Ethics Books

Joe Kita's writting is wonderful! I wish I could thank him personally for writting such a great book! I have almost finished reading it and I can't wait to go back through it again! I have laughed, cried and felt fear right along with him. He has done many things that I have been terrified of even thinking about but now I feel that mabe there is really nothing in this life that I couldn't face.

I was given the opportunity to read an advance copy of this terrific book and contribute a book jacket endorsement. Having just reread it, I cannot resist giving it another plug.

Joe Kita understands that some fears, "like termites," eat away at us constantly, and some fears guide us, protect us, challenge us, and ultimately lead us straight through to the other side of our personal hells.

Read Accidental Courage for inspiration, for fun, or both. But definitely read it.

Although many intelligent books currently in print address the subjects of fear and anxiety, I had yet to locate one that speaks so clearly to the male perspective, that is until "Accidental Courage."

Statistically, we are told that the majority of anxiety disorder sufferers are women, so this lack of attention to the peculiarities of the male experience of anxiety is understandable. Although not about anxiety disorder per se, Joe Kita has written a masterful work that explores what it feels like to be a man in modern times who feels his life being gradually but systematically eroded by fears, both big and small.

Not content to succumb, Mr. Kita sets out to face his (and our) fears in fascinating ways and lives to tell the tale in this remarkable book. His insights, wit and wisdom will make you want to read this book over and over again.

As a man who has suffered with anxiety, this book really spoke to me. Mr. Kita gets inside fear, experiences it, explains it. He speaks honestly and thoughtfully, leaving you with the feeling you just had a long conversation with a really good friend. In short, I highly recommend this book. Joe Kita shines the light on fear, and we see it's really not that scary after all.

Mr. Kita, thank you for writing this book.

Kerr's book is, in large part, a survey of the recent revival of interest in Thomas Aquinas' thought, gathering together a wide variety of interpretations that are not all readily available in English or in any one place. In surveying these interpretations, however, Kerr produces his own, somewhat revisionist interpretation of Aquinas, one that in many ways will complement the treatment already given by others (e.g., Milbank and Pickstock), though at points indirectly contesting their account. As such, it serves as an excellent introduction to the thought of Aquinas in the context of the last century of debates on how to interpret his thought properly.

Kerr discusses an array of Thomistic topics: Aquinas in his historical context, his epistemology, his "natural theology" and the five ways, his account of metaphysics, how he thinks about natural law and ethics, the controversies surrounding Thomistic discussions of nature and grace, and finally his soteriology (particularly "deification"), christology, and his doctrine of God.

Kerr is always clear and deals with the variety of alternatives when it comes to understanding Aquinas on a particular issue. Moreover, though he is not dogmatic in his own interpretations, Kerr does provide a case for reading Aquinas along the lines of many of the major revisionists of the past century (with whom I have am generally quite sympathetic).

For instance, many people think of "natural law" when they consider Aquinas' ethics. But Kerr does a good job exploring the various ways in which Aquinas has been understood on this issue, making a good case for seeing his "natural law" approach as quite different from that of later natural law theorists (late medieval as well as modern ones, such as Hobbes or Locke). Kerr also takes care to place natural law within Aquinas' larger discussion of beatitude, participation in the mind of God, sin and grace, virtue, prudence, and charity.

Kerr makes a good case for seeing Aquinas as not really an "Aristotelian," but at least as equally indebted to the tradition of Christian neo-platonism found in Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius (which, as a form of neo-platonism, has already been "corrected" by Aristotle's thought). Besides, there are some serious questions about what we have traditionally understood as "Aristotelian" in contrast to what Aristotle was actually saying (e.g., on the question of "substance"), as well as how he was understood by Aquinas. Later traditions and readings have often misconstrued not only Aquinas, but also Aristotle and Aquinas' interpretation of Aristotle.

While Kerr's volume is really just an introduction, it is an excellent one in both breadth and clarity-a book that I would strongly consider using if I were to teach an undergraduate course on the thought of Aquinas.

Kerr, a Dominican, is Regent of Blackfriars Hall, University of Oxford, Honorary Senior Lecturer in Theology and Religious Studies at the University of Edinburgh, and editor of "New Blackfriars," the periodical of the English Dominicans. This book is one of the most fascinating and informative books on Thomas to come along in some time. Kerr focuses on the period beginning with Pope Leo XIII's endorsement of Thomism as a bulwark against post-Cartesian modernism and subjectivism, and the division of Thomism into Transcendental (essentially Kantian-informed) and Existential (anti-Kantian and anti-modern) factions. He shows how modern Thomism has been shaped by, and is thus largely a product of, reactions to modern thinkers, such as Descartes, Kant, Heidegger and other thinkers. He successfully destabilizes the conventional view of Thomas as important mainly for his theistic proofs (the "five ways") and natural law theory, not only by arguing that Thomas's arguments are essentially unintelligible apart from his larger theological purposes, but that these purposes change the way we understand even his philosophical importance. The Thomas that emerges in Kerr's account makes an interesting dialogue partner with contemporary thinkers such as Martin Heidegger and Karl Barth. Furthermore, he holds his own against Barth's misguided claims that Thomas's concept of "nature" doesn't take sin seriously, or that his notion of divine "simplicity" is idolatrous, or that his concept of "analogia entis" is the invention of Antichrist! The Thomism that emerges is strikingly at odds with that which we often encounter in the secular or Protestant "textbook traditions," where Thomas's God is a barren "First Cause" or abstract "immutable substance," for example. Once we understand what Thomas means, Kerr argues, we see that his God is so dynamic that He is more accurately defined by verbs than by nouns! Kerr offers chatty, and sometimes wickedly naughty behind-the-scene peeks into controversies that have shaped modern Thomism, such as the very personal controversy between Garrigou-Lagrange and de Lubac. He also apprears to be thoroughly conversant with recent non-Catholic theology (for example, such as the work of the Lutheran theologian, Robert Jensen, or the New Finnish interpretation of Luther's notion of justification as close to the Greek idea of "theosis"-- an idea for which Kerr finds some parallel in Thomas's view of sanctification). He is, of course, intimately familiar with the usual suspects--the Catholic standards (Gilson, Chenu, Maritain, Von Balthasar). Very highly recommended.

