Caleb Carr Books

Terrorism is warfare waged deliberately against civilians. Carr suggests terrorists are paramilitary units mounting offensive campaigns. Terrorism as a tactic has never succeeded. Military history can teach us lessons to solve the dilemma of modern terrorism. Terror's lure as a quick and gratifying solution is powerful.

Rome used destructive warfare against Carthage and some of the Germanic tribes. Rome came to live with constant threats and rebellion at its borders as a consequence of the tactics employed. Citizens grew weary and wary of service in the military. Young people were filled with apathy and aversion toward the state.

The first requirement of a just war is that it bring peace. The fire of terrorism is self-consuming. Pope Urban II sent his knights on a crusade. Both Christian and Muslim warriors victimized noncombatants. We continue to feel the effects of the crusades today.

Under nationalism every inhabitant became part of the war machine. The wars of the Reformation, the American Civil War, and World War I were especially savage for reason of new technology. In the first example the Inquisition was allowed to degenerate into an organ of persecution and torture.

Grotius's RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE dates from 1625. Frederick the Great reformed warfare. He showed contempt for soldiers and compassion for citizens. He had a concept of progressive war.

Total war is conflict without structure or bounds. We have now had it again for some two hundred years. Napoleon resurrected total war from medieval times and he was hated for it. Subsequently Clausewitz devised a variation he deemed absolute war.

Helmut von Moltke, by contrast, created the modern general staff system and supported war with limited objectives. He understood that peace, not devastation, was the purpose of war. Sherman's campaign in the Civil War created endless resentment.

Destruction on a mass scale was the Nazi ethic. (The Prussian military elite, following the principles laid down by von Moltke, among others, almost succeeded in its assassination attempt of Hitler.) The vengeful nature of terror is shown by the dropping of the atomic bombs on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. Contrarily, the rebuilding of Germany and Japan after the war demonstrated immense generosity, overcoming questionable wartime acts such as the fire-bombing of Dresden.

Sadly, a subsequent development sent the United States in another direction at the beginning of the Cold War. James Forrestal established the national security state with the CIA, the NSA, and the Department of Defense. This put the nation on permanent wartime footing.

The American style of warfare is hostile to ideas of creative limitation. Carr's argument is tightly constructed, buttressed by telling historical points. By implication our current situation is addressed.

Mr. Carr has written a concise(small enough to fit in a hip pocket) history of warfare against Civilians. I would recommend this as an excellent primer on the subject. In my belief this should be regarded as a political history as well as a military history.

Saying that, I will add some of his conclusions about reforms are overly simplistic.

In this book, Carr sets out to describe the history of terror. Terror against civilians is nothing new. In fact, the ancient Romans practiced terror against the opposing enemy citizens most of the time. Even worse, the Mongols virtually eliminated their enemies' cities. In the middle age, things began to change. Some society's respected the citizens of another country or principality. However many did not and the slaughter continued. When things did change, they did not change for all societies.

Although I agree with most of what this author says, I had a problem with some of his definitions. For instance, where does terror begin and legitimate warfare end. One of the things Carr critisizes is the American "terror bombing" Well, that might have happened in World War II. Carr labels the bombing of Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Afghanistan terror bombing, but lists the foray over Libya as justifiable. I am not sure I agree with his analogy. Another issue I disagreed with is that of Vietnam. Here Communists used terror indiscrimately, while the South and the Americans used it somewhat sparingly (B-52 bombings). The Communists won and proved how successful some terror is against civilians.

This is an interesting read on a current issue that faces the world. This is an OK read about the use of terror.

The book starts off describing some of the origins of terror, beginning with the Roman Empire. It then steamrolls through the successive centuries picking examples throughout history of why terror doesn't pay off. While I understand the point, I feel the author tried to cover too much ground in too little space. More concrete examples and more direct writings and quotations from key players would have made the examples stronger.

The author also brushes over exceptions to the rule, including post-war Japan and Germany.

Overall, it's decent book that gets you thinking about terrorism in an objective manner...it's just a little bit light on the details.

