Germany Books

I was very impressed with just how comprehensive this book is. If you want to know more about German WWI Flamethrowers, and how they were organize & used during the war, then this is the book for you. I am glad I bought it!

Ladies and gents
I just received this book the other day.Although I have not read it in detail,a quick flip through indicates i am quite impressed with the content.It has loads of great and "new" to me pics.I am very surprised to see so many pics that have yet to see the light of day.There are diagrams of equipment as well as how and why these devices were used.Lots of insight into the whole process all in one book.
I am very particular and to find a book of this content is not an easy task.If you are interested in flame weapons,World War 1,or older photos,this is a must.Definitely a 5 out of 5.

I've read this book multiple times (German Compulsive Disorder) and still love it every time. It's witty, insightful, and non-offensive - no Nazi/WWII references or coarse language. I can easily peg my family members in the "Goddess of Group Cohesion" and other characters that pop up. Plus, I learned more about wursts than I ever wanted to know. (Not possible, I realize!) I only wish the publisher would bring out a new edition - I've already bought several used copies, some to give as gifts and others as very popular door prizes for a recent family reunion. An excellent take on what is definitely a neglected topic!

This is a funny book. I laughed aloud several times, and partly because I saw myself in these quirky habits Anderson attributes to German Americans.

I believe I do have some German heritage, but I'm not sure. I haven't done a genealogical study.

But I'm a Californian, where all German ancestry, if it ever existed, is amalgamated (pureed) with every other ethnicity.

Mr. Anderson (the author), on the other hand, is from New Ulm, Minnesota, a strange place I've never been to. His grandmother was from Germany, as he reports in the appendix.

One chapter is entitled, "Don't Throw That Away": Economy at any Length. Anderson writes: "German/Americans believe in the saving ethic...we save things so we can suffer."

There's a funny chapter on Catholics and Lutherans "meeting head on."

How about this one: "100 Years of Rectitude: Propriety as a Chief Virtue"?

Or the chapter on German language, "Sprechen sie? American damage to the mother tongue."

He writes: "German Americans don't think of German as a foreign language. They think of it as a guilt trip."

Anderson has sojourned in Germany, and his description of his attempts to use German, or to revert to English instead, are hilarious.

How about the section, "Hoarding and Counting as a Hobby." I saw myself here: I hoard books, although I haven't counted them yet (my wife has, and guess what...there's too many books!).

You will get a big kick out of this book, and you will appreciate Germans and German Americans more than if you had not read this funny book. Americans think of Germans, today, as Nazis and former Nazis. There's another side to Germans, and you find it here.

Diximus.

The usual men-at-arms quality and concise coverage of all facets of the topic. This second title on the armies of Medieval Germany is illustrated by the late Angus McBride and reveals some of the bizarre costumes and armor decor of the knights and mercenaries of this period.

The usual good basic coverage by Osprey, covering the Holy Roman Empire. Wars were frequent, between principates, towns and cities, leagues, robber barons, religious groups. It's no wonder that Germany would be the site of some of the bloodiest campaigns during the later Thirty Years' War. There is also an excellent section on the Hussites and their unique method of fighting the Empire. There is even a halfway decent map in this one! The excellent color plates by Angus Mcbride start with chainmail and end with full gothic plate armor.

This is a very extensive and complete coverage of World War II German weapons and equipment. Portions of the information may also be also be found in pages 308-422 of The Handbook on German Military Forces 1945, Directory of Wheeled Vehicles of the Wehrmacht, 128 pages and a WE publication of German Combat Weapons, 212 pages. Printed on glossy stock paper, it is a direct copy of various US Army World War II intelligence bulletins so the photos aren't that great. It is probably the best one volume reference available for WW2 history buffs and wargamers and has lots of stuff for scratch-builders.

Great book!!! If you are a WWII re enactor, or rich enough to be a collector of WWII German vehicles, you will find tech. info. and pictures on everything from tanks, trucks, to small wagons one can pull with your Kittenrad! I think those who enjoy building WW II German models would like this book too for the tech. info. and pictures in it. Maybe even gamers would enjoy this book so they can argue tech. facts and the reality of the game piece movement with one another! The information was taken from US Intel. files from WWII, I think, so you feel like you are some high brass intel. guy when you read this book!(Smile)Anyway, buy this book and see for yourself.

