Military Books

This is a beautiful book that takes us back to the time before the internet DVDs and laptops, and answer the question how do you educate the "user" of the increasing complicated machines of war that were being developed during WWII. This book is of Interest to the graphic artist and the WWII buff. You forget that no matter how awfully bad some of the machines were, and what death traps. They still needed a user manual. It is sobering to see the instructions for the Hampden bomber crews on how to bail out, (a feat that not many achieved) and you wonder how many owed their like to this graphic. The collection is exclusively Aviation, which raises the question of the other two Forces and their contribution (may be there will be a couple of sequels). I would have liked more translation of the foreign language graphics - but overall I have no complaints this was a great book.

Any one interested in the WW II planes will find this useful as well as gaining some history of the process by which this was developed. Less info and illustrations by American illustrators than I would have liked. But worth the investment.

World War Two was a highly mechanised and technical war, perhaps no more so than in the air. Development of increasingly more sophisticated aircraft meant a greater demand for technical and general arrangement drawings, as well as a wide range of training material. This lavishly-illustrated book celebrates the unsung and in many cases unknown artists and technical illustrators who created the many thousands of drawings and posters produced by the combatants during the war. It draws together samples of obscure, arcane artwork that in was either intended for a limited readership, or would be regarded as ephemera. This provides us with a glimpse into a special and little-known world of over six decades ago.

The first three chapters cover the life and contribution of artists who applied the skills learned in peace-time to the wartime production of aircraft, training and advisory material for aircrew and maintenance staff. The bulk of the 270-odd pages are devoted to examples of technical drawings and training posters from Great Britain, Germany, the United States and the Soviet Union.

Where else could you find the inner workings of the FN Type 64 under gun turret (complete with Type B, Mk II periscopic sight), how to dive-bomb with a Junkers 88, what the best-dressed aircrews were wearing, how the superchargers work on a Wright-Cyclone R-3350 aero engine, and why you should regularly burn off oil deposits from your spark plugs? These things might be only of historical interest now, but then they were matters of life and death.

The artwork is often very detailed and beautifully rendered, and is a tribute to the skills of the artists. This is assisted by the large format and high quality of printing. There is some explanatory text with each image, but they are mostly left to speak for themselves. The book will appeal to aviation history buffs, or to those with an interest in the development of technical drawing. It offers many fascinating hours of delving into the inner workings and operation of some classic aircraft. Highly recommended.

This fine book is cover-to-cover artwork, and descriptive text, of aviation documents produced during World War II. The documents include public information, manufacturer publicity, military training manuals, and conceptual views. There are quite a few aircraft cut-away drawings, but most of the pictures are solid view renderings intended to show what things looked like and how they worked/were used. Any student of historic aviation will find this book an exciting read. All other aviation enthusiasts will love it for the pictures alone.

The concept behind "Graphic War" is simple and intriguing. In 272 crisp, glossy 9-by-11-inch pages, author Donald Nijboer presents hundreds of superb examples of aviation-related World War II technical artwork from Great Britain, Germany, the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

Most of the artwork comes from wartime training manuals, operations handbooks, aircraft production and assembly documents, posters, etc. Without exception, the artistic quality is stunning. Sixty-some years ago, when anonymous artists created these amazing works, computer-generated imagery (and, indeed, even the computer itself) was not even a gleam in the eye of the most visionary dreamer. Dedicated and talented artistic craftsmen turned out these exquisite pieces of technical art using "low-tech" items such as India ink pens, colored chalks, airbrushes, rubber cement, vellum and Bristol board. "Graphic War" shows that these artists not only succeeded in conveying complex technical information to the airmen who needed to know it--they also often created beautiful works of art in the process. Check out, for example, the intricate "Halifax III Main Structure" (pp. 78-79), the superbly detailed "Centaurus Aero-Engine" cutaway (pp. 156-157) and the colorful "B-17F Armament--Forward Compartments" diagram (pp. 210-211).

About half of the artwork in "Graphic War" is from Great Britain. The other half is about evenly split between Germany and the U.S. The Soviet Union gets only 14 pages, because wartime Soviet artwork is very rare and hard to find. While I marveled at the superlative illustrations, I also really appreciated the captions. Rather than describing the artwork itself (which is largely self-explanatory), each caption discusses the actual subject that the artwork depicts. For example, the captions for illustrations of aircraft torpedoes describe their use, reliability, warhead types, etc. The captions for aircraft cutaways cover performance characteristics, production numbers, variants, theatres of operation, etc. Thus one not only sees the illustration, impressive in its own right, but also learns something about the subject depicted. I found this to be an exceptionally interesting and effective way to combine visual and textual information.

"Graphic War," an homage to World War II's unsung "heroes" who helped "keep `em flying," deserves a prominent place on every aviation enthusiast's bookshelf. Graphic artists are also sure to find it fascinating and inspirational. I recommend it most highly.

I used this book with my middle school social studies classes. It was the state testing week,and I wanted to continue the curriculum but not ruffle any feathers with more concepts. We were in the middle of our World War II unit. I selected some of the projects that we did in small groups, individually or with the whole class as an extension of our regular curriculum. We made silly putty, folded origami cranes, made WWII airplanes, and THE BEST was the individual recreations of the Rosie the Riveter propaganda poster. Each student posed as Rosie,and now I have a great set of things to display for our spring open house. The information in the book is entertaining to read, and the projects are simple, doable, and beneficial. I would highly suggest any social studies teacher of any level (elementary-high school) take a look at this book.