In a very concise manner Mr. Carr has written a wonderfully informative handbook. He realizes that terrorism is nothing new but must now be confronted with different measures then were used in past history. He does not say to appease terrorists he just states that people do not meld together when force is used against them for too long. Interesting that he feels that Mr. Rumsfeld is way ahead of his time on the issue.

Finally! A What Ifs? book focused on American History. The other books in the series were descriptive and concise, answering many questions I myself have wondered about the events that have shaped the world as it is today, so it was no surprise that this one followed through. Reading this truly makes one realize the immense impact every single event in history has on our world today. Five stars, without a doubt.

Most history books are written in a monotone voice and many of them are also white-washed. But this book is very different from normal history because it sparks the mind for new thoughts and new possibilities, or what could have happened.

This book is pretty amazing from the story of what could happen to the Mayflower to other unimagineable things that could pop up into the mind. I liked this book very much, but the only downside is that sometimes the essays and stories get a bit dull at times.

An interesting collection of historic events that would have happened differently if some element did not happen. I cannot say that this book was great reading because some of the stories, I felt, were boring. Some provided so much detail that they left me yearning for something written differently.

I bought this book because I wanted to find out what the movie would be like. Of course, this is a novelization of the movie. I am pleasantly surprised and disappointed.

First off, the novel being a novelization is not as deep as real novel. We don't learn that much about the characters. It's basically a screenplay of the movie. Hence, it is sometimes really hard to care about the characters, especially the ones that get killed and there is a lot of killing. There are also a lot of people that get touched by possession, but not truly possessed. They go crazy, hallucinate, kill and die but since, we don't really care about them, who cares.

Second, this book is overkill on the gross stuff. Flys, maggots, hyenas, crows are everywhere. Flys come out of a man's boils. A woman has stillborn child with maggots in the afterbirth. A guy hallucinates that his butterfly collection has come to life. A butterfly crawls out of his mouth. He kills himself. There are at least 3 vomiting scenes. And why? What are the filmakers thinking? Is the demon Candyman on crack? This stuff is not really scary it is just gross for grossness sake. I really hope they cut a lot of crap out of the movie.

However, this story is interesting and very atmospheric. All the stuff about the church and why it was made is capitavating. The demon is captivating too and so is father Merrin. Their battle at the end of the book is a really good one. Unfortunately, getting to that battle is an uneven journey. They really needed to concentrate on characters such as Sara and Bessian. I would have like to seen Bessian first go into the church and release the demon, or chant the spell on the spiral alter. We don't see any of that. Instead we get a couple of over-the-top evil characters, one with boils all over his face and one a quick to kill general. Both die, but why? You would think the devil would want to keep them around. There is another priest in the book besides Merrin. His role is a rip off father Karras from the origianl and we really don't learn that much about him. Of course, he battles the demon too. But looses big time with an ancient sword in his chest.

Overall, the movie is probably going to be pretty good, especially the battle at the end. The mysteries are good and I'm sure the special effects will be good. But be prepared to be more grossed out then scared. This will be a standard horror movie for a lot of people.

An enjoyable read, but differs on key points with the film.
Yes, I know, different genres, so different methods and ways to an end.
Anyways, there is enough crossover with the film to wonder why the writer was not kept up with the script changes. Personally I liked the way some scenes at least gave a background to actions, even if a "madeup" reason is given. However, the visual stun that the opening section of the film gives is just superb, and the writer could at least have delivered something just as powerful. And yes, the film has gross scenes, so the book delivers on some of those, but still , as a novelisation it could at least have followed a first person narrative method to convey the film in a much better way. Still, worth the read.

1.0 out of 5 stars Not worth the paper on which it is printed, March 29, 2008
By J. J. Surbeck (San Diego, CA USA) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)
I was a first excited to have stumbled on this book since there are so few good ones on terror and terrorism. Then as I read Carr's early chapters, I was astonished that see that he hadn't bothered to add one single footnote to make his case. In fact, as seductive as his original thesis is, and which I agree with, i.e. that terrorism always comes at a huge political cost, his book appeared to be more and more a long rant rather than a serious work resulting from in-depth research. It feels as if he wrote it in just a few hours of moderate work, or maybe he just talked for an hour and dictated it to his secretary. Because he obviously did no research, his many analyses of battles and conflicts in history are not only partial in their choice but quite questionable in proving his point. This has "sloppy" written all over it.

