Pearl Harbor Books
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Very moving personal historyReview Date: 2002-03-12


An atypical account of an American POW in the hands of the JapaneseReview Date: 2007-01-29
His account is very matter-of-fact and unlike most other stories of American captives under the Japanese, he often speaks highly of his captors. At first the treatment was very brutal, but later there were acts of kindness from the Japanese guards and some civilians. He received fruit and extra food in exchange for work favors and was impressed by many aspects of Japanese culture. His account of how the Japanese guards piled their weapons in an orderly manner and then marched out in military precision when the war was over is recounted with grace. He seems to have little animosity towards those who were once "the enemy."
The bulk of his wrath is reserved for President Roosevelt and the highest members of the American military. He believes that Roosevelt deliberately allowed Pearl Harbor to be attacked, citing the widespread notion in the military that it was where the Japanese would attack if it ever came to war. He also will never forgive Roosevelt's deviousness in telling the American defenders on Bataan to fight on because "help is on the way", when he knew that there was no way that they could be rescued or reinforced. It was a cynical ploy by the American planners to keep them fighting so that the Japanese would be delayed as long as possible.
I don't believe that Roosevelt deliberately allowed Pearl Harbor to be attacked. At the time, few people believed that a task force the size that the Japanese mustered could sail all the way across the Pacific without being detected. In fact they were, the people on the ground just didn't recognize it for what it was. However, I give Sabotta his due, he did his duty and fought till it was useless to fight on, so his right to bitterness is earned.


wouldn't it be niceReview Date: 2007-10-29
AN AMERICAN TRADGEDY-FROM WITHIN(the day ole glory criedReview Date: 2008-09-18
A very powerful expose at the top of our nation,and the the man who would
eclipse benedict arnold(in my opinion)as the greatest traitor in American history. "FRANKLIN D.ROOSEVELT. Ask the 'SOULS OF 3,OOO AMERICAN
SERVICE MEN AND WOMEN. AN ACT THAT WILL LIVE IN"INFAMY". very well written. Eric S-New Orleans
The Truth HurtsReview Date: 2008-01-05
Human behavior is as simple and uncomplicated as it could be. People have left reviews here who have not read this book, so horrified are they that they may be forced to accept that this country is not, and hasn't been since 1776, the Disneyland Main St. USA that they so cherish.
It's a nasty world, and we're right at the center of it.
A pretext for war; Pearl Harbor Review Date: 2008-01-03
This book examines:
"1 - The US Navy's eight point Overt Act of War strategy adopted by President Franklin D. Roosevelt that lured Japan to attack Pearl Harbor.
2 - The 1941 Japanese naval radio intercepts.
3 - Presidential and U.S. Army and Naval dispatches ordering American Pacific commanders to stand aside and let Japan commit the first overt act of war.
4 - Discover six years of Pearl Harbor hoaxes intended to deceive the American public and congress.
Follow the Japanese naval spy who was allowed carte blanche to spy on and prepare bomb plots of Pearl Harbor."
The McCollum Memo alone provides evidence that this was no surprise attack; well no surprise to the higher levels of the US government and military.
NonsenseReview Date: 2007-06-26


Americans under OccupationReview Date: 2008-04-09
There's no story here. Overlong and underdoneReview Date: 2007-05-29
The plot moves at a glacial pace. He introduces more than a dozen characters and few of them do anything interesting. One plotline is the riveting story of a woman growing sweet potatoes! This is obviously the beginning of a many book series and Turtledove has no intention of getting to the point until he's wrested every dime from the reader. This is part of the "every story must be at least a trilogy" trend. It would be interesting to see a good editor take the series and condense it down to a single book. Then, even with all the flaws it might make for an passable read.
Not a bad read. Review Date: 2007-05-15
First of a two-part alternative history of Pearl HarbourReview Date: 2007-03-10
The sequel is called "End of the Beginning."
This is the fourth alternative version of World War II which Turtledove has written. He has previously done stories with aliens from Tau Ceti invading in 1942, (the Worldwar series) a parallel history following pretty much the real track, in a world where technology uses magic rather than engineering (Darkness/Derlavi/World at War series) and an alternative World War II in a history following a Rebel victory in the US Civil War, hwich has the same roles as in the historical WWII carried out by different people (Settling Accounts).