The author has synthesized the history of WWII into an informative and fun easy-to-read activity book. I highly recommend this resource for children and adults.

What a great way to spend an afternoon teaching and learning with your child. We enjoyed the historical lessons and thought provoking perspectives. I would highly recommend it. T. Kearney - parent

Loaded with interesting and fun activities. Perfect for budding historian.

What a great book to teach children about WWII while having fun at the same time! I highly recommend this book to parents (and teachers!)who want to involve their children in entertaining, stimulating activities that engage the mind as well as the hands. Extremely well written, with easy to perform projects. Excellent job!
K.S. Barone, teacher and parent

The role of the American army in the Pacific between the Spanish-American war and the Second World War is often forgotten. Most don't even know the American army ahd a role so far away from home. Indeed the army was small but the stakes were high. In the wake of the war with Spain in 1898 the U.S gained a number of small protectorates and colonies in the Phillipines and Samoa and elsewhere. Eventually this became part of a defense system, but it was not merely to defend against outsiders. The Army also had a role with the local people and creating institutions. Moreover it also had to fight insurgencies that took place in the Moro area of the Southern Phillipines where Muslim insurgents fought Americans. The insurgency goes on to this day. However at the time the likes of General Pershing were used to put down this uprising with the least possible loss in lives.

This fascinating and detailed book opens up a new history of the American army and its role in the Pacific.

Seth J. Frantzman

Linn notes that the big question of WWII is, "why, with almost four decades to prepare, these (US Army) military forces proved unable to defend the nation's Pacific possessions against Japan." The author notes that the traditional approach has been to focus on events in the short-term prior to Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, however his effort is to, "offer a somewhat longer perspective through a narrative history of the U.S. Army in Hawaii and the Philippines from 1902 to 1940....its task is not to delineate the road to Pearl Harbor, but to illuminate the numerous paths the army trod in its long search for a viable Pacific defense....For years it had foreseen both the threat and its own inability to ward it off." From a strategic perspective, this book does a good job of putting America's failure into context. It points out that although the surprise attack of 7 December 1941 was not detected, from a military capabilities standpoint there was little the Army could have done. Although I believe one needs to be careful with historical parallels, a student of strategy can see how political and economic considerations drive strategy. Indeed, a similar issue between today (2004) and then was the tension between what is required to hold ground when forces are deployed vs. the ability to deploy and sustain those same forces over a great deal of distance.

During the first forty years of the 20th Century the U.S. Army had the mission of protecting the Philippine and Hawaiian Islands from attack by the nation of Japan. Although Japan was not originally thought to be a threat, from the 1922 Naval Conference onward the army high command considered Japan as the only real threat in the Pacific. This book provides a unique and very good history of what came to be known and the U.S. Army of the Pacific.

The book provides a good deal of fascinating information on all aspects of the Pacific Army from the life of enlisted men to the strategic thinking that informed its planning. But perhaps the most interesting theme running through it is how the U.S. Army identified the Japanese threat to the U.S. Pacific Islands and sought to mitigate it.

Because of budget and manpower constraints imposed by congress, the U.S. Army in the period between the WWI and WWII was incapable of fighting any kind of war. Yet as this book shows that did not prevent the Army General Staff and the Department Staffs of the Philippines and Hawaii from developing often very well thought out strategies for the defense of the islands. In the case of the Philippines the Archipelago was first considered vital to U.S. interests in the Western Pacific and a keystone in U.S. strategy. Gradually this view changed and by the thirties, the Philippines were considered indefensible against Japan and a strategic liability. Army planners sought to minimize the U.S. military presence there. This same thinking made Hawaii and especially the Pearl Harbor naval base on Oahu the keystone of a defensive arc running from Alaska to Panama which was designed to protect the U.S. Pacific Frontier.

One thing that is clear from this book and that is that the Army General Staff and the Islands' Departmental Commands were quite accurate in their defining the potential threats posed by Japan and fairly realistic in planning defensive strategies against those threats. For example the army was only too aware that the elaborate harbor defense systems that defended Pearl Harbor and Manila Bay were obsolete almost from the day they were completed. Still army planners at both the General Staff and department level tried to develop effective defensive plans. The problem was, as this book states, that there was a tradition that developed early on that allowed department commands to override general staff planning and design their own defensive plans. Thus in 1941General Short of the Hawaiian Department defined the threat from Japan primarily in terms of sabotage while the General Staff correctly saw it as a threat from air attack.

Brian Linn believes that the American annexation of the Philippines damaged rather than helped the U.S. position in East Asia. Even before the outbreak of the Second World War, American military planners knew that the Philippines were extremely vulnerable to Japanese invasion but were relunctant to raise a native force that could also be a threat to the American Army. The security problems only became worse when before the attack on Pearl Harbor, MacArthur authorized the defence of the entire Philippines and not just the Bataan peninsular. As a result of America's fear of a native force to protect the Philippines and MacArthur's overly ambitious plans, the United State suffered a humiliating defeat to the Japanese in 1942. I would reccomend this book foy anyone who believes that a new American empire would enhance national security but has ignored the disasterous example of the American experience with the Philippines.

This is a splendid and pioneering study of the Army in the Pacific, a subject badly in need of more light that it has hitherto received. It brings the Pacific Army to life in a way that no one else had even attempted.

Like any book, however, it has its limitations, and as is usually true it is the ones that author was not aware of (at least at the time) and did not flag for our attention that we must take most care of. In this case the principal limitation lies in strategic view.

