Central America Books
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Utterly fascinatingReview Date: 2007-11-09
A very good analysis of the Western Theater strategy..Review Date: 2000-08-21
A Must ReadReview Date: 2000-06-02
Boldly Written Account of a Crucial SubjectReview Date: 2004-11-03
Woodworth writes of Jefferson Davis as a man who seemed to be eminently and uniquely qualified to become commander in chief of the Confederacy. He was a West Point graduate, a Mexican War hero, had served as a particularly effective secretary of war under President Franklin Pierce, and had been a United States senator. He understood politics, and he clearly understood war. His resolve for his cause, like his loyalty to his friends, was unshakable. Contained within these impressive qualifications and traits, however, were flaws and blind spots that would severely hinder Davis' management of the war in the west, where he had no Lee to take charge. Foremost of these faults was a lack of judgement when appointing friends as generals, and unreasonable loyalty to them thereafter. Compounding these problems was a fierce pride in his own military judgement that left him unable to acknowledge and correct mistakes. Finally, his pride led him into bitter personal feuds with key generals that hindered his ability to utilize them to the fullest.
Woodworth follows Davis' moves in the west, from his initial organization of the Western theater, through the high stakes game played and eventually lost to gain Kentucky for the Confederacy, to the crisis at Shiloh, where with the death of General Albert Sidney Johnston, the Western Confederacy lost its best hope for competent command. The catastrophe of the loss of Vicksburg, the disastrous infighting among the generals under Bragg in the Army of Tennessee, the loss of Tennessee, the Atlanta Campaign, and Hood's final failed campaign are all covered. In each instance, Woodworth notes the command decisions that Davis made, or failed to make, in the crisis. At the end of each chapter, he summarizes and critiques Davis' performance, highlighting areas where Davis was at least partly responsible for the problems, as well as pointing out where he performed as well as could have been expected.
Woodworth clearly has a strongly opinionated point of view. He is nearly unique among the Civil War historians that I have read in his spirited defense of General Braxton Bragg as a competent commander, and lays all of the blame for the failure of Bragg's campaigns on incompetent and insubordinate generals under his command, chiefly Davis' personal friend General Leonidas Polk. He also repeatedly accused General Joseph Johnston of lacking a will to win, and of never believing that the Confederacy could win the war. While many will disagree with these positions, his boldness in stating them is characteristic of the bold approach that is evident throughout his book.
Jefferson Davis and His Generals is a bold, original work, that addresses a theme that is too often neglected in Civil War studies. It is consistently engaging, insightful, and controversial. It is clearly written, well researched, and a pleasure to read. I consider it to be among the very best books that I have read on the Civil War, and would recommend it highly, especially to those with a specific interest in the war in the west.
Theo Logos
Insightful and thought provokingReview Date: 2004-09-10
His treatment of Jefferson Davis is very fair. His points are valid and well supported, showing where Davis did well and where he did poorly. The reasons for the decisions are supported and logical, given Davis' personality. This is the best part of the book and balances the blame the "Eastern Block" that is found in other books.
I am less happy with his treatment of Longstreet, feeling that he has accepted the "Lost Cause Myth" and not explored the situation. Rather than dismiss Longstreet, I would have liked to see an explanation of his relationship with Davis and Lee's influence in this area.
This is a well written, easy to read informative book. Not without faults but a valuable addition to my ACW library.
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Good, very sad book.Review Date: 2007-12-07
A little masterpieceReview Date: 2006-10-07
There's an indescribable feel to this book, almost a scent, different from any other book. It really is a masterpiece.
Beautiful book!Review Date: 2005-09-13
Great Story, Great ModelReview Date: 2005-07-21
The Moust Beutiful PlasReview Date: 2003-10-08

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real-life adventure storyReview Date: 2002-05-26
A classmate writes...Review Date: 2002-05-06
Myrna. Together with an amazing memory
and talent for writing, she has the gift of
compassion. And from an ex-Zonian..."Thanks,
Myrna, for reminding us of things which we
grew up taking for granted."
