Russia Books

Col. Lunev was Russia's real-life James Bond.

In fact, he was the highest-ranking military spy ever to defect from Russia. He did so in 1992, after Boris Yeltsin came to power and after America and the West believed the old U.S.S.R. had died. Col. Lunev told America's CIA, the FBI, DIA and other national security agencies that Russia still posed a real threat and that Russian military and spy officials were still talking, planning and preparing for war with the U.S. and the West. Col. Lunev's message went unheeded-until now.

In a stunning two-hour interview with Barry Farber, one of America's most noted radio talk show hosts, Col. Lunev reveals some of the darkest secrets of Russia. In this two cassette audio presentation, Lunev now shares some of the vital information he shared with his CIA debriefers-much of which has never been revealed publicly.

Here are just some of the revelations of CIA FILES:
* Use of special operations forces to detonate suitcase nuclear bombs and poison your water supply
* Why Col. Lunev believes Russia has already positioned nuclear weapons on U.S. soil
* A new "earthquake bomb" that was accidentally tested and killed thousands
* Russian spies and sympathizers at the highest levels of the U.S. government and U.S. media outlets-you wouldn't believe who has been helping the Russians!
* Why Russian intelligence has targeted cultural institutions and is now even undermining our local banks
* American POWs from Vietnam and Korea-new information about their captivity in Russia
* And much, much more...

This audio presentation is perhaps the most important tape set you will ever listen to!

This book has received advance praise from a number of scholars and practitioners alike. Strobe Talbott, former deputy secretary of state, and president of The Brookings Institution, noted that "This volume offers a stimulating and hard-hitting look at the crucial questions of civil society--and its absence--in post-Soviet Russia." Harley Balzer (Georgetown University) says this volume "provides a unique perspective on oft-neglected aspects of civil society in Russia" wile Daniel Orlovsky of Southern Methodist University says that "This is an exciting and timely collection that brings together historical, social scientific, cultural, and journalistic perspectives on the nature of civil society and its problems and possibilities in contemporary Russia."

This book fills a huge gap in the literature about the Russian Civil War. The Siberian theatre hasn't been the subject of a monograph since the 1930s, and only Canfield Smith's wonderful book on the events in Vladivostok during 1920-1922 gave the reader an in-depth look at a part of the complicated sequence of events east of the Ural mountains. Dr.Smele's book is the first in-depth treatment in any language of Kolchak's government, how it came to be, why it performed so poorly in all its tasks as it did, and what became of it. The political intrigue, the rather inept leadership of Kolchak himself, the tragically inept military efforts - after reading this book the reader may wonder how Kolchak managed to do as well as he did (at first). I have found this book to be an indispensable reference work. In addition, it is beautifully written - perhaps not an important consideration for a scholarly work, but definitely a feature that makes reading this book a pleasure. Highly recommended to anyone with an interest in Siberia and/or the Russian Civil War.

The collection of excellent and delicious recipes from the heart fo the Rus is very well presented. I have owned this book for a few years now, and literally worn it out! It covers not only the food preparation but ethnicity and socio-cultural views of the people who prepare and eat this food as part of their cultural environment. A well written book and a easy guide to use.

The word 'page-turner' doesn't automatically come to mind when the subject is the history of some branch of mathematics, particularly if you are, like me, not a mathematician. Yet I found Lorraine Daston's book compulsively readable. She covers a period from about 1650 and 1840 when the basic principles and applications of the theory of probability were being discovered. While its disoverers came up with many ideas that we still regard as valid today, they also had many ideas that seem pretty crazy. It was widely believed, for example, that the probability calculus could be used to compute guilt or innocence in criminal cases.
The author explains this paradox by showing that the great probabilists of this shared the idea that there was such a thing as a rational person (they would have said 'rational man') and that it is possible to know what this rational person is like. They defined probability as rational expectation and defined rational expectation as the beliefs of a rational person.
By the 1840', it was recognized that the idea of a rational person was not an adequate foundation for the theory of probability. Probability was redefined as being either the frequency with which events occur or the subjective level of confidence that people have that an event will occur where this level of confidence has no rational foundation.
The book ends with the discrediting of the interpretation of probability as rational expectation. But this idea has undergone a revival in the last 20 years (the Bayesian revolution). That story would make an interesting sequel to the events described in the book.

Book Review

Brook, Stephen. Claws of the Crab: Georgia and Armenia in Crisis. Sinclair-Stevenson, 1992.

