Independent Books

Since there are so few books in the English language that deal with Slovenia at all, "Independent Slovenia" is a relatively solid introduction to the country and its more recent history, politics and economics. Most of the book's contributions are written by Slovene scholars (historians, sociologists, economists, etc.), so readers are given an insight into contemporary Slovenian perspectives. Even though a book of this type compels the authors to brevity, the first three chapters dealing with Slovenia's more recent as well as earlier history were still a little too brief for my tastes; much is left unsaid. Another problem is that several of the contributions are written in an extremely academic and dry style, making them a chore to read - this is particularly true of the chapter on trade unions (by Tonci Kuzmanic) and, surprisingly, the punk scene during the 1980s (by Gregor Tomc). These pieces, as well as chapters on women's issues and the economy, also deal too much with more theoretical aspects, with only scant attention given to how these movements and problems were reflected on Slovenian society in general. For example, the chapter on punk would have been much more interesting if the author included more extensive descriptions and analyses of the more popular bands - as it is, he mentions the names of one or two bands and leaves it at that. This indicates another major problem with many of the book's contributions: they tend to assume some prior knowledge of Slovenia. The editors should have also insisted on chapters that dealt specifically with the magazine Mladina, which was the sounding board for political change in Slovenia in the late 1980s (during the so-called `Slovenian Spring'), and with President Milan Kucan, who very ably presided over Slovenia's transition from Yugoslav federal republic to independent statehood. Mladina's role is only touched upon in a few articles, while Kucan is only mentioned twice - both times in an otherwise very interesting chapter by former (and now once more current) Foreign Minister Dimitrij Rupel on the political events surrounding Slovenia's push for independence. In hindsight, the chapters dealing with various aspects of Slovenia's economy in the post-independence period seem overly pessimistic, although they provide a strong analysis of the complex structural problems faced by all the post-socialist countries of Europe.

I would think that to undertake a task such as the one this book attempted to, to list all the courses available in the nation through distance learning, would require rather much effort. In compiling the courses offered, and useful information such as the actual course number and the cost, I thought the author did a great job. I did think the section on "Is Independent Study For Me?" could have been expanded, being that at the time the book was published there were still many aspects of distance learning that were not as commonly known as today. Also, in a more recent edition I believe relevant Internet web addresses would be included in the book; this would enhance the usefulness of the book too.

I was impressed with the depth of this book. Although I haven't had the opportunity to read the whole book, I have been very pleased with the information supplied thus far. This book can be a valuable resource to anyone contemplating entering the publishing field.

Los Angeles Times
September 7, 1986

It is with good reason that Tom Gervasi titles his book "The Myth of Soviet Military Superiority." He thinks the story of the Soviet Union's preponderance in arms is all a big fabrication. Not only are the Soviets behind us in strategic weapons, he says, but they are behind in intermediate range and tactical nuclear arms in land forces and conventional strength on the European front, and in overall military spending.

Gervasi goes on to argue that the Reagan Administration's massive defense buildup has been sold to the U.S. public with lies and manipulated information, and that the Administration has systematically suppressed dissent by using threats, punishments and selective favors.

As a result, Gervasi concludes, most of the main-stream press and think-tanks have been dragooned into a conspiracy of deceit. The real reason the United States is amassing ever-greater arsenals, Gervasi states, is because the defense industrialists want to increase their already-swollen profits.

Perhaps because of the iconoclastic views presented, this book is sure to be quoted frequently, and its message will be widely spread. Gervasi, the director of the Center for Military Research and Analysis in New York, has amassed formidable statistical information. The appendixes, footnotes, end notes and index constitute more than half of the volume. The dust jacket notes with pride that "comprehensive notes and appendixes document where every piece of evidence was obtained." So the quality of the author's command of facts, his care in argumentation, and his identification of sources become crucial in judging the book's value.