Breyer covers a subject about which not much has been previously written, and accompanies the text with some wonderful and rare photos. Those who are students of WWII, and who want to know more about the concept of The Fleet in Being, and the Kriegsmarine's application of it, will learn from, and enjoy, this book. Highly recommended, especially for collectors of WWII naval history.

When we talk of the history of German military during WWII, most part crosses our mind is about German Blitzkrieg in which the Panzer and Luftwaffe took the leading role. But few told us about German Navy, except U-Boat, which has planted an incorrect impreesion in our mind that it seems that Germany had no force on the surface of water. And few of us are acquainted with the once famous operations such like "Operation Juno" or "Operation Berlin". Armed with the service in the Kriegsmarine in WWII as his rarely strong background of the author, this book comes to fill the blank. After briefling the gloomy background caused by the harsh and strict Treaty of Versailles imposed by the victors in 1919, the author unfolds the develpement of big ships of German Navy chronically in which politics, economy, diplomatic and military concern took their important parts in it, listing all the ships being laid down, launchd, complexion and commissioned year by year, detailing all the rich data of each big ship such as their tonnage and caliber of the guns, displaying all the magnificent plans of the German Navy built-up one by one, especially the most grand and formidable Z-Plan which would propel Germany to emerge as the greatest sea power in the world. The author narrats all the operations the battleships participated during the war : Victories, the astonishing victories, and the defeats, the tragedies after putting up a most heroic fight against the crushing superiority enemy. Thinking of the superiority of the mighty British Navy at that time, readers will scarcely not feel that the success of the Geramn striking force operating on the Atlantic were all the more amazing. If readers keep the fact of the supeiority British fleet in mind, they will be hardly not astounded by the operation : "Cerberus", which against practically all rules in the art of warfare, in which the large squadron consisted of two battleships, Scharnhorst and her sister-ship Gneisenau, and heavy cruiser Prinze Eugen, escorted by destroyers and torpedo boats and covered by Luftwaffe, boldly and successfully with high speed returned home from Brest by dashing through the English Channel right under the nose of Britian who was completely caught napping until the whole units was passing the Strait of Dover when the possibility to mount effective attack was past, for which incident the British public complained with understanding indignation that "Nothing more mortifying...has happended in Home waters since the 17th-Century"! Readers can not be without surprised when they are informed by the author that at the time when the war broke out, Geramn Navy possessed only two battleships, two heavy and six light cruisers, plus 34 destroyers and torpedo boats and 57 submarines, the force was far weaker than its opponents : The mighty British Royal Navy alone in 1935 had had 15 battleships, 6 aircraft carriers, 19 heavy cruisers, 36 light cruisers, 169 destroyers and 54 submarines! not mentioning the also powerful French Fleet! Nor will the readers not feel suprised when their eyes fix on the beautiful photos of Graf Zeppelin, the sole German aircraft carrier which was launched in 1938, but did not completed until 1942, which will correct our wrong impression that German did not build aircraft carrier; while as the pages running, the puzzle hanging in our mind of why this carier never shown herself on the stage of the war will be lefted. Besides all these above, the author also discloses the important role that Hitler played on the rise and fall of German Navy : It was he who promoted to restore German Navy by successfully getting rid of the yoke of the Treaty of Versailles imposed on Germany, which made all the big ships built possible and legallized and all the masterpiece of navy plans blossom, by boarding battleships and by attending the ceremony of the new ships being launched, by ratifying all the plans of ships built; however it also was he who paved the way of the fall of the German Navy, mostly in 1943, by ordering cessation of all repairs of Gneisenau at the beginning of 1943 which made one of the only three battleships out off the stage of the war which served to further weaken the Navy, by stubbornly intervening the affairs of the Navy which led the downfall the Grand Admiral Raeder, by ordering all the large units under construction be halted. In short, I highly recommend this book which has provided readers full picture of the developement of big ships in German Navy history from 1935 to 1945 which intersts and benefits us who want to have whole accounts of German history during the war.

George F. Nafziger's The German Order Of Battle: Waffen SS And Other Units In World War II covers the organization of all Waffen SS, Luftwaffe, and naval unites, as well as foreign units in German service, including Russian, Italian and central European troops. Appendices demonstrate the theoretical organization of many of these German military formations and is based on German military documents, exhaustive and meticulous research, and considerable scholarship. The third volume of an outstanding trilogy, The German Order Of Battle: Waffen SS And Other Units In World War II is comprehensive, detailed, authoritative, informative, and a core title for any personal, academic, or community library World War II reference collection.