The Philippines, as the author makes clear, never had any intrinsic significance for the United States (or for the earlier colonial power, Spain, for that matter) -- no riches or resources to be reaped. The sole significance of the islands lay in their position. Initially, Americans had calculated (like the Spaniards before them) that possession of Manila would provide an important advantage in gaining the rewards of the rich China trade. Luzon and the rest of the islands simply came with the deal. Almost as soon as they had been seized, however, other events eroded Manila's importance in this role greatly. (Perhaps we should say "seeming importance," as there never were the prospects which had been envisioned in 1898.) Finding themselves in possession of a colony of little value, Americans not unnaturally felt reservations about spending large sums to garrison and defend it. Thus a purely nominal force was assigned to its defense, adequate only for internal security and the assertion of sovereignty. The oft-proclaimed "bastion" of the Philippines was in reality no more than a sentry post, bound to be overrun quickly in any serious assault. To invest in a real Philippine fortress or in mobile forces strong enough to quickly relieve it would involve an expense that few Americans could see as justified.

Distant events changed all that. By the late 1930s, of course, the propensity of Japan for aggressive military expansion was manifest, but that did not seem particularly threatening in itself, given that the economic resources of the country were so small relative to those of the U.S. But the outbreak of the European War in 1939, followed by the Nazi defeat of France and threat to Britain in 1940, heightened American security concerns vastly. Then in September, 1940, Japan joined the Axis Pact, making itself an ally of Germany. Japan had intended this to change American perceptions and it did that, but not in the way that had been hoped. Japan ceased to be a disagreeable nuisance in a distant place and instead clearly became a potential part of a serious threat, to be blocked if possible and crushed if necessary. Very suddenly, the importance of the Philippines' geographic position changed dramatically.

It is this transition that Prof. Linn misses in focusing on the local realities rather than the global strategic picture that dominated the awareness of Washington decision-makers in 1940-41. This broader reality is well presented in Waldo Heinrichs, "Pearl Harbor in a Global Context," in _Pearl Harbor Revisited_, edited by Robert W. Love, Jr. (London: Macmillan, 1995) (ISBN 0312095937), and in more extended fashion in the same author's _Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II_, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988) (ISBN 0195061683). For the same issue from a different perspective see Gerhard L. Weinberg, "Global Conflict: The Interaction Between the European and Pacific Theaters of War in World War II," in _Germany, Hitler, and World War II: Essays in Modern German and World History_, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) (ISBN 0521474078), or his book, _A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II_, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) (ISBN 0521558794).

Beginning with the Japanese occupation of Vietnam in July of 1941, thereby making manifest their determination to continue down the road of active alliance with Hitler, the U.S. began to rush all available military power to the Philippines, reserving only that which was essential to the security of America itself. But years of penuriousness and neglect had left the cupboard largely bare, and re-armament was yet to produce major material results. So the Philippine defenders, like the exposed sentry, became casualties of the brutally inexorable logic of war. Brian Linn's book provides a major and largely-overlooked piece of this picture, but is somewhat weak on the overall context.

There are also other sources which the interested reader may wish to consult in order to get a fuller picture. These include John J. Stephan, _Hawaii Under the Rising Sun: Japan's Plans for Conquest After Pearl Harbor_, (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1984) (0824825500) and the article by Richard B. Meixsel, "Major General George Grunert, WPO-3, and the Philippine Army, 1940-1941," _Journal of Military History_, 59, No. 2 (Apr 1995): 303-24. Both offer insights not fully captured by Linn. In a more recent article, "Manuel L. Quezon, Douglas MacArthur, and the Significance of the Military Mission to the Philippine Commonwealth," _Pacific Historical Review_, 70, No. 2: 255-92, Meixsel introduces some new evidence regarding the events in the Philippines in the 1930s and uses it to call into question some of Linn's claims.

While I have focused on its limitations, I want to emphasize again that this is a very valuable and unique book, even taking them fully into account.

365th veteran Charles Johnson wrote his comprehensive "History of the Hell Hawks" in the early '70s but only a limited number were published and if a copy can be found, it is very expensive. This new look at the group reasserts the history of this important outfit into the public eye. More importantly, the authors captured more personal stories of the 365th members that otherwise would soon be lost forever. For those who don't want to read through a long boring group history, this is the book for you! It is very well written and fast paced. I thank the authors for this wonderful work. Jay Jones, author of "The 370th Fighter Group in World War II".

The "Hell Hawks" is an excellently written and accurate presentation depicting the role of the P-47 pilots from D-Day through the end of WW II. The combination of fascinating aerial accomplishments and statistics are woven together to present an extremely accurate and equally fascinating tale of the role these dedicated and daring pilots played in destroying the vaunted Nazi war machine. It is a "must read" for anyone interested in World War II as it puts the American dedication and sacfrice into perspective.

Although I am only halfway through this book I am really enjoying it. I deals with American P-47 fighter bombers in the European theater. I never realized before how much more dangerous air-to-ground combat is compared to air-to-air. Pretty exciting stuff and very well written. (P.S. I do not live in Rock Hill, SC. I live in Denton, TX)

As the owner of many of Bob Dorr's books, I have come to expect that anything he produces will be well-researched, well-presented, and very well-written. "Hell Hawks!" is right up there not only with Dorr's other works but with the best in Be There combat writing. Here's an example: "The German pilot ran flat-out low...threading the needle between a church steeple and tall brick smokestack. Narrow streets raced under the wings of Kraman's P-47 as he engaged the throttle button triggering emergency water injection. His Pratt & Whitney surged as Kraman squeezed off short bursts at his quarry, the enemy banking abruptly left and right to throw off the American's aim. Across the Rhine, farther into Germany, the pair raced east..."