A Pilgrims Progress of one family caught in two culturesReview Date: 1997-11-20
Ms. Erickson bring's a female's perspective to the maturation of the free spirited 1st born daughter, Niza. Niza, offspring of Glover Boynton - an older American adventurer - who marries a young lady, Maria, in her home country of Ecuador in the 1920s. The family , eventually growing to 6 children, weave between the U.S. and the tropics.
The mid-section of the book seats the Boynton family in the Canal Zone (1930-1952), and it is there that Niza acquires the seeds that subsequently flower into a poised, confident woman who dares to achieve her ambitions in the central coastal zone of CA.
The author crafts her tale well; it has color and interest. The work -overall- merits your reading.
A WONDERFUL JOURNEYReview Date: 1999-04-07
A wonderful tale of adventure and the love of life...Review Date: 1999-03-08

Great adventure at sea!Review Date: 2008-04-21
Great fun and educational, tooReview Date: 2008-02-21
Pirates in ParadiseReview Date: 2008-02-15
We've all heard stories about the pirates of old. Greedy and dangerous, everyone feared what the pirates might do. In Pirates in Paradise, Max and Sam fight out that modern day pirates may not dress like Black Beard but they are still just as scary.
Nicely DoneReview Date: 2008-02-21
Both children and their parents will enjoy "Pirates in Paradise". Children will love the adventures Mark and Sam have especially the sailing around the Caribbean. Parents will love the fact that children will learn as they are reading. The book not only teaches them about sailing and pirates, but also about various islands in the Caribbean and types of fish found there. The pirate aspects are scary, but not too scary.
Besides the story itself, there are several other things in the book. There is an ongoing story in the books in the series involving a mysterious map with a letter showing up on the map during each adventure Max and Sam have. Children will have fun trying to guess what letter will show up and what the secret message ultimately will be. At the beginning of the book there are several pages about pirates including Facts about Pirates, Pirate Phrases, A Pirate's Life, A History of Piracy, and Piracy Today. At the back of the book there are facts about the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico, as well as a science experiment called "Ocean in a Bottle".
Although "Pirates in Paradise" is part of a chapter book series for ages 7 through 9 it can be read on its own. However, children will probably want to collect all the books in this fun series.
Shiver Me TimbersReview Date: 2008-04-22
I've been everywhere in the book and I hope it inspires children and parents alike to visit Virgin Gorda and the Baths, they are truly gorgeous. Life in the Caribbean moves at a different pace, slower, more friendly, well it wasn't so friendly to Max and Sam. From the beginning of the book when the boys spy "The Lost Soul" far away at sea, you know something is going to happen. And happen it does. Modern day pirates, who a year ago hijacked "The Lost Soul" leaving its crew abandon on a deserted island, are now after a better prize and they take over the boat Max and Sam are vacationing on, leaving Mr. Stone to go adrift, bound and gagged aboard "The Lost Soul."
Can the boys get away? Well, that is the question and why you'll be wanting to get his book to read to your child. Shiver me timbers matey, this is a book your child will love.
Reviewed by Captain Katie Osborne

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The Real Nate.Review Date: 2001-01-05
The author has done a masterful job of illustrating how greatness was thrust upon him. Nate never set out to become a hero, only to protect his own dignity and provide for his children.
I do not believe that there is a better book for teaching about the lies of 20th century sharecroppers. Theirs is an overlooked legacy.
Thanks For The Memories, NateReview Date: 2005-02-23
Just looking for help with a book reportReview Date: 2000-10-29
A Natural For Oprah's Book ClubReview Date: 2000-04-06
Family, Race, Class and Farming in AlabamaReview Date: 2005-01-05

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Miller's Chicago, South Side StudyReview Date: 2007-09-12
Extraordinary photographic record ... and extraordinary photographsReview Date: 2006-08-12
Wayne Miller, a white photographer now well into his 80s, went into the Bronzeville ghetto over a two-year period and made these touching pictures; then they "went into a drawer" for 40 years, until finally the Univ of Calif Press published this book. (The book itself is as well-produced a book of photographs as you are likely to find anywhere.)