This is another treasure of a book about the Caucasus that I unearthed from the bowels of the Wandsworth Public Library system in south London. Only one other person had borrowed it, back in September 1999 when I was working in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi. Reading this book, I discovered that Stephen Brook had got there before me when all the exciting stuff was happening at the start of the nineties. Independence from the Soviet Union, the overthrow of the tyrannical president Zviad Gamsakhurdia and the battles for Nagorno Karabakh - Brook was there or thereabouts. Studiedly sympathetic to the Armenians and guardedly admiring of the Georgians, Claws of the Crab is a rare eyewitness account of many of the events that made independent Georgia and Armenia what they are today. Suffice to say that there's been remarkably little change since the book's completion in 1992.

this story is about a girl who uses her head to help out her father who gets himself in trouble over a donkey. a man gave katya's father a horse and that horse had a baby with the father's mare, so the guy who first gave the horse wanted the foal, so he took the case to the tsar. the king gives out a riddle to the two men and says whoever answers the riddle gets the foal. the riddle is 'what is the fastest thing in the world, what is the fattest thing in the world, what is the softest thing in the world and what is the most precious?' the other guys asks a neighbour who owes him some money and the father asks katya. i won't tell you the answer but i'll say that katya won. the tsar was interested in these answers and asked the father who told them to him, to which he replied his daughter. so the king asked the father to bring katya to him, but he said that 'she must come neither on horseback nor on foot, neither naked nor dressed and neither bringing a present nor empty handed.' so she goes to him, and at the end of the book he marries her because she was the most clever person in the kingdom.

this was a nice story based on an old russian folktale. the pictures are beautiful and colourful with nice traditional, colourful borders surrounding them. i first heard this story in grade 3 or 4 and it was one of those that i remembered to this day. it's one of those odd books you'll find where the girl gets the guy because of her brain, not her beauty. a beautiful story. i recommend.

I am not an expert or professionally involved in the mining industry but I bought this book for an overview of a particular sector of the FSU economy. It is extremely professionally produced and contains all the information you could want on this particular branch. It does not extensively explore the economy of coal mining in Russia/Ukraine/ other ex-FSU states after the end of the soviet government but that is understandable given the dislocation of the governments in the new states and its detrimental impact on statistical gathering and info. If you are at all involved in the coal industry or just interested in a detailed technical account of the state of the soviet planning/management/development process as seen from a single sector, I would recommend this book.

Written by the director of the East European Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC, Cold Peace: Russia's New Imperialism is a sharp critique of the Russian regime under President Vladimir Putin, characterizing it as a long-term strategy devoted to regaining influence over former satellites, limiting Western influence in key parts of the region, and embracing nostalgia of its days of empire. Characterizing benign post-Cold War views of Russia as the modern equivalent of Cold War appeasement, Cold Peace pulls no punches in its scathing analysis of Russia's current policy toward states including the Ukraine, Baltic States, Belarus and Kaliningrad, and much more. A sharply worded warning especially recommended for politicians, students, business leaders and workers involved in international current affairs.