Dorr and co-author Thomas D. Jones (USAF Academy grad, ex-B-52 driver, veteran of four NASA space shuttle flights) also rightly recognize the guys who weren't strapping into the 365th Fighter Group's P-47s: "The men with stripes on their arms didn't pilot Jugs, but they made warfare in the Jug possible." We tend to forget that the aircraft of WW II, after all, were just 15 years removed from Lindbergh's Ryan NYP of 1927 but were very complex machines. The authors salute the men with the stripes well.

The results of close to 200 interviews of 365th FG veteans, other combat vets, family members, and more, plus four years of research, "Hell Hawks!" is loaded with the day-to-day details of fighting a tenaciously fierce enemy, demonstrating throughout the book that ground attack combat was a deadly way to earn your flight pay. The authors bring the personalities of the young pilots alive as well as provide a big picture of Allied strategy and the pace of war from D-Day to victory. This is an excellent book not only for military historians but for anyone who enjoys aviation writers at the top of their game. Splendid!

A very enjoyable book concerning the 365th Fighter Group, IX Tac, 9th AF. The author does an excellent job of covering the unit's campaign throughout the ETO, blending both the "big picture" and personal experiences nicely. My only complaints are that the time line seemed to jump around quite a bit in places and a tendency to throw quite a few names at you in short order, so I found myself re-reading paragraphs to make sure I knew what was going on and who was doing what. But this was a very minor distraction from an overall excellent book that I would recommend highly to anyone interested in the bloody air-to-mud war conducted by the 9th AF... a war that has for far too long been hidden in the shadow cast by the "Mighty Eighth".

An excellent book on WW I. Oddly, not carried in our fabulous library system.
Title based on a quote from Hamlet and is greatly misleading.

Of course, I say this work is elegant, true, vivid and memorable as a work, not the events it depicts. In parts of the world that used to make up the Commonwealth and serviced by Penguin books, the title may be THE MIDDLE PARTS OF FORTUNE. Having had 25 years in the military I can only say I read this book from cover to cover, and relished every word in it. Artistically, as an artifact, it has a satisfying structure and conventional narrative. Like the characters in it, especially Private Bourne, it manages a superb tone, neither hiding the horror, the detail, but never sentimentalizing the common bravery of the ordinary man whilst despising the shirker. I could go on but I just draw to your attention on P58 the brilliant detail of having to carry an awkward box three miles by hand: - ....he was glad to dump the box he and Lance-Corporal Johnson had carried the three miles from Philosophe on the floor of the Quartermaster's office. It had those handles which hang down when not in use, but turn over and force one's knuckles against the ends of the box when it is lifted. By reversing the grip, one may save one's knuckles, but only at the expense of twisting one's elbow, and the muscles of the forearm. Having tried both ways, they passed their handkerchiefs through the handles, and knotted the corners, so that it was slung between them, but the handkerchief being of different sizes, the weight was not equally distributed. The quartermaster's store was a large shed of galvanized iron, which may have been a garage originally. He was not there, but the carpenter, who was making wooden crosses, of which a pile stood in one corner, thought he might be back at the transport lines; on the other hand he might be back at any moment, so they waited for as long as it took to smoke a cigarette, watching the carpenter, who, having finished putting a cross together, was painting it with a cheap-looking white paint. -That's the motto of the regiment,- said the carpenter, taking up one on which their badge and motto had been painted carefully. - It's in Latin, but it means WHERE GLORY LEADS.
Bourne looked at it with a sardonic grin. - That is just one paragraph of 247 pages of fine prose, and itself could be a study as a sample of quite brilliant writing.
A classic of the 20th century.

I feels like i am reading both "The Stranger" and "All Quiet on the Western Front." I was hoping to get something from it but i was disappointed from what i considered the best combination of both novels.

This semi-fictional story is set in a brief 6 month (or so)period in 1916 in which the British Army began to assume the major contribution to the Allied effort. By this time of WW1 the French had been somewhat degraded and pretty exhausted by the combined efforts of Verdun and the Somme. The story is set on the Somme front after the opening phases of the battle and includes the description of a long recovery period behind the lines to refit-a luxury denied many German units. The story reflects to some degree the British class system , and many of the soldiers themselves seem somewhat bewildered about the nature of war confronting them. The Germans themselves are shown as remote and treated somewhat indifferently. Despite the possibility of death each soldier seems distracted with obtaining alcohol, women and decent food in that order.

The 1 difficult aspect of the book is the phonetic nature of the spoken words. The characters are, after all, British, and Americans may have a tough time understanding what's being said. When compared with All Quiet on the Western Front, which focuses more on the futility and abstract nature of the war, Her Privates, We is more insular and personal.

In his novel, "Her Privates We," Frederic Manning does something almost unique in Great War literature. He gives voice to the English common soldier. This was the man the British public personified as Tommy Atkins and whom Americans in a later conflict would call GI Joe. This was the man who did the work of war with bayonet, rifle and hand grenade.

Siegfried Sassoon, Robert Graves, Wilfred Owen and Vera Brittain--among others--have given us a look inside the English middle-class perspective of the Great War. Through their poetry and prose, we can gain some understanding of what they and their educated counterparts suffered and endured.

