the future and why. I recommend all of Mr. Hulets' books because in an age of homognized trash tv and magazines his is usually the only rational voice that speaks of a different perspective of what is going on in society. BUY THIS BOOK!

Hydra is certainly not a well-edited book but if its information you seek on who owns the White House, you will want this book. Corporatism as ideology is repeated throughout and the writer can perhaps be labeled a nihilist, however Craig is one of many who believe revolution is coming. He's not your typical militia pamphleteer, and he's thoroughly researched his facts and presents them grimly, and clearly.

"Beginning in the Reagan era, de-regulation has been the battle cry of Corporatism's corporate crusaders and raiders." The recent FCC ruling bears this out. His main complaint is with leaders of both parties who move from politics to corporate leadership positions and back with ease and with no questions about potential conflicts of interest.

"A theory making the rounds on the Internet, on the airwaves, and in the press claims that the bombing of the Taliban has nothing to do with a 'war on terrorism' but everything to do with the oil pipeline the West wants to build through Afghanistan." The Taliban were not removed from power in Afghanistan because they were tyrants. They were removed because they were weak tyrants. Craig points out there are 70 or so tyrannical governments existing in Africa and Asia, but they chose Afghanistan for the obvious reason. It had no national defense.
The book is solid and not to be missed. He complains about the downfall of society on the last several pages, but this can be taken with a grain of salt.

Hopefully Americans can put down their flags and try to learn about what brought us to 9/11. Mr. Hulet has made a pristine and thought provoking argument of why 9/11 came about. He has made an articulate argument of how the US government has used the crisis of 9/11 to carry out politcal objectives that otherwise could not be achieved (like the Caspian region oil and gas pipelines). He goes into depth about how America is up against guerrilla warfare and not just plain terrorism. We as so-called patriotic Americans need to understand what this implies for us as Americans. We will pay for this Empire in "blood and coin". The author also explains how we also need to come to grips with what it means by "Oil and Sovereignty"! We are headed to a Corporate world and the WTO is not thinking in the best interest of America or Americans. The most important concept Mr. Hulet points out is not whether this agenda is successful or not, it is the fact that they are going to try!!!... Please buy this book, and inform yourself, do your own reseach, and maybe share with a friend or family member.

Everyone, at some time or another, looks for a magic wand, for that perfect solution to a problem. In the last few years, since the end of the cold war and of our comfortable belief that conflict was something that happened between two superpowers, by proxy in far, distant lands, we have had to wake up to the reality of a transnational insurgency that has the power to affect us wherever we are, be it in a commercial building in New York, a hotel in Jakarta, a train station in Madrid or a bus in London.

Since Francis Fukuyama's optimistic "The end of history" (as premature a title as ever has been written), a number of books have been published that analyze small wars, as these are now at the forefront of the news. Reading these books one hopes to find an answer to the new phenomenon of an apparently religiously driven discontent that is spanning two continents (Africa and Asia) and has actively engaged proponents in another two (America and Europe).

Bard O'Neill's "Insurgency and Terrorism", published by Potomac Books in 2005, is a well-written analysis of how and why insurgencies develop. Does it give readers an immediate understanding of how to deal with the Al Qaeda's new threat of an international Islamic insurgency? Does it give us the magic wand we are seeking in a flash of inspiration? Unfortunately no. But the problem is that there are no easy solutions to the incidents of terrorism we are facing today. It is disingenuous and fallacious of Governments to propose and believe in easy solutions to this problem, as "Mission Accomplished" all to painfully has shown.

It does however pay to analyze carefully the situation we are dealing with in it proper (and several) contexts. And this O'Neill does reasonably well. Insurgencies have been fought against invading armies, or against unpopular regimes that use established armies to impose their governance. In the first seven chapters of the book, O'Neill offers a structured analysis of the socio-economical motivations for insurgencies, the environments in they are fought and the strategies used to fight them, the importance of gaining and using popular support (through conviction, propaganda and coercion) as well as manipulating external support (outside the areas directly affected by conflict), and the organization and hierarchy of an insurgent operation. Through this structured categorization O'Neill examines how insurgencies develop and succeed. Also through this analysis we discover how different Al Qaeda's operations are today from past guerilla engagements.

