Existentialism Books
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A shortcut to Know HeideggerReview Date: 2001-07-10
Basic HeideggerReview Date: 2001-08-19
Typical Heideggerian Ontological MellifluousnessReview Date: 2001-08-14
Heidegger's unfortunate career choices aside, this book is well structured into 3 sections: an introduction, part I., and part II.
The introduction is an exhortation to the reader to shake off the cobwebs of the Idols of the Theatre and open our minds to simplicity, to Greekness, which pertains to his concluding thesis in part II. of the book, an interpretation of one of Anaximander's fragments which comments on ontology's centerpiece, being itself. Heidegger wants us to abandon ourselves and look inward to a sort of Platonic remembrance of what is most elemental, essential, and primary. In this way he believes we, the reader, might become prepared to find at least a glimpse of the incipient grounds of being itself, as it relates to humanity.
Part I. is essentially an examination of the concept of being, and the outline of this section is further subdivided into 3 divisions.
Part I., division I.: Here Heidegger makes the interesting distinction betweens actual beings and the state of being common to all actual beings. Everything that exists is a being of some kind or another, yet possesses being per se no more or less than one from the other. Therefore beings and being, Heidegger proposes, are distinct in this regard. He also delineates an interesting trope regarding the verb 'is,' in breathtaking Clintonian fashion, by examining it for content and showing us there really is none on the face of the matter. All particular beings may make equal use of the copula 'is,' rendering it no more than a link, an empty universal, the abstractest of all abstractions, and, being a generality, there finds its most efficacious application independent of its object. In this way, with 'is' as a marker for being, the concept of being itself becomes more and more tenuous, almost evaporating.
Part I., divivion II.: Since Part I., division I., has indicated 'is' as the linguistic device used to denote being, as being common to all beings and devoid of content, Heidegger seems to feel here that the apparent vacuousness of this verb conceals a surplus. Perhaps a surplus representing the sum of all beings, in that their commonality, their groundedness together in existence, is being itself. To me it seems an ever shifting tautology as to whether Heidegger's ontology has a specific content or not, the thought occuring perhaps, as more of a vacillation between everything and nothing at one and the same time, rather than some parlor trick contradiction as might appear at first glance. Here Heidegger becomes the metaphysician. Material essence, solidity, belongs to particular beings, not however, to being itself.
Part I., division III.: In this section Heidegger reiterates the anthropocentric necessity of at least some degree of idealism in terms of being's relation to living beings and humans in particular. This revalation may not help in trying to understand an already strained paradox, but it certainly wouldn't do to overlook this obvious caveat.
Part II. is the conclusion of the book, and here we are introduced briefly to the ancient Greek Anaximander and his thetic fragment which states, "...the source from which things come into existence is also the sink to which they return when their existence is finished, necessarily...and each is made right with respect to all others as determined by the unfolding of time..." Heidegger examines this fragment to the effect that since all particular beings constantly come from the source common to which they somehow go in the end, the being that all beings share in this regard is an infinite, permanence. Ergo and again, beings are temporal, being is not.
It all seems much ado about little, but as the title says, 'Basic Concepts' is the focus of attention here, in particular 'being' and what it may mean in reference to itself.

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kockelmans' approach clairvoyant, rigorous but "smooth"Review Date: 1997-08-30
Superb book by a consummate expert on HusserlReview Date: 2006-10-21
not really inspiringReview Date: 2001-06-03

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Beautiful BookReview Date: 2007-02-07
Travel with NietzscheReview Date: 2001-06-24
Take a Hike with Fritz!Review Date: 1997-11-07

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Nietzsche and KnowledgeReview Date: 2008-04-03
But Cox's analysis of Nietzsche is by no means limited to setting up connections with post-structuralist thought (in fact, this is a very minor portion of the book). Cox is primarily interested in developing a comprehensive account of Nietzsche's theory of knowledge. A current debate over Nietzsche concerns whether he is best conceived as a postmodernist or a modern naturalist. Cox argues that Nietzsche is effectively a postmodern naturalist (although, I don't think he ever uses the word "postmodern" in the book), and suggests how Nietzsche's "postmodernism" (or, theory of interpretation) and naturalism mutually inform each other.
If you're looking for a clear and thorough "postmodern" interpretation of Nietzsche's theory of knowledge, this is your book. Also check out "Nietzsche's Theory of Knowledge," which includes a thorough discussion of Will to Power and its relation to Nietzsche's epistemology. If you're looking for a more "modern" take on Nietzsche's epistemology, check out Maudemarie Clark's "Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy" or Brian Leiter's "Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Nietzsche on Morality." But don't be so lame as to leave a postmodern scholar's work a negative review because you happen to be a modernist (and vice versa, for all you postmodernists out there).
Clear, comprehensive--highly recommended.Review Date: 2007-08-13
A mixed bagReview Date: 2002-12-03

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fairReview Date: 1999-10-30
A Smart AnalysisReview Date: 2005-08-16

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An Intriguing But Incomplete BookReview Date: 2001-10-27
A Valuable Book.Review Date: 2002-01-30
Don't be overly alarmed about the omission of Nietzsche and Kierdegaard. The reader is informed of this omission in the preliminary acknowledgements and is given a reasoning for the omission in the introduction.
Dr. MacDonald has written an extremely comprehensive and lucid introduction - in itself the introduction is a valuable exposition of the subject matter. The energy, vigour and supply of intricate detail that is given in the introduction is followed through to all subsequent chapters. Furthermore, the selection of readings by the eight different authors gives the reader an invaluable insight into the thoughts of some of the 20th century's most prominant thinkers.
Overall, this is an exellent book that supplies the reader with an impetus for further existential and phenomenological inquiry.