My grandfather Nathan Joseph ran the States Theatre at 3507 S. State St., in the heart of Bronzeville, for some 50 years (unfortunately the States is not depicted herein). I myself have written a novel of Bronzeville called "To Love Mercy" (Mid-Atlantic Highlands, ISBN 0-9744785-3-9). A historical Afterword appears at the end of "To Love Mercy;" it is an oral history of Bronzeville, in the voices of a dozen people who lived there in the '40s and '50s. This Afterword is illustrated with seven of Wayne Miller's photos from "Chicago South Side, 1946-1948."
I have given close to a dozen copies of "Chicago South Side" as gifts. I was coming to Amazon to buy two more copies when I saw this opportunity to write a review.
These photos have moved me to tears. Buy this book.
Marvelous collection of imagesReview Date: 2001-10-14
Shocking and IntimateReview Date: 2001-11-28
Brilliant, passionate photographyReview Date: 2000-10-16


A pragmatic travel guideReview Date: 2002-12-21
In regard to travel...this book covers all the bases. Colombia is an immense nation with outstanding hotels, magnificiant places to eat and wonderful people. Moreover, its parks and natural beauties can hardly be matched anywhere else in the world.
However, one must not ignore the subtle warnings in this text. Colombia must be approached with open eyes. It can be a wonderful experience and this book allows one to take a bite of the best the nation has to offer.
Though slightly dated this is very good, comprehensive guideReview Date: 2002-04-30
Peter Pollock writes for a broad audience, but he excels in providing insightful caveats for the adventuresome and ecologically focused traveler. He has information on shipping motorcycles and automobiles to Columbia. He has an excellent section on health, and his 'Background' section is succinct and informative (History, Culture Etc.). He covers the normal tourist destinations and encourages exploration of places that 99% of visitors to Colombia would miss (Tayrona National Park, Ciudad Perdia, etc.).
His accommodations and dining recommendations are adequate, generally accurate, reliable but are becoming outdated. Luckily, although this guide has been out for three years, the prices for lodging in Colombia have stayed relatively stable and accurate and eight out of the ten hotels I selected to visit in Bogota were still open.
AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT: A serious omission for this 2000 guide is the absence of hotel web pages and hotel email addresses. Electronic addresses have become a "must have" for any competitive guide book. A good hotel web page allows you to view the property, get current rates (and specials), view the
property and rooms and make an on-line reservations. This is a must for the next edition.
Good maps are essential in a guide. Bogota, Cartagena, Barranquilla, Cali and Medellin are sprawling cities that desperately need good maps. Bogota has four maps, but they are upside down! Normally maps are oriented with North at the top of the page, not so here, North is at the bottom and South at the top. I had a hell-of-a-time orienting myself, until I got my compass out and discovered this wacko lay out.
Also confusing are references to map numbers that don't exist. Pollard mentions a number, IE in the Bogota section, 'Hacienda Santa Barbra #3 on the map', but the publisher did not print the numbers on the map. His recommended sleeping locations are noted on the maps, but not restaurants. Needless to say, this is an important area that needs significant improvement.
The above shortcomings notwithstanding, you will not want to go to Colombia without this guide. I strongly Recommend it.
Extremely InformativeReview Date: 2001-02-05
very goodReview Date: 2002-10-24
Extremely InformativeReview Date: 2001-02-05

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From retired CIA officer Duane ClarridgeReview Date: 2007-02-13
Duane Clarridge - Thirty-three year veteran of the CIA's clandestine service, Chief of CIA Latin American Division 1981-84, conceiver and chief of CIA Counterterrorism Center 1986-88, author of " The Spy for All Seasons."
Contrarian Lessons in Surrogate WarfareReview Date: 2006-12-06
What is significant is that failure to adapt at a theater, or even tactical, level engenders dysfunction at a strategic level, and creates deeply-paralyzing or divisive morale problems which eventually pervade the political structures of democratic societies. Indeed, the damage to (or impact on) the society is often evident even before the damage caused by the failure to adapt to asymmetric warfare shows up in the overall capabilities of the military forces itself. The result can often be a "hollow force": a monolithic defense structure, incapable of acting against the adversaries who besiege it daily, and yet waiting, becoming more bureaucratic by the day, for a "worthy [symmetric] adversary" who may come but once in a lifetime, if at all.