Nafziger's German Order Of Battle is one of those books that take years to compile, organize, and then get published. The wait has been worth it. This volume includes a listing/ organization of every Waffen SS, Luftwaffe, and naval outfit, and foreign units serving Hitler. The descriptions of the different ethic groups that fought for German are well written, insightful, and fascinating. I cannot recommend this book highly enough.

A proper perspective on the question of the failed German revolutionary socialist opportunities starting in 1918 after the debacle of German defeat in World War I, the overthrow of the Kaiser and the establishment of a democratic republic until 1923 with the failure of the revolutionary opportunities resulting from the French reparations crisis is the subject of on-going controversy among revolutionaries. At the time most European revolutionaries, especially the Russians, placed their strategic aspirations on the success of those efforts in Germany. A different outcome during that period, with the establishment of a German Workers Republic, would have changed the course of world history in many ways, not the least of which would have been the probable saving of the isolated Russian socialist revolution and defeating German fascism in the embryo.

Since then, beginning with the Trotsky-led Russian Left Opposition in 1923 and later the International Left Opposition, revolutionaries as well as others have cut their teeth on developing an analysis of the failure of revolutionary leadership as a primary cause for that aborted German revolution. Against that well-known analysis, more recently a whole cottage industry has developed, particularly around the British journal Revolutionary History, giving encouragement to latter day hand wringing about the prospects (or lack of prospects) at that time and drawing the lesson that a revolution in Germany then could not have happened. To buttress that argument the writings on the prospects of the 1923 revolution by August Thalheimer, a central theoretician and key adviser to party leader Brandler in this period, have been warmly resurrected and particularly boosted. This kind of analysis, however, gets revolutionaries nowhere. It is one thing for those on the ground at the time in Germany and in the Comintern to miss the obvious signals for revolution it is another for later `revolutionaries' to provide retrospective political cover for those who refused to see and act on the revolutionary opportunities at the time. The events surrounding the failed German revolution were also echoed in what was called the `literary debate' inside the Russian Communist Party in 1924 at a time when the internal struggle, after the death of Lenin, was getting to a white heat. While at this historical distance it is probably impossible to argue all of the specifics of the revolutionary crisis of 1923 some lessons stick out.

A quick sketch of events beginning from the start of World War I with the famous treachery of the German Social Democratic leadership in voting for the Kaiser's war budget (and continuing to vote for it) are in some ways decisive for what happened in 1923. Later, facing the consequences of the defeat of the German army, war exhaustion and the possibility of harsh reprisals from the Allied forces the Kaiser's government was overthrown shortly after the armistice was signed and the fight was on in earnest for the future of Germany. That question however was not decided until the German working class had been subdued and or brought off with a bourgeois democratic republic, the notorious Weimar Republic. Unlike the earlier Russian experience in 1917 no independent mobilization of the working class through Soviets or other pan-working class organizations was established. And that is the rub. This is the start of the problem. No Bolshevik-type organization was present to take advantage of the revolutionary situation. What is worst, the forces that did exist led by the heroic martyrs Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht were defeated and they personally were tragically and ominously murdered. Thus, a known and tested leadership was an essential missing ingredient that was to have consequences all the way through to 1923.

When a German Bolshevik-type organization finally was formed it contained many elements that were subjectively revolutionary but political naïve or disoriented, and suffered from anarchistic excesses in reaction to the stifling Social Democratic atmosphere of the pre-war period. While a party needs those subjectively elements to make the revolution and this writer would argue that it cannot be made without them this confusion gave the reformist Social Democratic party plenty of ammunition for its reformist, parliamentary position. The key result of this lack of organization and proper preparededness was the so- called March action of 1921. Unlike the overwhelming reaction of the German working class to the attempted Kopp Coup of the previous year this was an action that went off half -cocked and did much to discredit communists in the eyes of the working class. The sorry results of this action had reverberations all the way up to the Communist International where Lenin and Trotsky were forced to defend the action in public, expel the former German party leader Paul Levi for a breech of discipline for his open criticism of the action (while it was going on) but also point out that it was the wrong way to go. In any case one cannot understand what happened (or did not happen) in 1923 without acknowledging the gun shyness of the Communist party leadership caused by the 1921 events.