All in all, this book is not worth the paper it is written on. It is an enormous disappointment. Clearly, the market agrees with my assessment: at last count, 67 copies of the hardcover version are on sale here for 1 cent each. I wouldn't even spend that. I had even added it to a list of references on terrorism, but I have since removed it. For good.

Carr's book is, first of all, good. He brings that new and overdue sensiblity which refuses to accept the classifications of previous regimes and establishments. At least this is his attempt. Some of the insights he shows, such as the idea that Total War is not a morally reprehensible product to non-Europeans, helps to shift the perspective of the discussion. But his basically middle of the road argument that Total War is inefficient and therefore never advisable is based on a hopeful assumption: that reasonable men will wage war in a reasonable way if shown the numbers. Of course this is false. The war we are presently engaged in is not a reasonable war. It is a war of fear against a culture different from ours, a shadowy enemy that scares us back to childhood remedies of sandbox fighting and therefore, unfortunately, brings Total War out of our Total Fear.

Mr. Carr has written a concise history of warfare against Civilians. I would recommend this as an excellent primer on the subject. In my belief this should be regarded as a political history as well as a military history.

Saying that, I will add some of his conclusions about reforms are overly simplistic.

This book would be a good gift for someone who is still afraid of terrorists.

When Carr wrote this book he obviously had a predetermined conclusion that he wanted to convey. Though I personally agree that deliberate targeting of civilians is counterproductive to any political / military endeavor, Carr presents a lengthy list of historical evidence that is taken out of context and without an understanding of how militaries fight wars.

In his book he describes Roman brutality in its dealings with invaded countries and asserts that this brutality was the eventual cause of unrest that led to the fall of the Roman Empire. I'm not sure if he could have generalized this more than he did. He failed to look at the overall success of an Empire that lasted nearly 5 centuries. Also, history has shown that part of Rome's success was due to how it integrated conquered countries into its society and allowed those people to eventually become citizens of Rome.

Carr goes on to show the terrorist tactics used by both sides of the U.S. civil war, and he focuses on Sherman's march to the sea and then to Washington. I will agree that both sides had incidents in which civilians were targeted, but it is over simplistic to say that Sherman's tactics were purely terroristic and were eventually counterproductive. Carr and many other people point at the burning of Atlanta as a major example of targeting civilians, but they fail to remember that Atlanta was the largest supply distribution point for Confederate Army and that Sherman gave the civilian population ample warning to leave the city. Any true student of military history will agree that Sherman's destruction of the Confederacy logistics support structure was critical to expediting an end to the war, which consequently falls in line with Carr's belief in decisive warfare as the preferred tactic.

Carr's final chapter draws scrutiny of U.S. strategic bombing, in the form of cruise missiles, as sites them as a terrorist weapons. His argument is based on his assertion that because military leaders are aware that civilian casualties will occur this makes it a deliberate attack on civilians and not collateral damage. His absolutist attitude does not take into consideration that the military target may be worth the cost in civilian lives. Prior to 9/11, President Clinton had the opportunity to kill Osama Bin Laden with a cruise missile, but in accordance with Carr's way of thinking about terrorist acts, he aborted the mission at the last minute because civilian family members were present in the camp. In retrospect that decision to not target a few civilians has cost tens of thousands of civilian lives in the both the U.S. and Middle-East.

Finally, Carr asserts that limited, preemptive ground warfare is the best method to avoid long wars of attrition and civilian casualties. I wonder what his opinion is now after three years in Iraq. I don't think many people really saw that coming.

Slow starting off but if the subjects (China, military history, adventure) interest you it is worth sticking to it. The pace of the writing picks up after a bit and the last 2/3 are enjoyable. I do wish there had been more historical pictures and maps.