Unfortunately, Gervasi indulges in much the same use of half-truths and tailored arguments for which he so justifiably excoriates his opponents. Regarding bombers, for example, Gervasi calls them and their weapons the "most important" (emphasizing megatonnage), "most accurate" of all, and highly dependable in reaching their targets. In supporting these assertions, however, he obscures the distinction between bombers which would penetrate Soviet air space at some risk to drop bombs or launch missiles, and aircraft which would stand off in relative safety and launch cruise missiles from a distance. Regarding submarine-launched ballistic missiles, he talks about the U.S. SLBMs of today being superior in accuracy to Soviet land-based rockets. While the U.S. Trident II D-5 missiles of tomorrow may have these characteristics, presently deployed U.S. SLBMs do not. One is left with a suspicion that the virtues of bombers and submarines are exaggerated and the effectiveness of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles minimized because Soviet strength is concentrated in the last category.

Regarding U.S. command and control, Gervasi argues that there is not "necessarily any need for a communications system that is sure to survive a nuclear attack. A retaliatory attack does not have to rely on such a system." A hundred pages later, the author discusses the threat to Soviet command and control posed by Pershing-II missile deployments. There he quotes Defense Electronics magazine approvingly: "The removal of C2 (command and control) capability by a comparatively small number of Pershings would render much of the Soviet ICBM first strike and retaliatory forces impotent." Gervasi seems to be arguing the case both ways.

According to Gervasi, U.S. Establishment spokesmen claim that American use of nuclear weapons in Europe would carry "no risk" of escalation to an intercontinental exchange. Perhaps one or two spokesmen have made such foolish claims, but there surely cannot have been very many of them. Gervasi also asserts, in arguing the balance of land forces in Europe, that Soviet forces "in the Leningrad, Baltic, Byelorussian and Carpathian military districts . . . are not in Europe."

In quite a few cases, Gervasi's end notes do not support his statements in the text. For example, he cites a 1949 interview of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to claim that Dulles acknowledged that there was then no real evidence of a threat from the Soviet Union. This did not sound like the Dulles I knew, so I looked up Gervasi's end note, which cited "interview, U.S. News and World Report (March, 1949)." The citation carried no reference, incidentally, to the volume, number, date or page in the magazine, and I went through all four weekly issues of that month finding no interview.

Looking through other issues of the same year, I did find an interview with Dulles published on Jan. 21, 1949. That interview did not carry the words attributed to Dulles by Gervasi, however, and Dulles' tone was not as represented. Dulles said: "You have a tense situation like a dry autumn in the wood when any fool can start a fire. . . . Soviet communism teaches that, while you must work for the overthrow of non-communist governments, you have to pick your time. . . . The peoples of Western Europe . . . feel naked. . . . Russian Communists' . . . methods are violent. . . ."

Take another example. On Page 145, Gervasi asserts that "America paid $122 billion in 1982 alone to equip and maintain its forces in Europe." The author's end note cites a 1983 article by Earl C. Ravenal -- even though, in his text, Gervasi attributes the information to the General Accounting Office. Comparing Gervasi's language with Ravenal's, one discovers that Gervasi misquoted Ravenal's figure by a few billion dollars and got the year wrong.

What Ravenal had done was to break down the total 1984 Defense Department budget request of $274 billion into European concerns, Asian concerns, Rapid Deployment Forces, and strategic programs. He then assigned more than 40% of the total to Europe, figuring that Europe was America's central military commitment. This gave Europe a prorated 40% share of all Defense appropriations of any kind -- from those supporting Army divisions in the United States, to new weapons development, service academies, recruiting stations, Pentagon operations, etc. Ravenal's organization of his data was odd, but at least he explained what he was doing. Gervasi uses Ravenal's figures to argue that U.S. forces stationed in Europe as a "token of support" for NATO cost egregious sums and -- besides -- are really maintained there to subjugate our European allies.