After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism by Fergus Kerr (Blackwell Publishers) (Paperback)
Written by a leading theologian, this new account of the writings of Thomas Aquinas and their interpretation by modern commentators reflects the major revival of interest in his work.
After Aquinas makes available in one volume all the material necessary for a rounded appreciation of Aquinas's work and his enduring influence. As well as revisiting Aquinas's own work, Kerr brings together a range of views that have previously appeared in disparate places, thereby exploring alternatives to the standard understanding of Aquinas's writings. This book therefore represents a major revisionist treatment of Thomism and its significance, combining useful exposition with original, creative thinking.
After Aquinas will become essential reading for all undergraduate students and scholars interested in the work of this great theologian.
Excerpt: The hard question is to account for the rival ways of reading Thomas. The mid-nineteenth-century revival of interest, primarily in his supposedly Aristotelian philosophy, was intended to put it to use in containing and eradicating the supposedly Cartesian/Kantian subjectivist individualism by which Roman Catholic thinkers were then attracted. This use of Thomas, as we saw in chapter 2, remains effective in the context of analytic philosophy. It may, however, soon have to deal with a threat from medieval scholarship: anachronism is always a risk when one calls on earlier thinkers to refute current arguments. Anyway, the standard outsider's view of Thomas owes everything to Leonine Thomism: at worst, `arid Aristotelianism', at best a combination of natural theology and natural law ethics which satisfies some and repels others.
On the inside, so to speak, among those educated in institutions where Leonine Thomism was all but mandatory, it was being rejected by the 1920s. Initiated by such remarkable interpreters as Pierre Rousselot and Joseph Maréchal, many students of Thomas concluded that Cartesian/Kantian philosophy could not be outwitted by being regarded as a total mistake; rather, Thomas had to be reread in the light of modern philosophical considerations. The `Copernican revolution' inaugurated by Kant, in his focus on the active role of the knower and the autonomy of the moral agent, turned out, in this rereading, to be anticipated in Thomas's conception of the natural drive of the mind towards truth and being. Far from being a supposedly empiricist epistemology, with the 1 mind being conformed to things in the world, Thomas viewed every act of knowing and choosing as implicitly knowing and choosing the truth and goodness which is the mystery of the divine being. This generated transcendental Thomism.' Kant's analysis of experience is `transcendental', in the sense of getting behind actual experience to lay bare the conditions which make it possible at all. This reading of Thomas disclosed the a priori conditions that Thomas took for granted in his understanding of human experience: namely, that in every act of knowing and loving the human being is tacitly and no doubt mostly unwittingly growing closer to (or further away from) God.
In a somewhat different way, theologians of the same generation, notably Henri de Lubac, reconnected Thomas's thought with the patristic tradition: in short, as we saw in chapter 8, retrieving his under-standing of the human spirit as created in the divine image and naturally desiring the face-to-face vision of God which of course can be granted only as a gift. This puts an end to the two-storey view of grace and nature, setting the two over against each other, in favor of under-standing human life under divine grace as the perfection of human nature. Opponents of this view feared that human nature as always already graced, human reason as always already anticipating beatific vision, and human desire as always already fulfilled in charity, smoothes out the tensions and contradictions and risks allowing nature, reason and desire to collapse into grace, faith and charity - or, by naturalizing the latter, turning Christian life into a form of secular humanism.
In his book on Karl Barth, Hans Urs von Balthasar rejected `sawdust Thomism' in favour of de Lubac's retrieval of Thomas's doctrine of natural desire for God. Balthasar's main concern, however, was to put Thomas's thought back into the context of the entire Western meta-physical tradition, understanding this as repeated disclosure of the divine goodness, truth and beauty, consummated in the self-revelation of God in the Christian dispensation of grace. Above all, Balthasar sought to bring out the importance of Thomas's insistence on the distinction in creatures between their nature and their existence, or, rather, on the complete absence of any such distinction in God.
Thomas, we may agree, is a transitional figure: later than the monastic theology and sacramental sense of the world which we find still in the early thirteenth century, earlier than the fourteenth-century developments that opened tensions and contradictions between nature and grace, reason and faith, and so on, leading eventually to the rejection (in the West) of Aristotle and Christian Platonism. It is not easy, nowadays, to believe in the harmony of reason and faith for which the High Middle Ages, or at least Thomas Aquinas, were once celebrated. It remains an option, on the other hand, to take Thomas either as a key figure in the development of modern theology or as primarily a continuator of pre-modernity. He can be read as inaugurating modern philosophy of religion, but only if his conceptual apparatus, and in particular his understanding of causality and substance, are assumed to anticipate the standard modern view. If, on the other hand, he has a notion of agent causality, and of self-diffusive substance, we find ourselves on a different hermeneutic line altogether.
Similarly with his conception of moral theology as principally an ethics of divine beatitude, and with his conception of sanctification as deified creaturehood, we are once again reading Thomas in the light of theological traditions he inherited, rather than in that of modern and in particular post-Reformation problems.
Sometimes, no doubt, this or that interpretation must be regarded as simply mistaken. On the whole, however, more complex factors are at play. For those who have been trained in analytic philosophy, and are inclined to accept Frege's principle that `existence is not a predicate', Thomas's talk of `Being' will (as Anthony Kenny says) be `sophistry and illusion'. On the other hand, for those who believe Heidegger's grand
narrative about the forgetfulness of Being in the metaphysical tradition, Thomas's talk of `Being' will either be `idolatry' or (with Balthasar) the wonderful exception to Heidegger's rule. While there are recent attempts to show that analytic philosophy and hermeneutic/deconstructionist philosophies are not as radically incommensurable as they look, it seems unlikely that students of Thomas from these rival traditions will ever take each other very seriously, let alone come to any common understanding.
Perhaps we should rescue Thomas from philosophy altogether - but then, after all, he is a great philosopher, indeed that is one of the sources of the ambivalence of his thought. He is a philosopher and he is a theologian, and we are never going to agree where to put the emphasis.
In short, as some readings of his natural law theory seem to show, incommensurable yet equally plausible, Thomas's thought, perhaps over a range of issues, contains within itself the Janus-like ambiguities that generate competing interpretations which can never be reconciled. Working out a doctrine of God and of creation in conjunction with Jewish and Islamic metaphysics, a Latin theologian in the new university environment referring all the time to great monastic theologians of the Eastern Church, a Catholic theologian haunted by Catharist dualism, more concerned to protect the faith of friends in the arts faculty against Islamicized Aristotelianism than to avoid alarming his colleagues in divinity with his Aristotelian insights - all along the line Thomas's work, we may surely say, offers readers today little of the `synthesis' and `equilibrium' for which it was widely admired 50 years ago, but, on the contrary, reveals a loose-endedness in its constantly repeated discussions of finally unresolvable problems: `straw', Thomas called his work, in comparison with the knowledge of God for which he hoped and prayed; sketches, we may say, that he made in the course of his long and involved journeyings.