So what is the specific argument of 1923 all about? Was there or was there not a realistic revolutionary opportunity to fight for a Soviet Germany which would have gone a long way to saving the Russian Revolution? On the face of it this question is a no-brainer. Of course there was a revolutionary situation. If the disruptions caused by the French take-over in the Ruhr to obtain their war reparations and the resultant passive resistance policy of the German government and the later inflationary spiral that affected many layers of German society was not a classic revolutionary situation then there are none this side of heaven. End of story.

The real question that underlines any argument against a revolutionary crisis is what to do alternatively about it. This is where the previous "ultra' policies of the German Communist Party came into play. The party remained passive at a time when it was necessary for action. The leadership, including our friend Thalheimer, acted as if a revolutionary crisis would last for a prolonged period and that they had all the time in the world. They caught Zinoviev's disease (named for the Bolshevik leader who always seemed instinctively to go passive when it was necessary for action, and visa versa. Moreover, most critically they did not take advantage of the decline in the authority of the Social Democratic Party in order to win over the mass of the rank and file of that body that were leaving it in droves. That is where the preceding events described above come in. The destruction of the authoritative leadership of Luxemburg and Liebknecht left a lesser layer not known for an aggressive strategy when called for. It is hard to believe that Luxemburg and Liebknecht would have responded in the same way as the Brandler/Thalheimer leadership. I would argue if anything Liebknecht would have had to be restrained a little. This is, in the final analysis, the decisive problem of the failure of the German Revolution in 1923. Nobody can predict whether a revolutionary crisis will lead to revolutionary success but one must certainly know when to move as the Bolsheviks did.

And what of the other reasons given for holding back. The fascists were a menace but hardly more than that. Damn, if they were really as much of a menace as right-wing social democrats and communists have portrayed the situation in 1923 what the hell were the fascists in say 1930, when they had 100,000 well-organized and fighting mad storm troopers in the streets. With that view the only rational policy for Communist would have been to make sure the German working class had its passports in order. As we tragically know there are never enough passports. And what of the German Army? The army was not that big even if augmented by `unofficial' paramilitary forces. It definitely would have been harder to split these forces along class lines. But workers militias would have at least been able to hold the line. And do not forget the more than willing Red Army was within a few days march to assist. As the Bolshevik Revolution and the ensuing Civil demonstrated in the final analysis a revolution is victorious or defeated outside the influence of whatever foreign forces are scheming against the regime.

And what about the internal capitalist opposition? And what about the stabilization of the economic situation? One can go on forever with the problems and talk oneself out of any action. While all these factors by themselves might argue against a revolutionary crisis in 1923 jointly they create the notion that this was a big revolutionary opportunity lost. That should make one suspicious, very suspicious, of the credentials of those `revolutionaries' who argue that one did not exist. Read more on this subject.

This is not the first book you should read about the German revolution - it's the last.

Clocking in at 980 pages, the book relies on a ton of primary sources in German but this doesn't overwhelm the gripping story of the revolutionary upheavals that rocked Germany from 1918-1923. The revolution was a product of a combination of a factors: the slaughter of WWI intensified class antagonisms, eventually leading to huge cuts in wages and near-starvation rationing; the main working-class organizations, the unions and the millions-strong Social Democratic Party (SPD), supported the war despite its repeated pledges not to participate in the murder of workers of other countries; the victorious workers' revolution in neighboring Russia in October, 1917, led by Lenin, Trotsky, and the Bolshevik party.

The enormous discontent with the war exploded when 80,000 sailors were given orders to attack the British navy in a suicidal maneuver. They refused and instead arrested their officers, traveling on trains to the nearest towns to spread the news of their mutiny. Once there, they set up the first workers' and sailors' council in Germany, and within days, workers, soldiers, and sailors across the country followed their example and set up councils across the country. They were emulating the Russians, who set up workers and soldiers councils (Soviet is the Russian word for council) and eventually put all power into the hands of those councils. The reformist SPD rushed to the head of the council movement to disorient, demobilize, and contain it within the framework of capitalism.

The outcome of the struggle between revolution and counter-revolution in Germany over the next five years was of enormous importance for European and world history. The failure of the German working class to take power into its own hands left Soviet Russia isolated and starving after a murderous civil war, in which 14 foreign governments (including the U.S.) sent troops and aided the pro-capitalist White Armies, leading to the deaths of millions of workers and peasants. With the working class largely eliminated as a social force, the party/state bureaucracy became the new ruling class and eventually re-introduced capitalist exploitation back into Russia under Stalin.