It is the persistent failure of much of the US conventional military leadership as well as the US political leadership to understand how to successfully prosecute warfare against a fluid, informal adversarial structure, operating within a broader psychopolitical environment, in Iraq (and Afghanistan) which is the Achilles Heel of the US as a strategic power into the 21st Century.
These are lessons which should have been learned after the Vietnam War ended in the 1970s. After all, the Vietnamese, the Soviets, and the leadership of the People's Republic of China (PRC) all emphasized that they had defeated the US in the media, and by sowing disenchantment (and narcotics) within US and Western society; in other words, by irregular, contextual, and psychopolitical stratagems. But peace after the Vietnam War -- as with the peace which followed World War I and World War II -- merely allowed the rump of the conventional US forces to re-assert the formal, highly-bureaucratized doctrine and methodologies which suit a rigidly hierarchical command and control system. Today's "Net-Centric Warfare", for example, is designed to use modern technologies, such as computerization and communications, imagery, and the like, to give true battlefield advantage to the field commanders, down to platoon level. Instead, it has been used repeatedly to afford centralized, remote micro-management of conflict, denying fluidity and cultural insinuation in the conflict zone by the forces there, where field officers should be able to exercise the command mandates of their commissions.
Significantly, many of the failures attributed to outgoing US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld were caused by his determination to bring change and greater flexibility to the US defense structures. He may have had other failings, but his attempt to force change on the services is what created many of his enemies within the uniformed leadership, those who are reluctant to change, and to learn the lessons of history.
What better time, then, for a book about an aspect of the "lost history" of the Cold War to emerge, giving profound lessons from the battle front on the business of asymmetric warfare.
William R. Meara's new book, Contra Cross: Insurgency and Tyranny in Central America, 1979-1989, is a profound contribution to thinking about strategic doctrine, as the US -- and all major industrial powers -- face a watershed of introspection following the US electorate's decision to essentially retire from the global battlefield. Meara's great contribution is the fact that his book recounts the impact of doctrine and the strategic environment on the battlefield of that "small" war against the Nicaraguan Sandinista leadership which projected one of the last aspects of the Soviet grand strategy against the West before the end of the Cold War.
The book is also timely in that it reminds a new generation of strategic thinkers of the real origins of the Sandinista Government which has now returned to Nicaragua, following the re- election of former Sandinista Pres. Daniel Ortega -- now 60 years old -- with the November 5, 2006, Nicaraguan Presidential election. But more than that, Meara's book, told from the perspective of a "boots on the ground" true Cold Warrior, has the true grit of realism. It is not a book of theory, but a book which shows how theory translates on the ground in an asymmetric conflict.
William Meara was a US Army Special Forces officer who trained as a Foreign Area Officer (FAO), and then specialized in, and relished, psychological operations. His field of expertise was Central America. His book cover, and the name of his book, reflect the "Contra Cross", the Contra crucifix memento made from a neutralized M-16 5.56mm ammunition by wounded Contra veterans in the hospitals which housed them after their personal war was over. Meara carried with him the memento, and the draft of his book, for a couple of decades before deciding to finally publish his writings.
The US Armed Forces and Government -- operating mostly from Honduras, supporting the Nicaraguan Contras against the Sandinistas -- were at this time still nursing their wounds after Vietnam. Many of the US military policies being pursued in Central America were based on either lessons learned from Vietnam and other Cold War theaters, or on a stubborn persistence in the view that a monolithic military machine -- the Green Machine of the Army, as Meara reminds us -- could roll over any adversary with "superior firepower" and technology. Clearly, the mainstream US Army had little time for psychological warriors or for grubby little wars. But there were those who understood this kind of warfare, such as the "crusty old SF (Special Forces) team sergeant" who embraced what he called "Low Intensity, High Per Diem War".
