Poland Books

This book is much more than an account of the disgraceful sellout of Poland to the Soviet Union by the west and the brutal imposition of a Soviet puppet state. It is nothing less than a one-volume history of Poland from 1944-1947. It provides so much detail in just one book, and includes such things as pictures of then-General Eisenhower's visit to Poland.

Lane devotes some detail to the double-dealing of Roosevelt behind the Poles' backs. The sellout of Poland included President Roosevelt openly lying to Polish-American leader Charles Rozmarek, even using a prewar map of Poland as part of the deception (p. 96).

Throughout his travels across Poland, Lane was keenly aware of the terror created by the Communist secret police (U. B., or UB). He clearly realized the fact that free elections were unimaginable under such circumstances, long before the farcical elections of January 17, 1947 that officially brought the Communists to power. Soon thereafter, Lane could not take it any more. He resigned his position as ambassador in order that he could freely speak to Americans about the crime of betrayal that had been done to Poland.

Lane (p. 181) pointed out that the definition of a Fascist was often very elastic: "...that some well-informed persons had even gone so far as to define a Fascist as a person not in one hundred per cent agreement with Communism." Left-wingers had used the term Fascist in this manner since time immemorial. Lane also includes a statement of Stalin saying that, whatever the negative American response, Americans will soon forget about it and move on to other things (p. 312). Ah, the more things change, the more they remain the same!

Lane provides some detail on the so-called Kielce Pogrom (pp. 246-251). He remarks: "But almost all sources agreed that the militia had been responsible to a great extent for the massacre, not only in failing to keep order but in the actual killing of the victims, for many had been shot or bayoneted to death...(p. 248). Yet no members of the militia had been brought to trial...the underlying cause of the pogrom was the growing anti-Semitism which, even our Jewish sources admitted, was caused by the great unpopularity of the Jews in key government positions. These men included Minc, Berman, Olszewski (whose real name was said to be Specht), Radkiewicz and Spychalski...It was known, furthermore, that both the U. B. and K. B. W. [Communist secret police] had, among their members, many Jews of Russian origin. (pp. 250-251)." Lane (p. 251) suspects that the "unbelievably inefficient" manner in which the militia and the U. B. (Bezpieka, or UB) had handled this situation points to at least some degree of conspiracy. Otherwise, Lane does not address the issue of whether or not those "mob" members clubbing the Jews were themselves planted Communist agents. He does point out that accusations of the "tardy response of the Church" had been fueled by the coincidental absence of the Bishop of Kielce, Monsignor Kaczmarek (p. 249).

If indeed a staged Communist event, the so-called Kielce Pogrom certainly had the desired effect: "So, emphasis in the United States press was placed on the anti-Semitism still existing in Poland, rather than on the significance of the rigging of the referendum (p. 249)." In other words, the death of a few dozen Jews was deemed more newsworthy than the enslavement of 30 million Poles. What else is new?

In addressing Jewish Communism (Zydokomuna) as a factor, Lane (p. 252) quoted some Jewish relief officials who opined that not more than 5% of the repatriated Polish Jews were Communistic in their viewpoint. If accurate, then 5% of 250,000 returning Jews still meant that 12,500 of them were available to play an active part in the enslavement and exploitation of Poland. Had only one-quarter of these become U. B. (UB) members, and each one of these on average had tortured and murdered only 50 Poles, then over 30,000 Poles were the victims of Jewish murderers. Note that this number far exceeds the aggregate total of the much-ballyhooed actual or alleged Jewish victims of Poles (1930's "pogroms", Jedwabne and environs, Kielce Pogrom, postwar property-related killings, all combined).