It seems fitting that one of the most implausible films ever made should be based "loosely" on a book about one of the most implausible real-life figures of history. Frederick Townsend Ward, the Devil Soldier, had nothing to do with the civil war in Japan; neither did any other American officer. But Ward did play a huge role in the defense of the Manchu imperial government against the forces of Chun Wang, the syncretic Sino-Christian rebel, in the Taiping civil war, supposedly the bloodiest conflict of the 19th Century. My five-star rating of this book is contingent upon also reading Jonathan Spence's book about the Taipings, God's Chinese Son. Otherwise you will have less than half the story. Caleb Carr writes very well, but this is not a novel, and as a history it is far too partial.

In his prologue, Carr declares: "No man's life can be truly understood out of context, but in Ward's case the context is especially vital." No kidding, Caleb! In Ward's case, the context is virtually all we have, since nothing of Ward's own letters or thoughts has survived. Thus Carr is writing a biography so much as a social history of a moment in time, that moment when the vast culture of China first "discovered" the West. Carr's short moment of importance was his organization and training of the "Ever Victorious Army" of Chinese soldiers using Western military training and tactics. For better or worse, Ward's model army became the nucleus of the forces that destroyed the Taipings, though the man who replaced Ward as commander after Ward was killed, the scoundrel known as Chinese Gordon, has replaced him in historical memory also.

More novelist than historian, Caleb Carr might fairly be criticized for overdrawing his sources, or for not maintaining sufficient academic reserve. It would be wrong to ignore this book, however, if you have any interest in the history of modern China, in which FT Ward was a meteor in the sky, an omen of things to come.

In 1859 a 28 year-old sailing officer from Salem Massachusetts took service under the Chinese Empire to defend it from mortal danger. When this young man died in battle in 1863 he had put down the largest and bloodiest civil war in human history (the American Civil War raging at the same time pales in comparison), he had been made a general and a mandarin, he had married a Chinese princess, and he was interred in his own temple. Perhaps most impressively was the fact that he did all of this while retaining the reputation among his friends and foes of being a man of decency, fairness, honor and incorruptibility. And yet for all this, he is nearly forgotten in both his native and adopted country.

Frederick Townsend Ward's history was erased largely because he was feared by both his Manchu masters and by the European powers that were seeking to dismember China for their own mercenary ends. The author speculates that due to his contempt for the cruelty and corruption of the Manchu's, that had he survived, he might have turned the instrument of his "Ever Victorious Army" against them in order to restore the Ming Dynasty. Had that happened, the history of China could have far different in the century that followed. It is clear that Ward found the concept of ending the Empire as unthinkable- which is why the later republic never honored his memory.

One other thing struck me while reading this book: Ward wanted to attend West Point but was not able to obtain an appointment because he lacked "connections." In the long run this didn't seem to hurt him too much....

If this story were fiction it would surely be dismissed as too far-fetched to ever be believed.

A very enjoyable tale of a colorful historical character. Carr has a real flair for bringing such a strange time to life, and making it feel familiar. He talks about the Taiping rebellion as if it only happened yesterday, which adds to the sense of reportage and realism. I'm looking forward to the reputed John Woo movie adaptation, although someone should have checked the illustrations before they were finalised. My copy prints Ward's battle-flag upside down -- doubly embarrassing since it is the right way up on the book's cover.

In this involving and well-written account, Carr strains to elevate the importance of Ward, a historical footnote, a mercenary of questionable repute and eventual Qing dynasty functionary whose prime contribution was the cobbling together of the use of "superior and modern" Western weapons against backwards sword and spear carrying Taiping rebels. And by Carr's own account, Ward was only partially successful. To thank him for his assistance (which ultimately helped maintain both Western imperial domination of China, the opium trade, and the extension of the corrupt and weak Qing empire), in a relationship of dual purpose, the Manchu Qing regime (not the Chinese people)gave him an official title and a Chinese wife. Carr's pro-Western bias is strong, as is his strange love of the Ward myth, which he does his best to overblow. Carr's sourcing is spotty, and in too many places, he speculates---typically in ways that favor Ward. This book, and indeed the Ward story itself, presents a very enlightening model of how violent rogue mercenaries, terrorists, and intelligence cutouts are used to assist governments in "counter-insurgency" wars throughout history, such as the Phoenix Program.