Meara, who left the US Army for the US Foreign Service (he remains a US diplomat) where he essentially continued his liaison and support work with the Contras of the ERN (Army of the Nicaraguan Resistance) until the end, highlights the profound importance of understanding the language and culture of the environment in which any war is being conducted. He knew that he had made the breakthrough when, as he put it, he was able to "swear like a Contra", and be able to converse at a truly meaningful level with the forces and cultures in which he had to operate. His time in Nicaragua, before he became part of the US-supported war supporting the Contras, gave him a good understanding of the Sandinistas, who took their name from the 1920s nationalist Nicaraguan fighter, Augusto César Sandino.
But before he was engaged in supporting the Contras, Meara was also engaged in US Army support operations in El Salvador where he also learned not only how Latin American armed forces shaped their priorities and doctrine, but also how guerilla forces, such as the Faribundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), functioned. He also faced the more enduring adversary: US Army "milicrats".
Apart from the profound timeliness of the book, as Sandinista Daniel Ortega returns to power in Nicaragua -- this time ostensibly within the framework of an ongoing process of democratic elections (we have yet to see whether he abides by the process, or whether he continues to think of "one-man, one-vote, once" as the process of re-entrenching pseudo-marxist-leninist governance) -- Contra Cross has real lessons for war- fighters and planners considering Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, or Sudan.
William Meara also highlights the distinctions which often exist between the actual combatants in the guerilla wars and their political leaders, citing the case of the Contras, whose political leadership was based in Miami, Florida, where sophistry and political expediency prevailed to the detriment of the forces in the field. Meara highlights the disservice done to the Nicaraguan rebellion by the Contra political leadership in Miami, which was the principal interface with the US political system.
Meara's final chapter, Contrarian Conclusions, outlines some of his maxims for conducting irregular or asymmetric warfare, and particularly the aspect of this which is conducted by great powers at arm's length: surrogate warfare. But before that, Meara had to defend, even resurrect, the image of the Contras, noting: "My positive sentiments about the Nicaraguan resistance put me clearly in contrarian territory. It would be hard to exaggerate the extent to which the contras were vilified in the United States."
He added: "But I think the world should be proud of the contras. The young peasants of Nicaragua refused to be enslaved by communism. They waged a courageous struggle against great odds. They persevered when the situation looked very bleak. They sacrificed for the good of their people and the future of their country. They were noble and honorable freedom fighters. The mucos refused to be like Longfellow's `dumb, driven cattle'. They were heroes in the strife. ... I give the contras most of the credit for the elections held in Nicaragua in February 1990."
Equally, in saying that he felt that "Americans should be proud of what the Reagan Administration did and tried to do in Central America", he added: "But I don't think that everyone has the right to feel good about their actions during the Central American conflict. I think those Americans who gave aid and comfort to the Sandinistas and the Salvadoran communists should feel guilty. They were on the wrong side in the Cold War." These were, he said, what Lenin called "useful idiots".
In his "lessons learned" in that concluding chapter, Meara notes: "Cultural factors really are the equivalent of a terrain feature that cannot be ignored [in surrogate wars]."
And: "Fluency in foreign languages is the indispensable key to understanding." "Regional expertise and experience are crucial. People working on insurgencies shouldn't be doing so on their first trip to the region."
He went on: "Americans need to be aware of the institutional biases and shortcomings which make it difficult for us to deal with foreign insurgencies. We need to realize that our big, high-tech military machine -- our big catapult -- might not be much use against an insurgency built around people like Miguel Castellanos [real name Napoleón Romero García, an El Salvadoran FMLN guerilla who later defected to the Government]. I saw many signs of our weakness in this area: the tank traps we were building in the `Choluteca gap' [in Honduras, to face literally a non-existent cross-border threat from Sandinista tanks]; our big bucks, high-tech approach to support for the Salvadoran armed forces; our army's conviction that `any good officer' can work on insurgency. I came to the conclusion that our powerful military is a blunt instrument. It is very capable of performing its primary mission (destroying enemy military forces), but is poorly-suited for cross-cultural battles for foreign hearts and minds."
"Finally, when we get involved in foreign insurgencies," Meara says, "we should always strive to conduct ourselves in a manner consistent with our national values ... we should remember our history. We should remember that we were helped by foreigners when we were fighting for our independence. We should remember that we too were once embattled farmers. ... we should not think of these people [the surrogate fighters] as dis- posable pawns."