Although this book does not directly discuss the postwar Polish-Jewish property disputes, a subject that has recently gotten a great deal of one-sided media attention because of the publication of the book FEAR by Jan Thomas Gross, it provides the context that destroys Gross' Pole-bashing thesis. To begin with, Ambassador Lane gives the reader a taste of the devastation of Poland by the Germans and Russians and the destitution of the Poles (partly quantified: p. 317). He even includes a surreptitious photo that shows a large Russian convoy taking away looted Polish property, and also informs the reader that the Red Army had seized 200,000 tons of grain from Polish lands. Furthermore, Lane points out (p. 219) that Poland was undergoing a serious shortage of grain that could lead to famine. Lane assesses the state of housing in postwar Poland, and how the Communists exploited it, as follows (p. 279): "We received reports from the larger cities--Krakow, Poznan, Gdansk, Katowice, and Lublin--that those persons who refused to sign the manifesto were told that they would probably lose their living quarters and their jobs unless they reconsidered their attitude. The housing shortage was critical all over the country, especially in cities such as Warsaw and Gdansk, where the destruction made it almost impossible to find shelter." Might not a "housing shortage...critical all over the country.." suffice as an explanation for many Poles not being thrilled when Jews came back to reclaim their property, and even killing them on rare occasions (300-600 killings out of some 300,000 returning Jews)?

This book is much more than an account for the disgraceful sellout of Poland to the Soviet Union by the west and the brutal imposition of a Soviet puppet state. It is nothing less than a one-volume history of Poland from 1944-1947. It provides so much detail in just one book, and includes such things as pictures of then-General Eisenhower's visit to Poland.

Lane devotes some detail to the double-dealing of Roosevelt behind the Poles' backs. The sellout of Poland included President Roosevelt openly lying to Polish-American leader Charles Rozmarek, even using a prewar map of Poland as part of the deception (p. 96). Throughout his travels across Poland, Lane was keenly aware of the terror created by the Communist secret police (U. B., or UB). He was well aware of the fact that free elections were unimaginable under such circumstances, long before the farcical elections of January 17, 1947 that officially brought the Communists to power. Soon thereafter, Lane could not take it any more. He resigned his position as ambassador in order that he could freely speak to Americans about the crime of betrayal that had been done to Poland.

Lane (p. 181) pointed out that the definition of a Fascist was often very elastic: "...that some well-informed persons had even gone so far as to define a Fascist as a person not in one hundred per cent agreement with Communism." Left-wingers had used the term Fascist in this manner since time immemorial. Lane also includes a statement of Stalin saying that, whatever the negative American response, Americans will soon forget about it and move on to other things (p. 312). Ah, the more things change, the more they remain the same!

Lane provides some detail on the so-called Kielce Pogrom (pp. 246-251). He remarks: "But almost all sources agreed that the militia had been responsible to a great extent for the massacre, not only in failing to keep order but in the actual killing of the victims, for many had been shot or bayoneted to death...(p. 248). Yet no members of the militia had been brought to trial...the underlying cause of the pogrom was the growing anti-Semitism which, even our Jewish sources admitted, was caused by the great unpopularity of the Jews in key government positions. These men included Minc, Berman, Olszewski (whose real name was said to be Specht), Radkiewicz and Spychalski...It was known, furthermore, that both the U. B. and K. B. W. [Communist secret police] had, among their members, many Jews of Russian origin. (pp. 250-251)." Lane (p. 251) suspects that the "unbelievably inefficient" manner in which the militia and the U. B. (Bezpieka, or UB) had handled this situation points to at least some degree of conspiracy. Otherwise, Lane does not address the issue of whether or not those "mob" members clubbing the Jews were themselves planted Communist agents. He does point out that accusations of the "tardy response of the Church" had been fueled by the coincidental absence of the Bishop of Kielce, Monsignor Kaczmarek (p. 249).

If indeed a staged Communist event, the so-called Kielce Pogrom certainly had the desired effect: "So, emphasis in the United States press was placed on the anti-Semitism still existing in Poland, rather than on the significance of the rigging of the referendum (p. 249)." In other words, the death of a few dozen Jews was deemed more newsworthy than the enslavement of 30 million Poles. What else is new?