The clerk, the taxi driver and farm laborer who went to war had no such heavy-weight advocates. Until Manning's novel first appeared in a limited edition during 1929, English private soldiers spoke primarily through letters home, not through literature. We know them best through the mute, exhausted faces that stare out at us across time from black-and-white Great-War-era photographs.

Manning, an educated Australian, worked as a minor literary figure in pre-war England. He enlisted in the King's Shropshire Light Infantry during 1915 and served as a private soldier in France through much of the 1916 Somme Campaign. Not coincidently, most of the novel's action is set within British lines during the time of that huge offensive.

Because Manning was a man who combined a writer's skills with a soldier's experience, his work gives us a rare and vivid glimpse of what trench life and fighting felt like from the viewpoint of the English private and non-commissioned officer. The book reflects the emotional and physical costs of battle. It also gives us some knowledge of the ways men related to each other and to their superiors. Any American who soldiered during the 20th Century will almost certainly find echoes of his own service experience within Manning's story.

In its 1929 printing "Her Privates We" was called "The Middle Parts of Fortune." The first mass publication the next year was ruthlessly edited to reflect 1930s sensibilities. The current paper-bound version of "Her Privates We," offered through Amazon, is completely uncut.

The Book's title derives from some obscene banter in Shakespeare's Hamlet, during which two characters describe themselves as the private parts of Fortune. Private parts, private soldiers, you get the picture. After listening to them, Hamlet concludes that Fortune is a strumpet. This would seem an equally valid conclusion for those of any rank or station caught within the titanic social and military struggle that played out during the 1914-1918 war.

Ironically, I picked this book up at the bargin bin in a St. Petersburg, Russia. Starting out in Oklahoma, it shows the progression from state college football, to OCS, through Ranger and Airborne training to the jungles of Vietnam. Two brothers, taking different paths through the Army.

The horrors of the Vietnam War come to life in this novel. You identify with the characters, and almost feel like you are with them. Being in the Army, this book scares me. What if it was me there? Could I be so courageous? Would I survive? It scares me to think about it.

I have read them all from Clancy to Brown and LtCol.(Ret) Scott is by far one of the best military writers to date. My father served in Vietnam and after he came back my mom said he was never the same and I always wondered what it was like, why men like my father and Col Scott, why they went when they were called knowing they might not return and those that did would be forever altered. I joined the infantry at 17 to see for myself and after serving in Panama and Somalia I understand. Col. Scott says it best in the books with way he connects you to the characters you come to realize they did it for the men to their left and their right, not so much for America, but the men who represent America. Sad to know that he won't be writing anymore books but the four vietnam books he wrote are some of the greatest military fiction ever written and in my opinion should be required reading for all young soldiers and leaders.

Leonard B. Scott writes another excellent book probably relating much of his own personal experience in Viet Nam. Again he sets up his main characters detailing what they left behind only to have everything they knew and understood here in the U.S. tested and in many instances left in some far off jungle in Viet Nam. Mr. Scott, though he was an officer, describes Army life among the enlisted troops with great clarity and understanding. He may be a Mustang (enlisted later becoming an

officer) whatever, I have enjoyed reading all of his Viet Nam Era Army books and would rate this one just as good as The Expendables. The vocabulary he uses is of that era and adds in his effort to recreate life back in the late 1960's. A Must Read if you like Scott's writings.

The way that Scott writes the story to the hill is extravagant. Not only do you see the one side perspective from the Brothers you also get to see it from the Vietnamese side. As one knows you need to know the two sides of the coin in order to get the real truth. This book like SCott's others is truly something else.

This is the book to get if your interested in knowing more about the less conventional side of explosives. It contains recipies that are reliable and field tested, warnings related to the use of them and safe practices that will keep you from harm. It covers some applications of sabotage and a few boobytrap applications.

When I bought this I thought there might be short blurbs of scientific explanations for how explosives work in general plus very detailed examples but this is entirely on how to make them it's still really interesting to know how they do it though

The series this book belongs to is both comprehensive and accurate.

If you've ever taken a college level chemistry course, you already know that the information contained in 'do it yourself' books on this subject is often impractical and sometimes extremely dangerous to apply.

While I strongly discourage using this information, you may find it helpful to know that the techniques and devices contained in the manual were invented/tested by Frankford Arsenal in the late 60's.

Whatever your specific interests in improvised munitions is, you'll find it in this series of books. (Especially valuable are the sections on swiches & detonators.)

Don't waste your time on the Anarchist Cookbook and similar works of theoretical crackpottery. If you want information about the subject that is tried & true, go with the black book.

The contents in this book were origionally tried and tested by the u.s government for the military, so its contents are much safer in terms of stability, and maybe to some degree, safer(although NO pyrotechnics are safe) than other cookbooks. It is NOT intended to be used in practice, but for educational purposes only!. As a pyrotechnician myself, i have found this book to be the best of its kind that i have found to date. Well worth purchasing.

This book farts in the general direction of the anarchist, terrorist and jolly roger cookbooks. Unlike them, this one was created by a bunch of government scientists so not only do the recipes work properly as long as guidelines are followed, but it contains many more recipes and many more techniques for your enjoyment. Remember, if you want a good book about explosives, rockets, chemical mixtures, how to build devices, and how to aquire ingredients, this book is for you.