Indeed, in this revised second edition of the book, O'Neill does keep the discussion current with references to how he believes the insurgency Al Qaeda is leading fits (or otherwise) in to his analyses. One would assume that Al Qaeda might deserve a chapter of its own but that is unfortunately missing; as O'Neill observes, the group's strategies and objectives don't fit particularly well in to any past or present insurgency. For instance, Mao's strategies are reasonable well described, particularly the requirement of support from the masses, and their mobilization in support a protracted popular war strategy, that seems to be one of Al Qaeda's aims. But, as the author points out, the closed cell organizational structure, loosely independent of a central authority, "is not conducive to mass mobilization." It is interesting to contrast Mao's doctrines on insurgency with Al Qaeda's today. O'Neill might have juxtaposed the two types of insurgency more strongly; in the section describing Mao's approach to coercion (as one of the tools used by insurgents to gain popular support) the author recalls Mao's "Eight Points of Attention" used to ensure his troops did the following:

* Speak politely.
* Pay fairly for what you buy.
* Return everything you borrow.
* Pay for anything you damage.
* Do not hit or swear at people.
* Do not damage crops.
* Do not take liberties with women.
* Do not ill-treat captives.

How different from the tactics being used by Al Qaeda today! Particularly the last two points! Mao led what arguably must be history's most successful insurgency and his tactics and strategies were successfully used in another war that began as an insurrection: the conflict that Vo Nguyen Giap conducted first against the French and then against the Americans. However Al Qaeda's protracted war doesn't seem to be modeled on any previous engagement.

Indeed O'Neill doesn't specify any example in history on which the Al Qaeda led insurgency is based. But it is in evaluating historical context that the book is quite weak. The approach O'Neill takes is structural rather than historical. He defines categories, and then finds insurgencies that fit them. The historical background of each insurgency is barely sketched out in most cases. And this leads to some omissions. For instance, there are references to the 1948-1960 Malayan Emergency throughout the text. But the context within which the British were eventually successful has been completely ignored: Gerald Templer's plan to set the country on the path to Independence, thereby voiding the political appeal of the insurgents, is not mentioned. Indeed neither there is a mention of Templer himself, who arguably was the architect of the most successful counterinsurgency effort ever staged by Britain. Of even more relevance today, and even though Afghanistan is mentioned throughout the book, no reference is made to the failed colonizing efforts made by the British in three disastrous wars conducted by them against Pashtun warriors, whose descendants also routed the Russians, and, in spite of all the recent American, Coalition and NATO efforts, are still causing seemingly endless trouble today. One might reasonably assume that a more detailed analysis of these two events would have been useful in the final chapter in which O'Neill evaluates possible Government responses to the threats presented by insurgencies. A far more detailed historical perspective of insurgencies, beginning with how the Romans fought successfully against insurgents in the lands they conquered, can be found in Walter Laqueur's "Guerrilla Warfare" published by transaction in 1998.

Even though the historical contexts of the various insurgencies O'Neill describes aren't presented as thoroughly as one might expect, the structured categorization of insurgents' operations allows the author to define a number of possible counterinsurgency strategies in the final chapter of the book. It is in this chapter that we find out that there are no easy solutions to be expected. Indeed a single definition of "victory" is not given. O'Neill observes that one of the most important factors in the success of a response is to be able to anticipate insurgents' plans and counter them effectively. However anticipation can only come from an administration that has a clear understanding of the opposing forces' strategies, tactics and goals. Without a clear comprehension of these, responses can be misdirected at best or play directly in to the goals of the insurgents at worse. In limited, national engagements, insurgent forces' strategies can be understood, but historically there has been a steep learning curve Government have had to face, and the learning has been (and obviously still is) faulty. This learning curve is much steeper for insurgencies that span beyond a single country's borders, as international cooperation is needed in the fight against them, and politics provide a huge barrier against this.

In conclusion, the book gives the reader some very good insights on how recent past insurgencies have developed and been handled. In today's context what the book misses out on is a strong thread that might give more specific insights in to how we might tackle the problem of a transnational insurgency that is driven through the very modern tools of communication (such as the Internet) by a group of people whose ideals are very firmly rooted in the medieval past. This lack of a thread is probably due to the fact that O'Neill wrote the first edition of the book in 1990, well before the rise of Islamic extremism. In keeping with the original structure of the book, the second revision shows that the Al Qaeda revolution is in a category of its own. It become implicit that we will need to develop new tools to fight it, and not much of our previous knowledge and experience on insurgencies can be called upon successfully.