In addressing Jewish Communism (Zydokomuna) as a factor, Lane (p. 252) quoted some Jewish relief officials who opined that not more than 5% of the repatriated Polish Jews were Communistic in their viewpoint. If an accurate, then 5% of 250,000 returning Jews still meant that 12,500 of them were available to play an active part in the enslavement and exploitation of Poland. Had only one-quarter of these become U. B. (UB) members, and each one of these on average had tortured and murdered only 50 Poles, then over 30,000 Poles were the victims of Jewish murderers. Note that this number far exceeds the aggregate total of the much-ballyhooed actual or alleged Jewish victims of Poles (1930's "pogroms", Jedwabne and environs, Kielce Pogrom, postwar property-related killings, all combined).

Although this book does not directly discuss the postwar Polish-Jewish property disputes, a subject that has recently gotten a great deal of one-sided media attention because of the publication of the book FEAR by Jan Thomas Gross, it provides the context that destroys Gross' Pole-bashing thesis. To begin with, Ambassador Lane gives the reader a taste of the devastation of Poland by the Germans and Russians and the destitution of the Poles (partly quantified: p. 317). He even includes a surreptitious photo that shows a large Russian convoy taking away looted Polish property, and also informs the reader that the Red Army had seized 200,000 tons of grain from Polish lands. Furthermore, Lane points out (p. 219) that Poland was undergoing a serious shortage of grain that could lead to famine. Lane assesses the state of housing in postwar Poland, and how the Communists exploited it, as follows (p. 279): "We received reports from the larger cities--Krakow, Poznan, Gdansk, Katowice, and Lublin--that those persons who refused to sign the manifesto were told that they would probably lose their living quarters and their jobs unless they reconsidered their attitude. The housing shortage was critical all over the country, especially in cities such as Warsaw and Gdansk, where the destruction made it almost impossible to find shelter." Well, duh! Might not a "housing shortage...critical all over the country.." suffice as an explanation for many Poles not being thrilled when Jews came back to reclaim their property, and even killing them on rare occasions (300-600 killings out of some 300,000 returning Jews)?

This book is much more than an account of the disgraceful sellout of Poland to the Soviet Union by the west and the brutal imposition of a Soviet puppet state. It is nothing less than a one-volume history of Poland from 1944-1947. It provides so much detail in just one book, and includes such things as pictures of then-General Eisenhower's visit to Poland.

Lane devotes some detail to the double-dealing of Roosevelt behind the Poles' backs. The sellout of Poland included President Roosevelt openly lying to Polish-American leader Charles Rozmarek, even using a prewar map of Poland as part of the deception (p. 96).

Throughout his travels across Poland, Lane was keenly aware of the terror created by the Communist secret police (U. B., or UB). He clearly realized the fact that free elections were unimaginable under such circumstances, long before the farcical elections of January 17, 1947 that officially brought the Communists to power. Soon thereafter, Lane could not take it any more. He resigned his position as ambassador in order that he could freely speak to Americans about the crime of betrayal that had been done to Poland.

Lane (p. 181) pointed out that the definition of a Fascist was often very elastic: "...that some well-informed persons had even gone so far as to define a Fascist as a person not in one hundred per cent agreement with Communism." Left-wingers had used the term Fascist in this manner since time immemorial. Lane also includes a statement of Stalin saying that, whatever the negative American response, Americans will soon forget about it and move on to other things (p. 312). Ah, the more things change, the more they remain the same!