Some parts of this book made me cry and some made me laugh, but the whole book brought some more truth into my life. Thank you, Mr. Ozinga for a great read!!

I picked up this book from the Seattle library. I can't speak to the purchase price. However, Altuism is one of the most enjoyable books I have read. Ozinga explores the subject, from social altruism (Serfdom, Communism), to biological altruism (survival gene, self-sacrifice of organisms). He sites hisorical, scientific examples, and builds them through chapters, to a common sense conclusion, "tolerence". This book was an engrossing ride.

I do not have enough time to write all that I should on this volume, but, suffice it to say, it is filled with wit, intelligence and insight. I heartily recommend it to everyone.

I'm still looking for my own copy, unfotunately I couldn't read it all, but what I read was very close to my own ideas and, I think, many of my friends. I liked very much examples from literature and History Mr Savater uses all along the book; congratulations.

Although somewhat of a contradiction in terms, this book is a touching discourse from a father to a son on how to live life on his own terms. He gives his perspective on everything lofty that he ahs ever come in contact with but underneath it all is the suggwestion that this is merely his take, and the most important interpretation is a persons' own.

If you are in search for your calling or pursuing your calling, this selection would be of a very good asset. It is a great investment for our well beings under the Spiritual Realm. It grasps the vitality of Christian Leadership in the New Testament Church.

This is a must book for all Christian to read. The writer clearly authenticate one's calling from God.

This is one book that every christian must read.The writer is right on the mark with his point and God"s calling.

I read this book for a graduate seminar on Aristotle. Politics is one of Aristotle's most prescient works that had a profound impact on our Founding fathers.

Nicomachean Ethics (EN) is part of political knowledge. Politics regulates when virtue does not. Laws are created for people who are not virtuous. Polis= "city or state." Humans live in society, so virtue ethics is not just for individual living, community is a shared project for the good. Aristotle starts with his method, a phenomenological attitude. He starts with pairs, male and female, builds up to ruler and subject, master and slave as a natural relationship, the 1st social community thus is the household. Household is an economic relationship and has monarchy of patriarch. Villages are a collection of households with a king. Then you have a Polis, a fulfilled complete community formed from several villages. Self-sufficiency is the mark of a Polis. An organized social relationship is Polis and a reason is being able to take care of needs of life and promote living well. Only in a Polis can you have art, philosophy, etc. All these are actualized in a Polis. Politics is natural to human life. We are meant to be social. According to Aristotle, "If you don't want to live in a state you are either a God or a beast."

