South Africa Books
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Great Photos, Good CoverageReview Date: 2002-12-20

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Perfect! Stellar research.Review Date: 1997-12-06

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KUDOES TO JOEL CARLSONReview Date: 2003-06-26

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Remains best book about GordimerReview Date: 1998-10-09

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No miracles, sober thinking.Review Date: 2001-06-28
In conjunction with the issues I laid out above, I just want to reflect, for a moment on Nelson Mandela's rhetoric that what occurred in South Africa was a miracle. The common belief is that there is an ontological predisposition to violence in Africa in general and South Africa in particular - that is a very dangerous oversimplification. In as much as there is a propensity to violence anywhere, why should we privilege Africa as the hotbed of violence. Can we see things another way and formulate policies accordingly.
There was an interesting note made in the introduction that: "Reluctant reconciliation is taking shape in South Africa. The ambivalent alliance between the two major contenders for power, the National Party (NP) and the African national Congress (ANC), results from a balance of forces where neither side can defeat the other. It is their mutual weakness, rather than their equal strength, that makes both longtime adversaries embrace negotiations for power-sharing. Like a forced marriage, the working arrangement lacked love but nonetheless is consummated because any alternative course would lead to a worse fate for both sides."
Already this sets the tone that the myth of the South African miracle is false and that the rhetoric surrounding the violence as set up by Mandela is false. A deeper examination of the issues leads us to believe that is will be the realistic self assessments as opposed to slogans and threats of violence that will lead South Africa to a stable transition and to effect a sustained stability - to whatever extent that can be achieved. People, unfortunately, en masse, do not like to hear this, it detracts from the rhetoric that fills the empty chambers of their hearts - therein lies the problem. In this context, it is very difficult to make a distinction between what we can be done and what ought to be done.
It is also interesting to note that whites will be in control for along time to come. The "emancipation" rhetoric want to see the toppling of tyrannical regime and see black freedom. Unfortunately, it is this very type to drum beating that results in violence: "Though strong in symbolic support, the ANC is weak in bureaucratic resources, military capacity, and economic leverage. Real power will therefore remain in the hands of the present establishment; even if Nelson Mandela becomes president of South Africa, the economy, the civil service, and the army will have to rely on white skills, capital, and goodwill for along time to come."
Having outline this, it is clear that a more reasoned and negotiated approach would be prudent. A statement like this one certainly does not bode well for the activists or the communist. Both of their projects will not be eliminated by this realization. However, realpolitik is for the engineers, rhetoric is the fodder for the activist.
The problem of the unassailability was already laid out early in the book, what is now important to do is to deconstruct the notion of Nelson Mandela as messiah and that his political apparatus is beyond criticism. One of the possible cautions for doing so can be construed as paternalistic. An argument could be made that it might be well enough that the ANC has achieved what it has. In this light, it will be making baby steps and will need time to iron out its kinks and be allowed to make mistakes. However, more sinister is the notion that because of his charisma, Mandela and the ANC are beyond any form of criticism - as if to imply "you are either part of the problem or part of the solution."
This merely confirms empirically that a less than critical approach can lead to a less than accurate prediction. Dr. Adam and Dr. Moodley bring to light several angles that ignored by the press and public who wish to see South Africa in terms of black and white rather than shades of gray.
Miguel Llora
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Excellent study on the politics and economics of apartheidReview Date: 2000-03-28
Lowenberg and Kaempfer provide powerful evidence for the Public Choice argument that South Africa's apartheid "was essentially a massive bureaucracy whose raison d'etre was the production of market regulations designed to effect wealth redistribution away from blacks and white mining and industrial capital owners in favor of white workers and agricultural capital owners. These regulations reflected the preferences of the median voter in an electorate dominated by white labor and rural constituencies." (p. 39)
Many people attribute the demise of South Africa's apartheid to international sanctions. Lowenberg and Kaempfer arrive at a different conclusion: "The white South African Government abdicated power because of a recognition that apartheid policies were becoming too costly to maintain. The main costs associated with apartheid were self-imposed as a consequence of years of misguided development strategies on the part of the National Party government and its predecessors. Although external events such as the oil price shocks of the 1970s and international reaction to apartheid after the Soweto riots of 1976 contributed to the slow growth of the South African economy, even more significant was the fact that the economy had undergone changes which had turned the apartheid system, once an asset for important groups of the white population, into a liability." (p. 218)
Lowenberg and Kaempfer devote several chapters to the sanctions issue. They show that despite claims that the goal of sanctions is to make targeted countries change objectionable domestic policies, sanctions more likely serve the interests of pressure groups within the sanctioning countries....
Therefore, the Lowenberg and Kaempfer hypothesis suggests, for example, that the United States might impose sanctions on the importation of South African wine, textiles, and coal and not to create domestic resistance, because abundant substitutes exist for those goods. Moreover, domestic producers might cynically support embargoes on wine, textiles, and coal imports as a means of gaining monopoly power. The United States embargoed South African agricultural products, but European nations, which were heavy consumers of produce from South Africa in the winter, chose not to embargo that category of goods.

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Ten stories in all fill this wonderful collection Review Date: 2007-05-13

Brilliant History & Analysis of A Tragically Divided City.Review Date: 1999-04-21

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Original and beautiful in an unusual way.....Review Date: 2001-04-06

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I like this book!Review Date: 2001-08-26
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