The quality of the individual articles is very high. As a collection, however, something is lacking. A better title would have been, "The Vietnam and Korean Wars with Bonus Material". Such huge portion of the book is dedicated to southeast Asia that one would think it was heart of the Cold War. I find it amazing there isn't a single article on Afghanistan (heck, he could have even have put in the Vietnam section that dominates the book and called the chapter "Russia's Turn"). In fact, the word Afghanistan doesn't even appear in the entire text. Not a word on the wide variety of surrogate wars fought in the Americas or the Middle East either.

Another flaw is that the introductory pages to each article written by the editor add almost nothing to the text. The articles would stand better on their own.

So basically I'd give the articles five stars. I'd give the editing/collation perhaps two stars. I gave it four overall because the bulk of what your read is very good and I'll give credit where credit is due. Nonetheless, the narrow scope of the collection and the poor quality of the editor's introductions is annoying.

This book disappointed me and I agree with the other reviewers who say it is incomplete and too heavily focused on Korea and Vietnam. Even beyond that, the selection and content of the essays is negative to the point of bias against the US--I do not agree with the reviewer who says the theme is "America won." To the contrary, many of the essays go out of their way to point out alleged American errors of diplomacy and military action, and ignores significant American steps that led to success, such as Reagan's decision at Reykjavik not to compromise on SDI. While the book is framed as a military history, it does discuss arms treaties and the importance of missile technology (and limitations thereon) to the Cold War; not to mention Reagan's role in structuring the limitations talks is a non-trivial oversight. Further, there is nothing about submarine warfare or undersea cable tapping, Grenada, Afghanistan, Uganda, Nicaragua or other East-West proxy wars, the terror caused by Soviet projection of military power (e.g., Hungary 1956), the Walker Navy spy ring, military uses of cryptography, or other important areas. If you want to read about American errors in Vietnam, buy the book, but otherwise look for a more complete and balanced account of the whole conflict.

there are a number of vignettes in this book that are interesting, however the general tone of the book is very America centric, perhaps with an underlying tone of "we won", which detracts from those essays that are more balanced. Generally this was unsatisfying, frustrating eneough to write this review, as although the better essays are quite good, overall there is a lack of substance.

However, the title is a tad misleading .

The book is a series of articles by many prominent modern historians and it begins at the beginning (a very good place to start) of the Cold War with an article entitled, "The Day the War Started."

Unfortunately, the book essentially ends in the early 1980s with, "The War Scare of 1983." What this means is the book does not consider the last years of the Cold War or how it ended. Another missing piece is that, other than the first series of articles on the war's beginnings and the more well known aspects of the Cold War such as the Cuban Missile Crisis and Berlin, the focus of the book is on the Korean and Vietnam Wars. It ignores other aspects of the Cold War such as our military involvement in Central America throughout the 1980s, the whole issue of brush fire wars in Europe's former colonies in which one side or the other was supported by the US or USSR, and the bipolarization of mid-level conflicts, such as in the Middle East, where, again, the US and USSR supported opposing sides. These missing aspects are not trivial in the context of the Cold War.

Having said that, I'm glad I bought the book, and I've already recommended it to others. It's impossible to not get a lot out of a book that includes articles by the likes of Williamson Murray, John F. Guilmartin, Jr., Douglas Porch, Stephen E. Ambrose, Victor David Hanson, and far more. But, in the end, it is incomplete - hence the three stars.

From the end of the Second World War until the collapse of the Soviet Union almost a half century later the two major powers in the world faced a kind of war. It was called the cold war because not much fighting occurred. To be sure, there was some in places like Korea, Viet Nam and Afghanistan. And there were some time where the two superpowers faced each other over loaded weapons such as Berlin and Cuba. But all in all, this was the longest time since the Roman Empire that the two strongest countries on the globe didn't go to war.

During much of this time the Military History Quarterly has provided a venue for the most prominent historians of our time to present articles on points of history as it was being lived. Robert Cowley is the founding editor of MHQ. In this volume he has selected articles from the Cold War period that serve to be a history of the Cold War written as it happened. The authors include some of the most prominent historians of that time, and some others that are not so well known but who provide an insight into the times.