Logos= "rationality or language" is what helps us to be political animals. Rational language expands capacity in human life. Since Aristotle thinks the Polis has a telos or an end then the Polis as potential comes even before the household. This is similar to the acorn having the telos to become a mighty oak tree. Politics completes the human condition for Aristotle. Need a Polis to develop other human capacities.

Aristotle's hierarchy. Slaves are a living tool for Aristotle. Aristotle argues that some people are meant to be slaves right from birth. "Born to be ruled." Slavish person does not have enough rationality to rule themselves. Aristotle says not every form of actual enslavement is justified according to him. He justifies the human use of animals as a natural act.

Aristotle now wants to find what kind of government is best. In a Polis citizens have things in common. Aristotle criticizes Plato's Republic, he finds it to be overly controlling. Socrates says the soul has 3 aspects and so does the Polis. The Soul has:

1. Reason
2. Passion
3. Appetite
The Polis has:
1. Philosopher King.
2. Guardians, (military).
3. Commoners.

Both are a hierarchal ordering. Socrates and Plato talk about the state holding all property in common. This includes the state raising children after birth instead of the parents, thus there will be no family clans trying to better themselves over their neighbors. Aristotle criticizes this idea. Aristotle says a Polis is a plurality of people thus people are not all the same and a Polis must accommodate differences in people, which actually makes a Polis better. Aristotle criticizes Socrates and Plato's idea of a Polis needing to have "unity" of people. This is a contrast to the Polis of Sparta. Aristotle says the best way to integrate citizens to the Polis is to allow them taking turns in ruling it. Aristotle believes that holding property or rearing of children in common as in the Republic is wrong no one really loves children like their own and communal property never gets really taken care of. Love is diminished the less nuclear family we are.
Aristotle says you need a mix of private and public property. Thus, the best kind of Polis is a combination of a governing element. Aristotle affirms a constitutional democracy or Polity. A citizen participates in government by definition for Aristotle.

Comparison of virtue and the good citizen. Excellence of virtuous man not the same as a good citizen. There will be few virtuous men, but good citizens just have to follow the law. Aristotle says good political virtue and good moral virtue don't have to go together. "Living finely then most of all is the goal of the city."

Aristotle classifies 3 types of government which occur naturally in nature and 3 types of deteriorations of those governments, they are:

1. "Monarchy," rule by one man a king, this is a top down rule. The deterioration is a "Tyranny," who is a ruler who rules for his own benefit.
2. "Aristocracy," rule by the best few men in the Polis, also this is a top down rule. The deterioration is an "oligarchy,' which he defines as rule of the rich who want to perpetuate themselves.
3. "Polity," All citizens participate in government with a constitution set above them to guide them instead of a king or aristocracy. The deterioration is a "democracy or what today we call mob rule or tyranny of the majority. He calls it rule of the poor.

Aristotle does a good job of looking at states and how they can be corrupted. Aristotle's concept of political justice and what is the best concept. What does justice mean? Not necessarily equality for all. Not all people are equal. He implies sometimes it is unjust to treat people equally. Justice is not necessarily equality for all; sometimes it would be unjust to treat all people equally. Politics is rated high by Aristotle as a human good. Education is a central feature of political life for Aristotle. "But we must find the relevant respect of equality or inequality; for this question raises a puzzle that concerns political philosophy." First, because someone is unequal on hierarchy that means better than others like more virtuous. This is like "distributive justice" who gets what goods. Do you give the best flute to the best flute player which is based on merit or to the richest or best looking person? Aristotle says inequality should tip towards those who earn it on merit. His concept of equality and inequality is based on merit. Another philosopher coined a famous formula for this based on Relevant Respect:

P= Person, Q= Quality, C= Context.
It would be just to treat P1 + P2 equally or unequally if P1 + P2 are equal or unequal in Q (quality) relevant to C (content). This is a formula on how to treat people relevant to goods. This is context dependent. Allot of empirical work to be done before we use the formula.

People who fight wars control politics in the Polis. The more people who have weapons in a civilian army is a guarantee that a small group of people will not take control of the government and democracy grows, like our 2nd amendment, this is a historical perspective of the idea that works.
Democracy spreads power to citizens a bottom up structure. Expertise in relation to politics. Many professions we tend to defer to the experts for judgment, physicians, lawyers, etc. Plato's Republic does this with his advocacy of Philosopher king running government. Aristotle says the judgment of the many combined as acting as one is better then a monarch or a few wise men to run the government. In principle, pooling of multiple people to run Polis is good. Politics by nature is a communal effort so you should use all the people's expertise. Aristotle is against letting experts running the Polis they are not always the best of judges. The best judge of the function of a house is the owner, not the builder. In addition, Aristotle says there may not really be any such thing as a political expert, like a philosopher king. Aristotle advocates for a constitutional democracy a written set of laws to protect Polis from a tyranny of the majority. "Law is reason unaffected by desire." A government of laws not men. A living being as the last word is not good.

Role of education in politics. Politics is coming together to foster human development and happiness for community, citizens, and improving human life like education. Aristotle says it should be public education.

I recommend Aristotle's works to anyone interested in obtaining a classical education, and those interested in philosophy. Aristotle is one of the most important philosophers and the standard that all others must be judged by.