Having done so many alternative versions of World War II, you would think he would find it impossible to say anything new about them or maintain the reader's interest. Judging by other reviews, some readers do indeed have that problem, and I expected to be one of them, but from the moment I picked up this book I found myself hooked.
Turtledove suggests that the Imperial Japanese forces would have treated the inhabitants of Hawaii with the same ruthless cruelty they dealt out to other people who fell under their control, such as the luckless people of Nanking. This is all too plausible. He weaves a story of how this might have affected the people who lived under their regime, from American Prisoners of War, U.S. and Hawaiian civilians, to Hawaiian residents of Japanese origin.
Turtledove's account of how the conflict might have left this latter group torn between conflicting loyalties is presented through the story of a family in which the father, who was born in Japan, welcomes the invasion and blames the death of his wife (killed by a Japanese bomb) on the Americans for resisting: his sons continue to identify with the American side and blame the Japanese attackers for their mother's death.
For the reasons hinted at above, I nearly didn't read this book, but I'm very glad I gave in to the temptation to do so. If you liked most of Turtledove's other books, you will almost certainly like this one.
A suspenseful masterpiece that makes you wish for more.Review Date: 2008-01-19
Yes, it is WW2 but a quite different scenario than his other books in this time. In this book, Japan follows up her attack on the `sleeping giant" with an invasion. He looks at a reaction from the shattered U.S forces and a hasty response from the main land later.
I found the book to be a "page turner", i.e. a book that I could not put down. I read it in a week and constantly enjoyed the different viewpoints from Japanese and U.S sailors, army and aviators. As a bonus the civilian population, both Japanese and "haoles", provided a great contrasting viewpoint.
Sam Hendricks, author of "Fantasy Football Guidebook: Your Comprehensive Guide to Playing Fantasy Football".

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Awesome ManReview Date: 2002-05-08
Pearl HarborReview Date: 2007-06-12
While reading this book I enjoyed lots of sections but the one I enjoyed most was when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and when the U.S. attacks Japan not because of the casualties but because they explained with detail and it was easy to understand and get pictures in my mind. It was very easy to tell what was happening at the bombing.
Even though there's so much going on in this book I think that if you really think about it that every book has either a theme or moral. In the book of Pearl Harbor I think that the moral/theme of the book is friendship because when Danny and Rafe need each other they are there for each other to talk to and to lean on too because they are so close.
What I liked most about this book is that it's a non-fiction so I learn part of history at the same time just reading. The main thing I would change is not have Danny die so I could see what would happen between him Rafe and Evelynn (Rafe's girlfriend). I think that this book is for older people because kids won't really understand what's going on in war so they will be all confused and the older people might have a clue.
Great screen-play!Review Date: 2003-06-21
Some people say the love story was a bit excessive and far-fetched. I agree. However, it does not take away from the extravagancy of the story of the bombing of Pearl.
Peal HarborReview Date: 2003-05-29
By: Chris M.
Mmm..Review Date: 2002-05-26


A bit different but enjoyableReview Date: 2008-07-23
Great page turner although I listened to it by Simon VanceReview Date: 2008-04-16
I think this is a story much better heard by a Brit like Simon Vance than read on your own, although Highcastle and Hariet's Dad sounded identical! Really enjoyed the 9 disc package!
Minor leagueReview Date: 2008-03-02
Strong idea but muddled execution Review Date: 2007-10-08
The protagonist is an American Tom Wall ,who has enlisted in the British Army and believes his brother has betrayed the Allies in Crete .he is searching for his brother aided by his sister in law ,Harriet Wall who is a British agent at odds with her father a prominent British Fascist who sets his own men against Tom
The plot is over complicated and takes too long to get going resulting in a sense of mounting impatience on my part .The scenario -which also revolves around the impending Japanese attack on the USA -is intriguing but the signs of a tyro novelist are everywhere and it just dfrags when it should be getting into top gear
There is promise here and I would assume the faults common to a debut novelist will be ironed out in subsequent books -I sincerely hope so at any rate becuase Mr Ross is a good stylist and shows a gift for suspense which bodes well for any futire books
Interesting HistoryReview Date: 2006-12-08
This is the author's first novel, and his writing is intelligent, but it also incorporates the idiomatic vocabulary and grammar of 1939/40 London, which modern American readers may find a bit difficult. However, the author's character development is a particularly strong part of the book, and his story's love interest between the brothers and the heroine (Harriet) quickly grabs the reader's interest. In fact, all the book's characters (including the German spies and Harriet's diplomat father) are fully-developed and believable. The reader's imagination is piqued from the opening chapter all the way to the end.