Contra Cross is full of personal insights and anecdotes "from the field", and is an inspiring and timely read. It is, in fact, essential reading, not just for those psyops and special forces practitioners who already embrace asymmetric warfare, but for the policymakers and those who have found their careers in the bureaucracy of military leadership. That is where the lessons need to be learned.
We all should thank William Meara for carrying this document with him over the decades, and giving it to us at this particular time.
[Reviewed by Gregory R. Copley, Editor, Defense & Foreign Affairs Publications, at the International Strategic Studies Association, Washington, DC area.]
Tales of a Cold War GruntReview Date: 2007-01-14
The numerous insurgencies and counter-insurgencies fought in Central America are slowly being forgotten. Located between the large and divisive Vietnam War and the even larger Global War on Terror, the proxy wars in Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador are now seen as the last gaps of the Cold War. Despite this hindsight, during the 1980s it was where the action was.
Since the author was involved at the ground level, he is able to give the people of the area a real human feel, which is lost in the Cold War rhetoric of policy makers from Washington.
The author makes several outstanding points about the need for cultural and language skills when dealing with local conflicts. While our current conflict is called the Global War on Terror it is the really combination of thousands of local conflicts tied together. Having the deep local cultural knowledge is the real key to winning our current war. While the book is far from being the seminal book on U.S. involvement in Central America, it never tries or claims to be. Its true strength is how it depicts dedicated Americans, whether military or Department of State, attempt to implement strategic policy made thousands of miles away in Washington into actual action on the ground amongst real people.
An Excellent BookReview Date: 2006-10-25
Meara's career with the U.S. Army began at the age of 17, when he joined the National Guard. In college, he attended Officer Candidate School, and decided to become a full-time Special Forces officer soon after returning from Nicaragua. The Special Forces "impressed him" with its combination of adventure and foreign culture immersion. After completing the "Q" course and the Foreign Area Officer training program at Fort Bragg, Captain Meara began his first real-world assignment as a psychological warfare instructor for the El Salvador Armed Forces (ESAF).
In 1986, El Salvador was mired in civil war with the Faribundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), an umbrella group of five Marxist organizations trying to overthrow the government. Meara's job entailed training his Salvadoran counterparts in Communist ideology, tactics, and strategies. This role put him in close touch with several FMLN defectors, whom he invited to his class as guest instructors. Through these courses, Meara gained a complex understanding of the institutional culture of ESAF. For example, he learned that it was just as preoccupied with Honduras, an historic enemy, as the FMLN. Furthermore, the Salvadoran officer corps resembled a social club more than a traditional military hierarchy. This club-like system fostered tolerance for officers who failed to perform and bred paranoia within the corps. It also made it extremely difficult for the U.S. Military Group (MILGRP) to convince the Salvadoran military to punish human rights violations. In the end, however, U.S. influence did convince the Salvadorans to clean up their act and in 1992, the FMLN laid down its arms in part because of assurances from the United States that it would "keep the Salvadoran military in line."
The second half of the book covers Meara's work as a State Department Liaison Officer to the Contras in 1988 and 1989. In that role, he oversaw United States Agency for International Development aid to the Honduras-based Contras and served as a de-facto ambassador to the insurgency during the waning days of the struggle. Meara shuttled between the Contra base area at Yamales and the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa, trying to secure adequate humanitarian assistance for the insurgency, and bridge the cultural gap between the troops in the field and their foreign benefactors.
As a fluent Spanish speaker with extensive experience in Latin America, Meara developed a close rapport with the Contras, but struggled to maintain emotional distance from the insurgency. This became particularly challenging towards the end of his tour when the U.S. began to cut off support to the fighters. In the end, Meara saw the Contras as embattled farmers similar in some respects to the colonial militia of the American Revolution--poor farmers whose way of life was threatened by the economic policies of the prevailing government. Meara had profound respect for the difficult odds under which they struggled but in the end never forgot that his primary loyalty lay to the U.S. and its policies. Meara's description of the isolated situation at Yamales reveals how easy it is for special operations types to succumb to Joseph Conrad-like influences of the field and become advocates of the insurgents as opposed to mere advisors. It takes a very special type of person to keep these impulses in check.