The second consequence of leaving capitalism intact was the Great Depression of the 1930s, in which Hitler and the Nazis were given power by Germany's ruling class to smash the workers' movement, re-arm, and end the Depression on terms favorable to big business. Had the German workers seized power in the early 1920s, history might not have known the names of Hitler and Stalin.

To return to the book: each line on each page of each chapter is so well written that it not only gives the reader a crystal clear picture of the problems and challenges posed by the revolution, it's almost as if you are there with the armed, angry workers marching through the streets of Berlin in 1918, or organizing a clandestine literature distribution circle on a naval cruiser in 1917, or in a mass meeting of delegates from workers' and soldiers' councils debating whether or not to seize power.

This book is definitely worth the money. It shows what happens when an experienced revolutionary organization with significant roots in the working class is not built before a revolution breaks out; it shows how reformist organizations can obstruct and sabotage struggle; and it shows how ruthless and cunning the ruling class can be when their power and wealth are threatened. I would recommend reading Chris Harman's "the Lost Revolution" to familiarize oneself with the events, people, and parties before you take on this book. Also, Sebastian Haffner's "Failure of a Revolution: Germany 1918-1919" is short and excellent, and it has pictures of the events and the people in question.

The background to The German Revolution and the Debate on Soviet Power is the revolt that erupted in Germany as a consequence of the terrible suffering among workers and farmers during World War I. This culminated (as a similar process did in Russia the year before against the Tsar) in the overthrow of the German Kaiser in November 1918. Immediately millions of people of all social classes found themselves confronting profound political choices as to what kind of new government would best advance their interests.
The majority of leaders of the trade union and socialist movements came out in support of a coalition government with liberal elements of the capitalists. A minority of workers, looking to the Spartacist group led by Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Leibknecht and others influenced by the example of the Russian Revolution, advocated a course of fighting for a government of workers and farmers.
The revolutionary-minded workers trying to forge a new organization in the heat of this struggle made errors that ultimately contributed to their being crushed in blood-with profound consequences for decades to follow. The second part of this book shows how this debate became international in character as workers all around the world were inspired by the workers uprising in Germany and sought to contribute to their deliberations as well as understand the lessons of their fight.
The underlying differences were over reform vs. revolution. The book documents this in the exciting form of excerpts from workers' newspapers, political debates and resolutions from all sides and positions allowing the reader to make up their own mind as the historical events unfold.
It's obvious that Pathfinder's editors went to great efforts of original research, outstanding translation work, map making, preparation of enlightening photos and other editorial aids in publishing this book because they want to make this material attractive and accessible to thinking workers who want to reknit the historical continuity of our class. They certainly succeeded as far as I'm concerned. At the same time, Pathfinder demonstrates a high degree of respect and confidence in its readers' abilities to make up our own minds and draw the necessary conclusions in the objective way they present all sides of this vital debate for our consideration.

For anyone looking to understand the 20th Century this book is critical reading. It tells the untold story of the German revolution of 1918, the revolt of the German people against their own government during the First World War. How that revolution developed and it's decline. What makes this work unique it that it is told through the writings and speeches of key players in that revolt and events surrounding it. The struggle to forge a leadership of the revolution which would not stop half way is a key theme of the book. Here we can read for ourselves Rosa Luxembourg, Trotsky and Lenin as well as many others as they work out the battles of the day. The book is critical for understanding WWI. I highly recommend it.

Vaughan's keen eye and impeccable scholarship provide a superb overview of German Romantic painting for newcomers and seasoned scholars alike.

This volume is a seminal addition to any art refrence library.

Vaughan's keen eye and impeccable scholarship provide a superb overview of German Romantic painting for newcomers and seasoned scholars alike.

This volume is a seminal addition to any art refrence library.

I have the original version, 1925 V. Stephanitz and would like to sell it. I understand that the Original Versions bring a rather high price. Anyone interested? Lillie Berg, Soldotna Alaska

This book is a little pricy these days but it's a great book and well worth the money for any German Shepherd Dog fan. You'll have the best luck finding this book in the English version through Hoflin Publishing Company. Written by the founder of the breed, this book gives many answers to age old questions from history, feeding, raising, training, and breeding among many other topics of interest. Anyone interested can learn a lot from this book not only about what German Shepherd Dogs were/are intended to be but also about dogs in general.