Ross has launched a promising career with this book. He paced the story well, and the plot lines finally dovetail into an entertaining ending that is a real "aha!" moment.
I recommend this book to any reader with an interest in the espionage genre.

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Worth a readReview Date: 2004-05-12
Does he prove it? No. There is no absolute evidence that proves FDR and the State and War Departments knew that Pearl Harbor was about to be hit. Toland's circumstantial evidence IS very strong, though, and if what he writes here is true (and he documents it all), then it is very difficult not to reach the same conclusions he does. I've always found it difficult to believe that, with the threat of war obviously hanging over the United States and Japan, we had no idea where the Japanese Navy was. But, again, there is no absolute proof, no documents that say "FDR knew." But no other historian, not even Prange, brings up the evidence that Toland does.
FDR apologists will hate this book. FDR haters will believe Toland has proven his case. Fair readers will wonder. Historians (and that's the way I make my living) will conclude Toland hasn't proven his point. Not absolutely. But he does do very good investigative work. We'll probably never know for sure what FDR knew or when he knew it.
Biased reporting ....the decline of a once good authorReview Date: 2004-04-28
Toland makes his case...but it's still just an indictment and not a convictionReview Date: 2006-11-06
Thorough going in his research, dogged in pursuing surviving sources for their versions of meetings and moments and recollections, Toland's work shows what really good history writing can be.
In this way, it should probably be equal parts troubling for Roosevelt supporters and detractors that Toland has taken up the gauntlet that Roosevelt knew and allowed the Pearl Harbor diasaster and that even with his considerable talents he still makes a case that in the end amounts to such thin soup.
Spoiler alert! Those wishing to let Toland makes his own case should pick up his book so that this author does not make it for him.
For those still reading, Toland's case essentially boils down to his assertions that US code readers had received and deduced the significance of a one line message from Japan being "East wind, rain." Apparently code for "war with US is on," the message -- according to Toland -- boded additional significance based on prior intelligence reports indicating the likelihood of an attack on the US.
However, and this where the devil gets into the details, one of those prior intelligence reports reportedly went to J Edgar Hoover, then FBI Director, who according to Toland, sat on the message without forwarding it to Roosevelt. Such a state of affairs would have been believable because, at least in one other World War II case, Hoover's FBI sat on potential evidence of Axis wrongdoing. Certainly, to be complicit, it would have been better for Toland's thesis if there was some assertion that Roosevelt himself had gotten word.
Toland's thesis also stops at the level of indictment and not conviction because even if his evidence is taken at face value and given the weight intended it by Toland, it still fails to make any other argument than that because Roosevelt should have known that he did in fact know and that because it seems like Roosevelt intended and intentional loss of US forces that he was in fact complicit in the purposeful loss of US forces.
Still the same, Toland seems incapable of bad writing and like his other works he manages to produce a story complete with almost novel like nuances and character development.
The only problem is that in this book he may have finally succeeded -- albeit inadvertantly -- in writing fiction.
Master Historian Turns to Pearl HarborReview Date: 2008-06-02
But as a lawyer I wanted to highlight how enjoyable and fascinating are the behind-the-scenes accounts of the various Pearl Harbor tribunals, which pinned guilt perhaps wrongly on some of the accused. I was particularly interested in famed Boston attorney Charles Rugg's defense of Admiral Kimmel, and the legal tactics employed to best make use of the otherwise secret cables and testimony that Rugg assembled on Kimmel's behalf.
A great account, and an inside look from a master historian of WWII, this one is a no-brainer for anyone interested in WWII history.
Excellent--The Dawn of revisionismReview Date: 2005-04-16

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Writing is better than the storyReview Date: 2001-08-05
OUTSTANDING original story!Review Date: 2000-07-22
The Author RespondsReview Date: 2001-10-20
The Imperial Japanese Navy steamed north at twenty-six knots, to avoid the (remote) possibility of air attack, up to approximately forty degrees North latitude. Once in the clear they turned east and slowed to fourteen knots their ordinary cruising speed (to conserve fuel), sometimes slowing to nine knots due to heavy weather. Six oil-tankers accompanied the Japanese fleet and refueling, especially for their escorting destroyers, was an on-going concern. The fleet typically slowed to twelve knots for this maneuver which took most of the day, the Japanese didn't have alongside refueling as the U.S. fleet did, but the tanker dragged the oil-hose astern for the destroyers to pick up. So, the Japanese didn't steam home at thirty knots, it was more likely fourteen knots.