Kelvin Knight puts his readers greatly in debt for this masterful and erudite study of the history of Aristotelian philosophy, with particular emphasis on MacIntyre's place in that history. Notwithstanding his disclaimers in the conclusion, Knight has in fact produced a clear account of "the conceptual subtleties and political implications" of MacIntyre's Aristotelianism elsewhere unmatched. And Knight really knows his MacIntyre, drawing on some 100 of his publications in this explication. An especially welcome element of the study is the manner in which Knight shows us the continuity of MacIntyre's early engagement with Marx and his latest work, an important corrective against political conservatives' misemployment of MacIntyre's work. Indeed, Knight finds MacIntyre's political philosophy to remain revolutionary. A great book on the most important ethical philosopher of our time.

Written by Kelvin Knight (senior lecturer in politics, London Metropolitan University), Aristotelian Philosophy: Ethics and Politics from Aristotle to MacIntyre is a scholarly intellectual history of Aristotelian philosophy, and its long-running importance up to the present day. Chapters explore the theoretical bases behind what Aristotle said about ethical, political and productive activity; Aristotle's practical philosophy as well as his theoretical philosophy; and applications of his ideas in settings ranging from medieval Christian times to Germany to revolutionary Aristotelianism in modern history including MacIntyre's Marxism. At times highly technical due to its depth and nuance of complex concepts, Aristotelian Philosophy is a welcome addition to college library and philosophical studies shelves.

I read this book for a graduate seminar on Aristotle. I think Aristotle's ethics is his most seminal work in philosophy. In the early 1960's virtue ethics came to fore. It is a retrieval of Aristotle. It has very close parallels to the ancient Chinese philosophy of Confucius and the modern philosophy espoused in the 1970's called Communitarianism.

For Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics, (EN) is about human life in an embodied state. Area of inquirery for EN is "good" this is his phenomenology. What does "good" mean? He suggests good means "a desired end." Something desirable. Means towards these ends. Such as money is good, so one can buy food to eat because "eating is good." In moral philosophy distinction between "intrinsic good" vs. "instrumental good." Instrumental good towards a desire is "instrumental good" like money. Thus, money is an "instrumental good" for another purpose because it produces something beyond itself. Instrumental good means because it further produces a good, "intrinsic good" is a good for itself, "for the sake of" an object like money. "Intrinsic good" for him is "Eudemonia=happiness." This is what ethics and virtues are for the sake of the organizing principle. Eudemonia=happiness. Today we think of happiness as a feeling. It is not a feeling for Aristotle. Best translation for eudaimonia is "flourishing" or "living well." It is an active term and way of living for him thus, "excellence." Ultimate "intrinsic good" of "for the sake of." Eudaimonia is the last word for Aristotle. Can also mean fulfillment. Idea of nature was thought to be fixed in Greece convention is a variation. What he means is ethics is loose like "wealth is good but some people are ruined by wealth." EN isn't formula but a rough outline. Ethics is not precise; the nature of subject won't allow it. When you become a "good person" you don't think it out, you just do it out of habit!

You can have ethics without religion for Aristotle. Nothing in his EN is about the afterlife. He doesn't believe in the universal good for all people at all times like Plato and Socrates. The way he thought about character of agent, "thinking about the good." In addition, Aristotle talked about character traits. Good qualities of a person who would act well. Difference between benevolent acts and a benevolent person. If you have good character, you don't need to follow rules. Aretç=virtue, in Greek not religious connotation but anything across the board meaning "excellence" high level of functioning, a peak. Like a musical virtuoso. Ethical virtue is ethical excellence, which is the "good like." In Plato, ethics has to do with quality of soul defining what to do instead of body like desires and reason. For Aristotle these are not two separate entities.

To be good is how we live with other people, not just focus on one individual. Virtue can't be a separate or individual trait. Socrates said same the thing. Important concept for Aristotle, good upbringing for children is paramount if you don't have it, you are a lost cause. Being raised well is "good fortune" a child can't choose their upbringing. Happenstance is a matter of chance.

Pleasure cannot be an ultimate good. Part of the "good life" involves external goods like money, one can't attain "good life" if one is poor and always working. Socrates said material goods don't matter, then he always mooched off of his friends! Aristotle surmises that the highest form of happiness is contemplation. In Aristotle's Rhetoric, he lists several ingredients for attaining eudaimonia. Prosperity, self-sufficiency, etc., is important, thus, if you are not subject to other, competing needs. A long interesting list. It is common for the hoi polloi to say pleasure=happiness. Aristotle does not deny pleasure is good; however, it is part of a package of goods. Pleasure is a condition of the soul. In the animal world, biological beings react to pleasure and pain as usual. Humans as reasoning beings must pursue knowledge to fulfill human nature. It must be pleasurable to seek knowledge and other virtues and if it is not there is something wrong according to Aristotle. These are the higher pleasures and so you may have to put off lower pleasures for the sake of attaining "higher pleasures."