This book give types of Insurgencies that history has show us and the definitions that make them different to each other.

This is an excellent book. The author is a well known and respected expert of the field. The book begins with an introduction that attempts to level set and baseline definitions and meanings. Although this may appear to be semantics, the differences both subtle and great is important. The book is well organized it is easy to refer to a specific chapter or section in the event you need a quick refresher and or reference. The book is well written, concise and offers a large quantity of foot notes at the end of each chapter. This book is for both the expert and the novice.

Terry Tucker, Adjunct Professor, Military Studies/History University of Maryland and Senior Doctrine Developer SANGMP, Vinnell Arabia

I have read the first edition of this book and I found it very useful to understand insurgency and terrorism. Moreover I wish I had read this book when I was in Colombia or in Haiti where we had to deal with insurgencies. In my opinion the book is an important tool for the intelligence analyst because it shows a framework to analyze the complex phenomenon of guerilla and insurgency. It was very valuable for me to learn about the four strategic approaches (conspiratorial - military focus - protracted popular war - and urban warfare)

As I wrote above, I read the first edition, so I don't know if the ideas that I'm going to write about are been included or not. The first one is about the "Legal Warfare" that was developed by the Insurgencies in Colombia and Argentina. It consists in accused soldiers of violations of human's rights. On almost every occasion they were false accusations. Therefore, they were judged and condemned by the civil authorities. However, nobody accused the terrorists of human right violations. The last one is about the insurgency that is developed from a defeated army. This is the case of what Col Volckmann said in his book "We remained" about the resistance in Philippines in World War II.

In conclusion, the book is brilliantly written and is very useful to understand and defeat insurgencies.

Terrorism and Insurgency by Bard E. O'Neill, is an invaluable resource for those interested in understanding insurgency and the relevant factors that lead to its success or failure.

This book appears to be written for a classroom audience (the author in fact provides a proposed semester-length class schedule complete with lesson plans and assigned reading). However, O'Neill also has government analysts and policy makers in mind. Throughout the book, and especially in chapters covering government response and the conclusion, he stresses the value of providing as complete a picture as possible while keeping in mind objectivity and maintaining an unbiased approach to analysis.

O'Neill begins his book by looking at insurgencies and the related fields of terrorism and guerilla warfare. His framework for analysis includes understanding the nature of the insurgency, insurgent strategies, both political and military, understanding the physical as well as human environment, organization, and the role of external support.

In the final chapter, O'Neill lays out a comprehensive lense through which a government analyst could view its adversary and policy makers can create successful counterinsurgency operations. Urging the avoidance of polemics and shortsightedness, O'Neill provides a credible and realistic lense through which to create effective countermeasures.

O'Neill helps to settle many unhelpful arguments and issues for analysts. For example, he rejects the false dichotomy of freedom fighter versus terrorist, as one deals with ends (freedom fighter) and one is a means to get their (terrorism). As such, a freedom fighter can use terrorist tactics to achieve his ends.

Also, a driving factor that many insurgencies use to determine their strategies are the physical and human environment around them and the perceived and real government response. Understanding this is invaluable both for insurgents and counterinsurgency operations.

The ideology, or political campaign, the insurgent group promotes, serves the valuable function of differentiating friend from foe. Providing an alternative to this ideology is integral to separating insurgents from the majority population (assuming the insurgents are a minority).

Many insurgencies survive through external support from other states or insurgent groups. One method students and analysts can use to find weaknesses to exploit is by knowing which insurgent groups do and do not receive external support and the motives for the disparity.

Finally, many responses to insurgency fail because of inflexibility, sloppiness, ignorance, bias, anger, bureaucratic imperative or psychological aversion. These failings create often flawed and fatally mistaken counterinsurgency strategies. Avoiding this should be of primary concern.

The fact that Trotsky tried to devise a revolutionary strategy to cope with the issues aroused by the existence of a Popular Front government in 1930s France made this collection of short pieces and pamphlets to remain consistently out of fashion for the next 70 years, as Marxists tended more and more to make a fetish out of Liberal Bourgeois political forms. Therefore the relevance of this book, as a discussion of the shortcomings of said Bourgeois Democracy in terms of the overall sclerosis imposed by it on the Body Politic.