Their route home must also be considered, they did not steam straight for Japan, but went up and around Midway Island, again to avoid the possibility of air attack. So, while the Japanese took a circuitous route home at fourteen knots a U.S. battleship could, upon exiting Pearl Harbor after the attack, steam directly for a point some seven hundred miles north of Midway Island at twenty knots (this class of battleship had a cruising radius of 6,800 miles at that speed) and indeed make an interception, especially as it carried four scout planes.
Was this scenario likely? No, but it was possible. So, too, was the dawn attack that caught the Japanese completely by surprise, which was not at all improbable given that a confident victor was halfway home unmolested. It is entirely possible that they would drop their guard at that point.
The final question, once the battle commenced why wouldn't a thirty-knot Japanese fleet simply come up to speed and disappear over the horizon out running their twenty-knot opponent? Well, it takes time to work an aircraft carrier up to flank speed and if a battleship was within range it would only take a few minutes and a few sixteen-inch salvos to set it alight (this happened during the battle of Midway when Japanese carriers were dive bombed). Also, the Japanese night formation used in this attack was their actual steaming formation described in "The Pearl Harbor Papers." So, if you're interested, read the book.
Daniel L. Houston
Tora, Tora, Tora at Peyton PlaceReview Date: 2000-07-27
Interesting, plausible naval historical sagaReview Date: 1999-08-01
Mr. Houston has crafted his novella around an intriguing premise: What might happen if an American battleship had escaped the Japanese onslaught at Pearl harbor and then chased the Japanese fleet as they sailed home? Like the dog that chases a car down the street, the logical next question is what do the Americans do if they catch the Japanese fleet? For the answer you'll have to read the exciting, action-packed climax.
By the way, did I mention the gratuitous sex? Although the four female castaways presented an interesting dilemma to the crew, Mr. Houston could have played it more PG-13 than R. Speaking of which, all the ingredients are there for a better-than-average made-for-TV movie. But, don't wait for the movie - read the novel now.


This book can shake the foundations of what you believe to be true!Review Date: 2007-03-05
I own many of the books cited by the author. His quotes are correct. His conclusions are good too! Some reviewers have become all tangled up in the Japanese Naval Codes and when were they broken. The offical documents do not mean that much to me. The reason these offical documents fail to interest me very much is because I have another book that I do not believe the author has!
Radio Magazine, May 1941. This is a little booklet type of magazine popular in the 1930's and 40's. It is geared for the radio hobbiest. Back then, radio was still new and millions of people enjoyed building their own radios from parts or even kits. This magazine was for the people to read, learn, and discuss topics of interest. In this issue is an article showing the home hobbiest how to listen to the Japanese coded transmissions at home. It teaches you how to understand the codes and it even shows you how to break the Japanese Navy Codes at home. So to me much of the arguement over when could our Navy read the Japanese Codes becomes irrelavent with the solution published in a hobby magazine seven months before the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Regarding the question: Did they use their radios on the way to Pearl Harbor; the answer is a resounding YES! They had to!
The Japanese Navy took a northern route just below the Alutian Islands then turned south to Pearl Harbor. During the third week of November this large convoy was hit by a severe winter storm. These big storms are common in the northern Pacific this time of year.
The Japanese convoy was scattered over a huge area of the Pacific Ocean. The commanders had to use radio to form up their convoy again. When ships are thiry and sixty miles away it is not possible to signal them by semephore (signal flags). Radio was the way it had to be done. And yes indeed our West Coast radio amatuers were listneing closely as the Japanese convoy found one ship after another. It was quite time consuming and once the ships gathered around they had to sail into a protective formation taking even more time.
Station CAST knew this convoy was coming when small groups began meeting outside several Navy bases and then sailed at random up to the very northern Japanese Islands. Then the time came to sail east. Station CAST was in Corrigador Island. This is why the men and files were smuggled out by PT boat and submarine. These men knew too much to let them be prisoners.
As you read more about Pearl Harbor you will also want Stinnets book: Day of Deciet. These two books go hand in hand and both are available at Amazon.