Dr. Megargee overturns decades of conventional wisdom about the responsibility for Germany's loss in the Second World War. Although unsparing in his criticism of Hitler, on any number of subjects, he goes further than any author that I am aware of in portraying the lack of strategic vision on major issues of national political and economic goals, the short-sighted and self-serving carving-out of personal empires in the byzantine structure of the German High Command, inter-office and inter-service rivalry, and the the emphasis on the spiritual over the material that manifested itself most dangerously in the long-standing institutional disregard for intelligence work and logistics that made Germany's loss nearly a foregone conclusion upon the launch of Operation Barbarossa in 1941.

Extensively researched and thoroughly documented, as well as clearly and engagingly written, this book is a significant addition to the scholarly literature on the German armed forces in WWII, as well as a refreshing antidote to the tiresome rehashing of the Führer's blunders and the self-exculpatory memoirs of numerous German officers that appeared in the wake of Germany's defeat. Strongly recommended for those interested in the subject, and another fine work of military history from the University Press of Kansas.

This is a great work of modern military history, by a top notch historian. Most good monographs rate 4 stars, but this is a case of using the Showalter formula even better than Showalter! Thorough, provocative, and very well written.

This book is one of the spate of recent works "proving" the guilt of the Germans in general instead of just Hitler and the Nazis, but is far better written than most and actually offers a point for discussion. I recommend a purchase and a close read.

There is little new information (if any) here, but the author's description of the functioning of the General Staff, the OKH and OKW from pages 17 to 101 is particularly easy to understand, and I say this as someone who first read Goerlitz's "History of The German General Staff" at the age of fifteen in 1954. It is this part that makes the book worth the price of admission.

Chapters 10, 11 and 12, offer nothing new except for one-sided cherry-picked references tending to support the author's far-reaching conclusions. Nonetheless, such support is weak at best. From time to time the author seems to understand this, but then he goes ahead and states his questionable conclusions anyway. For example, even though the author is quick to point out (& accurately) that memoirs are often self-aggrandizing, he uses a sole, questionable source (Lossberg) to describe Jodl's attitudes at the end of 1941 and his agreement that Manstein, at the time a newly-baked army commander, and someone who had never been responsible for more than one panzer division in his earlier corps and now 11th Army, was the leading general to assume overall command of the eastern front. Very doubtful, and something that cannot be verified!

The author correctly points out that many higher-ranking officers like Beck believed that Germany's only hope lay in winning a short, decisive military conflict rather than an economic or diplomatic course of action. Yep! Like a bridge player who carefully studies his cards and sees that there is only one course of action that might win the contract, he takes the sole option open to him. When it doesn't succeed, one should not criticism the player for not having used another strategy UNLESS IT CAN BE SHOWN THAT THE STRATEGY COULD (not would) HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL. Unfortunately, this is exactly what the author does without showing any realistic basis for alternatives. The player can be criticized for making the contract in the first place, but that was never the function of either the OKW or the OKH. I was also amused to see that the author took a similar position to the German defeat in World War I -- the high command again attempted to apply an operational solution to a strategic problem. Once more for the West Coast, what would the author have recommended they do? That he doesn't state.

Yes, intelligence concerning the Soviets was almost nil, but military intelligence world-wide has been notorious for being poor except in combat conditions. The US was and is no exception to this rule, and Ultra (not mentioned by the author) was indispensable to the Allies (most notably in North Africa.) In a limited time frame like that for Barbarossa, one does the best one can. As far as logistics are concerned, the German economy was not put on a total war footing until Speer did it in 1944 with the resulting improvements in production. Of course, by then it was too late, and at any rate, that was not within the purview of either the OKW or OKH. And the US also used the term "supply" just like the Germans. With regards to personnel, the Germans only had one chance against the Soviet Union and that was denied them by Hitler's racial policies. The Germans needed to fight a "War of Liberation" against the Communists, setting up puppet governments in the non-Russian states and utilizing their manpower. In spite of everything, the number of Hiwis was enormous and Russian units like Cossacks and the Vaslov Army still opted to fight alongside the Germans. But again, this was not an option open to the OKW or OKH. So given the situation, what was the high command to do? The author is silent on this point, but condemns the General Staff anyway. One feels compelled to point out that Beck paid the ultimate price, Fritsch sought death before Warsaw, and Halder narrowly escaped execution before the war's end.

Yes, there was a culture in the General Staff that viewed the Versailles Diktat (it was not a negotiated treaty) as unbearable and to be torn up as soon as possible. Yes, they wanted to regain lost territories. That is hardly new or difficult to understand in the light of history. To the extent that Hitler's aims coincided with theirs, the German senior commanders supported him. To their regret, they found themselves riding on the back of the tiger. Even at the end, von Bock's last words were to Manstein, "Manstein, save Germany!"

For a much fuller treatment on the German officer mindset that the author only alludes to, see Robert Citino, "The German Way of War."

Military personnel are normally conservative (as the author points out), and the General Staff operated much like they did in 1870. Insofar as their opponents were incompetent like the Polish, French, and British, they won easily through aggressiveness and vastly superior training. The US Army adopted much if not all of the German leadership doctrine and training methods after World War II, recognizing that US performance in Europe was spotty at best. War gamers traditionally equate three American soldiers to two Germans, and Marshall's contention that over 40% of American infantrymen refused to fire their rifles in combat brings "the greatest generation" into question. Live-fire training has never been possible to any degree in the American Army, mostly due to objections by civilians for the casualties it causes. Of course, another reason the Germans fought so well is that they executed over 30,000 of their own military personnel in the course of the war for a wide range of offenses.