If the examples just given were representative of but a few aberrations in generally careful documentation, it would be one thing; but one could go on and on with additional instances of arguments and citations gone astray. It is a pity, because Gervasi has presented some truths. A powerful case can be made for much of what he believes. A few of his suspicions about the Reagan Administration are well founded without a doubt. The idea of Soviet military supremacy probably is a myth. I am reminded of a remark made by Madame de Stael about the Russians almost two centuries ago: "If they do not attain their objective, they always go past it." Whether or not this be true of the Soviets, it does seem descriptive of Tom Gervasi

The Toronto Star, January 17, 1987
The arms race: When enough is never enough

TOM Gervasi is director of the Centre for Military Research and Analysis in New York and, one assumes, eminently qualified to write "the most comprehensive and fully documented analysis of the relative military capabilities of the two superpowers that has ever been published."

Indeed, the problems this book poses have less to do with credibility than with tone. It reads suspiciously like an election manifesto for the Democrats, bashing Republicans with the stick of economic profligacy at every turn.

Gervasi's thesis is straightforward enough - in fact he sums it up himself in his opening paragraph: "I am a citizen who believes that our nation must have a strong defence. What I have found is that we already have one."

And if that's not simplistic enough for you the rest of the book will make no sense at all.

The American taxpayers, then, have apparently been hoodwinked into shelling out billions to expand their nation's defence (or is it offence?) capabilities under the assumption that such expenditure is necessary to maintain strategic superiority over the Soviets who, Gervasi claims, are in reality hopelessly far behind in the arms race.

The main culprit, it seems, is the Star Wars program, which is, Gervasi insists, still closer to science-fiction than science-fact.

"According to the Union of Concerned Scientists, the most powerful lasers we can build are more than a million times below the power level that would be needed to do any damage to more than a small fraction of the Soviet missile force in the time available and over the ranges required."

It is, the author says, suspect logic that leads the U. S. government to pour such vast amounts of money into a scheme without any real evidence that it could possibly save anyone, but even more suspect logic that little effort is expended on what he fervently believes is a real solution: An international agreement to ban nuclear weapons of every kind. Another source of worry, and thus destabilization, is that the Soviets fear Star Wars technology will be used to knock out Soviet defence satellites long before it needs to be employed against missiles.

So often, indeed, does this book invoke our sympathies towards the fears of the Soviets that one begins to wonder where the author has been during the last 40 years of Soviet expansionism.

Since over 200 pages of this book are statistical charts listing such things as how many missiles, what kind of warheads, where situated, and so on, one feels somewhat churlish questioning the factuality of Gervasi's facts. Yet it must be done.

Indeed, statistics often seem a more potent weapon in the hands of politicians than the warheads themselves.

Since 1982, courtesy of President Ronald Reagan, the American public has been chastened with the knowledge that the Soviets have a definite margin of superiority in the arms race. According to Gervasi, this statement is a shameless lie based on juggled numbers and covert politicking by the Pentagon.

Yet the fact remains that, in the heated controversy that has arisen in the States over this book, Gervasi seems to have been out-accused by better informed sources. With all the boundless freedom available in the freedom-of-information act, we must accept the simple truth that, in matters of such complexity, we will always be at the mercy and ulterior motives of interpreters of one sort or the other.

The real strength of the book remains in Gervasi's sobering reminders about the realities of nuclear war.

Even with the most efficient defence system imaginable the chances are that several major cities would be destroyed.

Remembering the aftermath of the relatively minor destruction in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, this thought alone should underline the absurdity of any notion of defence more effectively than volumes of statistics.

As for the generals and their demands upon the public purse, Gervasi correctly observes that enough is never enough.