Phronçsis= "intelligence," really better to say "practical wisdom." The word practical helps here because the word Phronçsis for Aristotle is a term having to do with ethics, the choices that are made for the good. As a human being, you have to face choices about what to do and not to do. Phronçsis is going to be that capacity that power of the soul that when it is operating well will enable us to turn out well and that is why it is called practical wisdom. The practically wise person is somebody who knows how to live in such a way so that their life will turn out well, in a full package of "goods." For Aristotle, Phronçsis is not deductive or inductive knowledge like episteme; Phronçsis is not a kind of rational knowledge where you operate in either deduction or induction, you don't go thru "steps" to arrive at the conclusion. Therefore, Phronçsis is a special kind of capacity that Aristotle thinks operates in ethics. Only if you understand what Aristotle means by phronesis do you get a hold on the concept. My way of organizing it, it is Phronçsis that is a capacity that enables the virtues to manifest themselves.

What are the virtues? Phronçsis is the capacity of the soul that will enable the virtues to fulfill themselves. Virtue ethics is the characteristics of a person that will bring about a certain kind of moral living, and that is exactly what the virtues are. The virtues are capacities of a person to act well. All of the virtues can be organized by way of this basic power of the soul called Phronçsis. There are different virtues, but it is the capacity of Phronçsis that enables these virtues to become activated. Basic issue is to find the "mean" between extremes; this is how Aristotle defines virtues.

Humans are not born with the virtues; we learn them and practice them habitually. "We reach our complete perfection through habit." Aristotle says we have a natural potential to be virtuous and through learning and habit, we attain them. Learn by doing according to Aristotle and John Dewey. Then it becomes habitual like playing a harp. Learning by doing is important for Aristotle. Hexis= "state," "having possession." Theoria= "study." The idea is not to know what virtue is but to become "good." Emphasis on finding the balance of the mean. Each virtue involves four basic points.

1. Action or circumstance. Such as risk of losing one's life.
2. Relevant emotion or capacity. Such as fear and pain.
3. Vices of excess and vices of deficiency in the emotions or the capacities. Such as cowardice is the excess vice of fear, recklessness is the excess deficiency.
4. Virtue as a "mean" between the vices and deficiencies. Such as courage as the "mean."

No formal rule or "mean" it depends on the situation and is different for different people as well. For example--one should eat 3,000 calories a day. Well depends on the health and girth of the person, and what activity they are engaged in. It is relative to us individually.
All Aristotle's qualifications are based on individual situations and done with knowledge of experience. Some things are not able to have a "mean" like murder and adultery because these are not "goods."
Akrasia= "incontinence" really "weakness of the will. Socrates thought that all virtues are instances of intelligence or Phronçsis. Aristotle criticizes Socrates idea of virtue, virtue is not caused by state of knowledge it is more complicated. Aristotle does not think you have to have a reasoned principle in the mind and then do what is right, they go together.

The distinctions between continent and incontinent persons, and moderate (virtue) and immoderate (not virtuous) persons is as follows:

1. Virtue. Truly virtuous people do not struggle to be virtuous, they do it effortlessly, very few people in this category, and most are in #2 and #3.
2. Ethical strength. Continence. We know what is right thing to do but struggle with our desires.
3. Ethical weakness. This is akrasia incontinence. Happens in real life.
4. Vice. The person acts without regret of his bad actions.

What does Aristotle mean by "fully virtuous"? Ethical strength is not virtue in the full sense of the term. Ethical weakness is not a full vice either. This is the critique against Socrates idea that "Knowledge equals virtue." No one can knowingly do the wrong thing. Thus, Socrates denies appetites and desires. Aristotle understands that people do things that they know are wrong, Socrates denies this. Socrates says if you know the right thing you will do it, Aristotle disagrees. The law is the social mechanism for numbers 2, 3, 4. A truly virtuous person is their own moral compass.

I recommend Aristotle's works to anyone interested in obtaining a classical education, and those interested in philosophy. Aristotle is one of the most important philosophers and the standard that all others must be judged by.

Urmson offers a clear, concise, and even handling of all the major issues Nicomachean Ethics contains. The thematic structure of the book is outstanding. Urmson is like a grandfather who understands the "modern" difficulties of the day but is peacefully removed from their "pull."

This book is a keen analysis of Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics. Although only 130 pages, Urmson explains Aristotle's ideas very precisely. Urmson's diction and economy of words are evidence of his great learning on the subject. He thinks and write like a master. My only complaint is that the two page index is inadequate. But in a short book, that is not fatal.

Candy Paull demonstrates how she lives her life, and invites us to follow her lead and discover all the blessings that come to us each and every day. I have featured "The Art of Abundance" on my website www.PlatinumPearls.com since the book was first published. I recommend this book. Buy extra copies for gifts!

I was having a really hard time in my life, when I saw this book on Oprah. I don't watch Oprah normally, so call it fate. I read this book, and my spirits were uplifted. Mind you, my problems didn't go away, but I was able to put them in perspective.

Now, I'm lending this book to everyone I know, and making my own list of life's treasures. I felt like a little kid, seeing things in the world I had forgotten about.

Highly recommended for spiritual healing.

I have given this book as a gift three times. It is a quiet reminder of the simple good things in life that we rush by taking for granted. I loved the beautiful simplicity of this book and hope the author will write another.

The Art of the Impossible is, indeed, a very good introduction to the political philosophy of a great leader. Every lecture and article contained in this volume holds fabulous, almost poetic passages, and offers insights into the difficulties of leading a nation away from the physical and psychological devastation of communism. On some occasions Mr. Havel looks at his own position from a critical point of view, something we don't see very often in this kind of work.