The main lesson of his book is that only people well-versed in foreign languages and cultures have any hope of successfully waging insurgency or counter-insurgency wars in the third world. In order to be effective in special operations, you need to be able to "curse like a Contra," and in this regard America is still woefully unprepared, not just in the U.S. Armed Forces but government-wide. The strength of Meara's work is its first-hand look at insurgency and counter-insurgency, and the author's nuanced understanding of the local cultures in El Salvador and Nicaragua . Contra Cross also stands out as one of the few published accounts of America 's struggle against Communism in Latin America in the 1980s, and for this reason is important.
A Foot Soldier in Central AmericaReview Date: 2007-01-28
Let me back up in time a bit. In 1988 just back from UN duty in Lebanon and Egypt I sat down in my 15-man section at CGSC and we did the "where I have been and what I have been doing" confessional. My section leader looked at me and quipped, "you have not been in the Army." I simply asked him and the larger group, "Have any of you been shot at lately?" No one answered. Later the same guy in discussing low intensity conflict remarked, "I cannot see anyway the US Army will ever get involved in a counter-insurgency again after what happend in Vietnam." I asked him what exactly he thought was going on in Central America at the very moment. He suggested that what was happening was not really the US Army. Six years later I greeted that same individual as he arrived in Goma with a water truck task force. He had a stunned look on his face. I said, "Welcome to my world."
Contra Cross is about Bill Meara's world, one like and at once unlike my own. The book is from the foot soldier's perspective and it offers unique insights on the wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Bill was a Special Forces officer trained in psychological operations and as a regional specialist. He served in uniform with the Military Advisory Group in El Salvador and later as a Foreign Service Officer as liaison to the Contras from Honduras. Like any good read, Bill's book offers key themes and messages, weaving them through the pages, repeatedly exposing the reader to them in the hopes they will imprint. I will list some here:
Culture and Cultural Understanding is Critical
Language is Fundamental
COIN and Guerrilla Warfare Target the Minds of the Population, Not the Enemy
The Greatest Cultural Gap is Between DC and the Field
The Unconventional Warrior is Indeed From Venus and the Conventional Warrior Refuses to Visit From Mars
I tell every Soldier that I coach, teach, and mentor that I have two fundamental rules for cross cultural understanding:
They do not think like you do
They have an agenda in every interaction with you
Bill's narrative hammers home the first point and his story reinforces the second. His self-reflection on his role as an US government representative while serving as liaison to the Contras is one of the book's greatest strengths.
I would recommend this book to all from Strategic Corporal to the White House. I only wish that it had come out earlier.
Great job, Bill!
Sincerely,
Tom Odom
Author Journey Into Darkeness: Genocide in Rwanda

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Dark Side of FortuneReview Date: 2008-02-08
Oil ScandalReview Date: 2006-08-01
Another terrific biography from Margaret Leslie DavisReview Date: 2000-03-13
"Beyond Greed"Review Date: 2003-10-07
Teapot Dome - Early Oil IndustryReview Date: 2002-08-07
This is perhaps a timely book as well given the questions being raised at the time of this writing about corporate malfeasance and corruption in the U.S. (Enron). Teapot Dome was one of the biggest political scandals in the first half of the 20th century and involved the leasing of government/public lands in preserve areas for energy development. More than one person went to prison and wrongdoing was proven against multiple individuals in the matter.
The book makes the case that Doheny was more or less guilty of poor judgment and being in the wrong place at the wrong time more or less. It is true of course that Doheny was found innocent on the charges and it is also true that despite this Teapot Dome is the matter for which he is best known (despite for instance being a contemporary and rival of John D. Rockefeller in the oil business). If in fact he was innocent of the charges then he paid a heavy price in terms of his health and the somewhat mysterious death of his son, which was either suicide or murder depending on who you ask and how you look at it.
For those with an interest in the biographies of the early titans of U.S. industry this is a worthy read in that it does detail Mr. Doheny's rise to power as well as his fall from grace. He came from a modest background and did not make his fortune until after the age of 40 in a time before life expectations averaged 70+. He suffered through personal loses and setbacks and managed at the time of his death, despite the misfortunes, to bequeath a sizeable fortune to his heirs. This book may also be of particular interest in the study of Los Angelos in particular and California in general in that the Doheny's were prominent citizens who built some noteworthy structures in the city including religious and educational facilities.