Paris, February 1934: tens of thousands of rightists attempted to overthrow the French government in a violent demonstration. The Radical government was soon replaced with a Bonapartist ruler. How could the powerful working class movement respond? The French Communist Party was moving to the "Peoples Front" alliance with the Socialists and the Radicals, in reflection of Stalin's search for alliances with one or other of the imperialist powers moving towards war to redivide the world. Together with the Socialists, the Stalinists politically disoriented the French workers. Six years on from the 1934 demonstrations, Hitler was able to crush France, and the fascist Petain ascended to power. "Leon Trotsky on France", a collection of writings from throughout those six years, brings the light of Marxism and the experience of the Russian Revolution to bear in showing the way for workers seeking a revolutionary way forward. As the 21st century takes us deeper into a situation like the 1930s -- economic depression, political volatility and instability, rapidly sharpening inter-imperialist rivalry, the rise of ultrarightist forces -- the lessons of the 1930s loom large. With each passing year, books like this one are becoming more relevant for workers and fighters for social justice.

More than a history text, this is a compelling day-by-day analysis of the great political developments in France during the 1930s depression-- and incisive arguments for what working class parties needed-- and failed -- to do to fight their way victoriously out of the crisis. The brutal economic depression and the crisis of capitalist political rule, the approaching world war, the fascist uprising in 1934, the rise of Bonapartist-police state regimes, the great workers strike wave of 1936, the stakes in organizing a workers militia, the political basis for alliances in working class struggles-- all are explained clearly and logically, with the aim of helping working people understand and organize to defend their interests.

Trotsky writes with the experience of a leader of the 1917 Russian Revolution and the early years of building an international communist workers movement. He was particularly familiar with the French workers movement from years in exile before 1917, and spent time in France in the 1930s after being expelled from the Soviet Union by Stalin and his henchmen-- this experience helping him give rich political detail to his writings.

Above all, the questions posed here do not belong just to the 1930s. The perspectives of the capitalists, the petty-bourgeoisie, the workers and the peasants, and the question of leadership of the working class, of the forging of a revolutionary party with a correct program and the confidence to act are issues for today and tomorrow. Trotsky's writings here are invaluable in helping understand and organize in today's world.

Best part of the book -- Part Two: A Program for the French Revolution. For anyone who has had to deal with trade union brass who caution that the union membership must be careful not to alienate the friendly wing of management, for anyone who has had to suffer through debates in parties such as Canada's New Democratic Party, this book helps straighten things out clearly. As Europe thrashed its way through the 1930s, socialist revolution or fascist victory was put on the agenda in country after country. Trotsky goes over all the key issues as they arose concretely in France: elections and picket lines, workers armed defense versus reliance on the middle class, the relationship of general strike to the fight for a revolutionary change in government, how to win over the farmers. He hammers away at the fact that while capitalism was degenerating before everyone's eyes, nothing was automatic, nothing would inevitably change for the better without conscious action and organization by the powerful French working class. He pointed out that he was fighting for the lives of French workers who went into the streets in strike waves, who occupied their workplaces, who fought the police and fascist gangs over and over throughout the decade. And went down to defeat. Difficult to read simply as a historical document since so many issues are of burning relevance today.

France in the 1930s was wracked by mass struggles by workers, fascist, monarchist and other right-wing conspiracies two futures: the future of war, Nazi occupation and the Petain regime that aped fascism, and a victory of workers and farmers like the one in Russia in 1917 and Cuba in 1960s. Battles went on that could have prevented World War two, prevented fascism in Spain, and more.
Trotsky's advice here is not just directed to analyzing the big questions, but also discussing how small groups of revolutionists were affected by these big events, how they could deepen their role in the mass struggle.
With war, and what some call a gathering world depression looming in front of working people around the world, the same questions before French workers in the 1930s are coming before workers, youth, farmers and others who want to fight today. We are fortunate to read these writings by Trotsky to fight to avoid a future of war and fascism.

I liked the way Handel compares the classical thoughts of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. This a good way of understanding the fundamental similarities and differences in approach to war the West and East have.