This book is elequent and occasionally hits a nerve. But basically it's message is simply: Terrorism (or war against civilians to achieve a political effect) is a self-destructive method of warfare, because the reaction to terror is more often than not outrage rather than capitulation.

Carr goes beyond this to suggest that there are no exceptions to this rule, when some obvious exceptions come to mind (eg., Hiroshima, the extermination of the American Indians, and the frequent mass killings of any inconvenient population by various nations throughout history). So even the central message of the book is muddied by inconsistencies.

And beyond that message, this book has little to offer, and is badly flawed by its single-mindedness, its rush to judgement about complex events, its deliberate ignorance of obvious counter arguments, and a tendency to patronize the audience by asserting that events be interpretted his way, even when more familiar interpretations are more convincing.

On the plus side, I see no political bias or propaganda. Whatever biases the author has, they appear to be personal.

Despite some unfair negative press, this book is yet another example of Carr's masterful writing style and unparalleled ability to create strong, lasting images. Some readers expecting historical fiction might not appreciate Carr's subject matter, but it is important to remember that military history is Carr's field of expertise. Knowing this going in, I was able to immerse myself and enjoy from beginning to end.

After September 11, it is important to have a reasonable, intelligent response that avoids sensationalism and fear-mongering. Carr's approach (and use of history) not only describes the ultimate futility of terrorist actions, but attempts something few people in the media dare to do -- provide context and comparative understanding. Our plight might seem unique and unprecedented to those in the full arrogance of their Americanism, but Carr rightfully dashes such nonsense, demonstrating that terror, far from a "Middle East problem," is (and has been) world-wide in scope, taking various shapes and employing wide-ranging tactics.

Above all, however, Carr is simply a wonderful writer. His prose is clear and direct, yet always intellectually sound. This is far from the simplistic rants one comes to expect in this area; Carr always takes his book in the right direction and (thankfully!) expects his audience to bring more than a working knowledge of the subjects at hand. He is a challenging, provocative author, always avoiding self-righteousness and easy targets.

Buy -- and read -- with confidence. Carr is, as always, the man to seek in such matters. I only wish he gave us more non-fiction for his love (and knowledge) of the subjet is quite apparent.

Caleb Carr initially captured my attention with his historical mystery novels, The Alienist and The Angel of Darkness....both thrilling and engaging works of fiction....which gave way to the deplorable Killing Time, and seemingly the disappearance of Mr. Carr from popular fiction.

However, the author himself returns to life as does one of the greatest fictional detectives of all time, Sherlock Holmes, in Carr's 'The Italian Secretary'.

Holmes and Watson, Baker Streets most famed residents, are called to duty by Holmes' brother, Mycroft, in an effort to solve a mystery involving two recent murders that have brought a dark cloud over the Royal Palace Holyroodhouse in Scotland, one-time home of Mary Queen of Scots.

The detective and the doctor accept the challenge to join Mycroft in this latest adventure, doubly intrigued by the famed centuries old murder of David Rizzio, 'The Italian Secretary', who befriended Mary long ago, and was murdered for his troubles at Holyroodhouse as well, and whose spirit is still rumoured to wander the halls of the palace.

The two Holmes brothers and Watson set off to decipher the obvious and not so obvious clues to unravel the murders...and as is always the case with Sherlock Holmes, nothing is quite what it seems.

An entertaining follow up to the Sherlock Holmes legend created by Arthur Conan Doyle, this is a light, easy read, but nonetheless entertaining from beginning to end.

Caleb Carr makes a good effort here at a very difficult task. Not only does Carr take on the daunting job of resurrecting one of literature's most identifiable figures, he also goes against his own strengths as a writer to do so. Carr's forte always has been his in-depth characterizations, where as in a Holmes' book, the plot is the main thing. Also, this book is much shorter than Carr's regular work. I read, however, that this was to be a short story but it grew to a novel length and thus had to be published as a free standing piece. Overall, Carr has done a good job of providing a Sherlockian story. It was worth the time to read this credible effort.