The author acknowledges that she had the cooperation and blessings of the descendants of Mr. Doheny and that a good body of original documentation was available for review and research. This provides an intimate look at the lives of the people in question but it also may cause the thesis to lean towards their views. The book does tend to exonerate Doheny in Teapot Dome and it does make a good argument that his involvement was not profitable and that the Navy Dept in fact sought him out because of rising fears of the Japanese Navy in the years leading up to WWII. It was a condition of Mr. Doheny's development of the area under lease to him that he build an extensive oil storage and supply facility for the Navy in the Hawaiian Isles out of his own pocket. This he did and subsequently was not reimbursed when the lease was negated despite having spent many millions in pre-WWII monies. It is also I believe true to state that it was Henry Sinclair who was the actual lease holder on the Teapot Dome acreage and that Doheny was leased an entirely separate parcel of public land. Sinclair along with Interior Secretary Albert Fall went to prison in the affair but Doheny was also tarred and feathered by the affair.
Whether the delivery of $100,000 in cash by Doheny's son to Sec. Fall was in fact a personal loan much as one might expect between old prospecting buddies (which they were) is really a matter of conjecture. At any rate there was clearly the appearance of impropriety in the matter and both Doheny's son and the man accompanying him that night were involved in a murder/suicide after indictment but before trial. With the principle witness gone and little other corobative evidence Mr. Doheny's celebrity legal representation did get him acquitted although he was convicted in the court of public opinion.
Personally I am inclined to believe a man of his stature might loan a friend the sum in question but I also would not be surprised if a quid pro quo were expected in return. You see there was any number of companies competing in secret for the government contracts and it is interesting that both men who won had either the appearance of impropriety or were outright convicted of bribery. Part of the reason Doheny was spared prison was in fact due to the death of his son and his earnest and teary eyed appearance on the witness stand where he looked the part of a grieving grandfatherly figure who had lost something money could not replace.
It is an intriguing story and well written book, not terribly long or archaic for the casual reader. While it is a history book it is in fact also the story of an interesting chapter in American business and personality history.

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Brilliance that doesn't blind but illuminatesReview Date: 2002-06-18
First, Payne places the people who made the Mississippi movement at the center the story. He tells the story of both the original local leaders who made it possible for the civil rights movement to happen in Mississippi and the activists who followed their lead in the 1960s.
Second, he extends the time span of the civil rights movement, showing that it would not have been possible without the "organizing tradition" referred to in the subtitle. Payne expertly traces the relationships and linkages between different generations of heroic troublemakers in Mississippi.
Third, he shows that the original radicals, and I mean those who wanted to change Mississippi from its roots, were those who had already challenged the system to achieve personal gain. "Bourgeois" blacks in Mississippi weren't uniformly complacent or fearful. Wisely, Payne does not use this fact to justify any notion of a "talented tenth" that ought to lead the masses.
Fourth, the chapter on Ella Baker is a stunning and riveting account of one heroic troublemaker who didn't receive enough recognition for her efforts.
Fifth, when Payne writes about what we typically consider the civil rights movement, he places you in the midst of the activists and makes you feel their exhileration, exhaustion, frustration, fear, and courage. Scholarly books never have this quality. At the same time, he does this in a historical context and with a critical eye which absolutely illuminate the raw material in a way that first-person and journalistic treatments rarely approach.
For these reasons, and many more, this is clearly the best of many excellent books on the civil rights movement. Some could fault Payne for placing less emphasis on the national and institutional dimensions of the freedom struggle. But, in the case of the black American struggle for freedom, Payne shows us the story begins with, and is carried by, people who tried to change their communities, not their nation.
Scholarly Writing at Its BestReview Date: 2000-04-12
Who makes history? This book will tell you.Review Date: 1998-10-17
If you're going to read one book on civil rights, this is itReview Date: 2003-11-15
Read this Book!Review Date: 2001-05-18
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