This book is a comprehensive analysis of classical military thought. Although some would argue that this book is for military scholars, I beg to differ, and, heartily suggest this book to any First Year Student of Military Studies. It will greatly assist you in your comparison and analysis of theory and theorists and will also give you a comprehensive understanding of the universal logic of the principles and tenets of war.
This is a great book.

Dr. Terry Tucker
Combined Security and Transition Command-Afghanistan

is how I would describe Handel's 'Masters of War'. This however should not deter the keen reader from purchasing the book as it is indeed a wonderful, clear and interesting read.

In the course of his analysis, Handel sets out to compare and contrast the different schools of thought that 'the greats' developed, with particular attention being paid to Sun Tzu and Von Clausewitz. Perhaps this is where the text comes into its own for the academic. If one was to consider writing a study on the conduct and role of the military in this day and age, this book brings not only Sun Tzu and Von Clausewitz, but also Jomini and Machiavelli into focus. The student will hardly require a more comprehensive guide to different schools of thought for the construction of their essays.

In conclusion therefore, I would reaffirm my belief that this text would prove invaluable for any classical military analyst trying to find a text helping and perhaps reducing the amount of time devoted to sifting through Sun Tzu's 'Art of War' and Von Clausewitz's 'On War'. However, taken out of this context, although highly readable, it is perhaps beyond the requirement of the casual reader whom might be better served reading abridged texts of the originals first.

Michael Handel's third and final version of his "Masters Of War" may be the most accessible analysis of classical military thought available to the military professional or academic. Handel's patient, methodical, side-by-side textual analysis of the works of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz overcomes the deceptive simplicity of Sun Tzu's precepts and the equally deceptive dense verbiage of Clausewitz's "On War." The result is an enlightening exploration of what may be mankind's most complex and most dangerous collective activity. For all its wastage and terror, war continues to be a final arbiter of the destiny of nations and ideologies.

Handel's work is an intellectually challenging read designed for the military professional or academic. He examines important concepts such as the centers of gravity, the correlation of ends and means, and the relationship of military and political objectives through a compare and contrast analysis of the writings of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz. The writings of some other authorities such as Mao and Jomini are cited where especially relevant. Handel's prose is straightforward. He uses examples from a broad range of military history to illustrate his points.

The author, who died in 2001, completed his revisions for this edition before the start of the Global War on Terrorism. Nevertheless, both classical military thought and Handel's analysis continue to be relevant.

This book is very highly recommended for the mid-grade military professional, especially for those studying at the intermediate service college level, and for the military academic seeking a broader understanding of the operational and strategic levels of war.

The best side-by-side comparison of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Jomini strategic thought one can find. Included is Mao's strategic approach to completely round out classical perspective on war and strategy. The single best reference for understanding the similarities and differences between the masters of strategy.

Walter Boyne has given us a superb initial look at Operation Iraqi Freedom. Using his deep understanding of war in general and airpower in particular, he has taken what has so far appeared in the open press and has packaged it into a clear and concise narrative of this short but intense conflict.
Perhaps more importantly, he has detailed for us how the improvements that we made in our military forces post Desert Storm have given us the ability to dominate any military force. Precision guidance, information dominance, C4ISR, the close integration of SOF and conventional forces, the linking of ground forces to "on call" fighters, bombers, and massive AC-130 gunships are all highlighted by Boyne as he weaves their development and use into a larger narrative of the daily events of the conflict. It is a powerful story. And he looks at failure too, delving into incidents of fratricide and losses due to the terrible sand storms.
Many details are, of course, missing. Only time can correct that. But Walter Boyne has produced a useful work which helps to understand how we fought the second Gulf War. It is a bench mark for subsequent books.

"Operation Iraqi Freedom: What Went Right, What Went Wrong, and Why" is really two books in one. First, as the title implies, it is a treatise on a specific conflict - an in-depth presentation of how it all worked and an insightful analysis of how well it worked. Second, by way of extensive appendices that take up more than a third of the entire volume, it is a very comprehensive compendium of what it took to conduct that war in terms of materiel, weapons, logistics, people, methodologies, etc.