Although this book from the University of Chicago Press exhibits the character of media coverage about former President Nixon from early in 1992 until Nixon's funeral in 1994 quite accurately, I failed to agree with the tone in which his disgrace is continually hammered away at. Unlike feeling bad about a recent election, my sympathy with Richard Nixon is due to my desire to echo a complaint from his final press conference after losing an election in California in 1962, when he blamed the press for not having a single reporter who wrote whatever the candidate said. The complaint that I would like to make in this review goes much deeper. Reviling Nixon as I do, it is ultimately ironic that I find his sympathy for democracy in Russia much more appealing than the glory of gloating on being the lone surviving superpower, an approach to global politics that American political thinking was engaging in back in 1992 and still has not yet shaken off, which is particularly glaring in the never-ending struggle to impose regional changes in 2004 in places like Baghdad. If anything, the efforts of the current Bush administration to spread democracy in the times and places of its choosing seem so unlikely and altogether much worse than whatever Nixon was suggesting in 1992 that it is almost unthinkable that any policy expert at this late date could even guess: what was Nixon thinking? Comedians had provided audiences with some of their greatest laughs by contemplating that question, and this book is perfectly clear on that in the final paragraph of chapter nine:

National Public Radio, usually sober in its presentation of the news, was struck by the fact that Bush and Clinton had both delivered their speeches on April 1--April Fool's Day. The afternoon program "Talk of the Nation" invited Rich Little to do one of his famous Richard Nixon impersonations on the air. "Having marched up this hard road and won back your confidence," Little/Nixon pronounced, "I ask you once again to make me your President." The phones "went berserk," said an NPR spokesperson, obliging the network to confess that it was all a joke. (pp. 138-139).

Nixon then went to Russia and met with Yeltsin on June 4, 1992, and "on February 10, 1993, soon after Clinton took office, a totally different kind of discussion took place." (p. 141). Like talking about small change today, Nixon thought he might be able to help with "rescheduling Russia's huge $84 billion foreign debt for fifteen years." (p. 142). As Nixon said, "One of the things that is absolutely essential is that we not consider Russia to be a defeated enemy." (p. 144). I never hear anyone saying that about Osama bin Laden, but he probably isn't talking to former American presidents right now.

Nixon met with Clinton, who was "looking for a way to help Russia without having to come up with new money. . . . For reasons ranging from strict regulations imposed by the International Monetary Fund to bureaucratic chaos in Russia, less than half of the money had actually been delivered, much of it in grain credits, which helped feed the Russian people but also increased Russia's foreign debt." (p. 158).

This book is almost about intellectual respectability. Names dropped in June, 1994, can still sound impressive: Graham Allison, dean of the Kennedy School at Harvard; Thomas Friedman, diplomatic correspondent of The New York Times and author of a front page article on March 10, 1992, with the headline, "Nixon Scoffs at Level of Support for Russian Democracy by Bush." I wish there was an easy way to describe the manner in which the point of view adopted by Marvin Kalb, formerly moderator of "Meet the Press," in THE NIXON MEMO harps on Nixon's personal flaws to undercut the point on American foreign policy being promoted by Nixon in March, 1992. Nixon feared that Russia could reemerge as a major problem for the United States, but in a larger sense, the failure of the American political system to come up with any decent solutions for places like Russia, then or now, leaves those who read the papers following stories which are all boiled down to individual self-promotion. Expecting anything from Nixon that might continue to make sense is still unlikely in a perfect world, and on Comedy Central could be considered as crazy as any other journalistic assignment. A rare moment of reverence, much noted and largely adhered to by news media thereafter, was reflected in the way that American reaction to September 11, 2001, became a factor in promoting the belief that Americans needed to rally behind the efforts of our president at that dismal time to join in his war on terror.

The index on pages 229-248 has many distinguished names and topics. An appendix on pages 217-223 has Nixon's memo, How to Lose the Cold War. It starts with Russia, mentions "President Yeltsin's economic reforms" on page 218, as well as, "If Yeltsin fails, the prospects for the next fifty years will turn grim." Nixon praises Yeltsin for `throwing away the keys of what Lenin called the "jailhouse of nations".' (p. 219). "He has moved decisively toward privatization of Soviet enterprises and decollectivization of Soviet agriculture, steps Gorbachev refused even to consider." (pp. 219-220). "If Yeltsin is replaced by a new aggressive Russian nationalist, we can kiss the peace dividend good-bye." (p. 222). "Most important, a democratic Russia would be a non-expansionist Russia, freeing our children and grandchildren in the next century of the fear of armed conflict because democracies do not start wars." (p. 222). Sure, this sounds like the same old, same old Nixon to some people, and Wilsonian democratic Crusades are as popular as ever now. This book dotes on how such policies are seen by the press.