Lane provides some detail on the so-called Kielce Pogrom (pp. 246-251). He remarks: "But almost all sources agreed that the militia had been responsible to a great extent for the massacre, not only in failing to keep order but in the actual killing of the victims, for many had been shot or bayoneted to death...(p. 248). Yet no members of the militia had been brought to trial...the underlying cause of the pogrom was the growing anti-Semitism which, even our Jewish sources admitted, was caused by the great unpopularity of the Jews in key government positions. These men included Minc, Berman, Olszewski (whose real name was said to be Specht), Radkiewicz and Spychalski...It was known, furthermore, that both the U. B. and K. B. W. [Communist secret police] had, among their members, many Jews of Russian origin. (pp. 250-251)." Lane (p. 251) suspects that the "unbelievably inefficient" manner in which the militia and the U. B. (Bezpieka, or UB) had handled this situation points to at least some degree of conspiracy. Otherwise, Lane does not address the issue of whether or not those "mob" members clubbing the Jews were themselves planted Communist agents. He does point out that accusations of the "tardy response of the Church" had been fueled by the coincidental absence of the Bishop of Kielce, Monsignor Kaczmarek (p. 249).

If indeed a staged Communist event, the so-called Kielce Pogrom certainly had the desired effect: "So, emphasis in the United States press was placed on the anti-Semitism still existing in Poland, rather than on the significance of the rigging of the referendum (p. 249)." In other words, the death of a few dozen Jews was deemed more newsworthy than the enslavement of 30 million Poles. What else is new?

In addressing Jewish Communism (Zydokomuna) as a factor, Lane (p. 252) quoted some Jewish relief officials who opined that not more than 5% of the repatriated Polish Jews were Communistic in their viewpoint. If accurate, then 5% of 250,000 returning Jews still meant that 12,500 of them were available to play an active part in the enslavement and exploitation of Poland. Had only one-quarter of these become U. B. (UB) members, and each one of these on average had tortured and murdered only 50 Poles, then over 30,000 Poles were the victims of Jewish murderers. Note that this number far exceeds the aggregate total of the much-ballyhooed actual or alleged Jewish victims of Poles (1930's "pogroms", Jedwabne and environs, Kielce Pogrom, postwar property-related killings, all combined).

Although this book does not directly discuss the postwar Polish-Jewish property disputes, a subject that has recently gotten a great deal of one-sided media attention because of the publication of the book FEAR by Jan Thomas Gross, it provides the context that destroys Gross' Pole-bashing thesis. To begin with, Ambassador Lane gives the reader a taste of the devastation of Poland by the Germans and Russians and the destitution of the Poles (partly quantified: p. 317). He even includes a surreptitious photo that shows a large Russian convoy taking away looted Polish property, and also informs the reader that the Red Army had seized 200,000 tons of grain from Polish lands. Furthermore, Lane points out (p. 219) that Poland was undergoing a serious shortage of grain that could lead to famine. Lane assesses the state of housing in postwar Poland, and how the Communists exploited it, as follows (p. 279): "We received reports from the larger cities--Krakow, Poznan, Gdansk, Katowice, and Lublin--that those persons who refused to sign the manifesto were told that they would probably lose their living quarters and their jobs unless they reconsidered their attitude. The housing shortage was critical all over the country, especially in cities such as Warsaw and Gdansk, where the destruction made it almost impossible to find shelter." Might not a "housing shortage...critical all over the country.." suffice as an explanation for many Poles not being thrilled when Jews came back to reclaim their property, and even killing them on rare occasions (300-600 killings out of some 300,000 returning Jews)?

In responding to Elaine Lisandrelli's book Ignacy Jan Paderewski Polish Painist Patriot (Champions of Freedom) I would like to first say thankyou to the author for giving me this wonderful book. I have known Mrs. Lisandrelli for a very long time and in that time I have been left with a very wonderful impression from her that will never leave me. Mrs. Lisandrelli came into my life as my 7th grade English Teacher. She is a fantastic teacher and a wonderful friend to me. In regaurds to her book the book was the most fantastic story I ever read. I extremley enjoyed the use of words and the story behind it.

When I was in 7th grade and in her classroom her teaching was so perfect in every way. She knew how to build a students life and courage up into the clouds to study well and be the best that person could be. I for one am one of them. I am a person who will never forget her. Mrs. Lisandrelli means the world to me and always will.