In 1945 V.M. Molotov pleaded with Stalin to ease censorship of foreign correspondents, but sensing Stalin's disapproval, assured him he would tighten censorship. This example of kowtowing is emblematic of Stalin's interactions with his inner-circle, and the subject of Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk's Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945-1953. The structure of Cold Peace progresses chronologically through late Stalinism, 1945-1953, which has traditionally been described as the calcification of the Soviet Union's political, ideological, and economic institutions, and all under the dictatorship of an unstable leader. Gorlizki and Khlevniuk argue Stalin's actions were not a result of an unstable mind; but of his relationship with his inner-circle followed an administrative and political logic, which their book seeks to unravel (3).
Following the Great Patriotic War, coupled with Cold War tensions, the Soviet Union demanded a more effective administrative structure. Gorlizki and Khlevniuk use the international and internal problems as the underlying reasons that demanded changes to the Soviet state. Despite the necessity for a more effective state apparatus, Stalin preferred to rule informally. Gorlizki and Khlevniuk argue that Stalin wanted to restore the pre-war leadership balance, and be able to rule informally through the Politburo. Gorlizki and Khlevniuk describe the co-existence of the Politburo and the Council of Ministers (Sovmin) as neo-patrimonial. Stalin preferred to rule informally through the Politburo, but the formation of Sovmin served the purpose of making the administrative system more effective, hence neo-patrimonial. Sovmin was emblematic of the modern efficient state, which met regularly, contrary to the Politburo which met irregularly and undocumented (48). Stalin's preference to rule informally was the basis for his methods of keeping his inner-circle in line.
Gorlizki and Khlevniuk use the informal aspect of Stalin's dictatorship to best describe the methods he used to manipulate the inner-circle. Stalin would denounce, demote and reshuffle the responsibilities of his inner-circle. The logic behind these attacks was to reinstate pre-World War II leadership norms, and to eliminate any autonomous action that had been fostered during the War (29). Stalin's manipulation of his inner-circle did not end with denunciations, but also with periodic purges. Gorlizki and Khlevniuk use the Leningrad affair and the Doctor's plot as examples of periodic purges that kept his colleagues in line. Although Gorlizki and Khlevniuk's do acknowledge that Stalin was prone to fantasy, which would appear to be the antithesis to their main argument, our authors demonstrate Stalin's need for convincing evidence, and the support of his inner-circle, so they would be jointly responsible (170). Gorlizki and Khlevniuk use these examples to demonstrate Stalin's logical mind (163). Despite Stalin's informal rule, the neo-patrimonial system not only made Stalin an effective dictator, it also created the opportunity for the inner-circle to understand the problems of Stalin's leadership.
As much as Cold Peace is about Stalin's leadership, it is also about the buildup to reforms after 1953. After Stalin's death the neo-patrimonial system dissolved in favor of the state apparatus, or Sovmin (166). According to Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, this shift of the "center of gravity" to the state apparatus was a continuation of the rise of Sovmin (166). Members of Stalin's inner-circle held key positions in the party-state apparatus, and their positions within state agencies allowed them certain autonomy; this autonomy helped them realize the flawed and anachronistic nature of the neo-patrimonial system (106). The common understanding of problems, such as the lack of agrarian and labor camp system reforms, created a "collective membership," which Gorlizki and Khlevniuk argue gave Stalin's inner-circle a common understanding of the systematic reforms that would be necessary to enact (106). Stalin benefited from his inner-circle's "balance of forces," and would not upset it, because he always had the control of the "levers" of state security (113).
Cold Peace is a book that should not only hold a place in the history of the Soviet Union, but also speaks to a larger audience interested in dictatorships of the twentieth-century. Gorlizki and Khlevniuk provide a unique description of a dictatorship not available from a study of Mussolini or Hitler (168). The fundamental difference between Stalin and his dictatorial counterparts was not that he survived World War II, but the fact he was a "machine politician" (168). Stalin was not an accomplished orator, but did not hesitate to involve himself in bureaucratic disagreements, which Hitler avoided. In the context of twentieth-century dictatorships, Cold Peace, provides a picture of a dictator without the trappings of intense oratory, but an instinct for the intricate details of bureaucratic administration.
The collapse of the Soviet Union provided historians with a rich source of primary documents, which Cold Peace benefits from. Gorlizki and Khlevniuk admit the Russian archives do not allow them to "see into Stalin's mind," but it does allow them to understand his behavioral patterns in dealing with his inner-circle (165). Earlier works on Stalinism relied upon newspaper articles, and a small number of reports that escaped the clutches of the Soviet Union (11). One of the most famous memoirs is Nikita Khrushchev's Khrushchev Remembers. Cold Peace uses memoirs, Central Committee resolutions, correspondence between Stalin and his entourage, Politburo, and other leaders that counter Khrushchev's accounts (11). These sources help expose not only a complex political situation during Late Stalinism, but the logic of Stalin's manipulation of his inner-circle.
Gorlizki and Khlevniuk's Cold Peace offers not only historians of the Soviet Union, but historians of twentieth-century Europe a unique glimpse into the functions of a dictatorship. The neo-patrimonial system was a result of Stalin's affinity for informal rule, but was also influenced by the post-World War II situation, which necessitated a need for a more formal and efficient administration. Stalin's manipulation of his inner-circle was a result of neither rampant paranoia, nor fatigue, but a calculated method to maintain his dictatorship, and the "balance of forces" among them to operate an efficient state. Interestingly, Cold Peace, shows that Stalin's dictatorship fostered the leadership that would come after his death with an understanding that reforms were necessary. Gorlizki and Khlevniuk provide an excellent analysis of the behavior and logic of Stalin, neither as a deranged or paranoid leader, but a "machine politician."