Whatever you do read! Let it be a passion in you. Learn and love to learn. Never stop regardless of your age. Some of the Pearl Harbor books are written with a liberal slant. It is too bad because I like a book without a political slant. There are enough politics involved when author Stinnet tries and tries to get informatiom through the Freedom of Information Act. An American law to keep govt records open. The unexpected part of this FOIA is to de-classify SECRET documents.
Some authors such a Stinnet have done very well with this, Willey has not done as well. However, Willey has done very well in planting the reading and learning seed in others. Willey helps the student of history learn what it means to be hungry for information. Be sure to Read Willey's book along with Stinnets book. You will have fun for sure! George Morgenstern write an excellent book and never forget Crocker's book : Roosevelt's Red Road to Russia. There are about eight or ten books to read that will shatter your thoughts of how it was. Now you graduate into a small group who know. Harry Elmer Barnes wrote several books and edited one named after a phrase he (Beard) coined himself. Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace. This is a group of eight authors driven to tell the truth just like Stinnett and Morgenstern did. A chapter in Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace deals with George Orwells 1984. This is the real back story for the book or movie. If you read this then the rest you read will fall into place. No more confusion taking place. As you read more you learn that the conspiracy is put forth by our govt, and the anti-dote is given by folks like Wiley who are quiet, sincere information sources. When thinking of Pearl Harbor it is fair to ask yourself ........... why in the world are any Pearl Harbor papers still marked secret after 67 years? Read! Read more! Have fun and fill your mind with thoughts! Travel to far away countries in your mind. Have fun and never leave your couch!!!
Needs better writing - start to finish. But ...Review Date: 2006-05-24
But, even given the above, his text anent the Japanese Naval Operations Code (Chapter Two) and the highlighting "pre-Pearl Harbor Japanese Naval Despatches" found in SRH-406 (Appendix A) indicate just how unsettled Pearl Harbor remains even today. This is worthy of the reader's attention, with the recognition that many Pearl Harbor materials remain classified even after decades of FOIA requests.
In Chapter Two, for instance, Willey makes the connection is to British Navy Cypher No. 3 which troubles the NSA even now as the continued censorship of Safford's SRH-149 shows; further, the notes on page 168 point to the many inconsistencies about "codebook" values and their "source." In Appendix A is shown the basic and elementary linguistic forsenic analysis as to when Japanese Naval message translations actually occurred - that is, those SRNs cited were translated in 1941 via Willey.
Also found in Willey is an overview of the well-known (See Kahn's The Codebreakers) attack on codes such as JN-25B, where a detailed example is used. Explained also are the numerous "less than secure" aspects of the code itself (e.g., divisible by three), Japanese code clerks exercising a lack of proper procedures, for example, "tailing." Willey notes that the JN25B code had precisely 16,409 values; far fewer than the often quoted 33,333 or 50,000, implying a much more complicated code. Bring a pad and pencil to "follow" his examples. JN25B really was a very simple code to break.
For those untutored in the many esoteric threads of the Pearl Harbor saga - nescient, naive, and gullible absolutes remain evident. Consider Budiansky's "none" as compared with "some" from Gish and Parker (each senior NSA historians). These amply display the many gaps in the fundamental knowledge regarding Pearl Harbor.
Obviously the next Pearl Harbor chukker is still to come.
Myth making and outright falsehoods.Review Date: 2002-12-04
Outdated FraudReview Date: 2002-12-07
I'd also like to say that ALL of the Japanese officers involved including, Abe, Chigusa, Fuchida, Fujita, Genda, Goto, Ishiguro, Kusaka, Maki, Matsumoto and Yoshioka all maintain radio silence was strictly observed. Fuses were removed from the transmitters and the transmitter keys were disabled. Read ("The Pearl Harbor Papers") It was NOT possible! Willey, it seems will not engage in defending his work. More that likely he knows that it is outdated.
Great Work Of FictionReview Date: 2004-11-05
I was left confused and bewilderd by Mr. Willey's arguments as most of the evidence presented was taken out of order or mixed and matched to fit his argument.

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Pearl Harbor: Anatomy of a Warning Failure...Review Date: 2008-08-14
Wohlstetter examines the various signals about Japanese actions and intentions received at Pearl Harbor and in Washington D.C. in the months leading up to the attack, and how those signals were processed by key players against a background of competing information. At book's end, she provides the Japanese side of the equation. She closes with an absolutely priceless perspective on the continuing challenge of the intelligence warning problem.