That the Officer Corps was not prepared to conduct a modern war with the necessary personnel, logistics, intelligence, and economic basis is correct. But neither were the French, Polish, British, Japanese or Russians. The Axis were defeated through a combination of British and American code-breaking, Russian manpower, and American logistics and economic power. The US struggled to put 90 divisions on the ground in Europe, but changed the Red Army into a mechanized force while the Wehrmacht became increasingly dependent on horses. Yes, the German machines were good, but German engineers tinkered their way to oblivion and prevented mass production.

The author sums up with the following statement: "The myth persists of a supremely talented, if politically naive and ambitious, German officer corps being led unwillingly into war and defeat by a ruthless dictator, a megalomaniac with no understanding of the military art." If one removes the word "unwillingly" and tones down "supremely", that "myth" would seem to be true. Nor do I know any serious scholar that believes in the myth as stated. Maybe some portion of the readership does, but only if they are not well-read on the subject. The author then states an untruth: "They (the officer corps) made strategic decisions, independently and in support of Hitler's, that started a war...." I know of no strategic decisions made independently by the German officer corps or high command that started World War II. Maybe the author can enlighten me. They didn't even make strategic decisions in support of Hitler that started the war unless you count their support of Hitler himself during the crises of 1933 and 1934. For that focus on Hammerstein-Equord, Blomberg, and those that refused to back Fritsch.

The author also castigates the Officer Corps for continuing the war after its futility should have been obvious. Gee, that was why Halder resigned. One is also tempted to castigate Robert E. Lee and Confederate commanders for continuing the Civil War after the fall of Atlanta. But like German officers, (& the German opposition had already been told in no uncertain terms that the Allies would not help them), they could not rise in rebellion -- they could only play their cards as they were dealt and hope for the best. Maybe a miracle would take place -- it has before. Only in hindsight is everything so clear.

Like I said -- this book is an excellent starting point for discussion. But I deplore the current trend by the author, Wolfram Wette, and others -- they represent the pendulum swinging too far in the opposite direction from the memoir literature of the 50s and earlier studies.

And lastly, I must register my objection to the author's dissertation advisor writing the Foreword and even being referenced on the title page. It should have been enough for the author to acknowledge Murray in his Preface. Moreover, Murray clearly shills for the author, using adjectives like "outstanding" and "extraordinary." Obviously the standards of objectivity and propriety in the academic world (or Ohio State at least) have changed, and not for the better.

This is an excellent study of the highest levels of the German Army during WWII. But I think the main lesson is that there was no high command, at least in the sense the British and the Americans had one. Hitler and the generals around him spent their time micromanaging the Eastern Front with occasional interference in African and European battles. Hitler acted as if he were the counterpart of Eisenhower, not Marshall or Brooke. It is as if Rosevelt were to have sent Eisenhower daily detailed instructions on where to attack and what to defend.

The problem was only partially Hitler's. The Germans never really created a staff to manage a global conflict. Hadler resented Hitler's inferference, but because it was usually stupid, not because Hitler should have been managing the war, not the battles. The Germans were superb at what they considered the "operational" level of command--the control of armies on a single battlefield. But they never looked at the "big picture."

The book also proves that the German army high command, such as it was, had serious failings. They simply did not understand the logistics of a campaign as vast as the Eastern Front. Nor did they have the intelligence gathering capacity to estimate what they were getting into when they attacked the Soviet Union. Worse, they did not even realize their problems.

This book can teach a lot about why people frequently fail to understand and act upon hard facts. Learning this can help avoid future disasters of any sort.

This book is an attempt to re-write what has been the conventional view of the relation between Adolph Hilter and the German General Staff. After the war, Hitler was conveniently dead and that allowed the German Generals to put out a version of history that was accepted for some years but was at odds with the truth. The German Generals had towed the line that they were politically neutral prior to the 1930?s and that they had not been supporters of Nazi aims. Further that they opposed some aspects of Nazi war aims and acted in a professional way. Lastly they were highly competent and might have won the war if it had not had been for Hitler continually interfering with their operational plans.

Megargee argues convincingly that the German Generals had a political agenda similar to the Nazis. That is they supported the abrogation of the Treaty of Versailles, they wanted an end to democracy and they wanted Germany to rearm and to become a great power again. A large number of Generals such as Rommel, Guderian, Zeitzler and Reichenau were if not committed Nazis, enthusiastic barrackers yelling support from the sidelines.

One interesting point is Megaree?s estimation of the ability of the German Generals. After the war a large number wrote memoirs in which they modestly estimated themselves as pretty good. Megaree concedes that from an operational point of view the German army did well. However it was vulnerable in a number of respects. The key mistake made by Germany in the war was the attack on the Soviet Union. It would seem clear that the planning for operation Barbarossa was deeply flawed. For instance the Germans knew nothing of the actual strength of the forces against them. (The Soviets had 5 million men, 20,000 tanks and 20,000 aircraft to the German?s 3million 3,200 and 3000 respectively) In addition the Germans had no clear plan of defeating the Soviets. Barbarossa was based on the hope that the bulk of Soviet forces could be destroyed near the Polish border. It was then hoped that the Soviets might give in or the government would collapse. However if this did not eventuate the Germans had massive supply problems. They had limited fuel, and they could not use the Soviet railway system until they changed the gauge. In fact when the Soviets failed to collapse the Germans suffered massive supply problems, not being able to supply their troops with winter clothing and struggling to maintain ammunition levels and fuel and spares for their vehicles and planes.