I want to know whether the author of this book has come out with any other adition of this book after Dec. 1994, or any reprint of the book.

I would not recommend this book for USMLE quick preparation. Too much information for Board preparation, and too much unrelevant information in this book at all. I have spent a lot of time to "digest" it (altough it seems so thin). I am still not satified with my knowledge. Some topics are very mixy and some of the drug trade names are old already. ....Do not spend your time on this edition, chaps!...

This is probably very useful for counselors working with developmentally disabled adults. It is less so for families trying to cope with one.
I'd hoped for strategies to teach money management and independent living skills to a limited capability family member. This did not provide that for me.

Peterson's guides are usually exceptionally helpful, but this one has distinct limitations. It presents brief narrative data (usually one short paragraph) on 178 boarding schools and 78 summer programs in the U.S. and Canada. Each school has the narrative data repeated in English, Spanish, French, Japanese, and Chinese, all on one page, and followed up by 19 graphical icons to give additional data (dress code?; student-computer ratio?;boys:girls?; percentage of international students?). The icons have to be memorized, or the reading is very slow going. Clearly designed for foreign readers, it is less useful to US readers than other boarding school guides.

The author tries to ask and answer what were the Promise Keepers about and why have they basically disappeared after the 1990s. He does a good job in trying to find synthesis. The PKs may have no problem calling themselves "patriarchs," but they weren't raving misogynists either.

The author says something to the effect of, "There are many studies on how oppressed groups find their power. I wanted to examine here how a group of privilege loses its oomph." This was a very important inquiry. However, the jaded side of me wonders if he was halfway into his project when PK declined and just didn't want to throw it away. Maybe he is a victim of the college-based "publish or perish" rule. Further, this book could have benefited from an intersectional analysis. As lesbians or working-class women are doubly oppressed, PK members as Christians and men could be described as doubly-privileged. The author explores maleness in that light, but not Christianity. Like whites and heterosexuals, Christians are a majority group. When 95% of Americans identify with that religion, then we are far from Roman times when this group was persecuted. This book rendered that privilege natural in some ways that I found disturbing.

In his exploration of PK's falls, there are some items he left out of his analysis. On VH-1, a talking head opined that grunge was just a mix of blues, punk, and rock; it faded quickly because it added nothing new. Here, the author details how PK was part old-school patriarchy and part-mythopoetic movement. Maybe it too faded because it added nothing new. In the 1990s, men's wilderness retreats and the Million Man March were big, but they have basically vanished too. Maybe there is something about men's groups that doesn't keep the attention of men for long.

This book was a little bit personal observation, a little bit group interviews, and a little bit textual analysis. This may rub some readers the wrong way as being hodgepodge. The author explores PK men's attitudes towards their wives and feminists. However, according to Michael Messner, there is a women's auxiliary group called the Promise Reapers. Nothing is said about them in this book.

Early on, the author goes out of his way to say he supports women's rights. While he points to PK's homophobia, he never says he supports gay rights. I wonder if this book would have had a different flavor if it were written by an author that supported gay rights fully. The author focuses on how PK brought men of different denominations together and quotes a half-Jewish man who said he wished PK would approach men not of the Christian faith. Still, I thought little was said on Catholic men. Did PK want all types of Christian men to unite or just the ones influenced by Luther?

The author implies that studying the Promise Keepers may be a passé activity. As a person who knew nothing about the group during the 1990s, I found this informative, rather than "yesterday's news." I do wonder if the academic style would turn off actual, former PK members. Still, if I could wade through the Biblical passages, I am hoping they would attempt the college-level theory.