When I graduated in the year 2000 I knew then it was a time to go on with life and leave my childhood years behind me. My school, my friends there, ETC. But the one person I kept in my heart and still have there to this day is Elaine Lisandrelli who taught me everything I know. I have had other English Teachers thru my school years but not one of them was like her.

It is now the year 2002 and soon to be 2003 and I can still hear her voice teaching me and facing all the troubles I had right along with me. She never left my side and was always there when I needed her.

So I say this now and will never forget it. Thankyou Mrs. Lisandrelli for all U have done for me. I grew up and I became one of a kind and that is with all thanks to you. My teacher, My Friend

Love Brooke

A picture is a million words, or so the saying goes. Just look and you will see.

This book contains a billion words. Most in photographic form of a world that is gone. The Jews of Eastern Europe. Brutally murdered by the nazis than finished off by the Left.

Well worth seeing.

This work exhibits a balance of attention to battles on land, sea, and air. Famous events such as Westerplatte (the "Polish Alamo": my term), the siege of Warsaw, etc., are elaborated. Military personages mentioned include General Kutrzeba (leader of the Bzura counteroffensive, who later managed to evade German encirclement and join Warsaw's last stand), General Piskor (I knew his widow, who, despite her very liberal political views, frequently scorned "that wicked German nation".), General Anders, General Sosnkowski, General "Grot", General Abraham, etc.

Against the canard about the Polish Air Force getting preemptively destroyed on the ground, there is a description, and photo (just before p. 49), of Polish planes being camouflaged with vegetation to forestall this very event. Numerous aerial dogfights are discussed. Then no less than 98 Polish planes participated in the Sept. 17-18 evacuation of Polish forces into Rumania (p. 84), and individual Polish planes kept fighting until the final surrender of regular forces on October 5. (p. 86)

Some revanchists (e. g., Alfred Maurice DeZayas) deny the existence of a German Fifth Column. This work, without of course claiming to be exhaustive in this regard, discusses German Fifth Column attacks on Polish forces in Bydgoscz (Bromberg) (pp. 122-123), Leszno, Bojanow, Rydzyna, Rawicz (p. 52), Tomaszow (p. 44), Bielsko (p. 30), etc.

The reader learns of the unfortunately-temporary Polish successes against the vastly better-armed German forces. In the Battle of Mokra, the relatively-mobile Polish Cavalry destroyed at least 75 German military vehicles (p. 25). During the initial German thrust to the outskirts of Warsaw, a single German panzer regiment lost 57 of its 120 vehicles in just one day. (p. 51) In the early phases of the Bzura counteroffensive, which ended up costing General Blaskowitz his Field Marshall's baton, Polish forces captured scores of German guns and military vehicles, along with 1,500 German prisoners (p. 59). In an attack near Lowicz, Polish forces destroyed two German battalions and captured 100 military vehicles. (p. 71) General Franciszek Kleeberg's "Polesie" Group (in which my father, Mr. Kazimierz Peczkis, fought), beat off stronger German forces in early October, at one point taking 200 German prisoners (p. 130). It finally surrendered effective October 6, its ammunition exhausted. (p. 132)

Approximately 16,000 German soldiers and 66,300 Polish soldiers were killed in the 36 days of fighting (p. 135, 137). Many thousands of Polish civilians perished from military actions, and an additional 10,000--20,000 Polish civilians were murdered by the Germans. (p. 137) Interestingly, the Germans had to devote three times the effort to destroy a Polish division than they did to destroy an Allied division in 1940. (p. 135) So much for their ridicule of the Polish Army!

My name is Althea Wilson- Berkowitz, and this book is by my grandmother. She is now 82 years old. Everything in this book is true: It is my grandmother's story. She suffered for years, as did millions of others, to be able to write this book. It is amazing, and I'm sure you will agree.