Thus throughout the war the German Army acted as if intelligence was not really worth worrying about and that supply was a problem which could be overcome by an act of will. This deficiency was not a problem in initial war in the west, as the distances were so small and the French and British acted incompetently when faced by the German advance. However against the Soviets it was fatal.

Megargee summarises the weakness of the German generals as one of a strategic weakness. It was one that they shared with Hitler and in fact it is clear that they had little insight into the reason for their defeat even after the finish of the war.

Another issue dealt with by the book is the question of the role of Hitler?s leadership in bringing about the loss of the war for Germany. Megargee clearly shows that it was only in the later part of the war (1944) that tensions arose between Hitler and the Generals. By this time the war was lost. Over the big decisions there was not a lot of disagreement.

This book although expensive is short and easy to read. It is interesting not just for those interested in the war, but it illustrates how history can be distorted by over reliance on self serving material.

I heard about this little book in a radio review, what a revelation. Highly recommended for it's historical irony.

This little book is both a historical curiosity and of current relevance. I really wish I had seen it -- or something like it! -- before I went over to Iraq. It is exactly what the description says it is (thus the 5 stars). It's simply a reprint of an old Army pamphlet, though, so of course you can't expect too much.

This book was meant for WWII but it could have been written for the Troops in Iraq today, and it is a must read for all those who support our Troops in Iraq right now!!!

Why didn't the very first U.S. soldier to step foot in Iraq four years ago carry one of these in his or her gear and read it? Why isn't every soldier sent to the Middle East today issued one? Imagine the possibilities.

The book really is a lesson in respecting an entirely different -- and unique -- culture. For instance: Page 18: "No Preaching" seems essential; we all need reminding that "Manners are Important"(page 15); "the "List of Most Useful Words and Phrases" on p. 35 is critical in communication, a key to diplomacy before sabre rattling. Be sure to read Lt. Col. John Nagl's "Short Guide" as well.

I'm gifting everyone in my family, no matter which side of the fence they lean, one of these little gems poste haste.

A great reminder about cultural differences in Iraq. If you're stationed in Iraq this could really help you understand local population better. Great phrase section in the back.

Into the Shadows Furious is probably the BEST campaign history I've ever read. The greatest part of this book are the numerous first person accounts. Brian Altobello captures the fear, stink, mud and terrifying unknown that was the New Georgia campaign. This is an all but forgotten operation in the central Solomons that turned out to be a near disaster. Mr. Altobello includes very interesting exploits of the coastwatchers in this area and the role they played. I HIGHLY RECOMMEND this "you are there" book.

I participated in this operation and was a member of the lst Raider Bn. The author was very detailed in his various reports of the battles and accurate. His description of the battle fields and terrain were exactly what I remembered. He wrote about the "grunts" their feelings and miseries - the heroes and those not quite as heroics. He pulled no strings for marines or soldiers or sailors. He called the shots. He was so detailed in his reporting that I swear he must have been there. I recommend this to veterans of that campaign especially. You will never know what was going on over there, even if you were there, unless you read this book.

Frank Gee

Mr. Altobello's book does justice to a previously overlooked pacific campaign. Situated chronologically between Guadalcanal and Bougainville, it has become a footnote in history. It, unfortunately, was not a very well run campaign, lasting much longer and costing much more in men and material than anticipated. The reasons for this are several - inadequately trained, poorly led troops,a terrible attack plan that was made worse with modifications, poor intelligence, and a worthy opponent in defense. In all honesty, in 1943, the south pacific theater was low on the list for appropriations, most army troops available were national guard divisions with little or no combat experiance, and the navy was somewhat limited in its' support ability due to enormous losses at Guadalcanal - specifically no fleet carrier support. So, this campaign was a painful learning experiance for theses services ,and learn they did, with the much more successful campaigns in '44-45. The author has obviously done extensive research on this campaign and no facet of it is not well covered. I highly recommend this book to persons wanting in depth coverage of the Solomons campaign or someone with particular interest in the New Georgia campaign.

Brian Altobello's Into The Shadows Furious is the vividly presented story of the American battle to drive out the Japanese from New Georgia after the U.S. armed forces had finally secured Guadalcanal in the spring of 1943. The Japanese airbase at Munda on the island of New Georgia was a vital target and the focus of the Army's 43rd Division. The Japanese commander, Major General Sasaki, had prepared a series of strong defensive positions and roadblocks on the trails east from Munda directly in front of the American advance. The ensuing combat in difficult terrain slowed the Americans long enough that General Sasaki managed to evacuate the bulk of his forces. Into The Shadows Furious is compelling reading and a superb addition to the growing library of World War II Pacific Theater with its vivid, powerful story of an almost forgotten campaign that took a tremendous toll in blood and lives.

Altobello does a great job describing the true enemy in the battle of New Georgia, the merciless terrain. His vivid descriptions of the unrelenting jungle of New Georgia and its arsenal of weapons (mangrove swamps, giant crabs, mosquito swarms, and torrential rains) make it easy for the reader to visualize the obstacles our young soldiers faced. Into the Shadows Furious is at its best, however, when Altobello is describing the emotional battles the soldiers endured. Through his own easy to read and insightful prose and through the oral accounts of actual battle of New Georgia participants, Altobello is able to capture the frustrations and mental anguish that our yet untested soldiers faced. The resulting story is a compelling account of both the physical and mental journey each solider underwent during the costly battle of New Georgia.