Re-Affirming a CanonReview Date: 2000-04-28
Almost all of Murdoch's philosophizing in a single packageReview Date: 2000-07-05

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A short subjective SummaryReview Date: 2004-04-21
Amongst all of the philosophers, it seemed one topic held the same power and influence on the human mind. That was the topic of death wherein after one is dead one no longer exists except in the written articles left behind in the material world (Sartre). Camus seems to adopt Heidegger's philosophy concerning death, which is that death is undeniably going to occur, but it is not until one's mortality is actually at risk that one becomes more aware and petrified of the outcome of death. I found this idea the simplest to comprehend and agreed to it automatically. Another topic the philosophers seem to hit similar cords on seemed to dissipate due to terminology and mere personality complexities. This is the topic concerning the human being's ability of just `being' and the actual actions the human being takes.
In accordance to Sartre, the human being's actions are always ruled by natural causes and the actually `free will' we believe in is just a mere idea of subjectivity. For instance, if one is going to be a coward, he will always be a coward and it does not matter if he breaks those bonds of cowardice or not. Heidegger seems to go for a more pessimistic ideal of consciousness (almost everything seems pointless or wasted to him), which consists of the fact one is never really conscious of anything and is just simply in the world. He supports this argument with the entity of Daesin and being, which seemed to cause electric shocks of incomprehension to rack my mind. In fact, I was so confused with Heidegger's beliefs that I soon began to realize it means nothing at all even if I did understand him (his indifference and impersonal way of thinking portrayed a concept below the human being way of feeling). Finally I came to Camus, who relieved my past mental tensions with his good humor and simple way of explaining things.
Like Sartre, Camus seems to focus on the idea that actual free will is just a matter of subjectivity. However, instead of being indifferent to his ideals like Sartre seemed to be, he personalized his arguments with the character Meursault in his novel, The Stranger. Meursault is a simple man who falls from innocence to self-destruction due to his death. The idea seems simple enough, but I, for one, seem to have lost my innocence when I entered Elementary school. Thus, the novel itself seemed like a romance written by Hemingway. However, I quickly denounced this previous thought when Camus and Solomon speak of how Meursault does not love his girlfriend (not that he is an evil man, but what would be the purpose of love; better yet, why would he love anything when that would be absurd because it would be meaningless). Although Camus portrays Meursault as a character who understands that most, if not all, of his actions are meaningless because they will inevitably lead to nothing particular that has a point, Meursault himself seems like a much better projection of the existentialist theory than the depressing and monotone voice of Heidegger. In conclusion, I found Camus much more compatible to my adolescent methods of thinking as opposed to Sartre and Heidegger.
All of these philosophers seem to have placed my mind in a paradox unknown to me before. I now remember during my pre-teen years I used to think like Meursault (or perhaps I should say Camus) in the sense what is the point of doing anything? Not that I had evil intentions for my fellow student, teacher, relatives, whatever, but it just seemed ridiculously pointless since I was inevitably going to pass away from this physical realm (hopefully into a better afterlife than Sartre's). I also understood the possibility that there was no Hell or Heaven, which would make my afterlife a real after-life, hence nothing is happening afterwards. If it's just game over when you're playing the game of life, then why do anything at all. What's the necessity of action? It is interesting to relive these ideas, but hopefully, considering my current relationships and situation, I will not completely embrace this philosophy again.
Interesting But Not CompellingReview Date: 2004-06-08

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A major work by Habermas: Is its thesis convincing?Review Date: 2007-01-01
The underlying engine of crisis is the economic system. He notes that "In liberal capitalism, crises appear in the form of unresolved economic steering problems" and ". . .crises become endemic because temporarily unresolved steering problems, which the process of economic growth produces at more or less regular intervals, as such endanger social integration." Economic crisis might occur when output declines and its distribution becomes increasingly unequal, so disproportionate that it raises questions about the fairness and viability of the system. In this way, the ideology supporting capitalism would come under question and cease generating loyalty from the people. If government capabilities are questioned too much by citizens, crisis develops, and people come to lose faith in the ideology supporting the system and the system's legitimacy in dividing up the pie so that all gain "fairly."
People will not be actively involved in politics as long as their careers, family lives, and enjoyment of consuming material goods continue. Under such circumstances, they allow the capitalist economy and government to operate with rather little question. By providing an appropriate level of "goodies" to the people, the system renders the masses quiescent and allows the elite to remain in power. When questions arise as to whether the system is generating consumer goods at the proper rate, then the political disengagement may end and a legitimation crisis begins as people begin to doubt the validity of the current system.
Habermas' ideal system would be based on dialogic communication and open discourse. The question here: If the current late capitalist system suffers a legitimation crisis and transformation of the system looms, how will new norms develop? Habermas answers: "Only communication ethics guarantees the generality of admissible norms and the autonomy of acting subjects solely through the discursive redeemability of the validity claims with which norms appear. That is, generality is guaranteed in that the only norms that may claim generality are those on which everyone affected agrees (or would agree) without constraint if they enter into (or were to enter into) a process of discursive will-formation."
Citizens will test the validity claims of the various ideas and norms under debate. In the final analysis, "The validity claim of norms is grounded not in the irrational volitional acts of the contracting parties, but in the rationally motivated recognition of norms, which may be questioned at any time." And what determines which validity claim is best? Habermas contends that the better argument that emerges from a cooperatively engaged in dialogue should rule--if a consensus forms around this one possibility.
This is a powerful work, whether or not one agree with the thesis. Habermas has faith in the ability of people to create the norms that will govern politics and society. Is he too optimistic? That is the key question that readers will have to grapple with.
Habermas' Opus is Timely!Review Date: 2000-11-10

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good intro. to Nietzsche, and interesting to those familiar-Review Date: 1999-04-29
Good intro. to Nietzsche, and interesting to those familiar-Review Date: 1999-04-29
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