During World War II, Heinrich Jost was a sergeant in the German Army stationed near Warsaw, Poland when he became curious about the corpses he had seen lying along the walls of the Jewish Ghetto. An amateur photographer, Heinrich took his Rolleiflex camera into the Ghetto in September 1941 (unaware of the situation that awaited him there) and spontaneously shot several rolls of film taking pictures of street vendors and corpse carriers, dying children and well-dressed women. He had no inkling that his photographs would become a vital document of the history of the Ghetto and the dire circumstances of its Jewish population brought about by implementation of the Nazi holocaust. Heinrich kept his prints hidden for decades without showing them to anyone. Then in 1982, he personally handed the photographs over to Gunther Schwarberg, then a reporter for the German magazine "Stern". Schwarberg gave the photographs to the Jerusalem Documentation Center Yad Vashem, where they were exhibited in the spring of 1988 and then sent on exhibition around the world. In The Ghetto Of Warsaw is the first time that Heinrich Jost's photographs have been published in their entirety along with his impressions and recollections as recounted to Gunther Schwarberg along side each picture. An essential addition to any personal, academic, or community library Holocaust studies collection, In The Ghetto Of Warsaw is a critically important and compelling document of both the ghetto and the atrocities of the Third Reich.

In the early 1960's, Marvin Herzog was the chief interviewer for the Language and Culture Atlas of Ashkenazic Jewry (LCAAJ). The leader of this project was Uriel Weinreich who was also the author's thesis advisor at Columbia University. As the data poured in on the patterns of linguistic and cultural variation between the Jewish communities of pre-Holocaust eastern Europe, the necessity of a method for analyzing this vast quantity of data became obvious. Herzog developed such a method and it became the basis of the doctoral dissertation which constitutes this book.
Herzog, who later became my mentor at Columbia, had the idea that it was possible to isolate a part of the territory covered which was both small enough to be tractable and yet could be regarded as a miniature scale model of the entire territory, capable of exhibiting the dynamics of dialect formation that shaped all of Yiddish-speaking Europe which is an area about as extensive as the northeastern US.
The way he did this was suggested to him by the over all shape of the dialect regions that was emerging as data from the whole area surveyed came in. The bulk of Yiddish-speaking Europe, the part where East Yiddish was spoken, turned out bo be divided into three regions: one in the southwest, one in the northeast and one in the middle. The area in the middle was shaped like an inverted 'V' tilted toward the northwest. The point of the 'V' was in a part of northern Poland with Warsaw in the southwest, Lomza in the northeast and Brest-Litovsk in the middle.
Since the area around the point of 'V' is a miniature version of the whole 'V', Herzog realized that this small area in northern Poland could be regarded as a scale model of the whole East Yiddish territory even though this small area made up less than a tenth of the whole territory surveyed. He made an intensive study of linguistic and cultural variation attested in interviews with people from 34 communities.
The author, a modest person who was perhaps constrained by the conventions of writing a dissertation in a rather conservative field, does not say so explicitly, but the idea of studying dialect interactions in an auspiciously chosen small part of the territory of a language in order to shed light on the dynamics of dialect formation within the language as a whole was a singularly happy one. The principle that regular relationships that hold sway over a small area can hold sway over a much larger one has proven fruitful in my own research.
If this book has a defect it comes from overgeneralizing this principle of the equivalence of different scales. While it is true that accounts of small scale dialect processes can often be scaled up to give a true picture of large scale processes, the reverse is not necessarily the case. That is
large scale structures are not always mirrored in the small scale. I think that Herzog assumed large scale structures generally carry over to smaller scales and this accounts for a dubious choice that he made in presenting his data in map form. A geographical distribution can be presented by showing each location with an iconic symbol to indicate the variant form found there or by drawing lines across the map dividing it into regions in which particular forms predominate. Historically, people working on LCAAJ data have preferred showing the individual locations. Drawing lines adds nothing to the clarity of presentation and requires that the designer make arbitrary decisions as to the exact course of the lines. At its worst, (not in this book but in the first volume of LCAAJ) the line method can suppress detail about individual locations. Herzog favors the line method. I suspect that this is because it works well with maps of the whole Yiddish territory where lines give a fair representation of the gross patterns of variation and he believed, wrongly, that it should work equally well in small scale maps. It does not because there is more irregularity on the smallest scales and the lines tend to gloss this over. But this is a relatively minor objection that detracts very little from a brilliant book.
The data presented in this book can throw new light on the general history of Jews in Eastern Europe. Two examples illustrate this: In the common historical narrative, Hasidism spread from the southwest to the northeast of the territory studied here and was partly beaten back by the opposition of the Lithuanian rabbis. Herzog shows that the present distribution of Hasidism coincides with that of techniques for preparing Sabbath fish and farfl (a kind of pasta). Since rabbis could not have influenced these domestic routines, Herzog suggests that well-entrenched differences in folk culture, including differences in worldview were the ultimate determinates of where Hasidism gained a permanent foothold. Another pattern offers a window into the deeper past of the Jewish settlements. The linguistic features of West Slavic languages (represented here by Polish) differ from those of Eastern Slavic ones (represented here by Belarusian and Ukrainian). Yiddish dialects have both West Slavic and East Slavic borrowings and, as would be expected, Yiddish loans from West Slavic are found to the west of Yiddish loans from East Slavic. However, a comparison of the boundary between West Slavic and East Slavic loans in Yiddish and the boundary between West Slavic and East Slavic languages themselves, reveals an interesting result. The boundary within Yiddish is to the west of the boundary within the Slavic languages, indicating that East Slavicisms have penetrated further west in Yiddish then they have in the Slavic languages themselves. This surprising result contradicts the common assumption of historians that the Jewish settlement in this area went from west to east. If that were true, the Jewish settlers would be expected to have carried West Slavicism with them into East Slavic territory. Instead they appear to have carried East Slavicisms into West Slavic territory. Thus it appears that the course of settlement included migration from east to west.