As Wohlstetter documents, U.S. intelligence in 1941 was fragmentary, inexperienced, and disconnected from the decision-makers it was supposed to support. No single agency had the opportunity or authority to conduct meaningful all-source fusion and analysis of the limited available information. Principals in the Executive Branch shared information poorly with each other and with Pearl Harbor. Key decision-makers were distracted by an undeclared war in the North Atlantic, a politically sensitive mobilization, and wishful thinking about Japanese intentions. At the end, key leaders in D.C. and Pearl Harbor were looking in the wrong places for the start of conflict.
Wohlstetter clearly explains how the best efforts of dedicated personnel can be defeated by bureaucracy, human nature, and a failure to communicate. Her final thought, "We have to accept the fact of uncertainty and learn to live with it", could grace any number of post-mortems of intelligence failures. Her book is very highly recommended to the intelligence professional as a cautionary work on the inescapable difficulties of warning and decision.
When it comes to Pearl Harbor, there is no such word as "enough."Review Date: 2008-01-11
Try reading "A String of Pearls" [ASIN:0971365938 A String of Pearls]] While a work of historical fiction, it provides yet another "what if" to the story of Pearl Harbor that seems all to plausible in today's context. The book moves along very well. It's a "can't put down" work.
Excellent ReadReview Date: 2007-12-22
Anatomy of a SurpriseReview Date: 2008-03-11
Wohlstetter demonstrates that this mindset was coupled with an almost complete lack of inter-service cooperation between the Army and the Navy. Not even George C. Marshall, the brilliant Army Chief of Staff, understood that to defend an island like Oahu the Army would need to cooperate closely with Navy. In fact Marshall and his naval counterpart Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Stark hardly communicated at all. This distant relationship was duplicated by the lack of cooperation between General Short, commander of the army's Department of Hawaii and Admiral Kimmel, commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Thus the defense of Oahu and Pearl Harbor was not based on joint, integrated planning nor on a mutual understanding of the two services' capabilities and weaknesses.
The much discussed failure of the then U.S. intelligence system to provide warning of the Japanese attack was exacerbated by the failure of the newly established Air Warning System (AWS) to operate as it was designed. Neither Short nor Kimmel demonstrated any interest in the AWS and made no effort to ensure it was properly staffed and trained. Further the Navy chose not to provide the long range air reconnaissance patrols that were to be a part of the AWS. Finally the command and control as exercised by the Army General Staff and the CNO in Washington in the period prior to the attack was weak and badly executed. This was mirrored by the staffs of Short and Kimmel in Hawaii. In short the Japanese surprise attack on December 1941 succeeded because the U.S. C3IR systems in place failed. As Wohlsetter clearly shows Pearl Harbor was caused by multiple U.S. Military failures of concept and execution.
This book wisely does not speculate on the pre-Pearl Harbor actions of the U.S. civil government under President Franklin Roosevelt. The evidence here is much more complex and subject to interpretation.
A Hearty PerennialReview Date: 2005-01-02
If you haven't read "Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision," then you really aren't prepared for serious discussions with well-informed people about such things as "pre-emptive" and "preventive" wars.
Related Subjects: Cast and Crew Reviews
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Nearly 40 years later, William L.C. Johnson, a survivor of the explosions, asked another Navy man a by-the-way question about the event. One thing led to another, as they say, and within a few years, Johnson had collected dozens of first-hand accounts and photographs from eyewitnesses of the disaster. Out of those accounts comes this book.
William Johnson is no David McCullough, and this book will never be considered for a Pulitzer. It's not highly polished history -- it doesn't even, for example, get to the bottom of what really triggered the explosions in the first place. What this book is, however, is a very personal, and moving, labor of love, both for the author himself and for the many other men whose stories are told here.
In fact, the second half of the book is made up entirely of personal accounts from Marines, Army soldiers, and Navy and Coast Guard men who were there that day. Johnson also includes records of the Navy Board of Inquiry on the disaster, and the logs of several of the ships involved. These latter, especially, help illustrate the scope of the event, while the personal accounts demonstrate the chaos on the scene.
The West Loch disaster was, in the grand scheme of the war in the Pacific, a relatively minor event. It didn't even delay 'Operation Forager,' the invasion of Saipan for which the ships and men were being readied. But it wasn't minor for the men who experienced it, or for the families and friends of those who died. As the era, and the men who lived it, fade from view, this small book helps remember the men who gave their lives in action in May 1944.