This is a rather optimistic book, and every person who aspires to making our world a better - and safer - place for everyone, should definitely read it. It does not, however, provide us with solutions, but this is not what this work was intended for in the first place. What it does is identify the areas of politics we ought to concentrate on. The passages in which he argues for an increased participation of "intellectuals" in politics is particularly enlightening.

A commendable collection of lectures and essays, beautifully translated, which offers us a glimpse of a truly admirable man.

The essays and speeches contained in this book provide an excellent introduction to Vaclav Havel, one of the most intelligent and conscientious political figures of this century. His discussions about democracy, forgiveness, the future of the former Soviet Union, the future of the Czech Republic and other themes are thoughtfully composed and eloquently expressed. No review that I can write can do justice to this man's incredible vision for his country, our world, and our future.

I hope Havel's own words (he is one of the few presidents who writes his own speeches, consistently with his life motto "living in the truth") will inspire you to buy and read "The Art of Impossible" and other books written by this humble and couragoues man. From Havel's writings one can learn much about history, politics, philosophy,psychology and art/theatre. Moreover, everyone reading Havel's works with an open mind and heart will be challenged to reflect on his/her own place in this world.

"For forty years on this day you heard, from my predecessors, variations on the same theme: how our country flourished, how many million tons of steel we produced, how happy we all were,
how we trusted our government, and what bright perspectives were unfolding before us. I assume you did not propose me for this office so that I, too, would lie to you. (New Year's Address to the Nation, Prague, January 1, 1990)

"But this is still not the main problem. The worst thing is that we live in a contaminated moral environment. We fell morally ill because we got used to saying something different from what we thought. We learned not to believe in anything, to ignore each other, to care only for ourselves. Concepts such as love, friendship, compassion, humility and forgiveness lost their
depth and dimension, and for many of us they came to represent only psychological pecularities, or to resemble long-lost greetings from the ancient times, a little ridiculous in the era of commuters and spaceships. ...When I talk about contaminated moral atmosphere, I am not talking just about the gentlemen who eat organic vegetables and do not look out of the planes windows, I am talking about all of us. We had all become used to the totalitarian system and accepted it as an unalterable fact of life, and thus we helped to perpetuate it. In other words, we are all-though naturally to differing extents-responsible for the operation of the totalitarian machinery. None of us is just its victim: we are all also its cocreators. (New Year's Address to the Nation, Prague, January 1, 1990)

"...we must accept this legacy as a sin we committed against ourselves. If we accept it as such, we will understand that it is up to us all, and up to us alone, to do something about it. We must not blame the previous rulers for everything, not only because it would be untrue but also because it could blunt the duty each of us faces today, that is, the obligation to act independently, freely,reasonably, and quickly. ...Freedom and democracy require participation and therefore responsible action from us all. (New Year's Address to the Nation, Prague, January 1, 1990)

"We agree that the basic prerequisite for a genuine friendship between our nations is truth, a truth that is always expressed, no matter how hard." (The Visit of German President Richard von
Weizacker, Prague)

"Interests of all kinds-personal, selfish, state, national, group, and if you like, company interests-still considerably outweigh genuinely common and global interests. We are still under the sway of the destructive and thoroughly vain belief that man is the pinnacle of creation, and not just a part of it, and that therefore everything is permitted to him. There are still many who say they are concerned not for themselves but for the cause, while they act demonstrably in their own interests
and not for the cause at all. We are destroying the planet that was entrusted to us. We still close our eyes to the growing social, ethnic, and cultural conflicts in the world. From time to time we say that the anonymous megamachinery we have created for ourselves no longer serves us but,rather, has enslaved us, yet we fail to do anything about it. In other words, we still don't know how to put morality ahead of politics, science and economics. We are still incapable of understanding that the only genuine core of all our actions-if they are to be moral-is responsibility. Responsibility to something higher than my family, my country, my firm, my success. Responsibility to the order of Being, where all our actions are indelibly recorded and where, and only where, they will be properly judged. The
interpreter or mediator between us and this higher authority is what is traditionally referred to as human conscience. If I subordinate my political behavior to this imperative, I can't go far wrong. If on the contrary, I am not guided by this voice, not even ten presidential schools with two thousand of the best political scientists in the world could help me. (A Joint Session of the U.S. Congress, Washington, D.C., February 21, 1990)

After reading "The Art of Impossible" I would also recommend the following writings:

Havel, Vaclav. Open Letters: Selected Writings 1965-1990. Translated by Paul Wilson. New York:Alfred A. Knopf, 1991.

Sire, James W. Václav Havel: the intellectual conscience of international politics: an introduction, appreciation, and critique. Downers Grove: IVP, 2001.

Awakening Warrior is a must read for anyone interested in our military and national security. Challans explains how and where the US went wrong in thinking about combat, just war, military ethics, and military training. His unusual background includes experience as both an infantry officer and classically trained philosopher, so he is one of the few people capable of this level of analysis.

His book is a kind of manifesto that provides the philosophical grounding for revolutionizing how we recruit, educate, promote, organize, lead, administer, and operate our national security establishment.