I am a big fan of Carr's and I am a big fan of Sherlock Holmes. Carr's earlier works - The Alienist and The Angel of Darkness were true masterpieces. But The Italian Secretary is boring, has little plot and I must say, has a very dull climax unlike his earlier works. Sherlock Holmes powers are under utilized and Mycroft's intelligence is not employed at all. It is impossible to believe that an average Scotland Yard officer could not have solved this mystery. Moreover, the role of David Rizzio, the Italian secretary is over emphasized. The book could have been smaller by a hundred pages but for the unnecessary long sentences.

I am being very harsh in the review but I expected a lot from Carr being a great fan of his works.

"Come Watson, the games afoot" - Holmes and Watson are off to Scotland at the behest of Holmes's brother Mycroff to save the Queen.

Caleb Carr's The Italian Secretary is a fun read that those who love period mysteries and the Sherlock Holmes stories will find hard to put down. While parts of Carr's uniqueness come through, he has mastered the rhythm and style of Arthur Conan Doyle enough to take one back to the old masterpieces.

Take it in hand for a time of enjoyment escaping from the pace of modern life and pressure of the moment. But a warning - it does keep one on the edge of their seat.

As a longtime fan of Sherlock Holmes, I was excited about the prospects of reading this novel. Though I have yet to read any of Caleb carr's other work, I had noted the critical acclaim for his other novels, especially The Alienist: A Novel and The Angel of Darkness. I was also intrigued about the story as it took place in Scotland. With all these things to look forward to, I must admit I was disappointed with The Italian Secretary. There were some very fine parts, in particular the last two chapters, even though they may not have rung totally true to form for Sir A. Conan Doyle. Mycroft Holmes and Dr. Watson are present and deeply involved in this mystery. The story fell flat in several places, yet overall, I think the book was a worthy diversion. I place it somewhere between 2 and 3 stars.

This is a book with many good points, but they become so mired in confusion, and at times tedium, that they are largely lost. There is a kernel of an excellent book here as Carr has a point he wants to make, but it becomes lost in several threads of plot. With a better bit of editing this might have been an excellent book, but as it is it is probably better left on the shelf for one of Carr's earlier works.

I had read "The Alienist" and thought it was O.K. enough to try another of Carr's books.

I will say that I finished "Killing Time" merely because I felt it MUST get better at some point. It never did.

Instead of inflicting it upon others I gave it to my 2 rabbits who use it as a chew toy.

They are enjoying it more than I did.

I feel very fortunate to have borrowed this book from the library vice buying a copy. Reading this book wasted my time. The central idea, that an information society has special vulnerability to propaganda and manipulation by elites, strikes me as counter-factual and condescending. As sermon, this book failed to convince me.

As an adventure story, it failed to convince me. The idea of a secret elite with a high-technology airship manipulating the fate of the world's population lacks originality. (See Verne's Robur the Conqueror at Project Gutenberg.)

The book's ending relies on deus ex machina, and one that lies off-stage. It failed to convince me. In fact, the author relies on the very same mechanism for the ending that he condemns throughout the rest of the book: manipulation by an elite.

I can say only one positive thing about this book. I now know to avoid this author's work.

I like the whole disinformation angle. The islamist assasination in the US becomes a pretext to send troops to Afghanistan and then the attack on the afghani terrorist leader had a truly bizare foreshadowing of the caves where "the director" and his minions actually really did fight US troops. This book is mostly whimsy and grim near future. Some plodding dialogue.

This was written post Clinton admin missle strike attacks on Afghani targets, and the threat was identified. Still, the thing about Afghanistan is eery. Caleb Carr later day Nostradamus? : ) I would rather another Alienist type historical fiction novel.

If you like a flimsy, dim-witted plot and an imbecelic narrator, this one's for you.

I am the author of this book. It has a few good scenes, but is essentially "roman a clef" nonsense that every writer has to get out of his system early on. Do yourself a favor and read ANYTHING else I've written (you'll be doing me a favor, too). Forgive the follies of youth.

After reading The Alienist, I thought "Why not see what else this guy's written?" Should've known better. All I can say is thank God he waited 14 years to write another book!!! (Must've been taking classes....) Couldn't really make it past the first chapter. The charcters were, well, thinly veiled real people. He should have just called the "hero" Caleb... Sorry, Caleb, loved everything else, even the history books, but this is simply unforgivable!