The greatest excesses of Polish megalomania could not have imagined half of the information contained in this first volume! This brief review is necessarily limited. British Prime Minister Tony Blair comments: "The Polish Intelligence Services made a unique contribution to Allied victory in the Second World War. This Report brings to light for the first time the true extent of that contribution. This is about a part of history that is not usually told."(p. xii).

This book includes some insights into Poland's wartime situation, including the fact that almost 40% of Poland's wealth had been destroyed by the Germans (Daria Nalecz, p. 53). Of the 1,733 German planes shot down during the Battle of Britain, 203 were shot down by Polish pilots (Christopher Andrew, p. 54). Merely 666 tons of weapons were ever dropped by the British into German-occupied Poland against 10,000 into France and 18,000 into Yugoslavia (Eugenia Maresch, p. 209)[not from "technical difficulties" as much as a Soviet-appeasing mentality]. Polish warnings about the extermination of Jews fell on deaf ears (Jan Ciechanowski, pp. 540-541).

Before and during WWII, Polish mathematicians broke the "invincible" German ENIGMA code, enabling the Poles to locate 80-90% of the German forces about to attack their nation in 1939 (Ciechanowski, p. 447). Ciechanowski also addresses the fallacies of the many books which ignore or minimize this Polish breakthrough (pp. 32-34) and comments: "There is no proof that the British would have been able to break the Enigma code and to discover how the machine worked, if on the eve of the war the Poles had the same low level of knowledge in these matters as did their French and British colleagues."(p. 34). Gill Bennett (p. 440) calls the Polish ENIGMA success an "outstanding Polish contribution" without which the war might have lasted longer. The screen character of a Polish traitor among the ENIGMA specialists is pure fantasy (Ciechanowski/Tebinka, p. 455).