I wonder why the Army has relegated Tim Challans to his current job in Kansas when it could have him at the right hand of decision makers in Washington. Then again, of late we've seen too many talented, intellectually gifted officers pushed to the far corners of the Homeland or out of the military altogether because they didn't seem loyal enough, religious enough, conservative enough, or obedient enough to endure the erosion of a military that they probably love.

A century from now, if we are unfortunate enough to still need armies, the military may be ready to hear what this book has to say.

_Awakening_Warrior_ is a provocative look at the ethics of warfare and a critique of the jingoistic warrior memes that currently substitute for a genuine moral culture in the military. It is worth a careful read. In fact, it should be on the Army Chief of Staff's reading list for field grade officers-- though it would be difficult for some to swallow whole. Nevertheless, the issues covered are crucial to the future of both our country and our corps of officers. There are ideas within that are worth talking about, arguing about, and pursuing.

Those who oppose the War on Terrorism and who are skeptical about the current administration's ethical rationale will find the book's tone agreeable. Others will find it a little off-putting (Chaplains will find it down-right shocking) up front and near the end, but they should stay tuned for frank and adequately supported reasoning behind its main themes.

Challans, a retired Army Lieutenant Colonel who taught at West Point and The Command and General Staff College, is also a Kuk Sul Won Black Belt and Doctor of Philosophy. His qualities and qualifications rarely intersect in the officer ranks, and here they provide special insight.

He offers the reader an eclectic, behind the scenes critique of the current moral training that military members undergo. He goes on to describe a radical but conceivable alternative, emphasizing autonomy over the current mix of acronymism, unquestioning obedience to authority, and a hodgepodge of moral narratives, all of which currently take the place of a potential coherent system of education.

Thank the gods someone is finally critiquing the loathsome church-like culture our military has morphed into over the last 20 to 30 years. Professor Challans has written a scathing analysis that calls the bad-faith bluff of so many of the self-deceived leaders who have changed our military into a quasi-religious organization. If the Air Force's cloying advertisements on Armed Forces Network are any indication (the damn things sound word for word like some blathering god-awful prayer; NO KIDDING!!), then the US military has already prepared for the slide over the precipice into the abyss of theocracy. Professor Challans lays out in a systematic philosophical attack exactly how and why, logically, the US military has fallen into grave moral error in letting chaplains take over the teaching of ethics and how religion has suffused almost every detail in leadership theory and doctrine as it is currently practiced in the service. He also, in the process, unveils a supremely blistering critique of the Cheney administration and the formation of the mindset of an American Taliban, showing why America has headed down this path of assumed moral superiority that is in fact morally benighted. The moral affectations of Bush and crew will be the laughing stock of posterity if reason and logic have their say in the future, and Challans is the first real philosopher to show exactly why that will be the case. Highly recommended for everyone who wants to understand why there will be howling laughter in the classrooms of the future about our current era. Every officer of the US military who takes his or her oath to support and defend the US Constitution should read and digest what Challans says in this extended argument. They should do so to avoid being complicit in this nightmare of intellectual regression. The future freedom of our society may depend on people in the high places finally getting it, finally understanding why we are headed for disaster if we continue down this religious road.

The last thing this country needs is a military that thinks it is morally superior to everyone else because of their religion firstly, but for any other reason as well. It is dangerous for the democracy and it is dangerous for the world for any military to assume the ridiculous burden of moral rectitude. Witness the slaughter on 911 if you need further elucidation. Challans argues this point clearly and suggests the military begin systemic changes toward a principled method of ethics instruction, one derived mainly from a deontic perspective devoid of a substratum of apocalyptic metaphysics. He says chaplains need to get out of the ethics business and a system of principle should replace that of authority. Such a principled approach will help us avoid the problems of means/end confusion and is/ought conflation that have plagued the US military for so many years and have obsessed the poor and poorly educated.

Challans is significant in that he is a military insider who understands more than conventional academics what the military is all about and how they fail to inculcate any sense of moral autonomy. As a professional soldier (a highly decorated infantry officer) and a professional philosopher, his logic runs rough shod over the amoral mental meanderings of outsiders like neo-con guru Victor Davis Hanson, free-lancer Ralph Peters, and the other like-minded pundits who have no combat experience but favor torture and other relaxations of the rules of war.

The unfortunate irony here is that Challans will be ignored or attacked by people who think he represents some kind of misguided liberal agenda. His major critics will be those who cannot understand principle and will think it means something completely different. Challans supports reason only, but reason has become the enemy of those with a received world view (chaplains, romanticists, and the great mass of those in need of heteronomous authority). Ever since "faith based" made its way into the modern lexicon, there has been an increasing assault on reason in America as though it were a socialist plot. Challans has no liberal agenda. In fact reason, as he implies, is no friend of left wing extremism. The principles Challans suggests we embrace in reasoning about ethics are already embodied in the well-wrought judgments of those who enumerated the just war tradition as it exists in the Geneva and Hague Conventions. It is a sorry comment on America that we now represent a resistance to that body of thought.

As Bertrand Russell said, "Men fear thought as they fear nothing else on earth -- more than ruin -- more even than death.... Thought is subversive and revolutionary, destructive and terrible, thought is merciless to privilege, established institutions, and comfortable habit. Thought looks into the pit of hell and is not afraid." Challans is recommending we engage in thought.