If it were not so readable, this would make a great textbook. As it is, it should be required reading for anyone interested in studying wars and what makes them tick, especially one that was waged so recently and so much in the public eye. As one could imagine, the great majority of what we read in the print media and saw on the TV screen was, because of the nature of the beast, the parts of the conflict that included the action, the damage and the more sensational aspects of what was going on.
A concern often raised about a book produced shortly after an event is how credible it can be as an analysis considering the recency of what occurred. There usually is a suspicion that it is a quick-reaction book dashed off in hopes of a fast buck by an author "writing off the top of his head." That concern was put to rest in this case by a thorough reading of what many readers overlook in their rush to get to the main text - the front matter of the book. Here I found the a wealth of information that established the book's bona fide's for me - the acknowledgements, foreword and preface.
The acknowledgements pointed out the author's people sources, a host of knowledgeable top military and civilian thinkers who provide the book with authenticity and authority.
The foreword helps a book in two ways: first by what it says about the book and, second, by the credibility of who wrote it - in this case former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, retired Gen. Ronald R. Fogelman who stated that the book reflects the contributions of all the elements of the coalition and the new, higher level of cooperation and interdependence of the forces involved. Fogelman also stated, "The United States and its coalition partners can be proud of their work In Operation Iraqi Freedom, and this book offers the first best look at how well they did their job."
The preface then gives the author the opportunity to establish his objectives, in this case to examine the efficacy of U.S. and coalition strategy, tactics, operational methods, weapon systems, and personnel during the period of armed conflict from March 19 through May 1, 2003. This author, Walter J. Boyne, has the extensive background as a career Air Force pilot and former director of the Smithsonian Institution's National Air and Space Museum, and has generated the many contacts needed to successfully produce a comprehensive study like this.
The book then goes on to do just that in full, but readable, detail. The background of the how, who and what leading up to this war are followed by the actions taken to pursue it to a quick victory and by an explanation of the new type of warfare that made it possible. Interspersed are short, side articles such as the fascinating "How Nations Go To War" that put this one war into perspective with all other conflicts fought until then. The author inserts at appropriate places, as the book's title implies, discussions about what went right and why and what went wrong and why - and lessons learned.
Operation Iraqi Freedom is not light reading and you can't get anything from skimming it. Plan to spend some time - from beginning to end - and you will end up with a better understanding of the story behind what you read and watched in the popular press. Highly recommended.

Arthur H. Sanfelici
Editor
Aviation History Magazine

This book is a fine work. Obviously, publisher weekly's reviewer must be one of those individuals (without much of a life experience) that cannot stand the recent successes of our military in Iraq and elsewhere. Shameful.
More and possibly better work will follow, but for those who need a preliminary record of the iraqi battle, this book will do just that.

Walter Boyne's work in Operation Iraqi Freedom: What Went Right, What Went Wrong, and Why is on target. As some other reviewers here have detailed Boyne's qualifications (and they are extensive and appropriate), we'll simply agree that he is the right author to synthesize the information thus far available on the conflict.

Concerns expressed about writing such a history so soon after the dust has settled are valid but in this case, should be put into proper perspective. Boyne's book is a history of operations. It examines what went right and wrong between March 19 and May 1, a period commonly acknowledged as the conventional phase of the conflict. Boyne details the US military's new "unconventional" approach to conventional warfare during this phase. It does not attempt to deal with the subsequent insurgency campaign which continues.

The book is best viewed as a "first-look" overview of the operations leading to the dissolution of uniformed Iraqi armed forces. It is also a primer on the doctrinal and technological changes developed since the first Iraqi conflict which allowed the campaign to be prosecuted in a new way.

Boyne is to be commended for presenting a complex subject in an interesting, readable way. One of the book's advantages is that it reflects the contemporary wisdom of the many credible sources Boyne taps to tell the story. These include those who helped design the military that went into the conflict. In this respect, it is invaluable to future historians.

It is certain that military planners worldwide are energetically analyzing what the US miltary accomplished in the major combat operations Boyne's book covers. It is also likely that many will turn to Operation Iraqi Freedom: What Went Right, What Went Wrong, as an informed introduction to the subject.

The Publishers Weekly reviewer obviously did not read the book he or she reviewed; instead it launched into a series of anti-military statements that completely invalidate it. I cannot imagine how Amazon would willingly publish so obviously and willfully destructive review--it was non-objective and totally inaccurate--a Pub Weekly reviews on miltary subjects usually are.