Polish intelligence anticipated the German attack against its erstwhile Soviet ally at least several months before it actually happened (Andrzej Peplonski, p. 414). Subsequent information included such details as the presence of several thousand severely-frostbitten German soldiers in a hospital at Wilno (Vilnius)(ibid, p. 429). Based on the monitoring of railway traffic, Polish intelligence correctly deduced the fact that the German objective on the Russian Front in 1942 would be the Caucasus area, not Moscow (ibid, p. 425). The processing of German correspondence from the eastern front indicated that, by 1944, some 90% of German soldiers no longer believed in victory, and that depression, suicides, and attempted avoidance of duty were taking their toll. Allied bombing raids against Germany itself also sapped the morale of frontline German soldiers. (Adam Grzegorz Dabrowski, p. 533).

Polish intelligence regularly monitored German industry and Polish agents stole the plans of a specially-designed high muzzle velocity German antiaircraft gun (Andrzej Chmielarz, p. 410). Polish naval intelligence scored impressive successes in uncovering such things as German coastal batteries as well as the vulnerabilities of Allied shipping and port facilities (Gill Bennett, p. 165).

The Poles kept the British abreast of German progress in the development of jet aircraft (Chmielarz, p. 410). Polish intelligence played a decisive role in the unmasking of Germany's secret rocket program. This included the discovery of the Peenemunde testing site (leading to its subsequent bombing), the identification of the new German testing site (Blizna, near Tarnow), and the pinpointing of a cave in France in which the Germans hid their V-1 rockets for subsequent attacks on London (Rafal Wnuk, p. 244). Samples of rocket and fuel were stolen and analyzed by Polish agents. In time, an entire fallen rocket was camouflaged by Polish intelligence and subsequently disassembled and (in part) flown to London (Operation WILDHORN III)(Gill Bennett, pp. 441-442).

Direct British-Polish cooperation included the following: "Assisted by SOE supplies and training, Polish saboteurs played a major part in disrupting Nazi railway traffic on the Eastern Front, destroying or seriously damaging an estimated 6,000 locomotives. In the autumn of 1941 they came close to assassinating Hitler when he was traveling on his personal train, the Fuhrerzug, to his headquarters in East Prussia, the Wolfschanze ("Wolf's Lair").(Christopher Andrew, pp. 56-57).

Polish agents played a major role in deceiving the Germans as to the correct location where the D-Day landings of June 1944 would take place (Wnuk, p. 234). They also set the stage for, and subsequently monitored the results of, the Allied bombings of the important Ploiesti (Ploeste) oil fields (Tadeusz Dubicki, pp. 315-316).

Polish intelligence also worked to split the German alliance. Jan Stanislaw Ciechanowski focuses on the activities of Lt-Col. Jan Kowalewski in this regard: "Col. Kowalewski's idée fixe was to pull Italy, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Finland away from Germany. He attempted to do this by showing their representatives various ways in which their countries might join the other side, and by building up their skepticism as to the possibility of the final victory by the Third Reich."(p. 520). Unfortunately, Allied politics got in the way: "The formula applied to the German satellites turned out to be shortsighted. The western Allies had no concept of how to involve these countries in an anti-Hitler coalition. A more flexible policy...might have shortened the war. Lack of such a policy meant that Kowalewski's mission was doomed to failure."(p. 526).

General Hayes A. Kroner, Deputy Chief of Military Intelligence Division, told General Wladyslaw Sikorski that: "The Polish Army has the best intelligence in the world. Its value for us is beyond estimation."(Ciechanowski, p. 352). In like manner: "According to Sir John Colville, Prime Minister Churchill's trusted wartime secretary, Polish intelligence was the best among all the secret services of the countries participating in the war against Germany: 'the Poles were possibly the best players in this intelligence game.'"(Ciechanowski, p. 145). For all this (and more) the western Allies betrayed Poland to the Soviet Union!